Revolution

Stephen Frantzich

John Sullivan
 Library or Congress Catatoging-ln-Publicallon Data

Frantzich, Stephen E.
The C-span revolution/ Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8061-2870-4 (alk. paper)
I. C-SPAN (Television network). 2. Television programs, Public
service-United States. I. Sullivan, John. Il. Tit.le.
HE8700.79.U6F73 1996
384.55'532---0c20 96-18189
ClP

Text design by Debora Hackworth.

The paper in this book meets I.he guidelines for permanence and dur.ibil-
ity of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the
Council on Library Resources, Inc. &

Copyright@ I996 by the Universityof Oklahoma Press. Norman, Publishing

Division of the University. All rights reserved. Manufactured in the U.S.A.
I 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10
Contents

List llf Illusttations ix

Prologue: Setting the Stage for C-SPAN 3

I. C-SPAN:An IdeaWhoseTime Had Come 23
2. Arrival and the Pressure for Expanded Coverage 49
3. The Corporate Culture 75
4. Signature Programs and Their Significance 121
5. Extending the Mission: Presidential Campaigns and Boolarotes
as Signature Programmin 161
6. The C-SPAN Audience 219
7. C-SPAN's Impact: A View from the Inside 255
8. C-SPAN's Impact: A View from the Outside 295
9. The Future of C-SPAN in the Age of Cyberdemocracy 329

Selected Bibliography 407

vii
xiv PR£PAC£

her sister, Maury, may not have made their father computer literate, but both
were there in their own way when needed.
Kim Wiar, or the University or Oklahoma Press, showed considerable in-
terest in the project and provided early guidance. Alice Stanton managed
the developmen t of the project, while Teddy Diggs provided expert editing.
Finally we would both like to thank our students and friends who patiently
listened to more about C-SPAN than they wanted to hear throughout this
project.
Just as C-SPAN attempts to be a "fly on the wall" at public events, we hope
that the readers will get the feeling they are on the ins ide looking out. C
SPAN is a moving target , changing and evolving month to month. We have
attempted to focus on those abiding aspect~ that have long-term significance.
The C-SPAN urevolution" is not one or violence or conOict. It is rather a
series of subtle changes in the coverage of public affairs by the media and
in the use of public affairs coverage by political activists. It is the merging
of new technologies and political self-interest to create an environment of
broader access to public affairs for those who want to take an interest or to
use its opportunitie s to promote causes and political careers. C-SPAN is part
of a larger revolution in communications and information access premised
on the general principles that more information is better than less and that
decentralized information sources serve democracy better than centrali7.ed
ones . At limes C-SPAN has led the change , and at limes it has simply be-
come part of the larger flow of events. Brian Lamb's simple goal of opening
up the political process spawned a number of unintentional consequences
just as important to the revolution as the initial goals . For many members
of the public and for some political activists, the revolution has passed them
by. But for those capitalizing on this revolution, it is hard to imagine going
back 10 a world of closed meeting s, limited access, and full reliance on the
traditional mass media sources . Even though we as authors have some reser-
vations about the revolution in public affairs coverage , as well as about the
consequences of that revolution, we see its basic contours as inevitable and
its general thrust as positive. We hope both to chronicle C-SPAN's part in the
development of this revolution and to provide insights that will grant all par-
ticipants an understanding of C-SPAN's imponance , enabling them to make
educated judgment s about how to capitalize on C-SPAN for the benefit of
democracy . Let the revolution proceed.
 C-SPAN: AN IDEA WHOSE'fiME HAD COME 41

trolling which committee bearings to cover. Rose argued, ''The power to

pick what committee hearings members of Congress watch is the power to
set your own legislative agenda.''64 Joan Teague Rose complained: "We gave
free reign to them and they would not be cooperdtive .... They wouldn't
even be here if it wasn't for us.'' She referred to Lamb as "stabbing Congress
in the back after [it) had bent over backwards 10 cooperate.'>65
Another early disagreement concerned C-SPAN's control over the House
signal itself. Although anyone could direcUy tap into the signal from the
House, C-SPAN had developed a nationwide distribution system that made
it easier for any television station to rebroadcast it. When Rose attempted
to have C-SPAN provide its own produced programming free of charge,
Lamb countered by a.5serting that the cable industry had a right to protect
its investment Lamb argued: "Anyone can pick up the same signal at no
cost directly from the House. Once we get it and mix it with our own pro-
gramming, it belongs to us.'~ ln one of the first salvos, Rose threatened to
copyright the House signal, thereby giving the House more control over its
use. It soon became clear that there would be significant legal problems in
reversing the long-term policy of not copyrighting any material developed
by the government.
Wherea.5 Rose could not force C-SPAN to cooperate-denying access to
the House feed would face considerable opposition-he could hamper its
operations within Congress. Rose denied the internal congressional televi-
sion system access to the C-SPAN feed. House offices were limited to the
direct feed from the floor and could not receive programming produced
by C-SPAN, such as committee bearings . Rose's public criticisms varied.
He asserted that C-SPAN bad "!Aken a signal that should be free to every-
one." He added, "Lam b is ripping everyone off." A Rose aide, arguing that
C-SPAN was biased , noted that C-SPAN was a "Republican" nerwork. "I
don't think we should let a right-wing Republican like Brian Lamb decide
what's on the Hou se sys tem.''67 Rose' s characteriza tion of Lamb and the
network 's bias bolds little credence, however. Clearly. personal animosity
colored reasonable judgment.
The logjam in congressional acce ss to the C-SPAN signal was eventu -
ally broken by the intervention of Senator Barry Goldwa ter (R-AZ}. He
wrote to Senate Rules Committee Chairman Charles Mathias (R-MO} and
asserted the Senate's need for access to C-SPAN. Mathia s agreed and uni-
laterally made C-SPAN available 10 all Senate offices.68 Thus, whereas the
House was limited to the direct feed from the floor and was denied access
42 THE C-SPAN REVOL,IJ'l10N

to all other C-SPAN programming, the Senate was able to see all C-SPAN
programming. Rose eventually backed down and allowed C-SPAN on the
House cable system.

Early Operation s

C-SPAN faced early challenges of technical nece ss ities, audience needs, po-
litical challenges, and access issues. There was no assurance that the network
would survive (see box 3).

'TECHNICAL SUPPORT

A visitor to C-SPAN's Capitol Hill office, with its modem equipment and
spectacular view of the Capitol, caMot imagine the shoestring operation that
spawned the current prosperity. C-SPAN was initially run from a one-room
technical studio in the basement of the Rayburn House Office Building on
Capitol Hill and from a small business office in Crystal City. Virginia. The
move of the business operations to a three-room suite in Arlington, Virginia,
a half-hour from the Capitol, was a big step up.
The Arlington headquarters were far from luxurious. The call-in set served
as the engineer's workbench when programs were not being conducted. The
C-SPAN statio n logo letters were tacked to a beige -carpeted wall, giving the
set a jerry-rigged look at best. Lamb recalled, "During the on -the -air inter-
views, I wa~ always looking behind the guest because sometimes the 'C'
would fall off our sign.''69
The young staff was eager and flexible. "We called what we were doing
'guerilla television': C-SPAN was so new and different, we were making
up the rules as we went aloog." 70 During the early years, C-SPAN staff
saw themselves as being on a crusade. "We felt we were David fighting the
commercial media which looked like Goliath." 71
Equipment was expensive, and C-SPAN lacked the capital to buy the
cameras it needed to do its own programming. Perhap s borrowing from en-
ten.ainme nt television (Let's Make a Deal) or from Congress itself, Lamb
decided to go beyond Congress for programming and beyond the cable op-
erato rs for suppon . In 1979, he approached the Close-Up Foundation , which
brings high school students to Washington to see government at work. 'They
wanted a television outlet; we needed eq uipment-w e made a deal. They
bought us two cameras , swi tching units, tape recorders. all that stuff. We did
programs with these high schoo l students talking to Member s of Congress;
 C-SPAN: AN IDEAWHOSEliM E HAD COME 43

Box 3.
C-SPAN Milesto nes: Th e 1980s

Oc1ober I981 C-SPANsrndio and staff move 11>Capi1olHill.

December 1981 C-SPANbecomes available 10some D.C.
bu~inessc~,ia 1heCapitolConnec1ion
April 1982 ..Friendsof C-SPAN"h, l:1unchcd to encour-
age cable companies 10carry C-SPAN.afler
a satelhte 1ransponder switch causes some
operolOJ'\10drop carriage.
Oc1ober 1982 C-SPAN begins mund-1he-clock
progr.,mming.,even day~ a week.
Oc1ober1983 President Ronald Reagan make, an exclusive
appearance on C-SPAN', C/n,e -Up bro.,d-
ca<1and later 1clcphoncs1hcfollow-upcall-in
progmm.
Summer 1984 C-SPAN co,..ersi1sfirstnational pany
conven1 1ons.
September 1984 ..Gra,sroot, 84'"launchesa founeen-city tour
of electionco,,erage.
January 1986 C-SPAN is added 101heSena1ecable sys1cm
June 1986 n,e U.S. Senate goeson lhcair on C-SPANII
January 1987 C-SPANII expands 101wcn1y-fourhours a day.
No,cmbcr 1988 C-SPANbegin>regular foreign programnung
with live CO\erageof the Queen of England's
annual addressto PnrliomenL

we had use of Ihm equipm ent when we weren ' t doing 1ba1.''n
In the early days there was cons iderable concern about costs. During the
early call-in shows, C-SPAN used its tnree business lines for the phone calls.
This "led to a number of rather interes ting calls going oul over the air.''n
In employee Jana Fay's recollection, operating with a one-person tech-
nical staff for satellite uplink was pretty scary. One day she began getting
cal.ls lha1 C-SPAN was not broadcasting. After repeated calls 10 the trailer
at the uplink s ite. she began 10 fear that some sort of disaster had occurred .
She jumped in her car and went out 10 the s ite. Her knocks on the door of
the trailer went unanswered. and her fears for technician Don Houle' s well-
44 THE C-SPANREVOLUTTON

being began to rise. She imagined he had had a heart attack. Just as she was
about to get help, the trailer door opened, and a groggy and chastised Houle
appeared. He had fallen asleep, and be begged Jana not to tell Brian. She
kept her word, only to find out that a penitent Houle had already told Brian.
With more mock than real anger, Lamb then commented to her about not
being told, "Now I know who my friends are.''74
C-SPAN was not welcomed with open arms by the established media in
Washington. Its young, nonunion staff seemed too eager to put in long hours.
The established media's technical staff members, who might well be cred-
ited with establishing the "grunge look," were a bit disdainful of the C-SPAN
staff, will! its Lamb-enforced dress code. 'Theestablished media were ac-
customed to zipping into a hearing, selling up !he television lights to cover
only !he majority party members, and noisily packing their equipment after
harvesting the initial sound bites. They could not understand a network that
wanted to give full and unbiased coverage of a hearing gavel-to-gavel. At
times C-SPAN crews found their cables mysteriously cut; more often, they
were simply looked at a.~a transitory oddity that would not survive in the
world of high-tech sound bites.

B U ILDING /\ND MAINTAINING AN AtJDIENCE

Just as C-SPAN began to hit its stride in terms of expanded programming

and growing audience, it was faced with a major challenge. C-SPAN had
begun broadcasting by sharing a sateUite transponder with the Madison
Square Garden Channel on the USA Network. It was a good match, since
C-SPAN covered events during the day and Madison Square Garden cov-
ered evening events. But by 1982 an increasing number of channels were
broadcasting twenty-four hours a day, and C-SPAN was forced to change
sa.tellite transponders. The shift often required cable operators to use another
dish in order to keep C-SPAN on the air. Four hundred to five hundred ca-
ble systems, representing 2.5 million households, dropped C-SPAN after it
discontinued its association with the USA Network. This was a significant
drop, accounting for over 10 percent of C-SPAN's potential audience.
C-SPAN was forced to promote its service and cajole operators to keep
its signal on the air. A major boost came from the C-SPAN audience. A ba-
sic rule of human nature is that people are more likely to be activated out of
fear than out of hope. People who fear losing something they have become
accustomed to are more likely to organize than people who want something
 C-SPAN: AN IDEA WHOSETIME HAD CoME 45

they do not have. The activation of the C-SPAN audience bears this 001. Two
self-proclaimed "C -SPAN 'addicts,'" Shirley Rossi of Pueblo, Colorado,
and William " Bud" Harris of Cherry Hill, New Je=y. formed "Friends of
C-SPAN," a cooperative dedicated to keeping C-SPAN on the air." 7s They
petitioned cable operators to reinstate C-SPAN . Although operating inde-
pendent of C-SPAN, Ibey obtained the names of viewers who had called to
complain and created a mailing list for their news letter. In response to their
campaign, a number of cable operators reconsidered their decision to dis-
continue C-SPAN . As we will see later, this would not be the last time that
C-SPAN would go through tbe throes of abandon and rescue.
For some citizens, C-SPAN was still not available at all. The provision of
cable television is driven largely by economic considerations. Areas with a
dense population of likely subscribers were the first to be cabled. One of tbe
last major urban "is lands" in which cable was unavailable was Washington ,
D.C . For C-SPAN Ibis was symbo lic, since its goal was to bring Washington
to people outside the beltway. For citizens and political activists in Wash -
ington, tbe symbolism rang hollow. They wanted to be tuned in to know
what the rest of the country was seeing. Necessity is the mother of invention.
Mike Kelly, an English professor and head of the George Mason University
Telecommunications Department, saw a need and endeavored to fill it. In
1981, the George Mason Univenity Foundation created a microwave ser•
vice for the C-SPAN signal, which cou ld be picked up in hundreds of D.C.
buildings equipped with a microwave dish. The Capitol Connection service.
which cost about seven hundred dollan per year, was picked up by news
bureaus, lobbyist s, the national party organizations, executive agencies. and
the White Ho use. 76 When cable finally came to the District of Columbia in
the late I 980s, Capitol Connection subscribers switched to a commercial
cable service.

A POLITIC/\ L THREAT

House members feared that television could be used against them in upcom-
ing elections. Republican Whip Robert Michel (R-IL ) took to the floor in
October 1977 to warn his colleagues that the House shou ld carefu lly co nside r
the political impact of broadcasting the House proceedings. Little did Michel
know that he would be one of the first victims of political use of the C-SPAN
signal. 77 Even though the House resolution approving television coverage
had included a provision that restricted the use of the televised proceed •
46 TH£ C-SPANR £V0 LUTION

ings ("No coverage made available under this resolution nor any reoording
thereof shall be used for any political purpose"). th.e restriction did 001apply
10 challengers. During the 1982 campaign, Michel 's opponent, G. Douglas
Stephens , tried 10make the point that Michel was insens itive to the economic
tr0ubles of bis cons tilllents. Stephens created a thirty-second commercial
1ha.1included a shon clip in which Miehe! said that some Social Security
recipients were "fairly well-heeled:' Michel barely won bis seat back. 78
Both panie s began gathering an arsenal of damagin g clips of opposi -
tion pany members in a ''v ideo version of murually assured destruclion." 79
Each party knew that if it sanctioned the use of such clips, the oppos ition
would up the ante by unleashing its own clips. There was little question that
virtually anyone could be made to look foolish by a careful editing of com-
ments. Thus both panies agreed that they would not initiate the "first strike."
So far the agreement has held. with only minor infractions. largely perpe-
trated by challengers ignorant of the House rule and uninformed about the
pany agreement. Each time C-SPAN is alened about a questionable use of
its programming. General Counsel Bruce Collins sends a "cease and de-
sist'' leuer telling the perpetrator of the congressional rules and asserting
C-SPAN's right of ownership. In addition to not wanting to offend mem-
bers of Congress, C-SPAN is concerned about the danger the misuse of its
material might have on its public image. Many of the advertisement s using
C-SPAN material are very selective or use sophisticated graphic techniques
to make a point. As Collins pointed out "Our main concern is repu1a1ional.
If we don' t put our foot down, we become the free video production house
of literally thousands of campaigns.'' 80
Although the direct political use of C-SPAN footage is prohibited, the ad-
vantage of a member' s on-air visibility is hard to measure. Staying within
the law, members often inform their constituents and local news media when
they are scheduled to speak on the ftoor.81 Since C-SPAN allows the me-
dia to use up to three minutes of coverage without payment or approval , a
member's one-minure speech can legally be used in a news broad cast.
As we will see in more detail in chapters 2 and 7, the political use of Spe-
cial Orders speeches, an issue that gave Tip O'Neill hcanburn during the first
year of C-SPAN's operation, did not go away. Members of the Republican
minority discovered such speeches to be potent weapons in an institution
that limited their participation and in a mainstream media environment that
tended to focus on the majority pany.
 C-SPAN:AN ID£• WHOSB 1iME H•o Co>rn 47

SoRl'ING O UT THE QUESTIONS OF ACCES.~

As C-SPAN expanded its programmingbeyond simply transmitting floor

proceedings.issuesconcerning the right to cover congressionaleventsarose.
As a result of the push for congressional openness during the 1970s, C-
SPANwas allowedto cover most committees,but committeememberscould
still ban coverage of specificsessions and types of sessions. Powerfulcom-
mittees like the House Rules Committee,which scheduleslegislation,were
very hesitant to allow the cameras in. The Republican minority regularly
complainedthat the Democratsclosedsuch meetings out of fear of political
embarrassment.Other committees.such as House Administration. used the
excuse that their hearing rooms were too small to accommodatethe cam-
eras. Over the years,C-SPANbecame moreaggressiveaboutcommentingon
denied access. When the House TelecommunicationsSubcommitteeclosed
its markup session on cable regulation,C-SPANbitterly commented:"It's
ironic. A subcommitteehearing about television and they're not allowing
cameras in.'>8 2
One of the majorstickingpointswas accessto markupsessions-the meet-
ings in whichthe finaldetail~of legislation are agreed on. Manycommittees
regularly barred the cameras from such sessions. Brian Lamb complained:
"What I find interestingis that I've been personally lobbied by membersof
the House and Senate to cover any number o( hearings.... It seems a little
bit strangethat whenwe get downto the most importantpart of the process.
at a critical point, they won't let cameras in."83
Control over the House feed raised a related question concerning the
substance of access. In 1988 when Representative Robert Doman (R-CA)
refused to relinquish the microphoneat the end of his one-minutegrant of
time, the acting Speaker of the House ordered the sergeant at arms to cut
off Dornan's microphone.The Republicans cried censorshipwhen they re-
alized that the C-SPANsignal was going out with video only. After heated
debate, the House passed a resolution asserting that the "audio and visual
broadcastcoverage of House proceedingsnot be interrupted."

Conclusion
Over the years both C-SPANand Congress have felt their way in an attempt
to create a reasonable working relationship. By and large, the level of co-
operation has been high; incidents of conflict have served as punctuation
48 TH£ C-SPAN R EVOLUTION

marks requiring further consideration.With limitedcash and a lot of heart,

C-SPANcreated a national network and was weU positioned to capitalize
on its accomplishments.The future was not ensured, but the critical steps of
creating a network and establishinga relationshipwith Congress bad been
accomplished.
 CHAPTER Two

Arrival and the Pressure for Expanded Coverage

From out of the comer of his eye, he sees the familiar scene. The elderly
woman bas just discreetly pointed him out to her husband in the air-
port lobby. A muffled conversation ensues, sprinkled with phrases Uke
"It sure looks like him" and "ff you are so sure, why don't you just ask
him?" A few minutes later the woman timidl y sidles up and asks." Aren't
you somebody?" She adds , "I mean , you look just like John Glenn." By
then the older man has arrived to bear him say, "No, I'm Brian Lamb
from C-SPAN." With a big smile the older man says, "Yea, I knew it,
you're on Headline News, watch It all the time." Patien tly Lamb re-
sponds: "No that's CNN. I am from C-SPAN, we cover Congress and
public affairs." To which the older man respond s, "Sure, we watch it all
the time , great show."
For a CEO more interested in personal glory or for a network striv-
ing for ratings, such confused recognition would be frustrating. For
Lamb and C-SPAN, even this amount of recognition is somewhat em-
barra ssing but appreciated . A few years ago th ere would have been no

49
50 THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION

recognition at all

Arrival in the Public Consciousness

The C-SPAN audience has never been large (see chapter 6), and C-SPAN
staff members maintain a kind of "gee whiz" modesty about what they are
doing. In the early years they were not even sure anyone was watching. When
over thirty people called in during the first impromptu cal l-in program (see
chapter 4), there was a true sense of amazement.
Believing you are imponant is less of a priority in politics than having
others believe you are irnponant. C-SPAN staff use a variety of benchmarks
10 point out how and when the network "arrived" as a nationally recognized
force . Today they laugh about the days when C-SPAN was confused with the
Spanish network. They remember that trying to book guests was "jus t hor-
rendou s ." One employee noted, "We always bad to exp lain who we were."'
For a number of years, C-SPAN fought a quiet but frustrating battle to get
the news media to use "C-SPAN," with all capital letters, as opposed to
"C-Span" or some other variant. Callers often hod problems finding the tele-
phone number. since Washington directory &ssistance and telephone books
did not know how to deal with the hyphen and often could not provide a
phone number for C-SPAN.
Recognition of C-SPAN by the cable industry, which awarded the net-
work its first of many Cable ACE awards in 1980 for "distingui shed service,"
brought recognition from cable colleagues and resulted in positive public-
ity. Television writers began commenting on C-SPAN in their columns but
always had to write out the name as the "Cable -Satellit e Public Affairs Net-
work" and had 10 explain its programming focus because most readers were
not familiar with the network by its acronym. Real recognition did not come
until the politicians began to see C-SPAN as irnponant. For many members
of the I-louse, C-SPAN was invisible. lt was not available in their offices,
and their districts had limited cable penetration. President Ronald Reagan
is credited with helping raise C-SPAN's visibility. At a White House Pho-
togr-aphers' Dinner, the president put his fingers in bis ears and stuck his
tongue our, saying, " I always wanted to do that." C-SPAN had the only rele-
. visior cameras al the event, and the unpresidential gestu res were carried by
· news media around the world. It became clear that Reagan was not only the
subjecr of C-SPAN coverage but also a viewer. When the president called
in during a Close -Up Foundation program, the media picked up the story.
 ARRIVALANO 111E PRF.SSUREFOR EXPANDED COVERAGE 51

There is a refreshingsense of excitementamongthe C-SPANstaff, who still

get thri.lledwhen they are mentioned. When Reagan called, people started
running down the hall yelling, "The president is on the line!"
C-SPAN's big break came in 1984. Members of the ConservativeOp-
portunity Society (COS)-a group of conservative insurgencswithin the
RepublicanPany-used the C-SPANcoverage of Special Orders and one-
minute speeches. Their goal was to bypass the traditional media, which
largely ignored them. and make contact with the public. Under the leader-
ship of more aggressiveconservativessuch as Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Vin
Weber (R-MN), and Trent Lott (R-MS), they began a coordinated effon.
inveighingagainst the spread of communism, the wastefulnessof govern-
ment programs, and the decline of the American fanlily.They blamed the
Democraticmajority,often taking on colleaguesby name.2
Based on a 1984CongressionalResearch Service analysis, Republicans
spoke twice as often as DemocratSduring the Special Orders period. As the
minority,the Republicansfound that such speeches provideda balanceto the
influenceof the majorityparty during the rest of the legislativeday. As Gin-
grich put it: "Special orders offer a voice 10 the minority. They're our lime."
Others pointed out that Special Orders were a good safety valve, reducing
the frustrationof membersover the restrictionsof normal Housedebate and
serving as a good place 10rehearse ideas for the actual debates.3
Initially,SpeakerTip O'Neill (D-MA) was unconcernedabout the use of
Special Orders by COS members.He saw the impact in a very narrowsense
of lining up support for immediatevotes and missed the longer-term inten-
tions of the COS members. O'Neill commented:"I don't think they make
votes in things like that. As a mailer of fact our polls show the four mem-
bers of the House that monopolizedmost of the time were an asset to the
Democratic party because they showed a meanness, because they showed
an unfairness . .. . Our polls show they helped us.',.
After sufferingin silence, the DemocratScommissioneda study that con-
cluded that the best Democratic response would be to begin using Special
Orders speeches themselves. Bill Alexander (D-AR) began a coordinated
effon to use Special Orders,but he found few takers among his Democratic
P..u,ycolleagues.5 It was the Republicanswho mastered the technique and
raised the ire of SpeakerO'Neill in May I984. As COS chargesbeganto gain
altention, O'Neil.Irecognized his mistake in dismissing the utility of such
speeches. In a moment of pique, he ordered the cameras 10 pan the empty
chamber in the hopes of embarrassingthe Republicans. RepublicanMinor-
52 THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION

ity Whip Trent Lott caught a glimpse of the unfamiliar scene from his House
office while changing into his tuxedo for a GOP fund-raiser. As he raced to
the House floor,hopping down the ball and trying to get his foot through his
second pants leg. Lott got angrier and angrier. Robert Walker (R-PA), who
was then speaking on the floor, knew nothing about the camera panning.
Lott handed him a note telling him what bad just happened. Without miss-
ing a beat, Walker called the move "one more example of the arrogance of
power of the majority leadership."Lou then took over, fuming about the "un-
derhanded, sneaky and politically motivated change" in procedures.'-6The
"Camscam" affair eventually hurt both the DemocraticParty and its leader,
Tip O'Neill.

Tip O 'Neill Takes Charge

SOME.
,~...
Of yOIJ
REPUBLICANS
AREN'T
SMIL1H6!

Speak.er Tip O'Neill retained full conlrOI of the House cameras.

muc.h to the frustration of the networksand the Republican minor•
ily. (Cartoon by WilliamGarner. Washington Times, reprinted by
permission.)
 ARRIVAL AND lllf. PRESSURE R>R EXPANDED COVERAGE 53

Many of the strongest charges against the House leadership came from
Newt Gingrich. The day before the cameras were turned around, Gingrich
had questioned the patrioti sm and voting record of O'Neill' s political ally and
Washington apartment -mate Eddie Boland (D-MA). The day after switch-
ing the cameras, O'Neill. in a rare speech on the ftoor. personally criticized
Gingrich's comments: ''You deliberately stood in that well before an empty
House and challenged those people when you knew they would not be
there ... . It is the lowest thing that I have ever seen in my 32 years in the
House.'' 7 A chorus of jeers and catcal ls erupted from the Republican side
during O'Neill' s comments. His viola tion of House rules prohibiting per-
sonal attacks on colleagues led to the embarrassment of having his words
stricken ("taken down") from the CongressionalRecord.
The term "Camscam" was coined by WashingtonPost reporter T. R. Reid
to capture the conflict over panning the chambers . The media were not partic-
ularly enamored with Speaker O'Neill' s decision to turn the cameras on the
empty chamber and 10 attack the COS. One writer commented. 'The large.
boiler-shaped Irishman threw a video tantrum against some Republican whiz
kids .'' 8
Camscamsparkedinterestin watching the House in session and, indi-
rectly, in watching C-SPAN. It helped put C-SPAN on the map. Since aU
news sources carried stories about the affair, the name C-SPAN became rec-
ognized. The experience and opinions of Susan Swain, currently a C-SPAN
vice-pres ident, were typical. She noted: "At last we didn' t have to go into a
big pitch about who we were every time we picked up the phone and called
someone. It saved a lot of time and effort:"' One congressional staff member
verified the change by arguing that after Camscam, the awareness of C-SPAN
among many legislators went from "What is it?" to "How can I get itT 10

The Battle for Sena te Television

The U.S. Senate was engaged In a pubUc debate over access to its offi-
cial records. Tite outcome would have a dramatic effect on how much
the press and the average citizen would know about what happened
on the floor. Not everyone was sanguine about making the legislative
process more transparent. Opponents argued that opening the doors
"would promote oratorical pyrotechnics for the benefit of the gallery and
press and would Interfere with the expeditious performance of public
11
business."
54 Tue C-SPANREVOLUTION

Although this scene might well have OCQICred in the early I 980s, as
senato rs debated the desirability of allowing television cameras to record
Door debate , the debate in question had actually happened almost two
hundred years earlier. The issue was whether the Senate should con-
tinue its closed-door poUcy or should open press and public galleries.
There was strong precedent for secrecy. The Founders had written the
Constitution under a strict code of secrecy. The Federalists, who domi-
nated the political process of that day, believed that governm ent "ought
to be clothed in dignified aloofness, responsib le to the people, but not
constantly under their close scrutiny." 12
In typical fashion, the Senate tested the potential impact of the change
with an experiment. As the final ju dge of its own membership , the Sen-
ate had to decide whether Swiss-born Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania
was eligible to serve as a senat or. Fearful of challenging a state's right to
choose its own senator in secret, the Senate voted to open its doors for
Gallalin's hearing on February 11, 1794.13 When the Federalists closed
the door on Gallatin's Senate career, they also VOied 14 to 13 to shut
their own doors again. A few days later, Senator Stephen Bradley of Ver-
mont changed his vote and took along with him five new supporters. On
February 20, 1794, by a 19-8 vote on a new resolution, the Senate voted
to open its doors , but two years would pass before permanent galleries
were constructed. The addition of public galleries had little effect on the
Senate; most sessions were sparsely attended. There was little upsurge
in either public favor or public derision, but going public "removed an
irritant that had long alienated the Senate from the public. ""

The parallels between this debate and the modem-day situation. with the
Senate considering whether to expand its galleries through the use of tele-
vision. form another example of how history repeats itself. 15 The arguments
of the opponents in the 1980s had increased beyond a fear of playing to the
galleries to include an expected discomfon from the heat of additional light·
ing and a worry that traditions would be threatened, thus undermining the
constitutional purpose of the Senate. 16
The final outcome in the 1980s depended on changing the perspective of
key players such as Minority Leader Roben Byrd (D-WV). who earlier had
opposed the addition of microphones 10 the chamber. Rather than jumping
full force into the television age, the Sel1Jlleagain experimented, this time
with a trial period. When the results showed relatively little effect on Sen-
 AluuVAL AND THE P'RF.SS
U RE FOR EX:PANOBD CoVERAG£ 55

ate procedures, an overwhelming majority approved the change. Similar 10

the experience of two centuriesearlier,dramaticimpacton Se-nateprocedure
was not immediatelyevident. Several years after the cameras began to roll,
one of the prime opponents, Senator John Danforth (R-MO). called himself
a "conven" and assened: "'Theinterestingthing about television in the Sen-
ate is that it has not changed life in the Senate that much.... I think that is
good:' 17 Final passage of the legislation allowing cameras into the Senate
chambers involveda complex processof advocacy,timing, and compromise.
C-SPAN had been largely an indirect, bil player in the decision to allow
television cameras into the House. Bui when the Senate began 10 seriously
consider televising its proceedingsin 1981, C-SPAN was a major player. To
some degree, C-SPAN's growing audience and success in broadcastingthe
House served as the stimulus for Senate action. C-SPANmonitoredsenators'
willingness 10 accept television and regularly published lists of supponers
and opponents. During the four initiativeson Senate television between 1981
and 1985, C-SPANregularlysent representatives from its staff and board of
<lirectorsto testify at hearings. Senators who had served in the House after
C-SPANbegan televising used their experiences to argue, by analogy, both
for and against Senate television.
The initial push for Senate television came during Republican control
of the chamber in 1981. Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN)
anempled 10put the move into historicalconte<tby arguing."Televisionac-
cess is a simple extension of the public galleries in the House and Senate
charnbers."18The gallery analogywas apt, bul the magnitudeof the extension
would be dramatic.The61 1-seal Senate gallery.thoughoften full during the
spring tourist season in Washingtonand during historic debates. would hold
only a minusculeponion of the potential television audience,even consider-
ing C-SPAN'searly small audience.Although a strong supponer. Baker did
not push televisingthe Senate 10 the top of the agenda,panly ou1of fear that
he <lidnot have the votes. In a chamberwhere one personcan Slopall activity
through a filibuster,Baker backed off. He explained, "Television became a
tool for someone to threaten me with."19 Each rime televisioncoverage wa.~
discussed in 1981. Senator Russell Long (D-LA) began a filibuster. Charged
with keeping the legislative process moving. Baker was afraid that oppo-
nents of Senate televisionor of any other legislationcould hold him hostage
with a filibuster if he pushed televising 100 strongly.
By 1985 Robert Byrd. then serving as minority leader. became the key
player in the battle over Senate television. Majority Leader Baker was about
56 THEC-SPAN R EVOLUTION

to retire, and the incoming majority leader, Bob Dole (R-KN), supported
televising the Senate, but it was not high on his priority list.20 Dole's even-
tual support grew more out of the fact that his Republican predecessor had
pushed so hard for the idea.
Byrd continued Baker's two-pronged set of arguments. The practical ar-
gument asserted that televising Senate proceedings was an idea whose lime
had come and that the Senate would look foolish or irrelevant if it failed to
accommoda te television's power in society. As Baker saw it, "If we don't
open up the Senate to radio and television, 1 predict that in a few years ...
in the public mind at leas~ the House will be the dominan t branch ."11
A parallel philosophical argument allowed proponents to take the high
moral ground by asserting that television would improve -relations between
the Senate and the public, thus strengthening represen tative democracy. 21
According to Baker, "A democracy thrives on public suppon. and public
support th.rives on open govemment.' ' 23 With a touch of humor, Baker took
his argumentto TV Guide, a vehicle for informingtelevision viewers.He as•
serted : "Otto von Bismarck, the 'Iron Chancellor' of Germany, is supposed to
havesaid, •If you like laws andsausages,you shouldneverwatcheitherone
being made.' I say. ' Baloney.' "24 Opponen ts were forced to face the criticism
that they stood in the way of progress or that the Senate had someth ing to hide.
Few would argue that Senator Byrd's love of Congress a., an institution
surpasses that of all other senators. He took to the floor in 1989 to present
a series of meticulously researched speeches on the history of the Senate.
speeches that were eventually published in hook form." Although he had
initially opposed televising the Senate, Byrd is a realist who recognized the
potential loss of the Senate's influence without television. He exp lained his
switch: "We can't hold our own with the White House, and we can't hold
our own with the other body if they have TV and we don't . Many peop le
think Congress is only what they see on TV-Tip O'Ne ill and the House of
Representatives-and it shouldn't be that way.''26 Byrd amplified this view
by stating, "We finally came to the conclusion . . . that the Senate was rapidly
becoming an invisible force ... with the House of Representatives broad-
casting its debates. with the President able with the snap of ltis finger to
summo n around him the television and print media ... it was time for the
United States Senate to televise its debates."21
During the debates over televisi ng the Senate, Byrd received a dramatic
lesson in the power of televis ion during a trip back to West Virginia. Desp ite
his long tenure as a senator and as a party leader , he was introduced to a local
 AR.RIVA
L ANOTII.E PRESSUREPOREXPANDIID COVERAGE 57

audience as Speakerof the House.28 lt was hard to imagine 1hathe could be

confused with the much more ponly Tip O'Neill. Byrd realized that both he
and the Senate had a visibility problem and that the Senate was at a severe
disadvantageas long as the House was the only chamber on television.
Byrd was not alone in his concern. Senators were aware of Speaker
O'Neill's boast that he was "on television more than any other politician
in America."Both individual and institutionalpride andjealously were evi-
dent. Senator Charles Mathia.,(R-MD) argued that senators were ready for
the cameras becausethey were tired of "watchingthe House guys get an that
coverage.'"29
Byrd wasunwillingto ventureout until he knewwherethe voteswere. As a
party leader,he was accustomedto countingvotes.C-SPAN regularlypoUed
senators on theiropennessto televisioncoverage as pan of its campaignto
complement its House coverage. Over the years, the arrival of a younger
generationof senators more comfonablc before the camera had swelled the
suppon to sixty-two solid commitments. Senator Byrd called Brian Lamb
11
and Mike Michaelsonover to his office and askedonly one question, Are
these vote figuressolid?'"30
With an idea of where he slood, Byrd set about building the necessary
coalition to pass the legislation. Under Senate rules, he knew that simply
having a majority might not be enough. The right of unlimited debale (the
filibuster)and other delaying tactics could allow one senator to tie up the
entire chatnber. As Senator Alan K. Simpson(R-WY) described the Senate
process:"One personcan tie this place in a knot. And two can do it even more
beautifully.''31 In building coalitions in Congress. members hope to conven
opponenrs into supponers and thus achieve a net gain of two votes (deny•
ing the oppositionone vote andgainingone vole for their own side). Such a
dramaticconversionis often difficult.An alternativestrategylies in toning
down the oppositionand obtaining a commitmentthat the opponentwill not
use all the strategies available. Recognizingthe realities of coalition build-
ing and the potential problemsof delaying tactics, Byrd pinpointed Senator
Russell Long as a key stumbling bloc,k to Senate television.
Senator Long·s opposition stemmedJess from any concern about the pub-
lic's right to knowthan fromconcernabout theeffecton the internalworkings
of the Senate. While proponentstouted the potentialopponunities of televi-
sion, Long outlinedthe potentialdangers. He wasespeciallyconcernedaboul
howtelevision wouldchangesenators•incentivesandopportunitiesforseek•
ingpublicity. Long took the positionthat the Senate's greatest strengthwasirs
58 'floeC-SPANRevoLUT
ION

commiuees rather than its ftoordeliberations. ln his mind, the floor should be
the place where one senator could staunchly defend deeply held beliefs. He
would not accept the proponenLs'beliefs that floor debate was the legitimate
forum for making wise policy decisions or for educating the public.32Long
saw television as dragging senators away from theircommitteeresponsibil-
ities to the bright ligbts shining on floor debate. He argued: "Every senator
with an inflated ego or higher political aspirations would be taking 10 the
floor to make eloquent speeches for the benefit of the voters back home. ... I
hope I never see the day when the Doorof the Senate is a forum for senators
10 conduct their re-election or presidential campaigns at public expense.""
Long was particularly concerned that the arrival of television would re-
quire revising "the best rule" in the U.S. Senate. "the rule that protects the
right of a single Senator 10talcethe floor and hold it for a while if he thinks
everybody else is wrong." Long noted, "The free debate in the Senate will
have to go if the television comes in.""
After Senator Byrd became convinced that television should be allowed
in the Senate chamber, he met with Long. Byrd recalled the conversation:

..Russell. you and I are nocgoing 10 be aroundherealways. .. . Televi-

sion is coming 10 1he Senate. . . the American peoplearc entitled 10 sec
us a1our work .. . the Sen:ite.. . is rapidly becoming the invisible force.
The House is seen on C-SPAN. E\'erybodyknowswhatthe House is do-
ing. Why shouldn·1theysee theSenatein whichsenatorsspeak longerand
in greater depth aboutthe subjectmatter?... So, Russell.why don'tyou
andI v.-ork 10bringthis aboutwhilewe'rehere?". . . So RussellLong was
persuaded . He ne-.·crwas persuaded10 v01efor it But bis opposition10 ii
lessenedconsiderably.andit madeit possible for te1evisionto come.3.S

Although the tempering of Long's opposition increased the likelihood of

success. not all the opposition melted away. The Camscam brouhaha in the
House was good television and made a name for C-SPAN.but it had a chill-
ing effect on the Senate. Senators bad been looking carefully at the House
experience. One staffpropooeot in the Senate dourly predicted: 'There goes
TV in the Senate! If it were the heart, this would be the knife through it." Sen-
ator Paul Laxalt (R-NV) reacted to the House events by concluding that they
would hurt the chances for Senate television: " I sensed yesterday in talking
to several of my colleagues that we don' t need that kind of problem."36Sen-
ator Long was described as "quite pleased" by the problems in the House.37
Opposition continued. but the staffer and the senators underestimated other
 ARRIVAl. AND THE PRESSURE FOR EXPANDED CoVl!RAGE 59

senators' interest in sharing the sp01light with the House.

Of majorconce-m to senatorswasthatcolleagues wouldplayto thecamera.
Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) argued: "The camera is a natural attraction
fora politician,and if a camera is here, we're going lobe here. And we're go-
ing to say something, even if we have nothing to say." Senator Alan Simpson
(R-WY) felt that the cameras would distort the priorities of individual law-
makers. He admitted: " I can see myself sining at a committee hearing, doing
my job. A staff member comes in and says, 'They're talking about blank is-
sue over on the floor and you'd better get over there and get in on it or your
constituents will never forgiveyou: I just don't see how that is productive.":!$
Senator Russell Long fired a final salvo by arguing, "When the Senate is
on television, we wiU see a substamial increase in expediency and we will
see a substantial decline and erosion in statesmanship."l9But the fight was
gone from his opposition: he could see the handwriting on the wall. Long
had made a commitment 1ha1he would not use his right 10filibuster to kiU
Senate television, thus dramatically reducing his chances of success. His fi.
nal strategy lay in bottling up the issue of Senate television in a battle over
changes in the rules.
Senator Robert Byrd had seen the increasing support for Senate televi-
sion as a vehicle for reforming Senate procedures. A common strategy in the
legislative process is to allow a popular provision 10c.arry along with it leg-
islative provisions with less likelihood of success. Byrd fell that the balance
between the rights of a small minority 10 thwart action and the necessity of
the majority 10act had tipped too far in the direction of minority rights. He
prop0sed a package of reforms that would make filibusters and the introduc-
tion of nongermane amendments more difficult. This approach played into
the hands of Senator Long and other opponents. Ifthey could pile on enough
rules changes, each with an identifiable block of senatorial opp0nents, they
mi,gbt win yet by creating a majority out of many minorities.
The Senate Rules Committee stripped all the rules changes on the legisla-
tion for Senate television in hopes of a clean decision on television without
the distraction of rules changes. Senator Byrd faced a dilemma. His deal
with Senator Long not to filibuster was premised on allowing certain rules
changes 10 be brought up for a vote. Byrd and Majority Leader Dole met
and reinstated the rules changes."° Byrd argued: "We have to get the votes
or we won't pa.ssanything. Sometimes we have to offer this Senator, that
Senator, or a lot of Senators something thal they want in order 10gel what
we want... if therearecenain senatorswho aredead set againsttelevision
60 Tut C-SPANREVOLUTION

in the Senate but who would. nevertheless. vote for it in the event a particu-
lar rule or another rule is changed, or added or repealed, I hope we will let
them have the opportunity 10 vote on their rules changes. That may be, in
1
the finalanalysis,the only way we can get television.'"'
Senator Long knew that the one rule that might strip away potential
supporters involved restricting nongennane amendments, a rule that he pro-
ceeded to champion with great vigor. In the final analysis, the strategy failed
after an amendment to drop the rules changes succeeded by an overwhelm-
ing vote of 60 10 37. True 10 bis word of allowing a vote on the rules,
Senator Byrd opposed the amendment. Senator Long accepted the vote on
the amendment as a good-faith attempt to vote on the rules and stuck with
his commitment not to filibuster. In the end, the only rules change that re-
mained was one reducing the number of hours allowed in a postfilibuster
debate from one hundred to lhirty.42
On February 27, 1986,the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 28, allowing
cameras and microphones into the chamber for a trial period, by a vote of 67
to 2 1. Like the House, Ille Senate would control Illecameras and would limit
coverage to the senatorholding the floor. Since senatorsspeak from their
desks rather than from a limited number of podiums, viewers were likely to
get a broader view of the chamber. Closed-circuit television coverage began
on May I, and the feed was made avai.lable for the public (and C-SPAN)
on June 2. At its launch C-SPANII, which was created to cover the Senate,
reached 7.5 million households, considerably less than C-SPAN. Although
there was no extra charge for C-SPANII, limited channel capacity and in•
creased equipment costs slowed Ille availability of Senate programming 10
about half that of the House. By 1995, C-SPAN was available to 63 million
households (approximately two-thirds. or 67 percent. of U.S. households)
while C-SPANII reached only 39 million households (just over 40 percent
of U.S. households),
The first day on the air reflected the senators' awareness of the televi-
sion audience and the potential importance of their decision. Senator Albert
Gore (D-TN) repeated his perfonnancc as the first televised speaker in the
House, with a serious set of comments intoning the benefits of the "marriage
of television and free debate" to benefit American democracy.43 Senator
Dole concluded: "Today we catch up witll the 20th century. We have been
the invisible half of the Congress for seven years.'..., Other speeches wel-
comed the cameras and spoke about the ll11gepotential audience. In a more
lighthearted vein, Senator John Glenn (D-OH) mused about how senators
 Is the Publk Ready for Senate TV ?

•
·---~...

...,_.
-.;, ........
..... ~

.,._
-~~··.·-
.......' - .
~• • •••-.r•••-•

After its seven years of House coverage. C-SPAN's decision to tele-

vise Senate proceedingsgeneratedhumorousreactionsby canoonists.
(Cartoonby Lee Judge, Ka11sasCity 1imes, reprintedby permission.)
62 THEC-SPANREVOU
JTION

had planned wardrobesand behavior for this day. He then proceeded to use
a makeup brush to remove the shine from his forehead.45 Senator Howell
Heflin(D-AL) waxed poetic:
Tum tile spocliglnoverhere:
Focusthecameraon my place~
Pages.pleasedon·,cometoo near.
Otherwiseyou might blockmy face."'

In some ways the fightover Senate televisionwassymbolicof the Senate's

approach 10 legislation and its role in the American political process. The
fact that the Senate took seven more years than the Houseto accept television
gives meaning to its oft-repeated role as a "cooling saucer" for new ideas.47

First Dayor SenateCoverage

On the firslday of Senatecoverage.Brian Lamb, Paul Fitzpatrick.

and Sena10<Rohen Byrdmet at tile C-SPANcontrolroom. (Photo
courtesyof C-SPAN.)

After a six-week experiment with television during June and July 1986.
the Senateagreed to suspendcoveragefor two weeks 10 review its expe-
 ARRJVALANO THI!. P'RESS'VRE
fl()R EXPANDED CoveRAGB 63

Senator John Glenn with Mirror

On the first cmyof senate coverage.Senator John Glenn (D-OH)used

a makeupbrushto spoof the impactthat he fell televisionCO\'Cf •
age would h.avcon the chamberandiLSmembers . (Photocounesyof
C·SPAN.)

riences. As the Senate moved toward a final vote on television. the initial
conditionsof thetwo--mon thtestperiodcameunderquestion. With mos1sen•
ators pleased with the results. pressure developed to abrogate the two-week
blackout period during which the final debate on Senate television would
occur. Senate Majority Leader Dole felt uncomfortable with the confusion
this would c.auseamongthe viewersand proposeda resolutioncontinuing
the coverage during the evaluation period. Considerable opposition to the
resolution emerged. Fighting to shut out the cameras during the evaluation,
Senator William Proxmire(D-WI) in his typical frankness commented, "We
should have the opportunity to discuss this in a deliberate way without feel•
ing that we are being watched by people who might feel that they were being
shut out by the changes that we might want to make.'"'
Finally a compromise was reached: the cameras would be turned off for
three days. During the debates on July 16-18. C·SPANII continued to broad•
 Senator John Glenn with Mirror

On the first day of sena te coverage, Senator John Glenn (0-0H) used
a makeup brush to spoof the impact that he felt television cover-
age would have on the chamber and its members . (Photo coun esy of
C-SPAN.)
64 Tue C-SPAN RsvotunoN

cast the audio signal. The bulk of the debate revolved around fine-tuning
rather than rescinding television coverage. Senators were wary that floor de-
bate clips might be used in campaign commercials or in the development of
a "TV Bloopers" videotape. 49
The final 78-2 1 vote on July 29. 1986. favoring permanent television
coverage in the Senate defies simple analysis. Opponents included both the
telegenic freshman Dan Quayle (R-IN) and the Senate' s longest-serving
member, Democrat John Stennis (D-MS). On the final vote, younger and
less experien<:ed members were somewhat more likely to support allowing
the cameras in. Detailed analysis indicates that most senators voted their per-
ceived self-interest..SOA handful of senator,; who had initially opposed the
test period for television supported making the cameras permanent, whereas
some initial supporters voted against the final resolution . Perhaps most im-
portan~ the margin of victory for the three key votes on televising the Senate
continued to grow, reflecting the degree to which the idea had taken root.
After the first year, most senators were pleased with the changes they had
wrought. By this time Senator Byrd asserted, "TV in the Senate has been a
success . . . [it) has allowed us to carry out the charge of informing the pub-
lic in the age of television ." Senate Republican Leader Robert Do le agreed:
"Senate TV ha.< delivered the people's democracy 10 their living rooms.
That 's exactly why we turned on the cameras and the lights one year ago and
why television in the Senate is here to stay." However, many previous op -
ponent s were still not e namored with television. Senator Quenton Burdick
(0 -NO) argued that it had led to "longer speeches, increased visual aids and
grandstanding." Senator William Prox.mire noted: "Nobody is watching Sen-
ate TV. (It) may drive Sominex off the market, but it's not performing any
useful function for our country." On the other hand, there were some con-
verts. Senator Benne.ti Johnston (0-LA) concluded: "I think it has worked
well. Some of the fears that I and others had have not materialized. I think
Senate TV has been a success .""
To accommodate the cameras , the Senate made a few cosmetic changes.
New paint, wall coverings. and curtains were chosen to provide a belier
television backdrop. A short wall was erected to stop the disruption of the
flailing hands and feet of staff members walking behind sena tors who were
speaking. " Overall, the physical adjustmenL<were minor.
Allowing television coverage of Congress was not an isolated event. The
change was part of a series of reforms associated with democratization
and openness . Senator Robert Byrd argued that reforms such as televising
 AR.lUVALANO TH£ PRESSURE POREXPANDEDCOVERAGE 65

congressional procedures, passing "suns hine" legislation to open commit-

tee markup sessions 10 the press and public , providing staff assistance to
all committee members, and tightening the rules on filibusters all moved
in the direction of "grea ter egalitarianism and openness in the legislative
process."53

Arrival on the Broader Political Scene

Establishing a second network (C-SPANII) for the Senate, expanding the

number of potential cable recipients , and encouraging the continued "use"
of C-SPAN by politicians increased the visibility of C-SPAN and paved the
way for more recognition. By the late 1980s, C-SPAN had become part of the
popular culture: it was mentioned as a new political force and was spoofed
on the Gary Shandling Show, Saturday Night Uve , the David letterman
Show, and the Tonighr Show (see box 4). News stories no longer added the
once obligatory "(Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network)" or the "channel
that covers Congress" to every mention. By the early 1990s. C-SPAN be-
came more interested in the attention it received from the media and started
to distribute among its staff a "press router," which included all stories men-
tioning C-SPAN in the print media. By the mid-1990s. this had become a
major undertllk.ing, with over two hundred references per month.
While the cable industry continued to shower C-SPAN with awards for
specific programming such as its election coverage ( 1981. 1992). and even
for the C-SPAN bus (see chapter 3). more meaningful were the awards that
came from dozens of organizations outside the cable fraternity. Despite the
recognition, C-SPAN program planning is not award-driven. As the staff
sees it: "We just try to do good work and the rewards will follow. We try not
to let it go to our heads. The awards are temporary. We have to get up the
next day and go on." 54
During the 1980s. politicians regularly mentioned C-SPAN coverage in
floor speec hes, indicating that "the C-SPAN audience might want to know"
or wondering if their "colleagues had any idea what this looks like 10 the
C-SPAN audience." By the 1990s. politicians were regularly mentioning
C-SPAN in news conferences and other events covered by the mainstream
media. In announcing the 1994 Republican "Contract with America." Newt
Gingrich laid down the challenge that anyone who questioned the Republican
resolve only had to "tune into C-SPAN."ss
One of C-SPAN's greatest frustrat.ions is its inability to get the message
66 TH E C-S PAN REVOLUT
ION

Box-I.
C-SPAN's Arrt,-alIn th< Popular Cultutt

1988 C-SPAN is menrioned in Gm,, Trudeau '< ··Doone sbury..

comic ,trip .
1988 C·SPAN pro@:t3m schedulesarc included in the Nrw York
1ime.f 1ele~isionlisting:~.
1988 Lh·c C·SPAN fOOl.ige•~used on the Gary Sh011dli11g
S/rpw 10 spoof lhe network,
1988 C -SPAN plays a role in Roben Ludlum·, spy -thriller Tlw
lcan1t As,~nda.
1989 Joy Leno. poking fun at C -SPAN on Johnny Carson 's
'1"he HomeSh<>ppmg
Tonight Sltow. c:ommcn1c;, Nctwort
announcedth.at i1 ,s going10 mergewith C •SPAN,rorthe
convcn,cnceof buyinga pOliticinnanthe priv.icyof )'our
own home.'..
1989 C·SPAN is men11oned on ABC\ Wfro's tire Oos~.
1989 C-SPAN ii, s.poofcdon ${llurd<,JNi,:h1Uve.
1989 C·SPA.Nbegins -.howingup on DavidLetterman\ rnra.
mou\ ..to1Hen'"fo,ts.11holds.the number 9 position in 1he
li,c of "TopTen Reason-,:
Cong.re:;._-.
Ocsenes a Pay Hike'"
("'Because orC-SPAN. rhcy all had 10 buy hair piece,·) .
Brian Lamb. rejcc1ing an offer 10 appearon the Dadd
Utttm1a11 Show with humorousmomenh on the Hou,c
and Senate floons.explain:s.that C·SPAN would not use
ii'- unique po~ition to poke run at Congress.
l989 C-SPAN choice or
music is the subject of a music critique
in the Uh// Strttl Journal (Alan Ouen. ··we Long for the
Day They Play a Reconlof John Cage\ ·S,lcnce ..,.•
1989 Wa.,hi11gumitm Magazine identifie~ Brian Lamb on its
annual 1i.s1of Wash1ng1on·stop fif1yjournalists.
1990 "'What is C,SPAN?"' 1s the correct question for the Jtnp-
ardy qui,.-~how answer, '11,i<.;cable tclcvi,;ion ne1·work
has been airingli\'e gavel-10-~a\·cJ
ccwerngcof Cong~,
for ten years,"
1992 C-SPANfoocagcis featuredon Murphy Brow,r,
1994 C-SPANis an answerIO1heNtw York Timts Cl"OS!.word
puzzle inquil")'. ·-CableTV'(; C--··,.
 ARRlVAL AND T HF. PRESSURE FOR EXPANDED COVERAGE 67

Box 4 (continued).
1994 Vinually everycolumn:1bou1 nl!"-IYclec1edHouse
SP'!akcrNC\1,-t Gingrich mention~1hc1mponMccor
C-SPAN in promotingh.isc:rn.-cr, Gingrichmentions
C-SPAN':,,role in hi~riseto p0wcr.
1995 .. a, the-
Nt\\'SWCC'k listsC-SPAN in its ..Nev,,tcolumn
mouthpiece for the new majority.

'C-SPA,V UPD,ITE. July3. 1989

b\\'tJIIS11u1J~mu:zf,Jui~ :U. 1989.p. Bl,

across Iha! it does no1control !he cameras in the House and Senate chambers.
Members of Congress and the media continue 10 1alk abou1 the "C-SPAN"
cameras when !hey are discussing lhe coverage of floor proceeding s. Al-
though the term has become a shorthand for many peop le who actually know
better, the impression that C-SPAN already had control created confusion
when C-SPAN sought broader access after the 1994e lection.
Despite growing visibility , C-SPAN staff members remain awed both by
!heir success and by those with whom they interact . Brian Larnb"s Booknotes
interview with Richard Nixon was a highlight for Lamb and his staff. De-
spite having worked in the Nixon White House, Lamb had neve r talked with
the formerpresidentbefore interviewing him on the air. The interview was
conducted at the C-SPAN studios in two one-hour shoo ts. with a nap and
lunch for Nixon in between. Some staff members remained in the office so
that they would not miss seeing !he contr0versial former president. After !he
interview, the younger staff members stood in line to have !heir copies of his
book autographed while the o lder staff held back.
The unwillingness of C·SPAN's staff to take success for grantedcontin-
ues. In early 1995, af1er former Vice-President Dan Quayle' s release from
!he hospital, C-SPAN carried his press conference Jive. When he mentioned
his appreciation for Brian Lamb and C-SPAN, and how he had watched it
in !he hospital, a cheer went up in !he halls at C-SPAN. One of the C-SPAN
insider jokes- having more lhan a touch of reality-notes, "More people
discover us when they are sick or in the hospital." A few days later, when
Senator Bob Do le complimented !he educational value of !he network dur-
ing a Senate debate by calling it the "C-S PAN university," the same kind
68 Tut C-SPANREVOLUTION

of exuberant cries rang out again. Unw illing 10 rest on ils laurels, C-SPAN
has con1inued 10 expand iL~ programming , experiment with its fonna t. and
innovate (see box 5).

BoxS.
C-SPANMIiestones:The Second Decade

l989 Regularbroadcastingof the Briush Houseof Cornmon~

begin!io,
1991 Closed-capcionmg ofHOUM:debatesbegin.
1991 C-SPANwinsa CableGolden Ace Aw:lnJfor it~pre,.
C3mpaign co,,crogeand 3 PeabodyAv,ard ro,
idcnti:;11
ovemUexcc11eoce.
1993 The C-SPANschool bus is launched.
1994 C-SPANM1mulatcs of lhc LincoJn.Douttlas
re-creations
debates.wrnnmg criticalacclaimforlhc broadcast.
1995 The C-SPANMihoo1bus recei\CSa Cable GoldenA<.."C
Award.
1995 C-SPAN l'Cq!Je:)ti.cxp:1J1dcd
congrcssionnlacces.-.:ind
from the newRepublicanleadership.
CO\'era,ge

A Contemporary Challenge

As we will see in chapter 4, much ofC-SPAN's effon during the early 1990s
focused on improving and expanding ils programming and on encouraging
affilia1es 10 include both of its channels. C-SPAN had developed closer re-
la1ions with its affilia1es and had crea1ed an extensive educational program
desig ned 10 teach college and high school teachers how to in1egra1e put,.
lie affairs programming into the classroom using C-SPAN (see chapter 3).
Increased public visibility, improved quality of programming, and continu-
ing diligence seemed to guaran1ee C-SPAN a bright future. Unexpectedly.
an external challenge and an unexpecred opponunily came along, forcing
C-SPAN to redirect some of its effons to maintaining and enhanc ing its work.
Unintended consequences are often some of the most devas1ating. The
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of Im sounds
like an unadulterated good thing. Who could be against protecting con-
sumers and fostering competition? In reality, the bill is a good exam ple of
 AllRlVAL ANO THE f>RFSSUREFOR EXPANDED COVERAGH 69

the "law of unintended consequences." In an attempt to expand the range of

available information and reduce costs 10 con.~umers,a "must carry" pro-
vision was included in the bill. The act required cable companies 10 carry
local commercial channels being offered free. If the local channels did not
want to give away theirsignaJs.they could negotiateretransmissioncon-
tracts and charge a fee, or they could cut a package deal offering their signal
free if the local cable company agreed 10 carry network-owned cable chan-
nels. The package-deal route was more palatable to most cable companies.
ABC created ESPN-2, Fox developed IX, and NBC created an all-talk chan-
nel, "America's Talking." With cable systems typically limited to less than
one hundred channels because of current technology. C-SPAN was caught
in the squeeze. Whereas in the long run. new technology will expand the
number of channels on cable systems to nearly five hundred, the potential
short-term implications were significant.
During the debate. two strategies emerged. Some members of Congress
offered to protect C-SPAN and make ii one of the channels that must be
carried. Brian Lamb. true to his philosophical commitment to an unfettered
media, demurred al the offer: "I am totally opposed to having politicians re-
quire something be aired, even if it is my network:'56 Expressing a more
practical concern. Lamb also asserted: ·•we did not want 10 ask any favors
of Congress. With favors come paybacks. The Cable Bill messed us up. We
got hit the hardest, but we still won't ask any favors." 57
Lobbyists for the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) took
a somewhat different approach. more typical of Washington politics. They
used the potential for dropping C-SPAN to play the "Washington Monument
Game." (In its classic form,the game assens that if the Departmentof Interior
is facing a budget cut, the department will threaten to close the Washington
Monument. a highlyvisible action that wouldanger tourists wantingaccess to
"their" monument.) Senator Christopher Dodd(D-C'I) expressed frustration
over the NCTA'suse of the potential dropping of C-SPAN:''This isn't just a
threat; it's almost blackmail."n Despite warnings, the Cable Act passed by
an overwhelming majority of280 to 128 in the House and 74 to 25 in the Sen-
ate. but PresidentGeorge Bush vetoed it. The legislation had been framed as
guuanteeing inexpensivetelevision viewing. and C-SPAN was caught in the
waveof public support. Bush·s veto was portrayed as his being "owned lock,
stock and barrel" by the cable industry. The vef~ve rride was overwhelm-
ing, with a 74-25 vote in the Senate and a 308-1 lll vote in the House.59 It
was now up to the cable operators to determine the real impact on C-SPAN.
70 THE C-SPANREVOLUTION

Since C-SPANdoes not allowadvertisingand the revenue it would bring,

there was a strong incentivefor cable companiesto go wherethe moneywas.
Many cable systems dropped C-SPAN,forced it to share a channel, or rele-
gated it to the top end of the dial, whereit is hard to find. This may have been
justified by the ratings. As TCI (one of the larger cable companies) Vice-
President Bob Thompsonargued, "We've done a lot of polling and C-SPAN
is not alwaysthe most-watchednetwork.,.(,() As one cable operator put it: "I
don't have a lot of options. We have contractobligationsto take IX, we have
to take broadcast signals, we're channel locked.''61
Over sevenmillionpotentialviewershad their C-SPANcoverageremoved
or disruptedas cable operators followedthe "must carry" dictates and chose
more financiallylucrativeprogrammingover C-SPAN.Most often. the dis-
ruption involvedcutting back service rather than cutting it out completely.
By 1995, only about half of the disruptions had been resolved. Although
cuning one or both of the C-SPANservices is a problem, cutbacks in cover•
age and the shift of channels and times of broadcast for C-SPANraise other
difficulties.Since C-SPAN'sbalance in programming(see chapter 4) occurs
over time.as opposedto withinany one program,selectedcoverage vitiates
much of C-SPAN'sgoal of broadly informingits viewers.As one television
writer stated: "C-SPAN was designed as an 'equal time' channel, giving
political balance on its daily 24-hour schedule. Now such balance and con•
tinuity has been destroyed.It is difficult,under the split channel system, for
viewers to understandwhat C-SPANdoes.''62
Where C-SPANwas neitherdropped nor forced to share a channel, there
were other negative results. On several cable systems. C-SPAN-or. more
likely, C-SPAND-was moved to one of the highest-numberedchannels.
Such placement reduces the number of viewers who might land on C-SPAN
programmingas they channel-surf through the major networks at the lower
end of the available channels. Ideally, C-SPAN and C-SPANU would be
adjacent to each other on low-numberedchannels.
There was no clear intention on the pan of Congress to give commercial
broadcastersincentivesand motivationsto create new cable channels.but
that was the result of 1heCable TelevisionAct. Brian Lamb expressed his
frustration:"My attitude is one of controlled rage. The government writes
a piece of legisla1ionthat sounded good. but it is the public service channel
that is being hardest hit.''63The impact on C-SPAN was clearly an unan-
ticipated consequence. Brian Lamb noted, ~Even though I testified thal it
was one of the worst pieces of legislation I have seen in twen1y-nineyears
 ARRIVALANO THE P'RESSIJRI!.
FOREXPANDEDCOVl!.RAOB 71

in Washington.and that it would hurt us. the members of Congress did not
listen.''64Even after the results of "must carry" became evident, Lamb still
philosophically opposed plans to require C-SPAN carriage. In his words.
"The Congress has done severe damage to this network. and there is no way
to change that without doing us a special favor, which we don' t want.'-6$
In some observers' minds. targeting C-SPAN for actual abandonment by
cable systems may have been part of a continuing strategy to reverse the
law. David Moulton, staff director of the House Energy and Commerce Sub-
commiuee on Telecommunications and Finance, explained, "There may be
some Washington Monumentsyndromehere, where operators think they will
get the most political response by picking on the most politically sensitive
station.'-66And d0-~pitethe partisan paranoia that often pervades American
politics.none of the key players accepted the whisperedargumentthat the Ca-
ble Act wasa conspiracyby liberal Democrats to hamper C-SPAN, which had
been so effectivelyused by conservative Republicans.The voteon the Cable
Act belies any such conspiracy theory. Even the voting split on overriding
President Bush's veto was not clearly partisan. In the House, the cable indus-
try position and President Bush's position gained the support of 52 percent
of the Republicans and 11percent of the Democrats. In the Senate. partisan-
ship was even less clear, with 34 percent of the Republicans and 8 percent of
the Democrats supporting the veto. Legislators were swayed by arguments
that the bill would cut consumer costs and increase programming options.
Many C-SPAN viewers did not talce C-SPAN's loss lying down. Phone
calls to cable companies burned with outrage, and Ieuers-to-the-ed.itors
columns were filled with vitriolic attacks on the shortsightedness of deci-
sions made by local cable operators. As one cable insider put it, "Everyone
agrees on one thing about C-SPANjunkies: they know how to write letters."~'
In Waterloo, Iowa, Robert Snyder wrote. "By dropping C-SPAN, it is clear
that TCI is more interested in serving its own bottom line than it is in serving
the community with truly unique programming."68
In some areas~the protestwas moredemonstrative.I.nthe Americantra-
dition of activism,the people of McAllen.Texas. reacted to their local cable
operator's plan to cancel C-SPAN by organizing a protest group. "Friends
of C-SPAN" flooded the cable operator with indignant letters. Eventually
a deal was cut. with C-SPAN running during open times on two different
channels.69Die-hard C-SPAN viewers in Eugene, Oregon, persuaded the lo-
cal TCI manager to drop a pay-for-view channel. He poinled out: ''It wasn't
so much the number of people that complained, but the quality of their argu-
 r..,ongress

Although C-SPAN bas been called a "window on Congress," providing a

unique view of the legislative process, it is a window with a limited view.
All windows place some limitations on their users, of course. Shifting the
analogy a bit, one media observer commented, "C-SPAN now functions like
a video knothole in the congressional fence.'"'4 One factor limiting the C-
SPAN view is the set of congressional rules regarding the nature of Hoor
coverage. Another limitation stems from C-SPAN's philosophy and capac-
ity for covering events over which it has full control, such as committee
meetings and news conferences. Although thirty to forty committee and
subcommittee meetings occur every day, C-SPAN chooses to cover only a
few.The major constraint is the number of camera crews available. Secon-
dariJy, camera crews are seldom dispatched to congressiona l events unless
they can be covered live. The overlapping schedules of meetings and press
conferences generally mean choosing between them.
Technology is ripe for solving the logistics problem. C-SPAN is willing to
wire all congressional bearing rooms with permanent robotic cameras that
could capture all meetings either for live or for delayed broadcast. Since vir-
tually all of these sessions are currently open to the public -and to C-SPAN
cameras-there should be little congressional opposition. And since press
conferences are designed for coverage, an expanded C-SPAN presence at
such events should be welcomed.
A range of other meetings , such as party caucuses, state delegation meet-
ings, and special-interest caucuses. could also be covered. 45 Since most of
these meetings are currently closed to the public, members of Congress
would have to determine whether the advantages of openness outwei.gh those
of secrecy. Lest anyone think that opening fonnal meetings of any type will
place the entire legislative proces s out in the open, the experience of com-
mittees must be reviewed. Aftercomminees opened their doors to the public.
much of the key decision making occurred in the hal.lways, in the anterooms,
and at premeeting meetings. There is a limit to "su nshine" procedures. Cer-
tain issues must be discussed in private. The legislative process would grind
to a bait if everything had to be done in public. Just as there is a legitimate
"private space" in each of our lives, public officials must be allowed to have
some private space to develop policy agreements. Despite this recognition,
a great deal more of the legislative process could be shown.
The emphasis on an expanded role for C-SPAN in covering Congress
is natural, since House and Senate sessions make up the network's core
programming. But too much emphasis on Congress as the only realm for C-
SPANexpansionbeliesthe fact thatcurrentlyonly 15percentof broadcasting
time is allocatedto congressional sessions. C-SPANhas already discovered
other realms.

A WhiteHouse Channel
C-SPANcoverageof the White House has run into two problems. The com-
mitment to covering House and Senate sessions live and gavel-to-gavel,no
matter what, reduces C-SPAN's Oexibilityin covering White House press
conferences and speeches, which often occur while Congress is in session.
Second, C-SPANis committed to serving as an alternate source of program-
ming of events that the other media fail to cover.The other networkstend to
cover the major White House events in their entirety.C-SPANdoes provide
viewers access to these events on a delayed basis.
But there are many White House events, such as bill-signing ceremonies
and press briefings, that are not currently well covered.The idea of allowing
cameras into cabinet and staff meetings is tantalizing. The Clinton White
House is panicularly interested in providing more television access. It sees
the political advantage of getting to the public directly and repositioning
the way that C-SPAN"tilts our perception of what governmentdoes toward
Congress.'"'6The downside of expanded White House coverage is largely
political. Since the White House has decades of experience in mastering
public relations. it would be difficultto distinguishbetween legitimate pul>-
lic affairs forums and purely self-serving political events.47 Additionally.if
the C-SPAN focus is on programmingfrom the White House, the incum-
bent president's increasing use of the network could jeopardize C-SPAN's
commitment to balance. A channel about the presidencyhas more potential
for offering a balanced view.Coveragecould include academicconferences,
historical footage, and critics of the current president. C-SPAN's ability to
engage its audience by offering call-in programs after presidential events
would provide a useful service.

Opening the FederalBureaucracy

Someof the most criticalgovernmentdecisionsoccur in the bureaucracy.De-
cisions as to how laws are implementedare often basedon bearings presided
over by bureaucrats.The move toward openness in government means that
 CHAPTER SIX

The C-SPAN Audience

The prosecutor's question struck at the heart of the matter: "J ust how did
you become a junkie?" The nervous defendant explained: " It all started
a couple of years ago. I guess boredom was to blame. The old ways of
getting a handle on the world just were not working. I was surfing one
day and came upon this strange, yet somehow familiar scene. I had seen
the place before, but It had been filled with crowds of people. Now one
person seemed to be trying to persuade me to believe in a new way of
doing things. I moved on but was drawn back. Pretty soon I was coming
back on a regular basis. Today I can't imagine not getting my daily fix.
lt bas crowded other things out of my life. "
The prosecutor shifted to an understanding tone: "You are not alone .
I have heard variants of your story time and time again . Few people ex-
plicitly plan to get into your situa tion . You may just have been more
susceptible. An increasing number of people have begun to surf through
their television channels, finding C-SPAN by chance. They recognize the
House or Senate chamber and wonder, Why am I being allowed in there

219
220 THEC-SPAN REVOL UTION

when it's not a State of the Union message or a historic deba te? You have
simply joined the gro win g contingent of C-S PAN's loyal viewers. Sure
it's habit-forming, it may even be addi ctive, but it has not proven to be
harmful."

As one journalist put it: "Deadly as it may seem, C-SPAN bas an intollica-
tion all of iL~own. It bas created , across the country hundreds of thousand s of
C-SPAN junkies-hard -core loyalist s who savor a good congressional floor
fight the way true baseball fans love a pitchers' duel. Like that other Cre-
ator. Lamb made C-SPAN in bis own image-<:ommitted to the idea that TV
news should not be delivered in small, glib nuggets."' Another journalist ex-
plained: "C-SPAN is addictive. You can pretend it's the good old days and
you 're watching the Watergate hearings. You can pretend you're watching
a ball game and check your scoring against the boll scores of the morning
paper. Sometime s when your hearing is repeated. you watch it again, to see
your favorite parts." 2
C-SPAN' s audience represents a mix of viewe.rs. The self-described
'1unkies" are regular viewers. C-SPAN is "their " channel. lt is the backup
channel they tum to when they have no particular viewing plan. Other view-
ers are more selective . relying on C-SPAN for coverage of particular events.
Most televis ion viewers continue to "s urf" on by, often oblivious to C-
SPAN's ex.istence and stopping only when they happen to see a familiar
face. Virtually all of C-SPAN' s audience initially discovered the network by
chance. Our discus sion of the C-SPAN audience will consider its changing
compo sition, the impact of the audience on C-SPAN, and the impact of C·
SPAN on its audience. We will consider both empirical and imp.ressionistic
data.
When C-SPAN talks about its audience , it is most likely to think in terms of
impressionistic vignenes about individual viewers. After hearing hundreds
of stories about loyal viewers, C-SPAN decided to celebrate its tenth an-
niversary by chronic ling their stories. America 's Town Hall, written by Brian
Lamb and bis staff in 1988, profiles 104 regular viewers. The vignettes cover
the gamu1. from the weU-koown (entertaine r Frank Zappa, Representative
Newt Gingrich, and President Ronald Reagan) to teachers, busines spersons ,
and retirees. Some of the &tories are dramatic. Shirley Rossi , of Pueblo , Col-
orado, deserves the title "queen of C-SPAN." She watches twelve hours a
day and is an instant celebrity when she visits the C-SPAN studios . For those
who feel that one person cannot make a difference, the story of Lawrence
 Tue C-SPAN AUDIENCE 221

White should be an inspiration. After seeing C-SPAN at a local fair in 1982,

White, of Culver, Indiana, became so excited that he bought a satellite dish
so that he could watch the network. Although this guaranteed access for
himself, White began a protracted battle to persuade his local cable system
to cover C-SPAN so that his friends and neighbors could get access as weU.
When the local cable system refused to include C-SPAN because of lim -
ited channel capacity, White began recording C-SPAN programming and
running it on a local-access channel. White's efforts generated considerable
local publicity, and public support began 10 build. Five years after his first
introduction to C-SPAN, First Pie Cable added C-SPAN to its offerings. In
the typical idealistic outlook of many C-SPAN regulars, White commented,
"I didn't do it 10 become a celebrity, I did it because C-SPAN is a cause I
believe in and want others to believe in it, too.'' 3 It is hard 10 imagine any
other television network generating such an evangelical fervor.
For every Shirley Rossi and Lawrence White, there are thousands of other,
less-committed C-SPAN viewers. Their stories are best told using public-
opinion poUs and empirical audience analyses. The available empirical data
varies significantly in terms of content and comparability. PoUs commis -
sioned by C-SPANare most often used to prove the value of the network
to the cable industry. A yearly analysis by Statistical Research Incorporated
(SRI) is called C-SPAN Pricing Study. Aside from outlining audience de-
mographics, this study asks questions such as. "How much would you be
willing to pay for C-SPAN?" Brian Lamb and other C-SPAN staff react al•
most viscerally to the idea of ratings: "We exist in a world that too often
says, 'Show me your numbers or you don' t matter.' We are the single place,
including public television. that never makes a decision based on numbers .
Never . . . If we knew of something that might interest even a couple of thou-
sand people, it's probably worth covering. Most people in television would
say that' s crazy, no one's going to watch. But when your master isn't the
Nielsen ratings. ' no one' is a relative term .. . . If you go down the list of
what everybody else in TV does, we don't do any of it."4
C-SPAN's hesitancy about ratings probably stemmed from fear that ratings
would be so low that no one--including themselves-would be impressed
with the network 's significance. The fact that C-SPAN allows no commercial
advertising undermines the need for determining ratings of specific programs
in order to set advertising rates. Over the years a virtue has been made out
of these necessities. The corporate programming philosop hy reflects the ad-
vantage of not having to lower standards by "chasing eyebaUs"-a rather
222 THE C-SPAN REVOL UTION

inelegant slam agains t the network's commercial opponentS. In recent years ,

as channel capacity limitations have made adding channels a 1.ero-sum game
in which channels are dropped 10 add new ones, C-SPAN' s interest in ilS
general audience size has increased . C-SPAN recognizes that attracting too
smal.l an audienc e will make it a likely target for cable systems bunting for
a spo t to add a new channe l.
Over the years several academic studies have attempted 10 determine the
kinds of people who watch C-SPAN as a channel of choice, again with-
out rating specific program s . A number of these studie s rece ived C-SPAN
funding , indicating C-SPAN 's curiosity about its genera l audience . Maura
Clancey, who originally worked on surveys conduc ted by the University of
Maryland , was emp loyed for a period as C-SPAN' s director of research .
She later went to work for SRI and oow oversees the yearl y C-SPAN sur-
vey. Despite esc.hewing rating s, C-SPAN makes available the most positive
findings, which indicate a growing audience of politically aware viewers. In
front-page stories and color graphic s, C-SPAN press re lease s and internal
publications have long highligh ted poU results.
As C-SPAN becam e an establi shed entity , polling initiative s-s uch as the
Time s-Mirror Cenier for the People and the Press-inc luded C-SPAN in
their analy sis of the cont emporary media mix in America. Over the years
consulting firms . such as Fleisbmao -HiUard, added to the understanding of
the C-SPAN audience by polling congre ss ional staff and monitoring the
re.lative position of C-SPAN as a Capitol Hill information source. The fol-
lowing analy sis will utilize the rich but varied data collected on the C-SPAN
audience.

Finding C-SPAN

The unpredi ctability of much of C-SPAN 's programmin g makes it difficul t

to build an audience based on program loyalty. C-SPAN cannot contro l the
length of House and Senate ses sions and must work its schedule around
them. Detailed C-SPAN programming information is not published in many
newspaper televi sion listings. The philosoph ical goal of being timely (see
chapter 4) leads to programming choices being made only a few hours before
broadcast. Viewers con stantly talk about how they "happened on C-SPAN''
while they were looking for something else or how they simply discovered
the network while they were surfing through the channel s. C-SPAN is a net-
work for those who have plenty of time. People often tell Brian Lamb that
 THE C-SPAN A UDIENCE 223

they discovered C-SPAN when they were sick, so often in fact that he is
tempted to call it "The Sick Network.'' 5 Other viewers outline intricate pat-
terns of acquaintances and how they learned about C-SPAN from friends
and friends of friends . Some programs, suc h as Bookrwte.r,with its regular
schedule, have developed a small but loyal following via word of mouth .6
A portion of C-SPAN' s growth, and perhaps even of its demogr-dphics (see
later discussion ), has been faciUtated by contemporary methods of televi sion
viewing. With a limited number of channel s and vinually inviolate schedu les,
the television era of the pre- 1980s was dominated by "intentional" audiences
that expressed loyalty to particular networks or particular programs through
their viewing habit s. Conversation s were sprinkled with comments along
these lines: "It is Tue.~day night , it must be time for Milton Berle"; "We can '1
go out Sunday night or we will miss Ed Sullivan"; and "Don't c.all me at eight
o ' clock when Dallas comes on." Once a program was chosen, the viewer
tended to stick with it until the end. Advertisers recognired this behavior
pattern and "s andwiched " their most crucial messages between segments of
programs, when the audience was least likely to swi tch channels.
The expansion of television offerings and the almost simultane ous ar-
riv-.ilof the remote control set the stage for "chan nel surfing" or "grazing." 7
In 1.983, only 21 percent of viewers reported using a remote control. By
1988. that figure had grown to 43 percent and by 1991 to over 91 percent .8
The multitude of offerings-many of which were not listed in the newspa -
pers ' television guides-made planning one 's viewing schedu le a frustration .
The remote contro l allowed easy channel switching . Now the remote is to
television what page -lipping is to magazines. 9 Channel surfing varies signif•
icantly by age and gender (see graph 5). To some degree , channel surfing is
a "male thing," especially among older viewers. As comedian Jerry Seinfeld
succinctly put it, "Women nest and men hunt." 10 Better -educated viewers
are also more likely to surf. 11 Whereas channel surfing is most often used
for avoiding commercials. as opposed to seeking particular programming.
switc hing channels improves the chances that a viewer will find C-SPAN.
Although there is no bard evidence that C-SPAN viewers channe l surf mo re
than other niche audience s, an avalanche of anecdotes clearly indicates that
a high percentage of C-SPAN viewers are addicted "zappers ."
At the same time that many viewers are finding C-SPAN by channel surf-
ing, its long-fonn approach with limited action feeds into another developing
viewing pattern. Whereas television once required almo st complete atten -
tion because of its audio and visual com ponents, C-SPAN 's slow -moving
Page 224 is not part or this book preview.
 Tue C-SPANAUDIENCE 225

estimates of actual viewen.hip. Cynics might conclude that they are wor-
ried about the small segment of the audience C-SPAN captures at any one
moment. On the other hand, idealists are more willing 10 accept the official
argument: "If we constantly worried about the size of our audience, we would
stray away from our original purpose of providing politically balanced, long-
form, public affairs programming.'" 13 The realist.~ would be quick to point
out that no one really knows C-SPAN's audience size. As a noncommer -
cial network, C-SPAN does not need rating s figures to establish advertising
rates, and ratings services generally do not measure the C-SPAN audience.
Even if they attempted to do so, they would have difficulty applying their
typical program-by-program approach because the C-SPAN schedule varies
significantly day by day. The problem of actual measurement is exacerbated
by the purported tendency of C-SPAN viewen. to be channel surf en.. Rather
than turning on particular programs, they surf to C-SPAN with their remote
and stop for a few minutes to determine their level of interest. If they choose
to watch, it is seldom for an entire program.
Politician s use the ir own audience estimates for political purpose s. Rep-
resentative Robert Doman (R-CA) enjoys sprinkling his speeche s with
oomments about the "C-SPAN audience that at this time of day is proba-
bly at a peak of I million 10 I 1/2 million people." 14 To add force to his
assertion, Represe ntative Doman once included a visual image: "Over J
million Americans are following this debate on C-SPAN . That is the Rose
Bowl filled 100 times ."IS C-SPAN staff are at a loss 10 determine where his
estimates come from . As Brian Lamb said: "He never asked us .... Bob
Doman's figure of I million is just not true. It does not make sense when
Larry King only draws 700,000-800,000." 16 Representative Paul Kanjon.ki
(D-PA) upped the ante by referring to the "7 or 8 or IOmillion Americans
who watch C-SPAN," presumably assuming that if anyone ever watches C-
SPAN, he or she watches it all the time . 11 In the kind of exaggeration that
would put the C-SPAN public relations staff to shame, Richard Ray (D-GA)
addressedhis remarks to his "co lleagues and 50 million or 60 million people
. .. looking at C-SPAN today." 18
C-SPAN itself emphasizes its "potential" audience by carefully charting
the number of affiliates carrying its signa ls and the number of households
this represent~ (see graph 6). C-SPAN carefully tracks the.~e figures, since
they are the basis on which it receives revenue from the cable companies.
Among cable channels, in 1995 C-SPAN was sixth in terms of market pen-
etration (behind CNN, ESPN, TBS, USA, and the Discov ery Channel),
L CUP)'t19•1tll\l ·1 ..dt11ial

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7
 THE C-SPAN A UDIENCE 227

The available bard data comes from a series of often noncomparable

public-opinionpolls assessingC-SPANfamiliarityand usage overtime, with
emphasis more on the demographicsof the audiencethan on its size.22 Ini-
tially the only people interested in evaluating the C-SPANaudience were
academicsand C-SPANemployees. Many of the early polls applied only to
limitedgeographicareas or to cable subscribers.The first nationalpoll to as-
sess C-SPANviewershipwas not conducted until 1987.eight years after the
network began broadca~ting.A significant sign of C-SPAN's "arrival" as a
recognizedforce in American politics is the fact that national polls are now
beginningto include questions about C-SPANusage in their analysis of the
contemporaryAmerican media mix.

AWARENESS
OF C-SPAN

Brian Lamb developed C-SPAN with a kind of "Field of Dreams" philos-

ophy: "If we build it, they will come." For "them" to come, however, the
audienceneeds to knowthatC-SPANexist~.The early studiesof cable house-
holds indicatedthat it took almost five years for over one-half of those with
access to the C-SPANsignal to know it ex.isted.23 By the time of C-SPAN's
tenth anrtlversaryon the air, only about one-quarter of the national adult
populationknewof its existence.24 Awarenessexpandeddramaticallyduring
the next few years. By 1992,almost two-thirdsof adult Americanswere fa.
miliar with C-SPAN," and by 1995awarenessjumped to 73 percenL 26 The
term "C-SPAN"is now part of the political lex.iconfor all but the most unin-
formed segmentsof the Americanpublic. The expansionof cable television
penetration, the existence of two twenty-four-hour-a-daychannels,the clear
usage of C-SPANby public officials,and C-SPAN's "arrival" as a reference
point for popular humor on television and in cartoons have all contributed
to its visibility (see chapter 2).

C-SPANVIEWING
Along with increased visibilitycame increased C-SPANviewing. The per-
centage of the population reportedly having viewed C-SPAN "sometime
during the previous year" increased from under IO percent in 1987 to over
40 percent in 1994 (see graph 7). Estimates of the number of households
repre.,;entedby such figuresare impressive. Using a more limited definition
of viewing, a large nationalsurvey,conducted independentlyof C SPANin
0

1994,indicatedthat 8.6 percent of the U.S. populationhad watchedC-SPAN

Page 228 is not part or this book preview.
 THE C-SPAN AUDIENCE 229

ers are coming with a much higher degree of interest or established viewers
have significantly increased their viewing.

Table J
C-SPAN Viewership Compared with That of Other Media Sources

1992 199S
% Of the adult population viewing within the last week

C-SPAN 6.1% 8.6%

CNN 36.7% 36.9%
ANY CABLE TV 59.5% 62.6%
% Of the adult population viewing yesterday

EARLYNETWORKNEWS 14.1% 33.6%

LATENETWORKNEWS" 4.8% 5. 1%
% Of the adult population reading a newspaper each day

DAILY 60.2% 57.0%

SUNDAY 66.5% 66.0%

•ABC's Nigl11line
Sourr:es: Multim,dia Audience Report (New Yo!'.k:MediallUllk
Research, 1992). pp. 2-57; Mediamark Research Inc., personal
communicationwith the authors.

Brian Lamb has little misconception that C-SPAN is for everyone. With-
out recrimination, he realistically pointed out: 'There are enough people out
there to keep us in business ... but I think it is fragile. There are enormous
numbers of people who just don 't want to pay attention at all. They want to
make money and live. Bowling, golf, whatever--0ur stuff just doesn't matter
to them."27

PROGRAM CHOICE

Although C-SPAN violently eschews ratings, there is an interest and prac-

tical necessity in knowing who is watching which type of programming.
Among C-SPAN viewers, House and Senate proceedings are most popular,
with over40 percentreporting"'often.,or "occasional"viewing.Hearings are
230 Tu£ C-SPAN REVOLUTION

Graph 8

C-SPAN Audie nce Attentive ness

£C 25
0
::; 212
~
l20I -
8_ 20
"'
-
17.6
C 1161
1::
-
(J 15 -- -
~Cl)
~
:,
0
10 -- -
-.,
J:
0
~ 5 -- -
.0
E
:,
z 0 I
1987 '
1988 ' ' '
1991 '
1992
Years

N0t only aremore viewers watc.hing C-SPAN, but lhey are spending
more time each month viewing its programm ing. Nole: Data were
unavailable for lhe years 1989 and 1990. Soun:e: National surveys
conducted by the University of Maryland Survey ResearchCen1cr
(1987), Statistical Research Incorporated (1991 , 1992), and Luntz
Research Associa1es( 1994).

the next -most-popular category. About one-quaner of C-SPAN viewers re-

port regularly viewing call-in programs, with specialized program s such a.s
Booknotes regularly capturing the interest of about IOpercent of the C-SPAN
viewers. 28

Audience Demographics: Just Who Is Watching?

A number of predetermined factors related to opportunity and motivation

constrain the representativeness of the C-SPAN audience. On the opportu-
nity side , viewers must have access to cable television. Although the country
is increasin gly being cabled, the pattern of cable access presently represents
a bias toward wealthier and urban and suburban communities. Initially, ca-
ble companie s developed in areas with poor broadcast television reception
Page 231 is not part of this book preview.
- 232 T,rn C-SPAN REVOLUTION

size, the two answers may imply very different things . For example, polls
indicate that 52 percent of college graduates have viewed C-SPAN at some
time , as compared with only 31 percent of noncollege graduates. But since
college graduates compose about 28 percent of the population, on ly about
30 percent of the C-SPAN audience is from this subgroup. 31
Although the C-SPAN audience has changed a bit over the years by be-
coming more representative of the population, our empha sis will be on the
most current data in the hope of understanding where C-SPAN is right
now and perhaps where it is going. In terms of propensity to view. watch-
ing C-SPAN is positively correlated with education and income (see table
2). Age also plays a role, since middle-aged viewers are more likely to
watch C-SPAN than are those younger or older. Men are considerab ly more
likely to be viewers than women. White s show a greater propen sity to view
than blacks . The two surveys from the 1990s reported in table 2 indicate a
consis tenl demographic pattern and significant increases in viewing across
groups .

THE AGGREGATE SOCIAL MIX

Although differences in viewing tendencies between demographic groups

are interesting. the more politically important question seems to be the
overall mix of the C-SPAN audience . Those who hope to use C-SPAN
for polit.ical purposes (see chapter 7) want 10 know with whom they are
communicating.
Survey data from a variety of polliog sources reveals a consistent profile
of C-SPAN viewers. Viewers are considerably better educated and wealth-
ier than the population as a whole . C-SPAN viewers are also less likely 10
be members of a minority group. Despite the fact that women oumumber
men in rhe popu lation, men make up a larger percentage of the C-SPAN au-
dience . The C-SPAN audience is largely middle-aged , with viewers tending
to be older than the population a.~a whole (see table 3).
The uniqueness of C-SPAN viewers as upscale-well-educated, affluent,
and extremely interested in politics-has declined to some degree as the
audi.ence base ha.s expanded . Surveys that distinguish between long-term
viewers and newer viewers indicate that newer viewer s are much more like
the population as a whole. In an analysis of four national surveys in the
1980s, Maura Clancey concluded: 'The C-SPAN audience is beginning 10
Jose some of its distinctiveness. Several of the demographic characteri stic s
 THEC-SPANAUDIENCE 233

Table2
Population Subgroup Tendencies to Watch C-SPAN, 1992- 1995

PercentindicatingwatchingC-SPAN ••withinthe last seven days"

um 1995

TOTAL 6.8 8.6

EDUCATION
College Gradua1e 9.0 12.5
Aucnded College 8. 1 10.1
High School Graduate 5.7 7.2
Non H.S. Graduate 2.6 4.9
HOUSEHOLDINCOME
Over$75,000 9.2 12.7
$5~$75,000 7.5 IO.I
S3~$50,000 5. 1 9.1
$1~30,000 3.0 6.9
Under$10,000 2.3 4.0
RACE
White 7.6 8.9
Black 6.3 6.7
Hispanic 5.9 8.7
GENDER
Male 7.5 10.7
Female 4.9 6.6
AGE
18-24 4.2 5.8
25- 34 5.0 6.8
35-44 7.2 8.7
45- 54 7.8 10.2
55--64 6.7 11.9
65+ 6. 1 9.3

Scurces: Multimedia Audience Report (New York: Mediamark.

Research, 1992),pp. 2-57: Televisio11AudiencesReport (New York:
Mediamark Research, 1992), pp. i, 3- 177; 1995 data. Mediamark
ResearchInc., Spring 1995survey, compuler prinlout.
234 TltE C-SPANREVOLUTION

Table 3
The Social Demographics of the Agg,egate C-SPAN Audience

C-SPANVIEWERS NATIONALPOPULATION
(% of eocb group (% of populaJion
clwified u ..viewers") in each group)

1987' l992b 1995b 1992b

EDUCATION
College graduate 37 29 29 19
Ancndcd College 30 23 31 19
No College 33 48 40 62
HOUSEHOLDINCOME"
Over $75,000 9 22 21 12
$50--$15.000 15 26 22 17
S30--$50.000 35 28 27 27
$10-$30,000 31 19 24 32
Under $ 10.000 4 5 5 11
RACE
White
Black
Other
..
na•
na
83
II
6
89
9
2
82
II
7
GENDER
Ma le S4 58 60 48
Female 46 42 40 52
AGE
18-24 8 II 9 14
25-44 so 41 40 44
4~ 31 31 33 25
65 and O\'Cr 10 16 18 16

1
Fig.uresfor I987 come from a national survey done by the Uni\•crsity c,f
Maryland.. Individuals classified as C-SPAN ..vic....-ers.. indicated they hlKI
watched C-SPANwithin the lasl year.
~gures for 1992 come from national surveys reported in Multimedia
Audienc, R,port (New York: Mcdiamark Res,arc:h, 1992). pp. 2-57:
Television Audiences Repon (New Yort: Mediamark.Research. 1992). pp. i.
3- 177. This data is also reponcd in Harold Stanley and Richard Niemi. v;sal
Suuistics on American Polltics, 4th ed. (Wa.shingmn,D.C.: Congressfonal
Quancrly Press. 1994), p. 55. Figures for I995 oomc from Mccliamark
Rescan::hInc..• Spring t 995 s.uney,computer printout. ..Vi~·e..s"' are defined
as those having wa1chedC-SPANwithin the last seven days.
~ family income figures were not c."OrreCted for inRa,ion.
dna = Not available,
 THE C-SPAN A UDIENCE 235

that set C-SPAN viewers apart-very high levels of education and income,
and a preponderance of older, white male viewers-are disappearing.'' 32

THE POLITICAL MtX

C-SPAN viewing is not an isolated polit ical activity. Members of the C-SPAN
audie.nce tend to be heavy users of all public affairs media. Viewers are more
lilcely to read a daily newspaper and watch television news. The messages
seem to sink in, since C-SPAN viewers are almost twice as informed abo ut
political facts related to Congress than are nonviewers. C-SPAN viewers
also use more informal methods of exchanging political views and infonna-
tion . More than twice as many C-SPAN viewers (24 percent) as nonviewers
(9 percent) discuss politics with their friends and farnily.33 Significantly, the
characterization of C-SPAN viewers as being well -infonned about Congres s
remains clear independent of the viewers' unique demographic characteris-
tics and levels of media use. C-SPAN either draws or creates sophisticated
Congress watchers. 34
In terms of partisan self -identification, the overal.l C-SPAN audience is
relatively balanced. Republicans are more likely to watch C-SPAN , but until
recently their lower percentage of the population and the lower tendency of
C-SPAN viewers to identify themselves as partisan independents meant that
the aggregate C-SPAN audi.ence was consistently more Democratic than the
popula tion as a whole . By 1992, the national tendency toward independent
self -identification was even more dramatic among the C-SPAN audience ,
with over 40 percent of the general viewers of C-SPAN being unwilling to
identify with one of the major parties . In choosing a party, C-SPAN view-
ers in 1992 were somewhat more likely to call themselves Republicans than
was the population as a whole.
Voting patterns of C-SPAN viewers indica te significant autonomy in be-
havio r despite partisan loyalties. In I 984, the C-SPAN audience favored
Ronald Reagan over Walter Mondale more than the population as a whole
and more than the overall cab le audience. In 1992, C-SPAN viewers also
opted for the winner - Bill Clinton - at a percentage somewhat higher than
the general population.
In 1992, self -identified "regular" C-SPAN viewers were significantly more
Republican than all C-SPAN viewers and the pop u.lation as a who le. Dur-
ing the summer of 1992, these regular viewers also represented a hotbed
of support for Ross Perot. As we will discuss later, the 1992 vote by all
 CUP)'t19•1tll\l ·1 ..dt11ial

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238 THP.C-SPANREVOLUTION

C-SPAN JUNKIES'. A l..ooK ATTHE REGULARVIEWERS

Defining "viewers" as simply those who casually drop in on C-SPAN pro-

gramming may well miss that small component of the national public
reporting that they regularly watch C-SPAN. Of American adults, 6 to 8 per-
cent identify themselves as regular viewers. To some degree this C-SPAN
"junkie" contingent is simply an extreme caricature of the more casual view-
ers (see table 3). They are similar 10 regular viewers in terms of gender
distribution. income, and partisanship. However, some characteristics of ca-
sual viewers are not valid representations of regular viewers. Regular viewers
come equally from all racial groups. Undoubtedly reflecting available time
for viewing, the regular viewers tend to be much older. Forty-four perce.nt
are over sixty years old, more than twice the figure for the national popula-
tion. Given the more limited opportunities for higher education a half century
ago, it is no surprise that these older regular viewers are much more evenly
distributed in terms of education, with 35 percent not having graduated from
high schoo l. Significantly, the polling figures are not simply tapping the more
general audience for public affairs programming. Regular C-SPAN viewers
are older and somewhat less educated than the viewing audiences of com-
peting public affain programming such as CNN, National Public Radio , and
the MacNeil-Lehrer Repon."

lnfonna1ion Level of C-SPAN Junkies

On factual questions about the political process, C-SPAN junkies are better
informed about politics than are members of the general population-a clear
vindication of C-SPAN's primary goal. 41 They feel that they "have a real
understanding of what is happening in Washington, and regard those depend -
ing on network TV reportage almost patronizingly.'" 3 The self-described
C-SPAN "'addicts" perceive C-SPAN's success as an example of how the
media have underestimated the public . As one television writer and regular
C-SPAN viewer put it "C-SPAN is proving that there is a huge and serious
audience of people interested in serious topics. All the evidence is there that
the public is smarter than editors and TV producers believe.',..
Some interest groups use C-SPAN as part of their alternative media mix to
inform their membership about politics. Ralph Reed, of the Christian Coali-
tion, explains: "Many of our members have satellite downlink.~.They can be
reached inlmedialely either directly by [our) leaders, or through faxes and
phone banks, and told ... about an upcoming C-S PAN broadcast.'" 5 Al-
 THEC-SPANAUDIENCE 239

though the number of such focused and tuned-in viewers is small, their level
of information and commitment increases their potential influence.
In one sense, C-SPAN is a testimony to Brian Lamb's unbridled optimism
about the public 's capacity to "get it." From the earliest days he argued:
"'Let's just tum the cameras on and le.t the people figure it out. They are
smart enough to figure it out." After fifteen years, Lamb is a bit less confi-
dent.. He is willing to admit: "What you find out is, time and time again, day
after day, how little people know."46

Activating the C-SPANJu11kies

Regular C-SPAN viewers are akin to fans of a spons team . They watch
"their " network with fierce loyalty. As one editorial put it, "C -SPAN ... is 10
politics wha.t ESPN is to sports.'., 7 Like "Monday-morning quanerbacks," a
significant number of regular viewers panicipate in the call-in program s, and
many have stroQg opi nions about what C-SPAN is doing right and wrong.
There is a basic principle in politics-and in life-that people are more
threatened by the loss of something they have become accustomed to than
they are motivated to take action to secure something they do not have.
Although more politically active than the rest of the population, the bulk
of C-SPAN junkies do not spring into action until "their'' network is chal-
lenged. It is the C-SPAN junkies who have gone to bat when their access is
threatened. When C-SPAN was forced to change its satelli te transponder in
1982, four hundred to five hundred cable systems dropped coverage. Retired
insurance executive William "Bud" Harris, of Cherry Hil.l, New Jersey, re-
fused to take the interruption sitting down. Contacting C-SPAN to get names
of other disappointed viewers, he founded "Frien ds of C-SPAN," the first
viewer-membership group for any cable channel. Harris became president,
and Shirley Rossi, of Pueblo , Colorado, became the national vice-president.
The goal of the organization was 10 gel the network restored on those syste ms
that had dropped ii and 10 expand access. The project generated hundreds
of letters and thousands of phone calls. Bud Harris 's multi -page missiles to
offending cable operators cajoled, threatened, and attempted to embarrass
them into reinstating the distribution of C-SPAN. Local "Friends" chapters
emerged in several cities. Such viewer suppon is credited with pushing many
cable sys tems to reinstate C-SPAN. When the threat subsided, it became
difficult to maintain a national organization.
When the "mus t carry" decision in 1992 again diminished access, a num-
24() Tue: C-SPANREVOLUTION

ber of local groups again organized to put pressure on their cable systems.
They mounted telephone initiatives and barrages of letters to newspaper
editors in suppon of carrying C-SPAN. Slowly, cable system operators be·
gan to realize that the C-SPAN audience was not a group to trifle with (see
chapter 2).

TIU! ELITE AUDIENCE

Although C-SPAN's primary purpose is informing the public , it bas become

a vehicle for elite communication as well. Presidents and prime ministers
find C-SPAN useful for monitoring the political process. A broad range of
political "movers and shakers" also have discovered C-SPAN as a vehicle
for acquiring imponant information.

The First Viewer

Perhaps no one was more surprised than the C-SPAN staff when President
Ronald Reagan, shonly after participating in a session with Close Up Foun-
dation studentS at the White House, contacted a 1983 call -in program on
C-SPAN to correct his comments . He began his call by saying: "I jus t came
upstairs to the study here and turned on the set and there you were. The lhing
I called about was the exclusionary rule. Evidently there I did not finish the
answer, you're so conscious of the clock going by.""8 The president stayed
on the line for eight minutes , answering additional questions from several
students .
This was not a one-shot occurrence for Reagan. Another time he called to
challenge the comments of a reponer on a C-SPAN progr-dm.0 Reagan called
himself "a fan of C-SPAN's national call-in shows" and reponedly watched
congressional debate s and hearings while he shaved in the moming .50 lo
dealing with governors and members of Congress, he often prefaced his
commentS with the admission, "I saw your speech on C-SPAN." 51 David
Gergen, one of Reagan's key press aides. called CSPAN "one of the most in-
teresting developments" in providing information to the president. He noted
that Reagan found C-SPAN to be a "wonderfully helpful tool and source
of infonnation." 52 In a speech to the National Cable Television Association
convention in 1984, Reagan commented: 'Tm a fan ofC-SPAN 's national
call-in shows. I am continually struck by the sophistication and intelligence
of the questions that are asked .... I think it shows once again that . .. the
people out there are way ahead of us.''53
 THE C-SPANAUDIENCE 241

The ability to monitor other political players and receive "heads-up" in-
fonnation reduces the isolation of the presidency and gives the president
a powerful political tool-information. In describing a meeting with state
governors, journalist Howell Raines pointed out, "Mr. Reagan was ready for
the governors' criticisms today largely because ofC-SPAN." 54
Since Reagan was the first president of the C-SPAN era, his viewing habits
received considerable attention. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton and their
staffs watched C-SPAN regularly. Clinton seldom watched C-SPAN during
the day, but he reviewed congressional debates late into the evening.55 In
1993, Clinton used the C-SPAN replay to critique bis State of the Union Ad-
dress. "Well after midnight," the president and Mrs. Clinton "headed off to
watch a rerun on C,SPANof the hours-old hit everyone was talking about."56
Presidential "wanna-be" Ross Perot is also a regular viewer. During a talk-
radio appearance he commented: "I'm a longtime avid C-SPAN watcher. I
watch C-SPAN to get good information."57

The PoliticalElite in Congress

A wide variety of other key political players also find C-SPAN useful for
gathering information and monitoring the political process. Members of
Congress regularly monitor floor debate both from their offices and from
their homes (see chapter 8). When problems keep members away from the
chamber, C-SPAN is there. Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond (R-MO), con-
fined to bed after neck surgery, commented, "'Thanks to C-SPAN coverage
of committee hearings and Senate floor action, I was able to kee,p up with
Senate business."58 C-SPAN surveys of House and Senate offices indicate
that members of Congress are regular viewers. As one staff member put it:
"My Member keeps it on in the background, if he sees something interest-
ing ... he'll want to tum it up and find out exactly what is going on [on]
the floor. Announcements. floor scheduling ... he wants to get that kind of
information.''59
Only a portion ofC-SPAN's signal is seen on the Hill. Fifteen minutes be -
fore each House or Senate session. the congressional broadcasting system
shifts to a direct feed from the Hoor. Until 1995, that did not make much dif-
ference, since C-SPAN's floor coverage was largely unadorned. About the
only things that Hill viewers missed were the classical music that used to be
played during votes and the text "crawls" that were placed at the bottom of
the screen to explain what was going on. Beginning in I995. however, C-
242 THEC-SPANREVOLUTION

SPAN began to use the voting period to impart more infonnation. "Squeeze"
boxes placed in the comer of the screen during votes are used to replay seg-
ments of debate or live interviews with members and journalists. Viewers at
home now get more context, which viewers on the Hill are not aware of.
C-SPAN is obviously interested in its elite audience . Before and after
the 1992 election, C-SPAN polled new and departing members of Congress
about theirC -SPAN viewing habits. High percentages of each group reported
watching C-SPAN. A number of new members indicated that watching C·
SPAN influenced their decision to run and that they gathered important
information about their opponents and campaign strategies from C-SPAN
programming. Both new and retiring members highly praised C-SPAN for
informing the public. A number of members indlcated that C·SPAN coverage
had changed their positions or perspectives on a public issue.CIO
C-S PAN has become an invaluable tool and source of infonnation for
congressional staffs. It ranks third, behind the WashingtonPost and CNN,
as a source used every day. The over -time pattern indicates an increased
dependence on C-SPAN (see table 4).

Table4
InformationSources Used Every Day by Top Congressional Aides

1991 1992 1994

Washington Post 90 87 90
CNN 69 77 70
C-SPAN 58 66 62
National Public Radio 31 32 na
New YorkTunes 30 36 na
Wa/1Street Journal 30 40 na

Source: Surveys of over 380 senior aides in House offices conducted

by Fleishman Hillard Inc., Washington, D.C., and reported in press
releases
andpersonal
communicat:ions
wilh theauthors.

For some congressio nal staff members, C-SPAN is "backgr ound noise"
running constantly in their offices. Staffers pay attention when a key debate or
vote is in progress. For other staff, C-SPAN is an absolute necessity. One staff
member whose job it is to cover the Ooorpointedout: "C-SPAN is my life ....
I have three television[sl ... I watch constantly ... . It's almost addictive.'"''
 Competing Political Elites

Lobbyists and journalists report an increasing use of C-S PAN for monitoring
the political process. During the early C-SPAN era, when Washington, D.C .,
lacked cable service , lobbying organizations dominated the list of subscribers
to Capitol Connection (see chapter l). Today C-SPAN plays continuously in
the background in most lobbying offices. As one trade association lobbyist
pointed out: "I sit in my office every morning, watching C-SPAN 's early-
morning guests, absorb the headlines that callers point out, and listen to
Speaker Gingrich ' s televised press conference to pick up the hot news and the
buzzwords for the day. If the theme is competitiveness, I frame the interests
of my association in those tenns during my meetings with members that day.
If the theme is opportuni ty, I am sure to work that into my spiel to members.
C-SPAN allows me to more effectively play the inside-the-beltway game." 62
For jou rnali sts, becoming part of the C-S PAN audience allows them to ex-
pand their physical reach for stories. C-SPAN defies the limits of geography
in two ways. Journali sts outside of Washington now have access to many
events that only the "inside the beltway crowd" could cover previously. Ad-
ditionally, C-SPAN "transports " reporters to events that even the most liberal
expense accounts and free-time schedules would not permit. The journal-
ist's problem is greatest during campaigns, when multip le events happen at
great dis tances apart. Reporter Thomas Southwick argued that the media use
C-SPAN programming to cover campaig n events that they cannot attend,
giving them a full picture of the candidates ' performance s in a variety of set-
tings. It was clear in 1984 that "far more reporters followed the convention
proceedings via C-SPAN than via personal reporting from the convention
Ooor."63 Journalist Jeff Greenfield talked with pride about bow be was go-
ing to cover the Senate cam paign s in several states with no travel expenses .
"I am going to stay at home and tum on my television set. S,pecifically, I'm
going to watch ... C-SPAN .''64
 Other political elites outside of Washington are also regular C-SPAN view-
ers. Governors ' offices use C-SPAN to monitor events of interest to their
states. Surveys of party activists, such as participants in the Iowa party cau-
cuses, indicate that they are much more avid viewers of C-SPAN than is
the population as a whole. 65 Similar results are evident for delegates to the
national party oonventions. 66 A national survey of political elites (legisla-
tors, governors, party chairs, newspaper edi tors, CEOs of major companies,
and college presidents) indicates not only that they watch C-SPAN but also,

Copyngntocs
~atcral

244 THE C-S PAN REVOLUTION

and more important, that almost one-third credit C-SPAN with causing them
to change their minds on a public issue. 67 The lesson seems clear: above
and beyond providing access to the public 's thinking , C-SPAN serves as a
significant vehicle for informing key American political deci sion makers.

The Glitterati Contingent

Th e line between public affairs and entertainment is blurred in American so-
ciety. Entertainme nt figures regularly endorse political candida tes and causes
while a smaller continge nt of entertainment figures_have made the switch
from the sound stage and studio to the legislative chambers and meeting
rooms. It should be no surprise tbat C-SPAN can count among its loyal view-
ers several people who have made a name for themselves outside of politics.
Despite the reasonableness of this assumption, both C-SPAN and the media
Ut:bpJLe UJe leaMJU.:lUJC:UC:::>~ Ul uu ~ a:,:,wupuun, uuu, \..,-..>r l"'U.. i.1.JJUWC JU~Uld

express considerable interest in stars with a bent toward C-SPAN. The late
countercu lture rock musician Frank Zappa was prominently featured on the
cover and in a chapter of America's Town Hall. Zappa referred to C-SPAN
as "the best television available" and chafed at the suggestion that a rock
star could not be interested in politics and the future of the nation. 68 Singer
Barbra Streisand is known for her public political activity, but she admitted
that politics pervades her private life as well. She stated : "My favorite show
is C-SPAN. That' s what I watch , C-SPAN I and C-SPA.N 2. When I' m not
watching CNN.''69 It is not clear bow general such interest is, yet C-SPA.N
and the media make a great deal of the fact that C-SPAN, by counting some
of the "beautiful people" among its viewers, appeals to not only the public
affairs nerds.

The International Audience

Although it might reasonably be assumed that interest in C-SPAN is an

"American thing," an imponant international audience is developing. Se-
lected C-SPA.N programming is provided by the U.S. Information Agency's
Worldnet. Given the limited distribution and lack of internationa l surveys, the
size and composition of the international audience is even more of a mystery
than that of the U.S. audience. When C-SPAN opens its phones after ma-
jor political events, a significant number of international callers get through.
Numerou s letters indicate that the impact of C-SPAN on the political out-
look of foreign viewe~specially those in nondemocratic countries-may
be even more significant than any impact on individual American viewers.
The C-SPAN offices were abuzz about a young Chinese engineer in Hang-
chou who found C-SPAN while fiddling with the satellite dish on the roof
of the institute where he worked. He wrote, in broken English but crystal-
clear meaning , 'Throug h C-SPAN, I have learned the devoted challenging
of your people, the free debate and vote in your presidential selection, your
education system and the power of your people ."70
Above and beyond individual citizens, government bureaucrats and for-
eign leaders use C-SPAN to monitor U.S. politics. Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) discovered this firsthand. During a meeting, Egyptian President
Hosoi Mubarak told McCain, "Sometimes you and the Senate get very
aggravated." Even though they had not previously met, McCain got the dis-
tinct feeling that because of C-SPAN, Mubarak "acted as if he knew" the
U.S. representative. 71 To the degree that one believes unders tanding leads to
cooperation, C-SPAN has the potential for contributing to that cooperation.

C-SPAN Reacts to Its Audience

Although C-SPAN abhors "counting eyeballs" and refuses to adjust its pro-
gramming for the sole purpose of becoming more popular, it would like to
expand viewership on its own terms. In 1988, C-SPAN conducted a num-
ber of focus-group interviews designed to assess viewers' understanding of
the network and their suggestions for its improvement. The focus groups
included Capitol Hill staff, political professional s, and average viewers.
Focus-group suggestions have been used to make marginal changes in C-
SPAN policies and programming while retaining its basic philosophy (see
chapter 3).
Although explicitly refusing to count its audience, C-SPAN has carried
out a number of audience-building initiatives. Relying on the assumption that
people would tune in "if they only knew about us," generic advertising of the
network and promotion of specific programs were initiated. The publication
of America's TownHall in 1988 garnered significant publicity for the kind of
people who watched C-SPAN and attempted to "make it the 'in' thing to do."
The creation of an educational program, and initiatives such as the C-SPAN
bus, were designed primarily to promote C-SPAN usage (see chapter 4).
 The Audience Responds to C-SPAN

In the early years, the question "Is anyone watching?" was perfectly legiti-
mate. We now know that a significant number of people watch C-SPAN at

Copyrtg"ltoct
,..,atonal

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2:48 THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION

"their" network. McFarlin wrote a rejoinder admitting his mistake at being

so flippant. n
C-SPAN is regularly surprised by its audience's interest in network pro-
motional items and products. When Booknotesoffered a free bookmark, they
expected one thousand requests but received over ten thousand. Surveys in-
dicate that Boolawtes is one of the least-watched program s, but it draws a
well-educated and loyal audience. After the 1994 congressional election s, C-
SPAN's 1995 U.S. CongressHandbook sold over fourteen thousand copies
in the first five months.
There is consi derable evidence that members of the C-SPAN audience do
more than passively view the network and that they do not limit their politi-
cal activity to interacting with C-SPAN and its guests. C-SPAN viewers are
active in political behaviors such as voting, joining political organizations,
and communicating with elected officials . As is discussed in more detail in
chapter 8, political initiatives of the C-SPAN audience have permeated the
consciousness of political decision makers. Members of Congress regularly
report cal ls and letters from constituents activated by a C-SPAN program.
Some policy debates that in the past would have been carried out within the
dark and narrow confines of the Capitol corridors have been forced into the
sunlight by C-SPAN coverage. The change of venue bas affected the issues
included for consideration, the thought process of decision makers, and the
eventual outcomes of policy battles.

SETTINGTHE STAGEFORFUTUREACTIVATION: LoNG-TuRMPOLITICAL

PERSPECTIVESOFTHEC-SPAN AUDIENCE

Understanding the potential impact of the C-SPAN audience on the future

of the American political process involves more than assessing the discrete
and short-term political activation of individuals. The C-SPAN audience har-
bors unique and significant long-term orientations to the American political
process , orientations that have the potential for predicting the individual po-
litical behavior that members of the audience will favor in the future. Even
more important, to the degree that members of the C-SPAN audience reflect
a vanguard of opinion, understanding their outlooks on politics may well
help us understand the broader population. IfC -SPAN affects only a unique
set of individuals with a high degree of interest in publi c-a nd particularly
congressional-affairs, it is still significant. But if the C-SPAN audience is
the tip of the iceberg, reflecting outlooks acquired earlier because of en-
 Page 249 is not part of this book preview.

250 THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION

to vary according to the poll one uses. It is clear from all polls that C-SPAN
viewers are considerably more likely to have an opin ion of Congress than
are nonviewers. 79 The general pattern of poll results heartily challenges the
1970s conc lusion that there is a clear correlation between knowledge of
Congress and public support for the institution. 80
In preparation for a 1994 House Democratic leadership retreat, pollster
Mark Mellman was asked to conduct a detailed survey on public attitudes to-
ward Congress. He found that 46 percent of the national sample bad watched
C-SPAN. Those viewers were much more negative toward Congress than
we.re those who bad not watched the network. Viewers also seemed to be
aware of C-SPAN 's impact on their outlooks. Of those who had watched ,
more than twice as many (15 percent versus 6 percent) felt that what they had
seen bad made them "less favorable toward Congress ,'' whereas 22 percent
of the respo ndents perceived no effect, and 57 percent did not know if their
attitudes bad cbanged. 81 Overall , the results of the poll indicated significant
dissatis faction with Congress and particularly with the sitting Democratic
leadership. Mellman concluded, "To watch Congress is not to love it ...
people see partisan debate and confuse it with parti san bickering ; they see
the legislative proce ss and confuse it with inaction." 82 Asked to participate
in the meeting, Brian Lamb sat a bit uncomfortably as his network was indi-
rectly accused with causing some of the Democrats ' problems. Democratic
leaders were described as "surprised and concerned " about the finding s, and
one observer noted that the "air was reverberating" from the briefing .83 At-
tende es left the room with a pretty good idea that the 1994 elections would
 be a challenge for Democratic candidates. In the end, the poll had tapped
real public concern. All thirty-two House incumbents defeated in the 1994
general election were Democrats, and Republican s took over both the House
and the Senate.
Participants such as Representative J. Roy Rowland (D-GA) felt that tele-
vising Congress may have hurt the institution's image. H.e argued: "Some
of the things that go on have to be awfully disturbing to people ... some
of the petty arguments that people get into. I think that detracts from the
stature of the institution." 84 Brian Lamb reported, "I've been told person-
ally by high-ranking members of Congress that they made a mistake ever
opening up the process to television." 85 Other members attributed the defeat
of the Democrats in 1994 partially to the presence of the cameras and the
inability of Congress to explain its complex procedures and seeming ly dam-
aging norms of partisan behavior. Such opinions were not often expressed

Copyrtgntocs
r:'latoral

THE C-SPANAUOLENCE 251

publicly, however, since attacking openness in the policy process and taking
on C-SPAN are like questioning motherhood and apple pie.
Most comments regarding C-SPAN from practitioners and the media are
positive, pointing out its contribution to a better-informed population. CBS
newsman Charles Kuralt praised C-SPAN in 1987: "Don' t go looking for
the country bumpkin in the country. He bas been watching the Iran-Contra
hearings on C-SPAN, and he is likely to be better informed than his city
cousins. In a country that depends for its life on an informed citii.enry, this
• •• . •• • •• Q,r;,
is all to the good:' 86
Criticism of C-SPAN emphasized the shortcomings of Congress in prop-
erly dealing with the new m.edia age. Some observers argued that Congress
needs to clean up its act and allow more C-SPAN rather than less. Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute scholar Norman Ornstein proposed a Congress that
would make its policy process more understandable, and he supported the
more aggressive use ofC-SPAN by party leaders both in general and specif-
ically to explain ongoing votes as they happen. 87 As we wiU see in chapter
7, C-SPAN itself and the new Republican leadership considered this issue
after the 1994 elections.

The C-SPAN Audi ence and Citizenship

Far from being simply cynical naysayers, members of the C-SPAN audience
exhibit a sophisticated mix of enlighte ned criticism and tempered hope. Ac-
cording to a detailed analysis, regular C-SPAN viewers were described as
"vehemently anti- Washington, yet at the same time ... strikingly non-cynical
and deeply convinced of the importance of one individual's participat ion in
the American democratic process despite a deep discontent with the status
quo:•88
C-SPAN viewers hope to use watching C-SPAN as a tool for empower-
ment. On standard questions dealing with political alienation and efficacy
(the utility of becoming involved in politics), regular C-SPAN viewers in
1992 revealed themselves as more positive about politics, the political pro-
cess, and their potential for having an impact At the same time, they wanted
to change the current leadership by "throwi ng the rascals out." Regular C-
SPAN viewers were seeming ly inconsistent about the role of government in
society. They were willing to support an active involvement in social poli-
cies, but they generally felt that the government controls too much of our
lives (see table 5). There is little evidence that this was purely a partisan re-
 Page 252 is not part or this book preview.

THE C-SPAN AUDIENCE 253

sponse to Democratic control of Congress , since the C-SPAN audience at

that time included a slightly higher percentage of Democrats than did the
population as a whole.

Conclusion

Awareness of C-SPAN and of the size of its audience has grown dramati-
cally over the last two decades. The audience remains a niche audience of
upscale viewers with higher-than-average education, income, and interest
in politics. Beyond the generalizations, the audience represents a relatively
broad spectrum of Americans-in many cases broader than the audiences
for comparable upscale news outlets.
Although numbers count in business, media, and politics, the size of
the C-SPAN audience may well be less important than its composition
and its proclivity to act on its political beliefs. The C-SPAN viewership
counts among its members an elite group of policymakers and staff who de-
pend on the network for substantive, monitoring , and political-scheduling
information.
Regular C-SPAN viewers are not content 10 simply watch politics happen.
They inform themselves through a wide variety of sources and participate
in the political process in both traditional and nontraditional ways. In many
aspects , C-SPAN viewers support James Madison's plea: "A popular Gov-
ernment without popular information , or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the oower which knowledge gives." 89
304 THJ; C-SPAN R£VOL 1JTION

government channe ls to its current House and Senate channels), even the C-
SPAN audience(s) will come away with different infonnation , vocabularies,
and understandings .

IN CREASING THE TRANSPAREN CY OF GoVERNMENT

Proving the potentially broad-range impact of C-SPAN on democratic gov-

ernment is impossible at this time. But even if the optimistic hopes of its
supponers or the cautionary predictions of its detractors fail to material-
ize, C-SPAN does provide its viewers with extensive information on public
affairs.
C-SPAN's programming goes well beyond opening the doors of the House
and the Senate. C-SPAN has shown its viewers public affairs events tra-
ditionally reserved for a very small and select audience . In the process,
C-SPAN has not only informed its viewers but also, in some cases, changed
the events themselves. Some organizations-realizing the potential impact
of came ras- now bar C-SPAN.
Much of what goes on in Washington happens behind closed door s. For
decades, events such as the Gridiron Club and the Washington Press Club
Dinner served as places where politician s and journalists could let down
their hair and parody both their colleagues and the political process. Stories
of the happening s at these events filtered out through the print media, but
these versions were pale representations of the actual performances. Hear-
ing about Richard Nixon playing the piano or about Bill and Hillary Clinton
dressing up as the anti-health care advocates " Harry and Louise" falls into
the category of "you just had to be there."
For a number of years, C-SPAN attempted to get access 10 such events.
The Gridiron Club, the "Who's Who" of the Washington press corps. has
met annually for over one hundred years to "don funny costumes 10 roast the
President." 2s The event is clear ly off-the-record, although summaries of the
parodies often show up in newspaper repons. The media, which sponsor the
dinners and fight for open access in other realms, bar cameras, despite some
embarrassmen t. Each year C-SPAN request, acce.,s and is politely turned
down. The organizers of the Washington Press Club Dinne-r were also not ex-
cited about televised coverage of its satire, but they nevenheless decided to
allow the C-SPAN coverage. The implications of this change failed to inhibit
many of the participants. In 1990, Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
seemingly overstepped the boundaries of political correctness when she ex-
 C.SPAN's IMPACT: A Vu,w FROM THEOUTSID
E 305

pressed the somewhat off-color comment that she wondered bow men were
supposed to feel when they beard ..those S&L ads on the radio that say, 'Se·
vere penalties for early withdrawal .' " 26 Representative Claudine Schneider
(R -RJ) repeated a fictitious conversation with Senator Alan Cranston (D ·
CA) in which he supposedly asked her ..if she knew the difference between
a Caesar salad and sex, and she replied ' no,' only to be asked: 'Then what
are you doing for lunch tomorrow?' " 27 Columnist Mary McGrory, writ•
ing about the dinner , said that " the best lines were too blue to repeat." She
noted that if a man had made a woman the butt of such a raunchy jo ke, ''that
man would be having a farewell news conference in shon order." The C-
SPAN phones "burned with enraged calls." 28 With such events now going
on -the -record via C-SPAN, both good taste and even the application of polit•
ical correctness will probably follow . C-SPAN is holding the Fourth Estate
accountable, even as the media hold the rest of soc iety accountable.
During election campaig ns, C-SPAN offers its viewers political events in
their entirety, cinema verite coverage of candidates on the campaign trail,
analysis of political advenisiog , and call-in programs . For those concerned
about sound-bi te journalism and the dangers of political advertising, the ex•
pansion of information sources may have a positive effect. Speaking about
the broad range of cable and talk-show programming , of which C-SPAN is
a pan, Kathleen Hall -Jamieson , media critic and author of Packagingthe
President, argued that the new environment has a " mitigating effect on the
candidate's own advertisements ... . The ads were the primary source of
information for the uninvo lved viewer until this year, now the uninvolved
viewer has another forum." 29

Keeping the Participants Informed about Other Players

Creating a better-informed public wa.~clearly the primary intention when the

cable industry founded C-SPAN, but the public 's tool also provides signif.
icant information benefits for those who are being monitored . Some of the
most ardent viewers of C-SPAN are members of Congres s and other mem•
hers of the Washington establishment. Television sets run constantly in mo st
congre ss ional offices, allowing members and their staffs to monito r ongo-
ing debate both for content and for "heads -up " information as to when the
member might be required on the floor for a vote or a quorum call. Even
when members are home at night or are back in their di stricts, they use C·
SPAN for both entertainment and edification . As consummate politician s,
Pages 306 to 309 are not shown in this preview.
310 THE C-SPAN REVOLU'flON

by real-time monitoring. "A president can watch his cabinet members and
aides testify . Before . he couldn't know bow one of bis appointees was do-
ing on Capitol Hill. Now be can see them perfonn.'" 7 Tom Mann , of the
Brookings Institution , described C-SPAN as becoming "a central part of
the Washington insider network" and as having a "leveling impact " on the
distribution of information within Washiogton. 48
It is not only the policymakers who use C-SPAN for strategic monitoring.
Lobbyist Gary Hymel stated that C-SPAN cuts his office workload in half.
" We don't have 10 go to the House and try to keep a mental note of what 's
going on .... When a bill is being debated on the House floor ... we take
notes , eat lunch , and drink coffee , and tape it for a permanent record - we
can ' t do any of these things in the House gallery." 49
Not all of the implications of C-SPAN are positive for lobbyist s, who make
their living by portraying themselves as ultimat e insiders . ln one lobbyi st's
view, the ability of client s to watch political activitie s was "ju st another in
a serie s of events" that bad "basically taken the mystique away from what' s
going on in Washington. " He explained, "Anything that removes or takes
away from the mystique of the Washington lobbyist can ultimately have an
impact on the values, the amount of fees that one can justify charging in
this business ." Since the inception of C-SPAN, some lobbyists have "found
themselves caught off guard by clients who monitor floor action from their
office televisions." As one lobbyist noted: "When you have a client in Om -
aha, Nebraska , and you cal l him up and tell him, 'I just came up from the
House floor and this is what happened ,' in the old days, that client would be
preny impressed. Now, he calls you and says, 'I ju st saw this on the House
floor on C-SPAN .' " 50
The presence of the C-SPAN cmneras can also draw back the veil of polit-
ical events and reveal less-than -ftanering images. Using its typical , complete
form, C-SPAN covered the 1993 gay rights march. While the commercial
networks worked to portray the event carefully , " showing little of the scenes
many Americans would find disturbing , . .. C-SPAN showed the even t
in unexpurgated format. including scenes of tople ss women, homosexual
embraces, men in drag and leather , and other images and language not com-
monly viewed by most Americans." 51 The shock started the C-SPAN phone s
ringing and resulted in an avalanche of media notoriety for C-SPAN. Most
viewers blamed the marchers for going too far and prai sed C-SPAN for
showing the real picture of the event.
 C-SPAN's IMPACT:
A Vrnw FROMTHE OUTSIDE 311

C..SPAN and the News Media

Above and beyond informing participants and influencing political deci-

sion makers, C-SPAN has changed both the substance and the procedures of
those who interpret politics for the public. It is no coincidence that the term
"media" appears in the middle of the word "intermediary" -they both come
from the same root (medius, "to be in the middle"). The news media stand
as intennediaries between the public and acrual events , picking and choos-
ing which events to report and determining the way in which those events
will be interpreted. As an alternative media source, C-SPAN changed the na -
ture and rang e of available information. Its gavel-to-gavel approach allows
viewers to circumvent the selection choices made by the mainstream media.

DEFINING " NEWS"

All media are selective. The word "new s" itself should be a tipoff . It is the ar-
0
chaic pluralof the word"new,"meaning"differentu or 0 out of the ordinary.
The headline "Dog Bites Man " is not news, but "Man Bites Dog" may be . In
public affairs , it is conflicting public personalities that draw the media like
moths to a ftame.s1 What distinguishes C-SPAN from most other media is its
focus on "long-form" reporting. With its larger "news hole " of twen1y-fo ur
hours on two channels and its commitment to gavel -to-gavel coverage of
political events, C-SPAN avoids sound-bite journalism, which by intention
hones in on political personalities in co nflict. When C-SPAN covers events
other than House and Senate proceedings, it does make journalistic cho ices
concerning which events to cover, but the choices are driven by more than
conflict and personalities. Issues of balance and a commitment to covering
those events avoided by the othe r media figure significan tly in C-SPAN ed-
itorial decisions. With perhaps a bit of exaggeration, Thomas Southwick.
then of Mulli channel News, a cable industry insiders' publication, predicted,
"The 1988 election will break the stranglehold of 1he broadcast networi<.s
over the political process and usher in a new era in whic h the most important
conduit of information . .. will be [the] cab le television network C-SPAN:• S)
For C-SPAN, news is largely event -driven. The network covers sessions of
Congress, presidential speeches, candidate announcements , committee hear-
ings, and public policy confe .rences. Its emphas is on covering entire events
provides the raw material for interested citizens and for other media . In the
process. C..SPAN has changed 001 only the information that is available but
312 Tue C-SPAN REVOLUTION

also public expectationsof news coverage and the strategies of both media
seekers and media practitioners.

EXPANDING THE RAw MATERIAL OF RECORDED EVENTS

ln the not-so-distant past, news did not exist unless a reporter either was
there or couldget a reliable firsthandaccount Just like the old philosophical
question of whether a falling tree in a forest makes any noise if there is no
one there to hear it, news is not news unlessthere is someonethere to record
and report it Even if a reporter is on hand, be or she may not perceive the
newsworthinessof some portionof an eventor mayreport it differentlyfrom
another observer.ln the past, it was common to bear rumblingsabou1a par-
ticularly insightfulcomment,emotional moment, or outrageous statement.
followedby the caveat, "I guess you just had to be there." The uniqueness
of C-SPAN lies in its being "there" so predictably and so often. Forcer-
tain events, such as congressionalfloor debates and presidential speeches,
journalists knowthat C-SPANwill always "be there."

C-SPAN as the "Medium of Record "

Increasingly, C-SPANhas become the "mediumof record" for both official

and unofficialpublic affairs events. It is not so much that C-SPANmakes
news as the fact thatC-SPAN's large ''news hole" and eclecticnews-gathering
approach permanentlycapture a wide range of events.
After an event is identifiedas having news value, print journalists and re-
porters from the mainstreamelectronic media often tum to C-SPANtapes
to refresh their recollectionsor to get a feel for an event they were unable 10
cover. Most often this involves a mad dash down to C-SPANheadquarters
to reviewa tape or a call to C-SPANto see when a program will be re-aired.
C-SPANprovidesother media with footage for their programs.
It is true that the existence of C-SPANis not a necessarycondition for
clips of congressional floor debate to appear on other television programs,
since the networkscan receiveand tape the floordebate directly.But usually
it is mucheasier for them to go to C-SPANfor the f00t.age.More important,
events on the floor becomenews becausethe participantshave already expe-
rienced them. In many cases C-SPAN'sdisseminationof a story alerts those
"in the know" about an interesting event, and the news media lben widen
the circle and make more peopleaware. Aside from congressionalfloor de-
 C-SPAN'sIMPACT: A VtEwFROMTHE OUTSIDE 303

mation. As media critic Molly Ivins put it: 'The trouble with call-in shows
is that there is no check on the misinformation they spread. Some earnest
nut case calls in and says something preposterous-'( hear Ed Meese has
AIDS '-a nd before you know [it] that rumor has made the circuit of the
other call-in shows, and you can't kill the darn thing with a stick."23
The danger of call-in politics is exacerbated by the potential of organized
call-in campaigns orchestrated by groups or individuals. Far from provid-
ing the equivalent of an electronic town meeting where all views are heard,
such orchestration ensures that public responses will not be random . Presi-
dential candidate Ross Perot regularly instructed his followers , "See us on
C-SPAN ;' With a stacked audience, the calls often seemed more like a love
feast than a critical analysis of policy alternatives .

Societal Fragmemation

Althougb most of us revel in the expanding base of infonnation resources,

a word of caution is warranted. Societies require a common base of lan-
guage and shared information for members to communicate and interact
effectively. Some cultural diversity is possible , even desirable, but a society
without some degree of shared perspectives has a precarious future. In the
modem era, network television has served, to an extent, as the "cultural glue
that certainly has held this democracy together."24 Cultural defining events,
such as the Watergate hearings and the miniseries Root.r, provide viewers
with a common base of knowledge and shape virtually the whole society 's
views on key public issues.
With the explosion of diverse cable channels providing unique prognun-
ming and perspectives, society cou ld lose its common point~ of reference ,
resulting in a more fragmented society. Fragmentation comes in two types .
Substantive fragmentation, stemming from personal programming prefer-
ences. will lead to people with an in-depth understanding of more and more
narrow realms. Simultaneously , access fragmentation devolves from the
differential ability to pay for cable access. The difference between informa-
tion "haves" and information "have-nots" in the cable era will be dramatic.
C-SPAN is little more than a player in this broader trend toward "cableiza-
tion," but it may well inordinately contribute to the fragmentation in the
realm of public affairs. With the planned expansion of C-SPAN to five or
more separate channels (adding international, committee hearings , and state
 A White House Channel
C-SPANcoverage of the White House has run into two problems. The com-
mitment to covering House and Senate sessions live and gavel-to-gavel, no
matter what, reduces C-SPAN's flexibility in covering White House press
conferences and speeches, which often occur while Congress is in session.
Second, C-SPANis committed to serving as an alternate source of program-
ming of events that the other media fail to cover. The other networks tend to
cover the major White House events in their entirety. C-SPAN does provide
viewers access to these events on a delayed basis.
But there are many White House events, such as bill-signing ceremonies
and press briefings, that are not currently well covered. The idea of allowing
cameras into cabinet and staff meetings is tantalizing. The Clinton White
House is particularly interested in providing more television access. It sees
the political advantage of getting to the public directly and repositioning
the way that C-SPAN "tilts our perception of what government does toward
Congress.'>46 The downside of expanded White House coverage is largely
political. Since the White House has decades of experience in mastering
public relations, it would be difficult to distinguish between legitimate pub-
lic affairs forums and purely self-serving political events.47 Additionally, if
the C-SPAN focus is on programmingfrom the White House, the incum-
bent president's increasing use of the network could jeopardize C-SPAN's
commitment to balance. A channel about the presidency has more potential
for offering a balanced view. Coverage could include academic conferences,
historical footage, and critics of the current president. C-SPAN's ability to
engage its audience by offering call-in programs after presidential events
would provide a useful service.

Opening the FederalBureaucracy

Some of the mostcritical government decisions occur in the bureaucracy.De-
cisions as to how laws are implemented are often based on hearings presided
over by bureaucrats. The move toward openness in government means that
Copyrtgitoo :-r.ato,ial
348 TH E C-SPAN R EVOLUT ION

for the public." 50 Responding to a similar question during his confinnation,

Justice Clarence Thomas voiced qualified support: "I have no objection be-
yond my concern that the cameras be as unobtrusive as possible ... it's good
for the American public to see what's going on.''51
C-SPAN and the rest of the media keep hoping that the Supreme Court
will follow the lead of the forty-seven state court systems, which allow some
form of television coverage. Between 199 I and I994 a three-year experi-
ment in the federal court system revealed no significant negative results. Yet
despite the fact that surveys of trial participants indicated that the presence
of the cameras "did not disrupt court proceedings, affect participants in the
proceedings or interfere with the administration of justice," the experiment
was abandoned by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Judicial Conference.52 The
hope was that positive results would put pressure on the Supreme Court,
but none seemed to be forthcoming. The perceived media circus associated
with coverage of high-visibility criminal trials, such as the Menendez broth-
ers and the 0. J. Simpson trials, undermined any immediate move toward
expanded C-SPAN access to the courts.

State and Local Goverronent

State and local government offers an immense range of potential progr.un-
ming options for C-SPAN. Many state legislatures already allow cameras
to cover some or all of their proceedings. More than a half dozen states
have established systems for gavel-to-gavel distribution of the proceedings
of at least one chamber (California , Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island).53 A number of the state
systems were directly inspired by or modeled after C-SPAN. There is an
active debate in other states about i.nstaUing cameras.
Required "ope n meeting" laws in many states create a large number of
possible venues for C-SPAN cameras. So far, C-SPAN has limited itself to
coverage of governors' "State of the State" speeches, inaugurations, and se-
 coverage of governors' "State of the State" speeches , inaugurations, and se-
lected state legislative sessions . The task of selecting which meetings to cover
and the cost of remote camera crews temper some of C-SPAN 's enthusiasm
for fuller coverage of state and local public affairs.

International: Capturing the World

While the jet airplane has physically reminded many American s that the
world is getting smal ler, worldwide satellite transmi ssions that electronically

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350 THE C-SPANR EVOLUTION

ming but rather the lack of enthusiasm by cable systems to carry another
C-SPAN channel. The combination of "must carry" legislation (see chapter
2) and limited channel capacity leaves little room for new C-SPAN channels.
In addition , the slower-than-anticipated growth of C-SPANll has tempered
the board 's enthusiasm for additional channels at this time. The predicted
arrival of five-hundred-channel systems in the near future, however, has en-
couraged C-SPAN to keep itself ready for the expansion. C-SPAN has three
new channels on the drawing boards. One would cover a wider ranger of
congressional committees, the second would focus on · international pro-
gramming, and the third would emphasize business and finance. Just as it
did two decades ago, C-SPAN assumes that with expanded channel capac-
 • •
ity, the need for additional programming will offer it an ope ning not only
for the three planned new channels but also, possibly, for a host more.

NEW DEL IVERY OPTIONS

C-SPAN was created as a delivery vehicle to disseminate the House televi -

sion s ignal via cab le television. The fledgling cable industry was willing to
jettison its journalistic load and accept the House feed on the House 's terms.
Only slowly did the industry get into the business of venturing beyond Con-
gress and producing its own programming. As technology changes, C-SPAN
is faced with a dilemma: does it blindly repay its loyalty to cable. or does it
look out for its own interests first?

Funded, Founded, or Forgottenby Cable?

To some degree the cable industry is a victim of its own success. In less than
two decades it penetrated the population to an extent that most commercial
entities would envy. For most Americans, cable is no longer an option but is
the same as any other utility to be paid for each month. C-SPAN has benefited
the cable industry well, acting as its public affairs flagship. CS PAN program ,
ming and publications prominently displayed the phrase, "Private ly funded
to serve the public by America's cab le telev ision companies." The cable in-
dustry used this demonstrable commitment to the public interest in its battles
over licensing and regulation. C-SPAN also helped build a subscriber base
as a growing and vocal set of viewers opted for cable because of C-SPAN.
One longtime C-SPAN board member described C-SPAN as the "low
maintenance child of the cable industry ... the good kid ... the one to be
proud of." He also pointed out that like the good kid in the family, C-SPAN
 THE FUTUREOF C-SPAN 351

could be overlooked: there is the temptation to forget about its growth and
developme nt while expending effort on the "problem children."S4C-SPAN
could be in jeopardy if the cable industry talces it for granted.
The contemporary cable industry is experiencing a dramatic change. The
age of small, mom-and -pop cable operations bas given way to the almost
daily announcements of acquisitions and the creation of massive Multiple
System Operators (MSOs). As cable bas become more businesslike, financial
bottom lines increase in importance. Cable's loyalty to C-SPAN--<:able's
"public affairs flagship"-was once based on the personal experiences of
board members or on an idealistic commitment to better informing the pub-
lic. Today, loyalty must satisfy the demands of a cost-benefit analysis. Some
cable executives, while praising C-SPAN, point out that their "sacrifice" in
providing the network did not do them much good in the battle over the 1992
cable bill.
The uncertainty about future technologie s has created new lines of cleav-
age. Although the cable industry was never "one big happy family," the areas
of disagreement over regulation were relatively limited. In the old days , cable
operators fought over the rights to cable particular geographic areas. Today,
some cable companies maintain a complete commitment to cable delivery,
while others are actively exploring and backing new technologie s such as
wireless cable and direct-broadca st satellite systems (see later discussion).
One cable industry executive and C-SPAN board member, who did not want
to be identified , blurted out: "In the future it will be rid.iculous to talk about
the cable industry. With the growing diversity of delivery options, there is
little we will have in common:•SS
ln the proces s of building the demand for cable , the industry has created
an audience that expects expanded choices and options. The five-hundred -
channel cable system option based on compressed video seems to be within
sight, although most analysts predict that the more likely figure is closer
to two hundred channels. The availability of more channe ls offers C-SPAN
the opportunity to expand its programming but also raises the potential that
me opponunny 10 expano its prograrrurung out aiso raises cne po1ennai rnac
it will get lost in the glut of new options. On the positive side, C-SPAN 's
marginal cost in creating new channels is considerably lower than the cost of
creating a network from scratch, and its low direct cost to cable companie s
makes it an unlikely target for cost cutting. Market analysts have pointed
out that even with expanded channels, the difficulties of launching a new
network are significant in this age of "picky viewers." Those independent
networks most likely to succeed will need large infusions of money, exist-

Copyng'ltedmator1a1

352 TH E C-SPAN REVOLUTION

ing libraries of video materials , and/or sister networks to help feed them
programming. s6 C-SPAN has the latter two and could expand its channels
relatively inexpensively.
From the audience perspective, the program-rich new environment will
require more work to receive maximum benefit. The time it will take to read
through the traditional printed television guide will eat up most of one 's dis-
cretionary television time . Channel- surfing through hundreds of channel s
will no longer be a realistic option for most viewers. More sophisticated pro-
gramming guidance will be necessary. Either the cable industry will come
to grips with thi s problem or the situation will spawn a new set of comput-
erized products designed to help one navigate through the options. As cable
moves toward on-demand programmi ng (see later discussio n) the problem
will be exacerbated.
 Direct-BroadcastSystems

The Achilles ' heel of the cable industry is the cable itself. Installation and
maintenance costs saddle local cable companies with a continuing upkeep
burden. Local managers look with dread at approachi ng storm clouds and
major construction projects , knowing that disruptions in service are the likely
result~ausing the phones to ring o.ff the hook as dissatisfied customers
complain that their cable is out.
Direct-broadcast systems reduce the number of things that can go wrong,
and they put the burde n on the co nsumer. Receiving cable programming via
a satellite dish has long been possible , but the costs and inconvenience of a
three- to nine-foot dish have dampened the demand. Although C-SPAN has
never been scrambled, access to much of the programming required special
equipment. The arrival of small and less expensive dishes (seven hundred
dollars ) for home use has ushered in the direct -broadcast era. Direct broad-
cast, or direct to home (DTH), reached about a half million home s in its first
year . Although the figures look small compared with the cable potential of
over sixty million homes , such figures would have looked significant in the
early years of cable. DTH established a foothold in the distribution realm
and created a m.ecbanism for generati ng ongoing revenue. Like cable opera-
tors , DTH syste ms charge customers a fee and in turn compensate program
providers such as C-SPAN.
To some degree , the cable industry in the 1990s acted much like network
 THE FUTUREOf C-SPAN 353

television in the 1970s, attempting to first ignore and then thwart an emerg-
ing technology. Many of the once radical pioneers of the cable industry saw
the propo nents of the new technology as unrealistic upstarts. Other cable
operators decided that it was "better to join them than to fight them" and
became partners in PrimeStar's 0TH initiative.
C-SPAN initially hesitated to selJ its programming to 0T H systems but
eventually accepted the 1992 cable law requirement that it must sell to all
d istribution venues. The decision belied C-SPAN's logo of being "funded by
cable television ," so this was changed with a stroke of the pen to "created by."
C-SPAN has not faced its last technology-driven distribution challenge.
Considerable work is being done on distribution of television signals over
phone lines. For the foreseeable future, the well-entrenched cable system will
continue to serve as the backbone of C-SPAN distribution , but C-SPA.N now
has a programming base that makes it appealing to alternative distribution
systems that can pay its modest fees.

Other Distribution Mechanis111s

Various alternative mechanism .s for delivering television signals, such as
wireless cable and the use of telephone lines to transmit digitized video, are in
the developing stage. The entrance of telephone companies into the delivery
of video has prompted numerous questions concerning access to program-
ming and regulation. For example, if video delivery by telephone companies
is treated the same way as telephone service, the "co mmon carrier" rules
would deny telephone companies the right to control the programming they
deliver.
C-SPAN is approaching these new technologies with an open mind. On
the one band it has a commitment to-and a board of directors dominated
by-the cable industry ; on the other hand, it cannot afford to let old loyalties
preclude new opportunities.
 C-SPAN: AN IDEA WH OSE nME HAD CoME 47

SORTTNG OUT THE QU ESTIONS OF ACCESS

As C-SPAN expanded its programming beyond simply transmitting floor

proceedings, i.ssues concerning the right to cover congressional events arose.
As a result of the push for congressional openness during the 1970s, C-
SPAN was allowed to cover most com.mittees, but committee members could
still ban coverage of spec ific sessions and types of sessions. Powerful com-
mittees like the House Rule s Committee, which schedule s legislation, were
very hesitant to allow the cameras in. The Republican minority regularly
complained that the Democrat s closed such meetings out of fear of political
embarrassment. Other committees, such as House Administration. used the
excuse that their hearing rooms were too small to accommodate the cam-
eras. Over the years, C-SPAN became more aggressive about commenting on
denied access. When the House Telecommunication s Subcommitt ee closed
its markup session on cable regulation , C-SPAN bitterly commented: "It' s
ironic. A subcommittee hearing about television and they're not allowing
cameras in."82
One of the major sticking points was access to markup sessions,- the meet-
ings in which the final details of legislation are agreed on. Many committees
regularly barred the cameras from such sessions. Brian Lamb complained:
"What I find interesting is that I've been personally lobbied by members of
the House and Senate to cover any number of hearings .... It seems a little
bit strange that when we get down to the most importa nt part of the process,
at a critical point, they won't let cameras in." 83