GUARDIAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY The L PDF

GUARDIAN OF THE
EAST INDIA COMPANY

‘There are roads in solitude and rivers in the
desert, but there are no roads and no rivers in
a man who is always mixed up with other men.’
[Paurvels & Bergier]
GUARDIAN OF THE
EAST INDIA COMPANY
The Life of
Laurence Sulivan
By
George K. McGilvary
Tauris Academic Studies

LONDON·NEW YORK
Published in 2006 by Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of
I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com
In the United States of America and in Canada distributed by

St. Martins Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
Copyright © George K. McGilvary, 2006
The right of George K. McGilvary to be identified as the author of this work

has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any
part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission
of the publisher.
International Library of Historical Studies (Vol. 34)

ISBN 1 85043 856 0
EAN: 978 1 85043 856 4
A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library.
A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Library of Congress catalog card available
Printed and bound in Great Britain by T. J. International Ltd., Padstow,

Cornwall from camera-ready-copy edited and supplied by the author.
To
Margaret
Ever constant
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xiii
1 Bombay and Origins 1713-52 1

2 London and India House 1753-63 23
3 The Court of Directors 1755-58 38
4 Priorities 1757-65 51
5 India: Developments and Plans 1757-65 72
6 Feuds and Peace Treaties 1757-63 87
7 Activities: Public and Private 1757-63 109
8 Challenge: Defeat: and Reflection 1757-65 130
9 Fresh Start and New Game 1765-67 147
10 Great Designs and Personal Struggles 1768-72 160
11 Defences Breached 1769-73 174
12 Desperation and Defiance 1774-78 195
13 Fight for Survival 1774-78 205
14 Restoration 1778-82 220
15 Transformation 1780-84 232
16 Personal Loss and Political Revival 1781-83 244
17 Closing of an Era 1782-86 255
18 Endings 1784-86 266
Abbreviations 280
Chapter Notes and References 281
Bibliography 305
Glossary 315
Index 317
vii
Preface
This is the life of a man whose career was centred in London’s eighteenth
century business world. He worked from India House in Leadenhall Street,
headquarters of the East India Company, but with a place reserved for him at
the highest levels of national government.
The book concentrates upon what went on in London and from the
perspective of the Company’s leader. It is not a recitation of what happened
in the Indian sub-continent – although Sulivan’s policies with regard to India
and reaction to events and other particulars originating there do come into
play.
As well as management of all manner of domestic business, he and his
fellow Directors had to deal with the impact made by events taking place
abroad. The cataclysmic eruptions overseas, beginning with war in 1756,
invariably affected the Company as well as the ‘City’ and Parliament.
This life at the heart of business in London, and at the centre of power in
the Company (as often as not its chief spokesman) led Sulivan into deep
involvement in the nation’s affairs. Consistently, he was caught up in many of
the major developments and controversies of the time. Some of these crises
and events in which he was involved have already been subjected to analysis
by others, but lack the ‘Sulivan’ dimension.
The most arresting feature about Sulivan was the extent to which he lived
just for the East India Company. It dominated his waking and sleeping hours.
He was a living encyclopaedia upon its affairs, forever up-to-date regarding
business, home and abroad. He was the Company’s guardian angel,
continually striving to ensure that it would suffer no wrong.
Assumption of such an all-knowing role sprang from natural ability and
length of service, but he also wanted to don such a mantle. Whether in or out
of the Company’s executive at India House he found himself resolving things
or having to make decisions. Invariably he did so almost single-handed,
although working within the bounds of committee structures and factions.
ix
For great swathes of time Sulivan controlled India patronage, so much so
that within public and private circles he was known as a ‘king maker’. He was
also an arch politician, a negotiator and manipulator. If the Company was
involved in any way, he was the man who just had to be consulted. In or out
of executive office he served as a human interface, enabling Company
servants, Directors and Proprietors to come together; with whom
Parliamentary interests and commercial entrepreneurs found common
ground; and where developments in India, attendant problems, upheavals,
and all else, found an understanding mind.
During a century of change, he was energetically involved at the centre of
power. He is to be found planning and executing naval and military
strategies; commanding and supplying adequate manpower, equipment and
supplies for war and other emergencies; while running everyday concerns and
liaising with Governments. His aims and achievements were to impact upon
countless individuals, and affected British society then and in future years.
The ramifications of much that he was engaged in reached outwith British
shores. His exploits also shed additional light on the lives of many of those
he was involved with, such as Chatham, Clive, Hastings, Burke and Pitt the
Younger. The qualities and abilities he displays are breathtaking.
Sulivan regarded himself as a public man (and was looked upon as such)
although strictly speaking he was a London business man, a director and
proprietor of a private monopolistic Company. The fact of the matter,
however, is that he was part of the governing nexus, shaping the future
direction of events in the Indies and in Britain; and his role was crucial at a
time when the Company’s new relationship with the state was being re-
defined.
He is certainly important enough to justify the in-depth treatment given
here. Moreover, in analysing why he sought such power over the East India
Company in the first place, and why he fought so stubbornly for the
Honourable Company’s interest and survival against individuals and
governments alike, a very human story emerges. Not least, in this respect, are
the implications of his financial tragedy, for himself and his family and the
others it touched, such as the Burkes.
A striking fact to emerge is how very well known Sulivan was during his
years of complete control of the East India Company, a feature that is more
marked when contrasted with today’s woeful ignorance. He was regarded as
something of a phenomenon then. In London, from 1757 to 1786, he was
the subject of gossip, newspaper comment and pamphlet war. His name was
as well known to contemporaries as that of other public figures from all
walks of life. He was always to be found showing the way at India House,
whose Courts and committee rooms he graced for 31 years.
His achievements were many and the following list signifies some of the
specific and striking claims that he can lay claim to:-
• He was the accepted leader of the largest and most powerful private
Company on earth at that time.
x
• In all probability he was the most able individual ever to be involved
with East India Company business and its most astute servant. No one
else approaches him in stature.
• He ranks beside Clive and Hastings in East India Company history; and
figures large in the story of Britain’s imperial ventures.
• Sulivan was mainly responsible for eventual success in the East Indies
against the French and their allies. He (not Chatham) orchestrated
Company forces operating in the east; and he was responsible, in
particular, for success in the Indian theatre of the Seven Years War.
• Clause 11 in the final treaty of peace was every word his own.
• He was on hand again from 1778 to 1784, helping the Company through
the chaotic war situation in the Carnatic.
• While in Bombay he fearlessly exposed fraud and corruption, at every
level; and initiated reforms in Customs, and the collection of revenues.
These improvements and alterations he later implemented in every
Presidency.
• Following his struggle to gain control of the Company, beginning in
1757, he initiated and carried through the financial rescue of 1758/59,
saving the organisation from bankruptcy.
• By increasing exports of materials and goods to India, while cutting back
in specie, he commenced a revolution in commerce.
• He completely overhauled and reorganised the Company’s secretarial
structure at India House to meet the new demands put upon it.
• He resolutely resisted moves towards autonomy in India, particularly
Bengal, maintaining control from India House.
• He was the creator, champion and guardian of Warren Hastings – who
he deluged with proposals and detailed plans.
• In London he organised and led the defence of the Governor-General
against ministerial attack, whether or not this was understood at the time
by his friend in Bengal.
• He was largely responsible for the appointment of Lord George
Macartney as Governor of Madras; and for the appointment of many
others to high position.
• He was a more than adequate adversary of his one time friend and
business colleague, Robert Clive, in the feud that developed from 1759
onwards.
• He and Edmund Burke conducted an increasingly serious quarrel after
prior joint-business adventures left them both impoverished.
• Their enmity was conducive to Burke’s alignment with Clive; so much so
that despite his Lordship’s death, his struggle with Sulivan transformed
into one of Burke/Francis versus Sulivan/Hastings. All of this had a
bearing on the subsequent impeachment of Warren Hastings.
• Much of Sulivan’s thinking is reflected in the India Act of 1784. From as
early as 1757 he began planning reform of the Company at home, and of
its settlements abroad. Over the years ministerial bureaucrats such as
xi
Atkinson and Jenkinson clandestinely sought his advice and expertise.
Finally he was asked for and placed his suggestions and essential details
for reform before Robinson and Dundas. Much of what he said
contributed to Pitt’s Act.
In the years since his death he has been all but forgotten. Today there is an
almost general ignorance of what he accomplished. Although somewhat
puzzling, this is perhaps not altogether surprising, because the world of the
Honourable Company remained quite impenetrable for a long time. Not
much of its inner workings were known about by ordinary citizens during his
lifetime; and until fairly recently the East India records remained a rather
daunting area of study. The workings of the Company were tortuous, and its
relationship with the state particularly so. However, modern scholars, like
Professor Marshall, have added to the work of Namier, Sutherland and
Philips, to name but a few, in clarifying much of this. More recently, a flurry
of articles and Ph.D.s dealing with problems that involved the Company,
have cleared away some mystery and confusion.
All of this might go some way to explain why until now there has been no
major analysis of Sulivan’s career. He has only figured within the context of
other studies; or is mentioned in passing and in part, elsewhere. A limited
biography of him exists in the History of Parliament (two pages); he appears in
the Dictionary of National Biography, Missing Persons, published in 1993; and in
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography of 2004. The other published in-
depth treatment is to be found within the structure of the late Dame Lucy
Sutherland’s, East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics. There are some
mentions in specialised histories – especially those eulogising Clive – and in a
few academic treatises, such as my own examination of the early part of
Sulivan’s life.1
His particular significance was remarked upon by at least four eminent
historians: L.S. Sutherland, K. Feiling, C.H Philips and A.M. Davies.2 They all
agreed that his life must be understood in order to determine many of the
developments at the heart of British political, economic and imperial affairs
between 1757 and 1786; and to bring into focus several questions that remain
unanswered. So much began with him, passed through his hands or was
affected by his thoughts and personal objectives that understanding him is
pivotal to much else. Hopefully, this work makes the pattern clearer.
xii
Acknowledgements
A great many people, knowingly or otherwise, have contributed towards

this book finding life. In the beginning I enjoyed both inspiration and advice
from the late Dr. James N.M. Maclean and from Professor Emeritus Victor
G. Kiernan. Many others include: Dr. Angus Calder, Dr. James G. Parker,
Owen Dudley Edwards, John Riddy, and the late Father Thomas Walsh. I
have been honoured by the generosity of Laurence Sulivan’s descendants, in
particular Mrs. B.E. Baumer, Dr. J. H. Baumer, Mr. Martin de Bertodano,
Lady Rosemary Griffin and Mrs. Diane Morrison.
As the bibliography will make clear, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to
the staff of libraries, record offices and private collections the length and
breadth of Britain and Ireland. These are too numerous to name individually,
but I thank them, each and every one.
Of course, any new work owes much to the labours of scholars who have
gone before, and to that of contemporaries; little of significance could be
produced otherwise. In this respect I have benefited enormously and pay my
due respects.
Lastly, I thank my wife Margaret for her patience and encouragement,
together with her determination to see that I brought this work to a
conclusion.
The form and spelling of Indian words used are based on the Handbook of
Oriental History, edited by C.H. Philips, 2nd edition, London, 1963. Round
brackets encompass words I have introduced that were omitted in the
originals, or they have been inserted to make the meaning clear.
xiii
1
Bombay and Origins

1713-52
Portraits of Laurence Sulivan in mid-life suggest that when Elizabeth Owen

first set eyes on him she beheld a lively young man, bursting with energy. Of
small-to-middling height, around five feet six or seven, he must have
bewitched her with his expressive blue eyes, arching eyebrows and fair hair.
He possessed a strong, well-proportioned build. From later accounts, it
seems his voice was of an even modulation. His attire and whole manner said
he was a gentleman. He had a stamp of quality, of authority and awareness.
He must have appeared different, interesting, exciting.
By her portraits, she was of a similar height and build to her husband-to-
be. Her slightly long, well-proportioned face and general air of languor
balanced one another; while her eyes were large and calm. Auburn hair
framed the whole countenance. It was an appearance that bespoke natural
repose.
They were married on 20 August 1739 in the Anglican Church, Bombay.
He was twenty-six years old, she twenty-five. The wedding was a formal
affair, the ceremony according to the rites of the Church of England, to
which his wife belonged. From his many negative words on the subject,
Sulivan went along with the church ritual since it was expected of him. Later
in life he constantly described himself as ‘an infidel’. Elizabeth Owen, on the
other hand, remained a devout Christian all her days.
Despite the heat, flies and general discomfort of an Indian midsummer,
the ceremony was subject to the formal protocol and strictures that governed
everything in the English East India Company’s Presidencies. Even during
this most personal of occasions, pride of place went to the Governor,
Stephen Law, and his spouse Martha; then to ex-Governor John Horne
followed by Members of Council and their wives. The marriage was
solemnised by the Reverend James Chapman. It must have been a severe
trial, and it can only be hoped that the subsequent banquet was more relaxed
than the actual ceremony.
2 GUARDIAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
The notification in the Bombay records of his wedding to Elizabeth Owen

is the first indication anywhere that Laurence Sulivan existed. That he was
born on 24 April 1713 is only known from a letter written by him in January
1782. The date he arrived in Bombay is a mystery, but he was there no earlier
than 25 November 1738. Governor Stephen Law authorised a census of
European inhabitants in Bombay reaching that far back and he does not
appear. Nor is he present among Company servants in the factories; or in the
lists of European inhabitants, free merchants and itinerant travellers in
Bombay, Surat, Tellicherry, Madras or Calcutta.
The facts regarding his future wife are a little more copious. She appears
from January 1738 onwards, among the European inhabitants in Bombay as
a single woman. She had applied to join her brother Edward Owen, a
covenanted servant, formally employed in the Bombay treasury where he
‘weighed off the treasure that came from England – counted and packed the
money to the Factories and signed the notes for the land marine
paymasters.’1
It seems likely that Sulivan worked alongside Edward Owen, and that this
led to an introduction then romance with his sister Elizabeth. Their father
was possibly Richard Owen, Master of the Bombay Merchant. He was a free
merchant* at Bombay and Surat in 1720. An Edward Owen, a Director* of
the Company (and one of its accountants) was probably an uncle. He died in
London in 1729.
Elizabeth Owen’s family did not welcome Sulivan as a suitor. His own
words to his son on the matter are clear enough, ‘Your mother’s relations all
loved me as a friend and intimate, but dreaded and strongly opposed the
union. And it was pronounced that your mother would be unhappy.’2
He would appear to have been the sort of rake young ladies travelling to
India were entreated to beware of. They were to be ‘Careful of their
conduct...to guard against the ruin of their reputation...and in all things, to
show prudence.’3 He admitted as much later, saying that prior to his marriage
he was ‘wild, dissipated and a favourite with both sexes’.4 Certainly, his
conversation seems to have been very entertaining; and he was doubtless
then an amusing, perhaps slightly disorientated, young man.
His inheritance must have been small for him to be in India at all: a few
contacts, certainly a good education and a bright intelligence. However, he
would not have been considered a good match and in all likelihood was
known or presumed to have few possessions and even less prospects. On the
other hand, he was looked upon as a gentleman and accepted as such. His
speech, good manners, dress and deportment had to convince his superiors –
not to mention his wife-to-be, of a certain status.
The speed of their courtship was remarkable by English standards,
although perhaps not by those of Bombay, where the unhealthy climate and
peculiarities of such a closed world bore down heavily. Nevertheless, the
Governor’s permission had to be sought. Weddings within the European
community in Bombay were not too plentiful in the years 1738 and 1739.
Apart from her own and that of her brother Edward to Ann Tolson in 1738,
BOMBAY AND ORIGINS 1713-52 3
which had occasioned her visit to Bombay in the first place, there were only
three others. Theirs was to be a match that lasted until death separated them.
For Laurence Sulivan everything changed with marriage. The vagaries of his
previous existence ended. He set about forging a completely different
approach to life. It might have been triggered by his new responsibilities; or
perhaps the fact that his Owen relations did not consider him good enough
stirred him to do something.
He admired what he later termed his wife’s ‘prudence, discreetness and
sagacity...in some few instances...perhaps carried too far, yet 9 times in 10 she
will be found on the right side’.5 She was to be his main support throughout
his life; and he nearly always asked her opinion of his ideas and decisions.
The immense trust and affection she was held in is identifiable in all his
correspondence.
Elizabeth Sulivan certainly worked a profound change in her new husband.
She reached into the depths of his being to such an extent that he could not
bear the thought she might think him unworthy. With his wife’s total trust
and support, he saw the path he must tread. That being said, his new
awakening and kindling ambition were kept well hidden: ‘My line was
marked, unknown to all, and its success depended upon resolution and
perseverance.’6
Marriage was hugely important to the development of Sulivan’s career
because of the determination it bred in him. He also had the respectability
and security personified in Elizabeth Owen. Although a picture of the young
Sulivan remains a little hazy, a clearer image begins to emerge by 1740,
shown most distinctly in the way he approached his work. He now spent
every morning at his official employment and every afternoon on his own
affairs. He ‘shut out every other temptation’, broke all former habits, and
severed all connection with those comrades of his former life.7
2
In the absence of irrefutable evidence of Sulivan’s life before he arrived in
Bombay, the conclusions reached must rest on inference. It is only possible
to detect some echoes of an early life from later interests, by taking account
of his skills, the travels he made, suggestions culled from later
correspondence, and assorted gleanings. These, the attitudes he struck, duties
performed in Bombay, and what he seemed comfortable with, tell quite a lot.
Everything hints at a general legal and accountancy background, such as
would be familiar to a notary public. He was almost certainly connected in
some way with shipping and cargoes.
This practical acquaintance with activities peculiar to shipping and trade
included particular skills like ship insurance, and the lading of cargoes. He
knew about the transfer of mercantile goods and money; and was thus aware
of the intricate relationships involving ships’ captains, entrepreneurs and
merchants. He was expert in measuring profit margins from freight transfer,
of assessing shipping costs and other associated distribution dues. This
training and knowledge is reflected in his own private records; and is signified
by his intimate knowledge and understanding of the problems faced by the

Company’s marine service. A close connection with its shipping interest* was
maintained throughout his life.
That he received this early training in Cork is suggested by some
exceptional coincidences during his years in Bombay, concerning people who
hailed from there and must be thought of as relations. The first of these was
a Commander John Sullivan (or O’Sullivan) from Cork, who was involved in
the country (coastal) trade,* especially at Bombay and along the Malabar
Coast during the years Laurence Sulivan was there.8 Also, a Commander
James Irwin, again a probable relation, and also from Cork, appears on these
shores at this time.9
Later in life he helped members of their families to a quite extraordinary
degree. Contemporaries regarded their various offspring as his kinsmen,
often referring to them as such. Help and opportunity in the first instance,
therefore, possibly came to young Sulivan through these men. Captain Irwin
was probably the prime mover. Dating from the early 1730s, he had been a
free trader in India. Earlier he was at St. Helena before becoming involved
with the East India Company. Irwin sailed on a brig called the Mary during
these early years.10
This ship, or at least a ship called the Mary, appears significant. It is
perhaps too coincidental that on 27 July 1708, by an ‘Instrument of
Attestation’, a Captain Robert Irwin was Commander of the ship Mary, of
Dublin, ‘burthen about 64 tons’.11 This vessel could have sailed from Ireland
to the Indies in order to participate in the country trade.
From 1736, and earlier, Captain James Irwin (perhaps a relation of
Commander Robert Irwin) traded along the coasts of India, being in Madras
that year, acting as a Supercargo,* not in the Company. In 1737 he was
working the Madras coast, still on board the Mary, but now in the Bengal
service. By 1739 he had become part-owner and Master of the Mary. The
other title holder was an Anthony Upton. It is perhaps no coincidence that in
1739 this same man was President of the Mayor’s Court Bombay, when
Laurence Sulivan served as an Alderman. Sulivan also remitted money for
him.
Sometime between 1743 and 1751 Captain Irwin married a Sarah Beale in
St. Helena.12 He was to die in Bengal on 20 June 1752. Before his demise he
had bought the estate of Hazeleigh in Essex, a clear sign that he had managed
to accumulate a sizeable fortune. A great intimacy existed later between
Sulivan and all members of his family, but especially with his eldest son,
Eyles Irwin.13 All Irwins of the next generation, who were the offspring of
Captain James Irwin, were patronised by Sulivan and given good positions in
the Company’s various services.
There were quite a number of private ships from Britain involved in the
country trade; interlopers who were there in defiance of the monopoly. They
swelled the so-called ‘separate stock’ of Company ships licensed at the end of
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and let out for private trade. It
might be the case, therefore, that sometime during 1737 or early 1738,
Sulivan sailed east on board the Mary, perhaps then owned by Anthony
Upton, accompanying his kinsman, Captain James Irwin, at that time a
Supercargo.
On board, Sulivan would have acted as his assistant. It is probable that
around 1738 Commander John Sullivan (O’Sullivan) of Cork City, whose
mother was Elizabeth Irwin (Mrs. Philip O’Sullivan), also captained the Mary.
He and Captain James Irwin were probably brothers-in-law. Laurence Sulivan
can be envisaged learning the duties of a Supercargo under the supervision of
these men, en route to India.14 But no matter how he arrived in eastern
waters, he was certainly employed in a private capacity. Working on board
such a coastal vessel, he would rapidly learn the avenues open to exploitation.
Another discovery would be that in the layered society of the European
settlements free traders held an inferior rank. Company servants were
regarded as superior, and had more rights and privileges.
Some deductions regarding his Irish origins are possible. Evidence,
including that relating to Commanders John Sullivan (O’Sullivan) and James
Irwin, points to his being very closely related to Benjamin Sulivan of Cork,
son of Philip O’Sullivan and his wife Elizabeth Irwin.15 Benjamin and
Commander John Sullivan (O’Sullivan) were brothers. Laurence and
Benjamin were the only ones, however, to spell their surname with one ‘l’,
and dropped the ‘O’. This might signify their choice of Benjamin’s mother’s
Protestant religion. Benjamin was a lawyer and conversion was required to
practice in Ireland. Laurence Sulivan had some legal training.
What is more, the O’Sullivan More coat of arms (with a few minor
differences from the traditional) formed the right half of Laurence Sulivan’s
seal. On the left was a rampant lion crowned with a coronet.16 He and his
son continued throughout life to use these heraldic arms, which were
eventually granted on 13 July 1801 to Sir Benjamin Sulivan, Knight, eldest
son of the above Benjamin Sulivan of Cork.
The interest shown by Laurence Sulivan in the family of Benjamin Sulivan
of Cork was striking. He helped them all, and particularly the three older
sons: Benjamin, John and Richard Joseph Sulivan. He launched them into life
via the East India Company and set them on their way to riches and firm
establishment in English society. He also helped the youngest son Henry
Boyle Sulivan until his early death, and the sisters too.17
In the eyes of contemporaries Laurence and Benjamin Sulivan were very
closely associated, though Laurence would only admit they were ‘relations’,
and ‘a family connection’. In London in the early 1760s, the two of them
spent hours in social chat. The mystery arises from Laurence stating many
times that Benjamin’s family was connected to him, but saying no more; and
in his non-appearance in all pedigrees traced.18 Benjamin senior arrived in
London in 1761 or just after, and in all probability it was Laurence Sulivan’s
dazzling leap to prominence that attracted him to the city. He died and was
buried there in 1767.
The contact between the families is best illustrated by Laurence Sulivan’s
patronage of Benjamin’s sons, though in the early 1760s he also lent
Benjamin between £200 and £300. In a letter, written some time later to
John Sulivan (the second son), he said: ‘Having in a former letter desired you
to pay what your father owed me to Col. Wood, the death of that gentleman
obliges me to request this money may be paid to Mr. Roger Darvall.’19
Laurence Sulivan also helped Philip, the only son of Commander John
Sullivan (O’Sullivan), Benjamin Sulivan’s brother. The youth was provided
with a post in the Company’s military branch, reaching the rank of Captain.
Sulivan said to his son Stephen in 1778: ‘Be kind to Philip O’Sullivan if he
merits your attention.’20 His other connection was with the family of Captain
James Irwin, whose son Eyles Irwin was helped enormously. It is very likely
that Captain James Irwin, of the ship Mary, was related to Elizabeth Irwin,
wife of Philip O’Sullivan (mother and father of Benjamin Sulivan), and that
in some way both were related to Laurence Sulivan. Like Captain James
Irwin, Elizabeth Irwin stemmed from Counties Cork and Roscommon.
Sulivan never seems to have said who his parents were, where he was born
or made any mention of his childhood and upbringing.21 The reason why can
only be guessed at; but he stemmed from an older, Anglo-Norman, Catholic
and perhaps even Jacobite background. Prejudice against the Irish was rife,
and he would not want contemporaries to dwell on his name, although many
might have entertained suspicions of him.22
Despite declared adherence to the King, Constitution and religion of
England, a prerequisite for his position, his enemies would have attacked
without mercy. Perhaps he concluded that it was best to blank out his origins.
He never mentioned ancestry or lineage, certainly not in writing. No family
connection ever stated just what the relationship was, either by salutation or
by inference. Naturally, such a course of action would require great care and
a kind of grim determination by him and by others in the know. However, it
is certainly plausible; secrecy was a central plank with Sulivan, allowing his
career to go ahead, unhindered.
Logic, which (apart from the occasional but deadly mad gamble) seems to
have always predominated with him, would have dictated that he must close
and utterly forget the early chapter of his life, and merge with the English
code. This might have influenced his marriage and entry to the Company. He
wanted to become a high-ranking member of the established order, and in
effect this is what he did become.
3
When he first appeared in Bombay, the English Company was competing
successfully against the entrenched Portuguese, Dutch and French, though
these were only fringe struggles in a subcontinent dissolving into chaos. The
Mughal Empire, weakened and corrupt, was falling apart. Real power was
being wrested from the emperor by his feudal vassals, primarily the Nawabs
of the various regions. Warring tribes like the Marathas wreaked havoc.
Skirmishes at sea against the Dutch and Portuguese were common.
Although its commerce continued to increase, Bombay remained the third
ranking Presidency in terms of size and popularity. This might suggest that it
was reliance on his relations that determined Sulivan would go to there;

although the country trade along the Malabar Coast was good at that
particular time. This freight (mostly Asian) was carried in British vessels;
partly explained by superior British seamanship and navigation skills. A
boom occurred in the period 1700 to 1742; and English shipping involved in
the country trade doubled from 3,000 to 7,000 tons. With it came a demand
for more mariners.
Bombay was always the unhealthiest Presidency; few children survived (as
Sulivan would know all too personally). Society, for the most part, retained
an English character, superimposed upon that of the native Indian. There
was an easy understanding and tolerance. However, all understood that there
was only one sovereign power, the English one. A stiffness and hauteur
attended every public function; position and seniority governed social
standing. This labelling was even reflected at worship in Bombay cathedral.
The settlement also had its wilder side; there was a great deal of
intermarriage and concubinage. The Mayor’s Court* records show ample
evidence of this. Gambling was the pet vice. All kinds of card games were
played. The taverns dealt with the huge demand for backgammon and
billiards. Drinking, especially of heavy red wines, was widespread.
Slavery was practised, something the Company considered almost solely in
economic terms. If Sulivan felt anything, he kept quiet. At the very least, he
would have known of the profitable returns to be made from this vile
commerce. He would have been aware too, of other dubious activities going
on in this area, associated with piracy. Ships belonging to all the European
trading nations were plundered. The most fearsome was the Maratha
Admiral, Kohanji Angria. At the same time the brilliant horsemen of the
Maratha confederation controlled inland routes; to such an extent that
Governor Stephen Law had the main gates to the city strengthened and a
constant watch kept. This accounted for Bombay expenditure rising to
£26,338 in 1736, then to £37,500 by 1744. It also led to Law’s recall in 1742
by a non-comprehending Court of Directors.
Sulivan could get to India only by sea – the overland route was not in
operation until much later. Also, he had to do a job, fulfil some duty. He was
not a seaman, nor a medical man; but very soon after his first appearance in
Bombay, working in a private capacity, he was to become a successful
businessman – as well as an excellent Company servant. This hints at prior
knowledge and training. Yet he said little of this or of his travels. He made
mention of only one occasion:
I borrowed my ideas not only from reading but an instance which

will never depart from my memory,…the Dutch deposit all their
power with their Governor General…A certain habit with a
truncheon proclaims his office. After the dreadful massacre of the
Chinese at Batavia, Baron Imhoff held the truncheon until he had
saved and secured that important settlement from destruction.23
This eyewitness account shows that he was on the island of Java during the
initial part of Baron Gustav Wilhelm Von Imhoff’s period of service as
‘Raad’ (Ruler) of the Dutch East Indies. The Baron reached Batavia in March
1740. By this time Sulivan was married to Elizabeth Owen, but it probably
typifies the sort of commercial voyages he had already been involved in. This
journey was almost certainly his last before entry to the East India
Company’s service.
4
Although it is only during Governor Stephen Law’s tenure of office that
Sulivan appears in the Bombay records in an official role, he had served his
predecessor, Governor Horne, in a personal capacity for some time. There is
no doubt, however, that Stephen Law becoming Governor in April 1739 was
a fortunate and significant occurrence for him. As well as becoming his
immediate master, Law assumed the position of patron; and then friend and
confidant.
His place of work was Bombay Castle, in a room right next to that of the
Governor. From him he learned much that had nothing to do with tiresome
accounts. He became aware of the subtle undertones of Bombay society; and
developed a thorough understanding of relationships with the local native
powers and rival European trading nations. Most of all, he was given an
insight into the usage of power. The art of exuding authority (if it can be
taught at all) was learned from Governor Law. He and Sulivan were friends
for life.
Ironically, in view of his later importance within the organisation, Sulivan’s
entry into the Company’s service was extremely inconspicuous. On 17 March
1740, faced with a shortage of men, Law asked for three covenanted servants
to help him. When they were not forthcoming, he called upon the Council to
allow Sulivan to be his assistant, on a temporary basis. He was to be paid 80
rupees per month, the sum his predecessor, Governor Horne, had paid him
out of his own pocket for also being his assistant.
The Governor did not have the authority to take Sulivan into the service,
he could only advise such action to the Directors. His recommendation to
this effect was included in the Bombay General Letter* that went to England
on board the Harrington. After clearance from India House and a security of
£1,000 paid in London by ex-Governor Horne and a Thomas Waters, he was
formally entered in the records. As well as his duties for Law, Sulivan was
employed clearing up the mess of Horne’s personal affairs, abandoned on his
return to England. Almost all of these were bound up with the country
trade.24
The appointment was backdated to 1 January 1740, the date he had
actually commenced the duties spoken of in March 1740. Also, although
theoretically merely a personal secretary to Law, he obviously already had
experience of the various branches of public business. He could not
otherwise have been able to cope with what had been the work of three
covenanted servants. It is almost certain that from April 1739, when the
Governorship changed hands, until January 1740, Sulivan worked in the

morning on Company business in the new Governor’s office. In the
afternoon he would be busy with ex-Governor Home’s private affairs. He
would have received payment from both. During the course of the four years
he worked there, from 1739 to 1742, he applied himself with great diligence.
His initial appointment on 13 February 1741 was as ‘assistant to the
President’, with the rank of Factor. As a covenanted servant he received a
good deal more than a salary. He was provided with free food, quarters and
servants; and bought wine at special low rates. Remuneration was used more
for pocket money than for maintenance. Wages were paid at six monthly
intervals. The experience beside Governor Law provided him with telling
insights; and enabled him later, when a Director of the Company, to deal
with problems which were beyond the grasp of most Directors and
Proprietors,* who had spent no time in India.25
Disaster struck, however, with Stephen Law’s recall in November 1742 for
over-spending. John Geekie, senior member of the Council, became acting
Governor until William Wake arrived eleven days later. Geekie had no love
for Sulivan, nor did Wake trust the disciple of the man he had replaced;
although he continued to use him in a capacity similar to that established by
his predecessors.
There is a hint of the unhappiness this change brought in a letter to his
son, written many years and a lifetime of experience later: ‘Take a little pains
to be well... show an affected openness...but be close…watch...narrowly...it
was not my practice and I suffered for it. I knew myself honest and thought
caution unnecessary, which made me the dupe of many a fool.’26
Wake neglected him, and there was nobody in England with sufficient
influence to speed his promotion; Stephen Law was not yet established.
Nevertheless, Sulivan was determined to build a career within the Company,
and gain financial independence. He also wanted knowledge and experience
of every aspect of business. As his life would show, he was not the sort of
man to quit easily.
5
Sulivan became fully immersed in the life of the settlement. On 20
December 1739 he was elected an Alderman in the Bombay Mayor’s Court,
at a time when the President of the Court, Anthony Upton, was away from
the island. He remained an Alderman until 1743, attending Court regularly.
Here, at first hand, he was involved with Indians in their own arena, with all
the noise and fractious behaviour associated with life at street level. It was a
joyous kaleidoscope, a seething world of heat, smells and sounds.
He handled wills, administrations and cases involving legal wrangles over
commerce, on behalf of Asian and European alike. As suggested, his
involvement in such work – from his very first appearance in Bombay –
points to him being already skilled in legal and notary public techniques. He
also acted for others in business and legal affairs, carrying their warrant of
attorney. He was honest, thorough and had a sound knowledge of
procedures, of the intricacies of the coastal trade and of local commerce.

Unsurprisingly, many lawsuits were against ex-Governor Horne. Sulivan’s
four years of attendance suggests that real ability and knowledge were
brought to bear.
Those of the Owen family still alive in Bombay could hardly be expected
to have foreseen this complete change of character and lifestyle that Sulivan
achieved so soon after marriage. He was happy with domestic life, and
showed blinding devotion to his wife and son Stephen, born on 22 October
1742. The child was the second born, named after Governor Stephen Law.
Two other children died: Martha, born 18 October 1740, died 12 November
1740; and Laurence, born 6 June 1745, died April 1748. The death of this
little boy, when almost three years old, was particularly heartbreaking. In
addition, he and his wife were to care for the widow and two surviving
daughters of his wife’s brother, Edward Owen, who died around 1745. These
nieces, Elizabeth (‘Betsy’) and Anne (‘Nancy’) Owen were born on 24
October 1741 and 14 September 1743, respectively.
So many deaths prompted him to send Stephen to Britain around 1748.
His nieces appear to have accompanied the boy. Later, in 1752, Adriana, the
wife of his friend and follower, John Spencer, hoped that on arrival in
England the Sulivans would be ‘blessed with finding in Master Stephen the
satisfaction you have so long wished for’.27 It is very likely that the children
joined Stephen Law, who occupied a house on the west side of Queen
Square. Later, Sulivan too would have a long association with this particular
neighbourhood.
The desire to get rich carried most Europeans to the Indies; but it took a
long time if no patronage was available, to propel a young man into one of
the more lucrative positions. Even though there were many perks, the
Company paid a miserable salary. Servants were expected to barter and trade
to better their lot and spent a great deal of their time so employed.
Money was made through recognised channels: private trade, money-
lending and also accepting presents and perquisites from wealthy and
important Indians, although this was something Sulivan always frowned
upon. Nevertheless, he was adept at all other means of accumulating wealth.
During the years in Bombay he was active in pursuit of riches, though not to
the detriment of public duties.
His sharp business acumen was put to great use; and his skill helped amass
a moderate fortune, which was all that he desired. His personal business
ventures were launched while in Governor Horne’s employ. He was
markedly busy in the country trade, both on his own and on the Governor’s
behalf. His employment along the same lines in private work for Governors
Law and Wake is witnessed by his name appearing on many and various
papers; such as that on a bond of November 1739 concerning the goldsmith,
Servaji Dharmseth.
These activities as a private trader were important then and for the future.
Here he made his connections, and many became close business colleagues.
That his maritime connections were numerous is confirmed by the many
references to deals with ships’ commanders. He dealt with sets of certificates,

such as those ‘on account of a Captain Thomas Brown’; and others ‘on
account of Captain Charles Foulis’. He handled President Wake’s freight
charges for goods going on the Salisbury to Gombroon.
It was during these years that he developed a close partnership with
Captain Samuel Hough, Captain Thomas Lane and John Spencer, which was
referred to later as ‘The Marine Society’. The activities of this group, after his
arrival in England, assumed even more importance. These men became
special business friends. Spencer was to uphold the India end of the triple
business enterprise. Captain Hough was an important figure in the Bombay
navy.28 Captain Thomas Lane developed into Sulivan’s closest confidant and
his man of business. Sulivan would later use him as a cover for his own
hidden machinations at Leadenhall.* He arrived in England a year ahead of
him, sailing from Bombay in December 1751.29
They were only three of a legion of friends and business acquaintances he
was assembling, who would be central to his future success in London. The
most important, apart from those mentioned, were Commander (later Sir)
William James and Commander James Barton. The list of his friends among
Company servants, ‘Country’ Captains and free traders is just as impressive.
To these can be added many who later gave their support in England.30 Of
course, he made enemies too: Governor Wake, Charles Crommelin, William
Price and perhaps Henry Savage, fall into this category.
There were other activities by which Sulivan acquired wealth, in doing so
securing even more friends and business acquaintances. For nearly all of his
time in Bombay he acted as an attorney and administrator, executor and
trustee, for his colleagues – distinct from his duties in the Mayor’s Court. He
was involved to such a degree that he either displayed a new, exceptional
skill, or (as indicated in his Mayor’s Court duties) came to Bombay already
qualified for such work.
In 1741 he was involved (together with Edward Owen and a John
Lambton) as an attorney on behalf of ex-Governor Horne. Sulivan was
required to make the goldsmith-cum-financier, Servaji Dharmseth, pay to the
Company money that Horne had stood security for. He had to be as shrewd
in understanding the minds and business habits of native Indian merchants as
he was in his handling of Europeans.
Dealing with the estates of others gave him further room for manoeuvre.
In December 1751 he and Hough bought bills in Bombay for the estate of
Benjamin Lowe, deceased. On 8 December 1752 they did the same again,
this time for the estate of an Alexander Fogue also dead. The money
involved totalled £5,241-4-6, which was to be paid through the ‘current
account’ in London. Nobody was specified, but as attorneys for the estates
Sulivan or Hough picked up this money. This type of activity continued
almost until the day of his departure. On 12 December 1752 he and a John
Sewell were defendants in the Mayors Court for a Wifran set Savajee, against
an action brought by William Sedgwicke. Then on the same day, together
with Thomas Byfield, he and Sewell represented Savajee against a similar

action brought by Brabazon Ellis and Francis Pym.31
6
In January 1747 he was promoted Junior Merchant; but no Company duties
of significance came his way until October 1748, when he was created
Provisional Collector of Rents and Revenues. It was an important and
profitable post; confirmation came in July 1749, and was combined with the
position of Mint Master. It was as Collector that Sulivan made his mark on
Bombay; and developed models and methods that he carried to London. He
was also to portray fraud on a large scale. What he created (and uncovered)
was of great significance then and later.
Two months later, he was promoted Senior Merchant and made Deputy
Accountant and assistant to a George Scott. He and Sulivan commenced
chasing one another in and out of Company posts over the next four years.
This office automatically meant a place as Deputy Accountant, the functions
were so linked.
The duties that he had to perform as Collector were endless. The island of
Bombay was five miles across at its widest and, according to Sulivan,
nourished 20,000 people. It required to be surveyed minutely as to both value
and extent. Everything produced in Bombay was farmed, that is, let out in
return for a payment or rent to the Company. A detailed register was to be
kept of all farms. He was to ensure that the soil and vegetation were not
spoiled; and appointed and advised inspectors who made a weekly round,
reporting to him.
In addition, it was his duty to adjust and settle all accounts, receive all
moneys and make the necessary disbursements. He was to deliver his
financial statement and the money every three months to the Governor and
Council. Regular books were to be kept; and he was required to explain
reasons for any increases or decreases in the sums received. The information
was eventually relayed to India House.
Yet Sulivan had no power to lessen the amount of money expected by the
Company, even in the event of famine or any other calamity. He could only
represent the situation to his superiors and plead the hardship of the renters.
Nor could he judge who should receive the farms; they were auctioned, and
completely under the control of the President aided by his Council. For
cases of glaring criminality, he had no jurisdiction. The Collector had to
gather a variety of dues: rent from the growing of coconut, cultivation of
tobacco and the production of arrack; rent from Bombay pensions; and
money that stemmed from various privileges. He also collected money from
salt sales, quit rents and batta* grounds. Similar collections were also made at
Mahim, the Company settlement in the north of the island.
Coconut growing gave the biggest return. A few opulent merchants
dominated this. They were given the whole crop for a number of years to
work or sublet as they wished. These few merchants had combined to create
a monopoly situation that could not be broken. As a result, the Company

never received a fair price for the crop since this was always rigged.
Sulivan changed things. He created ten distinct divisions of the coconut
grant with sixteen plots within each division. Each lot was leased by the
Company, which now had direct ties and records dealing with every lot. The
results were astonishing. A twenty-five per cent increase in revenue took
place following the first of these new leases; fifty per cent following the
second issue, with a continually rising yield thereafter. He increased the
amount gathered from 8,177 rupees in December 1748, to 13,510 rupees in
April 1749. This success encouraged him to enforce the system over the
whole range of farms rented out by the Company.
From these fiscal reforms Sulivan was able to relieve some of the social
distress inherent in the existing structure. The system of farming out
operated by the Company had led to the under-tenants and labouring people
becoming very dependent and open to persecution and oppression. The
Company Collector, before Sulivan’s time, was generally someone of Council
standing. Part of his remit was to guard his charges from all threats; and he
was duty bound to correct misbehaviour, enforce payment of dues and
receive and judge petitions of complaint from renters or dependants. All
these petitions and judgements would be registered in the Company books
that they might be produced in the event of further appeals to the President
and Council.
The Collector was, therefore, in a powerful position and could command
the use of force (a body of sepoys*) to secure rents due. Theoretically, his
role in this respect was only to assist the farmer, and he ought to have taken
such action only when appealed to by him. Instead, the Collector took the
initiative and the ‘cruel, impolitic and oppressive practice of demanding
money with menaces’ was the order of the day. Sulivan stopped all this.
His efficiency in the Collector’s office reflected upon the need for
improvements in the Company’s commercial administration in India; and
showed how well equipped he was to make the necessary changes. He
demonstrated that awareness of financial and administrative detail that later
was to give unrivalled comprehension of the intricacies of the Company’s
financial system.
Evidence of the zeal and honesty that he brought to his new office of
Collector was not long in finding its way into the Company records,
doubtless just as he planned. His incorruptibility is so startling when
compared to what went on among his colleagues that the question of a
completely different morality seems to enter the equation.
In a letter to the President on 4 March 1749, a mere six months after
assuming his post, he gave a comprehensive survey of one particular farm,
the Mazagon estate. What he had uncovered constituted a first-class outrage.
His aim was to justify the Company’s right to all salt, fishing and other
revenues from the estate; and he desired the authority of the President and
Council to collect these. He quoted from the Company’s own records to
justify his arguments, going back to 1674 to do so; and he was quite truthful
in his assertion that he had ‘spared no pains to obtain a true knowledge’.32
The Governor and Council agreed with his findings but did nothing. On
16 May 1749 he again brought the affair before them, because the inhabitants
of the Mazagon estate were not only still paying taxes to those who claimed
possession of the farm on the estate, but had been taxed double. Governor
Wake then formed a committee to enquire further. On 20 May it was
adjudged that the Company owned the land, as Sulivan had said, but that the
various so-called ‘owners’ of the farm also had good claims. The committee,
therefore, turned down Sulivan’s plea that no more taxes should be paid by
the tenants, and argued that custom and usage had established the principle
of payment at a ‘fixed and fair rate’. A similar compromise, one that
corrected nothing, was reached over fishing rights and disputes, such as those
over the collection of brushwood and weeds.
Although unsuccessful up to this point in his efforts to remedy things,
these details depict an awareness in Sulivan (unusual among those who
occupied the office of Collector) of the predicament of the poorest Indian
workers in Bombay. He seemed to be trying to combine humanity with
efficiency. His work reflects this, as well as the delicate handling required.
From December 1749 onwards his thoroughness and unwillingness to
waive his scruples over this affair earned him the displeasure of Governor
Wake. His revenue books for the year ending July 1749, together with
abstracts of the rents and revenues collected by himself and his predecessors
from August 1747 to July 1749, were ordered to lie on the Council table, and
remained there following their first scrutiny.
On 8 December 1749 they were finally remarked upon. The Governor
began by praising Sulivan and noted that before his advent to the office the
Collector’s books had been kept in a very irregular manner. He was
commended for creating order out of chaos. The Governor also noted that
recently there had been an increase in salt sales compared to former years.
Sulivan was able to answer that more salt had been sold by the Company
because he had not disposed of it privately, so the whole profit had gone to
the Company. Wake’s response was that Sulivan, like his predecessors, had
received five per cent on the sale of private salt.33
Further comments were passed on the nature of the private sale of salt,
noting Sulivan’s particular criticism of the profits made by his predecessors,
Byfield and, to a lesser extent, Dorrill. Sulivan had shown in his abstracts of
the collections made by these two that they made unjustifiable private profits.
The Governor had no alternative but to agree, but hinted that his hands were
perhaps too clean. Sulivan also took pains to point out where the
unjustifiable increase in charges had occurred. Wake maintained that the sum
involved was not unusual; that increases in costs had been unavoidable
because of the exceptionally bad circumstances operating in 1748. He was
not very convincing.
Now alarmed, the Governor took steps to cover all traces of his
complicity. The details Sulivan had brought into the open would appear in a
bad light to the Directors. He wrote, therefore, of Byfield and Dorrill as

servants of the Company who had appeared to him both honest and above
board. Yet, reluctantly and with many evasions and justifications, he
conceded that the figures brought to light by Sulivan proved their abuse of
office. He naturally portrayed himself as innocent of any intention of
reducing the amount of salt to be sold through the Company.
His major defence was that Sulivan himself had ‘kindly’ depicted in his
researches that if (as Governor) he had helped Byfield towards such
extensive profits it was unintentional. Wake also appealed to the fact that
Sulivan had handled his personal affairs from the moment he set foot on the
island, and could verify that there was no evidence in his private accounts of
any intention to defraud the Company.
After causing so much trouble for him, Wake took the post of Collector
away. From internal evidence, he was suspended from 8 December 1749. By
2 January 1750 George Scott had taken over. There is little doubt that Sulivan
had uncovered a state of affairs that said little for the senior Company
servants in Bombay and even less for Governor Wake. It is also very
probable that his purpose was to depict to the Directors, his part in clearing
out the corruption that infected the collection of salt revenues. Nor did he
allow dismissal from office to deter him from bringing forward evidence of
yet more corruption in salt revenue collections.
Sometime before October 1750 he informed the President and Council
that he had uncovered further abuses in the Collector’s office. Wake
accordingly convened a committee of councillors to examine the state of the
salt revenues. What happened next appears like deliberate deception by
Wake. The figures that Sulivan had given to Sedgwicke and a committee in
his letter of 27 October 1750, were used misleadingly by the Governor
against him in two sets of despatches to England. Those by the Boscawen
stated that the revenues (those Sulivan was complaining about) for 34
measures of salt had been illegally collected by Sulivan and not by Byfield.
The despatches by the Salisbury repeated the error, saying that Sulivan and
not Byfield had been responsible for the collection. This time the salt
mentioned had risen to 38 measures.
On 13 November 1750, four days before the new Governor, Richard
Bourchier, took office, Sulivan was transferred to be Chief at Mahim. Wake
wanted him out of the way. He was aware of Sulivan’s smouldering
resentment, and disgust at the loss of his post of Collector and shabby
treatment he had received. It appears too much of a coincidence that he
should be absent from Bombay when the new Governor arrived, it allowed
Wake to misrepresent the situation when he handed over all settlement
affairs to Bourchier.
Aware that everything would change with the new Governor, Sulivan
timed his next letter on corruption in the salt revenues for delivery on 16
November 1750, the day before Bourchier took over. Again, as per Company
law, a committee was forced to convene to enquire into this. Naturally, the
new Governor wanted to start his term of office on a sound note and
intimated how necessary it was to get to the heart of the matter.
Despite this, it was December before the issue was taken up once more;
and again only due to Sulivan’s insistence, even though he was still at Mahim.
When asked to give exact details of the offences committed in the Collector’s
office, he took the opportunity not only of doing this, but of recounting the
whole sorry history of events. He produced a copy of his letter of 27 October
1750, showing the misrepresentation by Governor Wake in the despatches to
India House. He also asked that this letter be allowed to appear in the Public
Consultations to vindicate his character. This was done.
Sulivan was to remain at Mahim until 10 May 1751. Re-arriving in
Bombay, he once more took over the Collector’s office from George Scott.
This was Governor Bourchier’s decision. Not only was he convinced of
Sulivan’s honesty, but wanted him to clear up suspicions he now entertained
of further fraud, again in the salt revenues. By 28 May Sulivan had made a
preliminary examination of the matter, enough to satisfy the President and
Council that their worst fears were correct. Joseph D’Souza, the suspected
ringleader, was taken into custody. Sulivan found subsequently that he was
solely responsible for the fraud.
Meantime, he had also completed an inventory of the Customs House at
Mahim and handed over control to Alexander Douglas. Now he could
concentrate on the Collector’s office at Bombay. The position afforded many
opportunities for private trade, so he made a speedy return to the main
settlement and lost no time in picking up the threads where he had left off.
7
He spent only a few months in the Collector’s office, however, because on
24 October, as part of a committee, he was despatched upon an important
mission, to settle a crisis at Surat involving Company officials and native
powers. Surat was ruled jointly by representatives of the Mughal dynasty and
the Marathas. A struggle had developed involving the forces of the Maratha
leader, Naik ‘Allam Khan, and his ally Atchund, against Safdar Khan, in
alliance with Sidi Ma’sud, the Governor of Surat. This was a follow-up to
troubles of earlier years, especially those of 1748.
The essence of the problem was that Naik Allam Khan was determined to
subdue the surrounding province as well as the city of Surat. He did not
propose to keep the city, but intended ‘that it should remain in the hands of
the Moors...(led by Atchund) that he will not place any person in the
government of Surat without our concurrence and therefore desires that
some person may be sent up’.34
There was some dithering whether to call the party ‘Envoys’ or send a
committee representing the President and Board. The latter was decided
upon. It comprised a Major Mackenzie, Henry Savage and Sulivan; who
immediately begged the Board’s permission for a few days to consider it all.
It is possible that he did not relish the thought of the company he would
keep, the dangers he would face or the neglect of his private interests. He had
also become Warehouse Keeper. Bourchier was repaying him for uncovering
the frauds. However, this also made it impossible to refuse the mission.
Again he provisionally transferred the office of Collector to George Scott,
while John Hope took over as Warehouse Keeper.
On 21 December 1751, armed with their instructions, the committee sailed
for the Surat bar on board the Bombay Grab. Their principal objective was to
secure peace. They were given ample powers for: ‘Transacting all affairs in
settling the government of Surat as if we were present ourselves.’35 In the end
Major Mackenzie failed to accompany the committee all the way. The Board
then appointed Lt. Daniel Draper.
The commission was also charged with recovering large sums of money
lost or spent by the Company at Surat; with recovering the full enjoyment of
its privileges there; and with re-establishing the Company factory. It was to
ensure the safety of Company personnel, particularly that of Mr. Lambe, the
factory Chief, and of the military force. Two members of staff, Messrs. Pym
and Hunt, were prisoners in the Dutch factory. They were to be freed.
Another aim was to reverse the role of the fiercely hostile Dutch who would
allow no goods to be shipped to and from Surat. Above all, the committee
was to assume absolute command.
On the voyage north the Company force sailed into the Maratha pirate,
Kohanji Angria fleet. They were taken and detained at Versora. The pirates
kept some Company ships, and an Andrew Price was first despatched to
Tannah and then Bassein to get other vessels. Astonishingly, the brigands
then acted as a protective convoy as far as Surat.
The committee reaching Surat on 31 December 1751, took property from
all inhabitants except the Europeans, and blocked the harbour. An attempt to
take control of the besieged Surat castle where Atchund was holding out
came to nothing because of the ‘shameful disorder’ of the Company’s
military force and its supply of ammunition. After consultations designed to
dispel military ineptitude, it was decided again to try and reach the castle,
when word was received that Atchund was preparing to give up the position.
News followed that the forces of the Sidi were already in the fortress,
forestalling their military plans. The struggle was at an end without the
committee actually being involved at all.36
Devoid of bargaining power, Savage and Sulivan could only treat with
Atchund and Sidi Ma’sud as best they could; but to get the best settlement
for the Company, they resorted to any leverage that could be mustered. They
took command of the river; resolved to prevent all trade; were determined
that no ‘insolent Dutch would pass without search’; and that they would
commandeer as much property as possible. Neither held out much hope of
success stripped as they were of alliances and burdened with problems.37
On 11 January 1752 the committee informed Bombay there was no change
in the situation and that they were awaiting overtures from the enemy.
Although they suffered small harassments, like the efforts to prevent them
from getting fresh drinking water, this was certainly the best course of action
they could have taken, and it soon began to show results. First though, James
Lambe was dismissed from his post of Chief at the Surat factory. This was
done to convince their enemies of the powers the committee possessed.
Savage and Sulivan then focussed their displeasure on the Dutch whose
‘insolence will lead to seizure of one of their councillors as reprisal’.38
At the end of January there was tense concern over the arrival of the
Maratha fleet in the Surat roads. Then the appearance of a large ship from
Batavia gave the Dutch a temporary ascendance. Fortunately, both dangerous
situations passed without mishap; and at once the struggle was carried to the
Dutch who were made responsible for the whole situation.
They were also helped in that cracks were appearing in the hostile and
intransigent attitude held by Sidi Ma’sud. A meeting was arranged aboard the
Defence. Steps were then taken to bring all the principals together for peace
negotiations. The situation was made easier because the local Asian
merchants complained ceaselessly that business was suffering. Their lobbying
reached sympathetic ears; a poverty-stricken Surat gave no advantage to
anyone. There was an immediate emphasis by the committee on the needs
and requirements of freight and other business. Bales were loaded on the
Hector right away.
By 19 February the committee was certain of having achieved the end it
set out for, securing peace. The President and Council at Bombay were urged
to send the men who would replace Lambe, Pym and Hunt. With successful
completion of the mission, Savage and Sulivan wanted to depart as soon as
possible ‘because the season advances apace and as we both intend for
England by the first ships we shall barely have time sufficient to adjust our
own private concerns’.39
Sidi Ma’sud signed the articles of peace on 25 February and on 5 March
Charles Crommelin was appointed the new Chief. The Board expressed its
delight, and approved of the initiative taken by Savage and Sulivan in advising
the Court of Directors of the peace, although they had not consulted
Bombay first. They had no wish to have their own roles diminished in a
report issued from Bombay. The treaty with Sidi Ma’sud was finally
concluded on 17 March, by which time Crommelin had arrived and was
deemed acceptable. Savage and Sulivan chose this as the moment to depart.
By 27 March the two were once more in Bombay.
8
Although Sulivan had intimated a wish to leave Bombay for England, upon
his return from Surat he resumed his duties. On 31 March 1752 he again
became Collector; then on 10 April, provisionally, Customs Master. During
his absence he had been made ninth in Council, and took his seat on the
Board. The amount collected in rents and revenues, now paid into the
Company’s treasury was astonishing after three months’ absence. It paid
tribute to the reliable system he had introduced. His books could, and did,
balance.
The last serious thought given to Collector duties concerned some
disputes between the Company and the inhabitants of Bombay; and
particularly those concerning a certain Ramseth who had rented from the
Company the right to plant all vacant spaces in Bombay and in Mahim. The
Company had said that it would pay half the value of such improvements to
the amount of 11,000 rupees. But it could not be decided whether or not
damage done to trees and to wells and waterways was due to neglect and
abuse by the renters. Upon this decision depended the Company’s duty, or
otherwise, to repair and pay for the damage. Sulivan was asked to evaluate
the extent of the harm done and determine responsibility.
He spent from August to October in research and taking evidence on
oath. He costed every conceivable item, and gave many sound reasons for
the inability of the renters to account properly for either what they owed or
were due. These ranged from property being seized by the raiding Maratha
General Damaji, to the effect of the monsoon. Company records were
searched for proofs of lease and terms offered. Unsurprisingly, it was Sulivan
who found a ‘mistake’ had been made by Governor Wake’s Secretary, which
provided the farmers with an unusual demand on the Company allowing
them a total of 23,155 rupees for ‘improvements’.
He brought forward evidence that suggested a great deal of fraud; with
lack of precedent for these advantageous terms. No comment was made at
the time, by those in Council, upon the unique nature of the lease. An
examination of Secretary Price’s writing also showed that the clauses
permitting such unusual profits had been put in afterwards.
This was clear indication of corruption at the highest level; and Sulivan
made sure Governor Bourchier did not miss the point that Governor Wake
was ultimately responsible for this chicanery, and had attempted to defraud
the Company. He indicated this had to be the case because every written
article required explanation by the Governor in Council, and this had to be
understood by the merchants. He had completed his revenge on Governor
Wake.
9
Avenues by which money made in India could be realised in England were
always needed. Sulivan became a master of all this, knowing how cash could
find its way home with as little loss in real value as possible. He perfected a
few tricks using the Company treasury. For example, advantage was taken of
fellow servants with no wish to remit money home yearly. Bills were paid
into the funds in Bombay made out to such a colleague’s account. These
were endorsed that payment was to be made to a specified agent in England,
supposedly that of the colleague, but in fact Sulivan’s man.40
The ways of remitting India money were not to change very much
throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, the guidance he later gave to his
son gives perhaps the best description by an expert. These channels excluded
bills drawn upon the English East India Company.
From Madras to China money is frequently wanted by persons
going thither…The next are remittances thro. the Dutch to their
Company in Holland… A third is with the French…The last
method is by diamonds…always advise me in time that I may

insure. If any of our India Captains should want money for their
ships, use; and will grant you bills upon the Husband…Formerly
the Commanders and Agents of His Majesty’s ships took money at
an high exchange and gave their bills upon the Navy Ordnance or
Victualling boards.41
The variety and number of these channels discloses his ingenuity. He

continued to be engaged in such activities when he reached England in 1753.
For an unbroken eighteen years, from 1740 until 1757, and fitfully beyond
this, he continued in this pursuit. Other more dubious enterprises in
common use were: borrowing money from the treasury; using Company
ships; not paying interest on sums borrowed from the Company; and lending
to Asian agents, without interest, in return for private favours.
Unfortunately, Sulivan was not averse to taking risks; best summed up in
advice to his son: ‘Remember, you never have money lying dead in your
chest.’42 He probably took this too far. As he ruefully commented later in life,
‘From a strong propensity in my nature (which you inherit) I began early to
risque my fortune in lending money and standing security.’ That this had
proved a rather painful occupation encouraged him to advise his son,
‘positively and peremptorily be security to no man’.43
What these activities do portray are the systems Sulivan was capable of
developing, and the temperament he possessed. These were some of the
skills that would help him in the years ahead. His first maxim was:
Enter into no schemes before you have perfectly digested them,

traced every material circumstance, and are clearly satisfied you can
confide in the person you may connect with. Habituate yourself
not to a ridiculous but a suitable reserve. Be ever master of your
affairs.44
There are also interesting glimpses of his attitude towards the Asians he
worked with: ‘Black clerks and Dubashes are in general a set of artful,
plausible scoundrels... however, at the same time, under a proper curb, with
care that you are drawn into no scrapes, they may often be extremely
useful.’45
The feature, however, which more than anything else enabled him to
amass his fortune and build his career, was the strict method and regularity
he applied to his affairs. He said to his son:
Ever bear in mind these truths that method and regularity ensures
you ease and satisfaction, that irregularity and neglect constantly
involves you in trouble and perplexity, that method and order in
accounts, apportioning your time to invariable habits is so essential
that upon it will depend the permanence of every good
resolution.46
He stressed the necessity of laying down rules and following them into
habits. This would ‘be of infinite more consequence than you can at present
possibly conceive’.47 These were the techniques Sulivan instilled into the
fabric of his being when in Bombay. As he said, ‘it procured me a character
with the Company and with individuals such as I trust my son would not be
ashamed to possess.’48
He also kept a record of every conceivable thing. His methodical approach
brought order, enabling instant reference to any subject at any time. Of prime
importance was his ‘Cash Book’. A second, equally significant to him, was an
‘Account Current Book’ containing a record of ongoing balances, and notes
on people with whom he had ever conducted business. A third was his
‘Letterbook’. It held copies of all correspondence ever entered into. A fourth
was an ‘Inventory Book’, with details of the family’s attire and other
property. The fifth was for ‘Miscellaneous Observations’. Over the years he
had not faithfully entered up this book and came to regret it.
He can be pictured every morning at his post, and then ‘all afternoons,
when Public Employ admitted, were appropriated to my private affairs,
accounts and business. And almost every evening of my life with my
family.’49 This order and regularity were the hallmarks, not just of his first
career in Bombay, but of his later, illustrious one in England. With them
came personal satisfaction as well as success.
10
On Wednesday 29 November 1752, accompanied by Henry Savage, Captain
Hough and their families, and given a 17-gun salute from the shore batteries,
Sulivan and his wife set sail for England on board the Streatham commanded
by Captain Charles Mason. As one of the Bombay Council he was permitted
five tons of baggage; and an Indian servant girl attended his wife. He had
been granted his request for passage to England on the grounds of ill health.
This was a familiar ploy, by which the Company paid for the trip, excepting
personal expenses. He also received a gift of £100 from the Governor; and
he and Samuel Hough shared £2,000 from ‘the running cash’.50
For the first part of the journey they were protected from pirates by a
flotilla of Company ships. It was a fairly uneventful voyage, however, as far
as St. Helena, where they stayed for nine days. There was a shortage of
drinking water before reaching the Scilly isles and they were limited to three
pints each per day. He and his wife enjoyed the trip, remarking later in life
that they had ‘received distinguished marks of kindness...from the crew,
much to the great mortification (of) the other passengers, Hough, Savage &
Co. who, because of their familiarity were despised and ill-treated’.51
While at sea, he would have celebrated his fortieth birthday. He was
wealthy and in the full flower of life, with a successful career behind him and
a sound reputation. Should he wish, he no longer needed to discipline
himself so severely; the future for his family was secure. Nor had the years in
India affected his health too much, probably because of the self-control that
dated from his marriage. He was set ashore in England on 7 June 1753, to be
reunited with his son. He never saw India again.
It might have appeared to his fellow travellers that Sulivan contemplated a
quiet semi-retirement. That this did not happen was entirely due to his
ambition and passion. Instead, he was to become embroiled in issues of great
controversy and in intense struggles written large upon the public stage.
Traces of a ground plan that led to such a scenario are just visible: in the
duties he performed, and in his assimilation of what was important and
needed. Such a pattern is discerned in his making certain that any important
work was known at Leadenhall. The nourishment of friends and adherents,
and the favours he obliged many with suggest the same.
These years developed in him endurance and an ability to recover from
severe setbacks; although in all probability he was already inured to tragedy
and loss in a harsh age. His obsession with power perhaps took root in
circumstances prior to arriving in the Indies; probably from an Irish
background, but this can only be speculation. In Bombay, however, the
driving ambition within him developed, even riches, came second; and he
faced up to the long climb necessary. He wanted authority at India house; but
kept his ambition well hidden.
He had evaluated his own strengths and weaknesses, assessing his fitness
for the road ahead. Through application and unstinting prosecution of the
Company’s business he became an accepted authority. He had refashioned
himself and practised ‘method, regularity and constantly measuring...time in
habitual but commendable pursuits’.52 This systematic approach to life was
developed; experience gained; contacts made; and caution learned. These
lessons appear in the advice he would give to his son: ‘Be guarded in
delivering your opinion of man or parties, abroad as at home, it’s always
dangerous and may injure you.’53 This acquired knowledge of human nature
helped lay the basis for Sulivan’s future supremacy. It was learned in the
testing ground of Bombay.
2
London and India House

1753-63
As the carriage rolled into London in June 1753, Laurence Sulivan would
have cast his eyes upon the colourful exciting London described by Swift and
Pope, Dryden and Goldsmith, Johnson and Boswell, where peoples from
every corner of Britain and most of the known world congregated. The
carriage almost certainly took him to Queen Square, to be welcomed by his
friend and patron Stephen Law. He and his wife were reunited with their son,
and nieces.
In typical fashion, he was well prepared for his own arrival, with a home
ready. It was a rented house in East Street, off Red Lyon Square,
Bloomsbury.1 The next move, in 1758, was to Mile End Green in the parish
of Stepney. Sulivan had commenced the process of buying the house from
the Chandler family in 1755; finally purchased on 15 July 1756 for £630.2
Mile End was an excellent residential quarter for an East India Company
Director, which Sulivan became in 1755, because of its proximity to both
Company headquarters in Leadenhall Street and to the Company’s shipping.
The principal docks were at Blackwall.3
His friend Thomas Lane lived there, as did many other Directors,
Proprietors and Captains of EastIndiamen.4 He was soon in contact with
quite a few of his neighbours. For example, ‘on 26th November
1762…Stephen Martin Leake, Garter King of Arms in 1754, who lived in
Mile End old town, recorded that he paid two shillings to “Mr. Sullivan’s
man for bringing a Fillet of beef”.’5
His daily routine can be followed quite readily; it did not vary much from
that of Bombay. After breakfast he worked in his study; went to the ‘City’ by
coach; and after 1755 to India House. The midday meal was invariably taken
at Leadenhall – paid for by the Company if he was in the Direction; for
which he also received an annual salary of £200. Supper was with his family.
Scarce an evening passed without answering messengers, followed by more
work, and perhaps a glass of Madeira before bed. The house in Mile End
Green was a substantial one; and the very survival of the documentation
indicating the time and money spent on it, tells of a special fondness.6 From
the outside the house would have been quite striking, since Sulivan had the
building white-washed, from the level of the bottom windows upwards. The
original tiling, from base window level to the ground, was retained.7 Inside it
had a ‘great staircase and hall’ 8
Apart from furniture, he drew up inventories of every conceivable article
to do with the premises, its occupants and expenses. The methodology
involved was typical of him. Lists were ranged under general headings; within
these, individual categories, such as ‘house expenses’, were collated via a
range of sub-titles. What he called ‘Mrs. Sulivan’s branch’, when catalogued,
came to over thirty-four items, ranging from butcher and baker expenses to
the cost of mustard seed, lemons and tarts.
He paid eleven bills annually in respect of house-rent and taxes. These
included payment of his pew, the parson and rector, the watch, the
scavenger, and the poor rate. He paid for coals and for ‘posterage charges’;
and even for a sermon by a Bishop Coneybear – the parish church of St.
Dunstan’s Radcliff was only a few hundred yards from the house.9 House
and contents were fully insured with the Sun Fire Insurance Company.10 He
governed his household in a paternalistic manner, leading a well-ordered life;
and became a respected member of the merchant community, living in a style
befitting a prominent citizen with business in the City. 11
This was necessarily a settling-in period; and he and his family had to
adjust to the mores of conduct usual for returned Company servants. He
spent liberally to keep up appearances. Infinite time, patience and money
were used to gain the best possible advantage, and to be seen to be doing
well.
His greatest expense, however, centred upon his own person. Sulivan took
great care of himself. This is reflected in accounts with the apothecary, and
with a barber: ‘to shave me every day and powder my wiggs at 15 shillings a
quarter’. His footman, called ‘William’, had also to shave him, ‘no card
money, no clothes but what I please’.12 Sulivan knew it was important to put
on a good show; and this is reflected in the extra care given to internal health
and external appearance. Even his watch received an annual spring clean.
The master of the house very carefully specified every item of his own
apparel. It might suggest a vanity with regard to his person. On the other
hand, he did have to maintain the appearance of a man of substance; and he
was appearing regularly in public. However, the particular relish which
accompanied his description of each item smacks of self-satisfaction. These
garments vividly portray his personality. He cut a striking figure in his
crimson satin waistcoat, blue velvet coat and breeches trimmed with lace; his
black silk stockings, gold garters, gold buttons, wig, and gold-laced hat with
matching shoes.13
During this period of adjustment to life in London, he maintained a
number of servants. He had a cook, a housemaid, a footman and a
LONDON AND INDIA HOUSE 1753-63 25
coachman; and also kept an Indian girl as a servant for the first year of his
return from India. It was the coachman and footman who seem to have
caused him most trouble; and there would seem to be reason to doubt
Sulivan’s ability to keep on good terms with his staff.14 He was a cultured
man and kept abreast of opinion, paying his subscriptions to arts and science
foundations and to societies; attending plays. A voracious reader, he took
newspapers, magazines and reading-books; and was a member of a
circulating library. He was also building up ‘Maitland’s History’, in numbers.15
What excited him was meeting people, coming across new ideas, novelty.
His family, the Company, shipping and the life of the river interested him.
Court and country life bored him. He found relief from pressure within his
home, so different from the business world he frequented. Good
conversation washed down with an excellent vintage was perhaps his main
indulgence. His accounts speak of ‘Liquors taken this day.’ He kept an
excellent cellar. A pinch of snuff now and then was another luxury, but there
is no mention of tobacco.
His hobbies and pastimes were little different from those of others. Apart
from reading, he would play cards, especially whist. Visits were made to spas,
such as those at Bath and Tunbridge Wells, where he and his wife
participated in the customary promenading. He took carriage rides, and
visited the West Country a lot, staying with friends in Taunton, Ashburton
and elsewhere. They took great delight in entertaining company, in calling
upon acquaintances and in going to the theatre.
There is not much in his letters referring to enjoyment of these social
engagements; nor is there much in the way of family news or intimate detail.
Common gossip or behaviour was seldom mentioned. He gives no
description of inanimate objects, items of beauty or of possessions that might
have meant something in a sentimental sense. Only occasionally did he
mention the fact that in a will some friend had left him a ring, for
remembrance sake.
The impression these manuscripts create are of a man always on his guard.
The colour that does appear, and it is powerful, is found in his narration and
superb use of language. He made wonderful use of imagery to put something
across; as in a letter to his niece Betsy: ‘You must remember me always busy
about nothing;’ or to his son, ‘I never more will build castles.’ In reality he
had few pursuits, the Company was his life.16
2
Sulivan’s choice of home, suggests that he had no intention of retiring, and
intended to have a public commercial life. The first consideration, quite
understandably, was the remittance of his fortune; and he kept open all
channels and contacts that might lead to mercantile opportunities. His home
was to be the base for all his operations.
The two years from 1753 to 1755, when he entered the Direction, were in
many respects critical in that he had to speedily forge and then consolidate
those connections in the metropolis necessary for his advancement. He must

quickly pick up the thread of affairs. It was especially important to maintain
contact with men who had been his friends and business acquaintances in
Bombay, those now returned, and others continually visiting London. It was
necessary too that he become familiar with men of importance, who could be
useful and who held positions of rank in social circles as well as business. He
was aware that advancement would depend upon projection of his own
talents.
Ship expenses were notorious, so there would have been limited funds on
arrival. Money from India would have to be speedily realised. It was essential,
therefore, that he make swift contact with those acting as agents for him,
probably Thomas Lane, or even Stephen Law. At no time is there mention of
either Sulivan or Owen relatives.
At first there would be no opportunity or need to develop the associations
required for any other line. He relied on friends already made. By confining
his activities to what he already knew and had practiced in Bombay; and by
keeping the affairs of the East India Company foremost in his mind, there
would be little time lost. Sooner than it would have been possible in any
other sphere, he was able to display on a wider stage those qualities already
shown in India.
As a financial and commercial centre and as a focal point of world trade,
London was immense. To Sulivan the metropolis would have been
fascinating. He fell in love with everything he saw; it became his spiritual
home, where he experienced exhilaration and a zest for life. Yet the sheer
size of the place and multitude of activities re-emphasised that he must
restrict himself to what he knew best.
The financial world he entered was undergoing what amounted to a
revolution. A credit expansion was underway, particularly in the mobilisation
of commercial capital. Those in the City he found interesting were the
families of merchants, goldsmiths, assurance companies (particularly
mercantile and fire insurance) and marine underwriters. Importers and
exporters came to be included, as well as ship builders, ship owners and
ships’ captains. Bullion financiers, gentlemen speculators ‘from the west of
Temple Bar’ and the casual investor, were all attached, from time to time.
From the transactions of people ‘in the alley’ and in the coffee shops of
the capital in the 1750s emerged the stock exchange of the l770s. Established
centres such as Jonathan’s; the stock-jobbing coffee house, Lloyds; and the
London Assurance Company, among others, came to the fore. Such groups inter-
connected through the market with the great monopoly trading companies,
like the South Sea and East India Companies; and with the Bank of England
and the Treasury. The needs of Government put an ever-increasing reliance
upon the various institutions that collectively made up the market. Financiers
from Amsterdam, Paris and other European currency centres were
increasingly tempted to invest there because of steady and high return backed
with security.
Britain was also gaining a position in world bullion distribution. The ‘City’
was taking over from Amsterdam because, apart from Jamaican and West
Indian bullion, Portugal, which with Spain controlled the South American
bullion sources, traded with Britain, and paid in gold from Brazilian mines.
This was fed into the expanding English trade network, especially in the Far
East and East Indies. The Bank of England and the London exchange
market, and especially the monopoly companies, made greatest use of this
specie.17
Specialists, like ships’ husbands* assumed greater importance.
Commanders of EastIndiamen had certain valuable powers as well. With
their perpetuity of command* and control over appointments, they held a
monopoly. Such rights had translated through time into property and vested
right in command, and from there to sale of this. Private trade and smuggling
made such posts even more precious. These pursuits could render an average
profit of £4,000 per annum to a Commander in the 1750s.
Shipping insurers and shrewd directors of the great companies, especially
the East India Company, were encouraged to become deeply versed in
particular mercantile subjects. Similarly, the committees of finance, shipping
and warehousing in an organisation like the East India Company were
steadily absorbed into the booming commerce.
In realising his own wealth and remitting that of returned Company
servants and ships’ captains, Sulivan was provided with every opportunity to
transact other pursuits in the City proper. Soon he was acting as a go-
between, advancing the East India Company, its shipping, and many of its
servants and their businesses, more and more into the London market. He
came to terms with as many important men as he could within the City; and
was engrossed in the mushrooming banking, credit and other monetary
activities. He would deal in many spheres, but showed exceptional skill when
handling anything that touched upon the Company.
He brought to bear on the commercial life of London great ability and
much detailed information of what was going on abroad. Looking after the
business concerns of others had also endowed him with objectivity. Armed
with his own strict schedule he again worked industriously, a habit, as he said,
which had ‘fixed so strongly as to accompany (me) to England’.18
He had an exceptional grasp of how India House operated, of its affairs
and financial structure. Stephen Law, Thomas Lane and Edward Owen, his
late brother-in-law, had seen to that. Owen had been an accountant at India
House for four years before going to Bombay. To some degree this
knowledge helped prepare him for the launch of his remittance agency. The
private occupations practised in Bombay were taken up again, but in a bigger
way. He became involved in cargo and its insurance; in banking; and in
speculating upon the stock exchange, as his careful notes on current stocks
and bonds show.
Once more he acted as an attorney, fulfilling the executor and trustee tasks
that this demanded. He also indulged in money-lending and notary work,
since remittance and insurance activities for and on behalf of people with an
East India Company interest, made this unavoidable. He was embroiled with
shippers and with the Company shipping interest;* and although increasingly
absorbed in the affairs of the Company proper, even after he became a
Director in 1755 his private activities continued. He helped link together
individuals and agencies with the various arms of the money-market.
In his remittance work he acted as a receiving agent, converting into
sterling the wealth flowing from the Indies in the form of bills, exchange
notes and diamonds. To begin with, this mainly concerned returned
Company servants and ships’ captains. Such work triggered the functions of
trustee, executor, or attorney, when authorised to act for clients.
The degree to which he placed his own affairs in good order and the
propriety with which he handled the business of others is exemplified in one
of the homilies he was fond of delivering: ‘It is a true and trite observation
that the man who neglects his own concerns is unfit to manage the affairs of
others.’19 His career demonstrates that he did abide by these rules. His
appetite and faculty for dealing with rates of exchange, acting as a financial
adviser and general factotum, soon made him a much sought after City
figure.
The number of his friends within the Company’s shipping interest ensured
a sound foundation for his London agency. These included the ever-present
and ever-active Captains Thomas Lane and Samuel Hough. He was helped
too in that his good name had been carried to London prior to his arrival.
Ex-Governors Horne and Law, Commanders Hough and Barton and
Company servant Waters had seen to that. He had a very good platform
upon which to build a business and attract associates.
Remittance work was easy for him, he was so steeped in such activity. It
also involved granting loans. He was well versed in discounting bills and
issuing promissory and ‘drawn’ notes, which allowed his money to be used by
others. He became involved with scriveners, brokers and merchants. The
agency was based on acquaintance and interest. In fact it was the extension of
his web of contacts made in India that secured such work in London. He
sometimes worked alone and at other times in partnership. Yet, as far as this
particular activity was concerned, he had complete faith in only Commanders
Lane, Barton and Hough.
In his private ventures with Sulivan, Captain Hough acted as the principal
co-ordinator in the eastern hemisphere for all remittance activities. Agents
holding powers of attorney on behalf of their clients acted through Hough
and were channelled to Sulivan. Hough could provide ways and means of
remitting Indian funds through confidants among his fellow captains – and
via his position as Superintendent of the Company’s Marine.
Robert Clive used Sulivan’s remittance system quite extensively, employing
Henry Vansittart and Robert Orme as his agents. They too worked through
Captain Hough. In the course of making thirteen remittances in 1758, Clive
paid the money to Captain Barton for bills ‘at 180 days sight on Messrs.
Sulivan and Boulton (Henry Crabb Boulton)’. By this means, the Colonel was
able to send home a tremendous amount.20 When he returned to England in
1760, he even paid a personal visit to Sulivan at his home in Mile End Green;
perhaps only one of many.21 The other members of the clique in India, all of
them involved with Sulivan in remittances, were John Walsh in Calcutta,
Robert Palk in Madras and John Spencer in Bombay. Clive knew Captain
Samuel Hough and John Spencer, from the Bombay Council of 1756.
Sulivan’s agency was the London base for this triangular affiliation.
A principal concern in the l750s was the partnership formed with his
friend and Company servant, John Spencer – in his role of private merchant
in Bombay. Sulivan in London and Spencer in Bombay formed a fixed axis
for freight and mercantile insurance activities. Captain Hough joined them,
caring for in-transit shipping freight and associated goods. James Moffat, a
Scottish insurance broker of Lombard Street, acted with Sulivan from the
London end, underwriting the ventures and bringing in extra capital. Captain
Thomas Lane, a ship’s husband as well as Sulivan’s right-hand man,
personified the tie that this consortium had with the immensely important
Company shipping interest.
They formed a tight-knit body: Sulivan, Spencer, Hough and Lane -
forging even stronger bonds with their business interests. James Moffat was
an excellent business colleague and his many connections served them well.
The presence of his brother Robert in the Bombay Presidency had created
the link; and James Moffat himself enjoyed a particular friendship with
Captain Hough.
The main outlet for Sulivan’s funds was undoubtedly shipping and freight,
particularly in association with these friends. Between 1755 and 1762 his
business ventures involved him with at least eight ships in European and
Indian waters; all noted in his India account with Hough. Debts in India,
payments to ship owners, agents and customs dues were all entered. The
books reflected a healthy state of affairs, typical of his business from 1753
onwards, which would remain steady into the early 1760s.22 John Spencer
provides an illustration of how long this particular line of business continued.
As late as February 1766, he instructed Sulivan, ‘You will please to continue
the management of my concern in the ‘Havannah’ Captain Madge.’23
The middle of the eighteenth century was a period when specialists in a
variety of financial fields were emerging. Assurances in general, and shipping
or marine insurance in particular, were no exception. A bonus, as far as
Sulivan was concerned, was its necessarily close connection with the
Company’s shipping. The firm formed by Andrew and James Moffat was one
of an ever-increasing number of brokers, and the one he dealt with most.
Sulivan’s link was with James Moffat, the senior partner, who put him in
touch with William Braund. He also used the firm of Barclay, Amyand and
Staples.
Firms dealing in ship insurance functioned in an intermediary fashion. On
the one hand there were merchants, brokers and men with landed wealth
who would underwrite a risk. On the other were groups sharing ownership
and the freight of ships. Such parties included Sulivan and Spencer, together
with ships’ husbands like Thomas Lane and ships’ commanders such as
Samuel Hough, who all required insurance.
The Moffats handled all types of gambles, but marine assurance interested
them the most. James Moffat was also a director of the Sun Fire Insurance
Company, with whom Sulivan had insured his house. This Company illustrates
how interlocking were the many organisations in London. Sulivan and
Thomas Lane were friends of the Moffat brothers; while the shippers, Peter
and Joseph Godfrey, Charles Raymond and William Braund were all
underwriters for the same firm. Since they were also ships’ husbands, they
were already intimately connected with Sulivan and Lane. Sulivan’s close
friendship with John Hyde, the Governor of the London Assurance Company,
(whom he introduced to the First Minister, the Earl of Bute, in 1762) was
doubtless also due to these incestuous relationships.
Insurance companies were important sources of ready cash in the market.
Thus, as a Director of the London Assurance Company (since 1754) Thomas
Lane was a pleasing channel for access to such money, or even the dispersal
of personal funds. By acting as Sulivan’s ‘man of business’, he allowed the
great man to keep out of sight. The reason for such furtiveness Sulivan (later)
put neatly into words: ‘It is not (thank heaven) from a consciousness that my
actions will not bear the strictest scrutiny but even an appearance
unaccompanyd with the true spring and motive would be a triumph to my
enemies.’24
Through Thomas Lane, he shared in the large sums lent out at interest by
the London Assurance Company; and it was also invested, used or otherwise
cared for on his behalf by the same man. John Dorrien, another who was
close to him, and who dealt extensively with this company, would have been
similarly employed. Other evidence displays the connection of insurers with
his friends among Company shippers and Directors. All were close to him
then and later, and associated with the Company at that time and in the years
ahead. Many filled dual roles of insurance specialist and/or men with capital,
or held seafaring positions or commercial employment.25
Bankers in the City were useful to know because of their capital; and they
too were assuming a new importance just at the time Sulivan was making his
mark. Financial houses were mushrooming, and in the 1760s and 1770s
Sulivan was to have extensive dealings with firms such as the Baring Brothers;
Boehm, Amyand and Goslings; and Devon and Child; but there is evidence to show
that these connections began in the 1750s.
It was probably his friendship with James Moffat that led to contact with
Child’s bank; while the Amyand bank belonged to yet another acquaintance. In
the intimate London commercial world, these bankers were also insurance
brokers or directors of insurance firms with an interest in Company shipping.
With his connections Sulivan was in close touch with these financial houses;
and just how well he knew the banking business is illustrated in his later
correspondence.26 Also, his accounts for 1755-6, and 1759, speak of his early
interest; while ‘Bank of England annuities’ for 1751, 1756 and 1757; ‘Bank
annuities consolidated’ for 1756 and 1759; and ‘Bank circulation at par’, tell
where some resources were parcelled out.
As a Director, from 1755 onwards, the importance of banking connections
becomes even clearer. The letters to his son in 1778 display how much he
understood developments in the application of money that had taken place
over the years. The manner in which he urged his son to take action echoed
his earlier habits, ‘Every person returning to England whom you can
influence, endeavour to engage that he takes my recommendation of a
banker to keep his cash, as this often strengthens my interest.’27
Much of his money lending, executor, trustee and notary work was
associated with, or came about because of his other lines of commercial
endeavour or sprang from his involvements abroad. He linked his lending
with this notary work, doing so at a time when demands for discounts and
loans on mortgages were on the rise. It was a relatively open field in which
the Bank of England had only a token interest.
His Bombay grounding gave him an advantage; and the City contacts he
made following his return supplied ready funds. Success depended on the
nature of the individual concerned. Sulivan had to be: ‘A man of integrity,
trusted by all, the self-evident executor and trustee for his whole family.’28
This description, applied to William Braund, more than adequately describes
how Sulivan was regarded. He was quite obviously an outstanding person,
the one to depend upon, as far as his close family of friends were concerned.
This is testified by the wills of Captain Samuel Hough, John Spencer,
Governor John Horne and countless others who trusted him to carry out
their last wishes.
The duties of an executor fitted well with Sulivan’s special skills. Countless
opportunities arose for what he and his contemporaries considered
acceptable business practice. These advantages would appear during the
payment of the deceased’s debts, distribution of property, and the right to
sue in law and receive any legacy.29 His quasi-legal activities are best
illustrated in a petition that reached the House of Lords in 1785, and was not
to be dismissed until February 1787, that is, after Sulivan’s death.30 The
matters considered were thirty years old, and concerned Samuel Hough’s
estate. Sulivan was a co-executor of Hough’s will, together with James Moffat
and the deceased’s wife, Martha Hough. He was also co-executor in England
of John Spencer’s will, acting with the Reverend Edward Norton and
Thomas Lane.
Sulivan and Moffat possessed themselves of Hough’s estate to a great
amount; according to the petitioners ‘more than sufficient to satisfy all the
testators’ debts and funeral expenses’. They, in turn, coveted all the proceeds
from the joint trade and private India accounts; that is the £3,598-12–9
Spencer owed Hough in 1763, plus £23,000 owed him through the joint
trading account, with compound interest in full. Sulivan and Moffat
maintained, on the other hand, that Hough had obtained further money and
that this account was still open and unadjusted.31
They also countered the compound interest argument put forward by the
petitioners, and specified that of the credit claimed, over £13,000 was
interest, and over £6,000 consisted of compound interest. They had also
renounced execution of Spencer’s will. The decree of the Court of Chancery
of 3l October 1785 upheld Sulivan’s argument. No interest was allowed on
either the private trade or joint trading accounts. Nor were any costs given to
the petitioners. The petition was dismissed.32
This legal struggle lays bare the kind of transactions he was involved in;
and illustrates sharpness in business practice. Moffat and he would have
shared around £6,000. His hard-headed business acumen is apparent in other
ways too. Items in his accounts for 1756 indicate that on 19 September 1753
he received 10,630 rupees; and on 1 January 1756 a further 1,913 rupees, to
hold in trust for his ward, Louisa Barton. He invested this money in a
manner beneficial to himself as well as his client.33 There were several other
instances of this kind. In yet another he was a trustee to a marriage
settlement, whch resulted in a decree being brought against himself, Robert
Palk and Henry Vansittart.34 On 21 June 1757 he:
Executed a bond to Thomas Rammet Esqr. and Mary Reynolds

his sister and himself for and in consideration of £300 paid me
by said Rammet. I engage to allow him and his sister during their
natural lives the sum of twenty five pounds per annum to be paid
half yearly, first payment of £12.10. to commence the 2 Decem.
next, the second do. The 20th June l758.35
This type of risk illustrates the nature of a great deal of his work during the
1750s. The bond would scarcely ruin him, even if he should pay for many
years. The cumulative result of similar transactions would prove lucrative.
Buying Government securities was another of his schemes. They were
‘purchasable at a heavy discount redeemable at par and yet bore interest’. It is
almost certain too that as well as holding Government and East India
Company stocks and bonds, Sulivan invested in the South Sea Company and in
insurance societies.36
His connections within shipping circles were particularly striking. This
came to involve him in freighting activities, and he developed further his
numerous contacts in the Company’s marine service in general. He also
formed several partnerships: The most important again involved Spencer and
Hough, operating from Bombay; John Walsh in Bengal; and Robert Palk in
Madras. Yet another involved James Moffat.
As far as his future intentions in the Company were concerned, it was the
inroads made into the Company’s shipping interest* that proved most
important.37 Sulivan identified closely with these men; he shared their views
and promoted them in the years ahead. The shippers were to form a large
part of what he was wont to term his ‘natural’ interest. Like them, he was
dedicated to the independence of the Company and against state
intervention. From the 1750s he and this interest were as one; and his
support for them was well known. Even in 1764 John Walsh, writing to
Clive, referred to it: ‘and he (Sulivan) has obliged many (ships’ husbands) I
am satisfied in that channel’.38
Sulivan was one of a number of ‘Charter Parties’,* as appears from his
1755-6 accounts. He developed a deep understanding with (Sir) Charles
Raymond and John Durand, both powerful ships’ husbands.* They, together
with the Godfreys, Thomas Lane and others of his friends, monopolised
control of shipping. Invariably, these same men are to be found sitting upon
the Committee of Shipping in the Company, dealing with the hiring of the
special kinds of vessels needed, and ensuring a continuity of supply.
Again it was a closed society. Husbands of ‘permanent bottoms’,* masters
holding ‘perpetuity of command’* and Company Directors were almost as
one. Such homogeneity gave the shippers tremendous political weight. The
‘combinations’ of husbands who controlled the Company’s shipping had a
big voting strength in the Court of Proprietors and a strong interest in the
Direction. It is unlikely that Sulivan ever exerted much control over this
close-knit body. Luckily for him, alliance with its leading personalities was
enough. The shippers were capable of excluding rivals and of coercing the
Company. Yet there were only about 30 really important persons, interrelated
through business and marriage.
Another factor blocking any control over the shippers was that two years
before Sulivan arrived in London, an owners’ organisation came into being,
whose shipping policy was approved by the then Direction. Thus, from 1751
to 1761, he was bound by a document he had no part in forming.
There were numerous networks linking him with the shipping interest.
Stephen Law, already active on his behalf within the Company, brought
interesting introductions. Messrs. Hough, Barton and Lane each introduced
contacts. The connections Sulivan was bringing about between shippers and
mercantile insurers helped to create closer links. In this manner James Moffat
and Andrew Moffatt became firmly cemented into the Company shipping
through him. The people for whom the Moffats acted as brokers were, in
turn, usually in shipping, such as William Braund and his brother Samuel.
His pre-eminence among the shippers blossomed fully after 1755. Again
Walsh hearkened to this tie-up: ‘His (Sulivan’s) interest is pretty strong in the
shipping, among the husbands of ships and he has obliged many.’39 Thomas
Lane was of immense importance in the development of this. As a ship’s
husband, and through contacts with other husbands, who formed an elite, he
could make strong representation. A remittance partnership with Henry
Crabb Boulton also paid dividends, giving another connection with this
interest.40 However, the best evidence of these links lay in his friendship and
business collaboration with the Godfrey family, and especially with Peter
Godfrey. All of the Godfreys were involved with Sulivan and Stephen Law in
remitting money from Bombay and elsewhere.41
For example, Messrs. Watts and Orme remitted money to Peter and
Joseph Godfrey and to Sulivan in the 1750s; in June 1757, bills from Bombay
worth £13,700 were made out to Sulivan, Law, Peter and Joseph Godfrey. In
another instance, a warrant dated 14 September 1757 said that Sulivan,

together with Peter and Joseph Godfrey, were to be paid a further £13,700.
Using Company channels only, they remitted a total of around £30,000. In
addition, Sulivan and Edmund Godfrey were trustees for a Bombay
colleague, Timothy Tullie; and were joint executors of his will.
What was to prove most important was that Edmund and Thomas
Godfrey influenced his initial entry and further progress in the Company.
The Court Book for 3 November 1756 shows them acting on his behalf,
alongside other shippers: Captain John Purling, Charles Raymond and
Frederick Pigou.
Despite his success, there are signs that Sulivan knew he could only be
satisfied working in the executive branch of the Honourable Company. There
he could be his own man. The thought of becoming a Director was certainly
not new in 1755, but it was brought forward as a practical reality in the lead-
up to the April election of that year. Indeed in many ways, the period from
his disembarkation in 1753 until entry to the Direction in 1755 was really one
of preparation.
During his transactions in the money market, he consciously cultivated the
image of being an expert on anything appertaining to the East India
Company. Everyone who mattered in business and in politics was made
aware that he knew what he was talking about in this field. He was helped by
the dearth of first-hand knowledge of India among the Directors. Incredibly,
experience of what was going on in the east was looked upon by many there
as having little relevance. It was a situation Sulivan helped change; but first,
he would take advantage of it.
3
In 1755 Sulivan stood on the threshold of events that would change his life
forever, and would send his career on a dizzy upward spiral. Only in 1739
had he realised it was crucial for his own sense of identity that he participate
in some way on the world stage. The obvious first step was to work for
position and responsibility within the Company, which was to be the route to
high office and perhaps fame. He had understood that he could only be ‘in
the game’ if operating there, and amounted to very little outside it. He also
found peace of mind. This organisation was all he would ever need for
fulfilment. The bonuses were that it provided security, stability, nourishment
and wealth.
It might also be the case that from 1739 to 1755 he developed a Confucian
belief in how he would conduct his life. As far as possible, he behaved in a
principled manner, emphasising personal virtue, devotion to family, and
justice. He seemed to want to improve his moral character during these years;
this developed into a desire to influence and change things for the good in
the wider world. He had realised, however, that only upon a public stage
could he do anything worthwhile. His wife would have sympathised, and
perhaps influenced such traits. She understood him.
Gambling was almost certainly part of the dissipated life he once led. In
1739 he was a reformed gamester, but only in the sense that he ceased to take
on crazy odds; but the volatile swings that accompanied such behaviour –
even though well under control for much of the time – could affect his
judgement. With the risks came the possibility of self-destruction. Of course,
this all had to be hidden, and by and large it was. The image he wanted to
project had to be worked at and then protected. He must be seen as the very
model of stability, a man with a sure touch, a winner.
From this perspective, it really was not strange for him to say so little
about his former life. He was making a new beginning. It could also explain
why he left nothing much of his early years in his correspondence. It was
only in 1778, when the father feared he would never again see his only child
that some of the deliberately forgotten life came out. Nor did anything he
ever wrote to others (other than to Stephen) indicate this propensity to dice
with fate. But the termination of some first career in 1739, hints dropped
during his second, illustrious one, and the imagery he used, gives the game
away. His life was to be conducted in as secretive a way as possible - for
someone who might become an eminent public figure. Everything was to be
a mystery. The approach fitted nicely with the need for concealment, and
suited his nature perfectly.
Between 1753 and 1755, probably at frequent intervals, his curiosity would
have brought him to India House in Leadenhall Street, to the main doors of
the Honourable Company trading to the East Indies, and upstairs to the
‘Strangers Gallery’. The narrow front of the building that opened to the main
street was quite unpretentious. But it hid a vast grandeur within, with a public
hall and a Proprietors committee-room scarce inferior to anything of like
nature in the City. It stood out as ‘the most remarkable contemporary edifice
of commercial capitalism’.42
As in all else up to that time, it was probably his patron and adviser
Stephen Law, himself a Director, who would have attended his first step
through the portals of this building that housed all his dreams; and he who
conducted him through the Courts and minor committee rooms. Law would
have led him along its corridors, showing him the labyrinth of warehouses
and antechambers that lay between Leadenhall Street and the Thames.
On 25 February 1755 he purchased £2,000 of Company stock, which
qualified him to become a Director. By then he was familiar with India
House and the way it worked, knew many of the Proprietors and Directors,
and had more than a reasonable knowledge of the problems the Company
faced. By this move he clearly signified where he was now to concentrate his
energies; and had taken the next step in a course probably planned before
leaving Bombay. Much of the groundwork needed to bring about his rise
from Director in 1755 to Chairman of the Company in 1758 was in place.
The lead was taken by that group of friends headed by Stephen Law,
known as the ‘Bombay Squad’ or ‘Bombay Faction’. They were backed up by
the influence of the shipping interest and the support of the business
contacts he had made in the City, especially in insurance and banking. The
‘Squad’ was willing and drilled enough to give him its combined strength in
his push towards control. It was in their best interests to do so; a first move
in securing their man an important office in the Company’s executive,
commanding patronage that would benefit them all.43
Sulivan understood the aspirations of his supporters and had much in
common with them. It would have been perfectly natural to him and to those
ex-Bombay colleagues that he should use their friendship. Nevertheless, he
was the vanguard of a new presence in Leadenhall politics with this ‘Indian’
interest. It marked a new development. Until then the executive function of
the Company had been firmly controlled by old City families.
Acquaintance and dealings with bankers and insurers helped; and he had
extended his general Company expertise, paying a lot of attention to shipping
connections. He was right in doing this, because it was probably the backing
of the shipping interest, although deeply submerged, that served as the
foundation for his climb to power. Fortunately, Sulivan was aspiring to the
Direction at a time when this interest was ‘searching for commercial ends by
use of political means’.44 The Godfreys, especially, made it their business to
promote him.
This phalanx was to remain the bedrock of his support for years; so much
so, that John Zacchary Holwell wrote to John Payne on 17 March 1759, ‘For
what have we not to fear from so malignant, powerful and inveterate a
conjunction as Messrs. Law, Sullivan and Godfrey.’45 Sulivan was able to
marry his own interests to those of the shippers, at times subordinating his
own desires to fulfil theirs, only to achieve what he wanted later by and
through this important body.
He was sure of strong advocates, therefore, when he bid for a place on the
Company’s board. The only question was whether Stephen Law and he had
assembled a power base that would carry the day. The support of Law was
crucial. He, in turn, was most probably fulfilling a long-term objective of
challenging the groups that controlled the Company. In 1732, while in India,
he had learned from a Robert Adams of others making such an attempt.46
After his unjustified recall from Bombay in 1742, this thought would have
burned ever more brightly.
Law was a Director from 1746 to 1749, from 1751 to 1754, and would be
again, finally, in 1756. It is not difficult to understand why he gave Sulivan all
the help he could. It is doubtful whether the Bombay ties could ever be
broken. He wanted to see his friend succeed; and also knew that if Sulivan
prevailed he could only benefit. It was a legitimate ambition then for anyone
involved in public service to make a comfortable fortune in the public
employ and establish those he was associated with.’47
Governor Law would have advised Sulivan of the opportune time to take
out the qualification to be a Director. His influence also meant his protégé
would be placed on the ‘House’ (or Directors’) list. In an effort to influence
the electors, the outgoing Directors drew the ‘House’ list up each year. Direct
canvassing, normally based on terms of personal friendship, was carried on.
Everything suggests that a well thought out plan was being implemented. Co-
option of such a new Proprietor was quite unusual. The very speed of his
election to the executive office, just over a month after taking out
qualification, and done without rancour, suggests as much. Other factors
helped: the absence of serious party divisions within the body of Proprietors;
the uncertainty brought about by the rapidly changing situation in India, and
rumble of troubles ahead.
At the election in April 1755 his new share-holding commercial associates
welcomed him and he was returned. The Proprietors had confidence in
Stephen Law, and would know enough about Sulivan to satisfy them. It
ensured there would be little or no resistance to his candidacy. Almost
certainly his good sense and sound advice had already been noted. Potential
leadership qualities would have played a part; and undoubtedly he was found
to be a vital force, though he might have appeared a rather mysterious figure
to many.
With his suitability guaranteed by the shippers and with the unstinting
support of the ‘Bombay Faction’, he had found success. Once in the saddle
he was very capable of staying there. His unopposed election, nevertheless,
was a formidable achievement. He stood on the threshold of a new chapter
in his career, a Proprietor and Director of a powerful institution. He also had
something to prove, to himself mainly, but also to others who really knew
him.
3
The Court of Directors

1755-58
What demands explanation is why, after only entering the Direction in

1755, Sulivan could so quickly become Deputy Chairman in 1757, then
Chairman of the Company in April 1758. It was an extraordinarily short time.
Why, too, did this mark the start of a new era, and be seen as such by
contemporaries?
There are several answers to why he rose to the top so soon. They include
his hunger for power and sense of opportunism; his natural abilities; and a
lack of quality or the talent needed to oppose him. His strength of will,
however, was unbelievable. He also had luck, and a formidable body of
support. Significantly perhaps, the increasingly bedraggled state of the
Company’s affairs at home and abroad, which cried out for a change of
direction, helped him. The threat of full-scale war with France (and possibly
with the Dutch in alliance with unfriendly Indian Princes) was never far away.
His fellow Directors could not be expected to know that he was working
to a different agenda from them. To him the Company was not just to be
abused, of which he had first-hand experience. He held an ideal picture of
the organisation’s stature and grandeur, of its immense power and the central
place it occupied in the fabric of the nation. Preservation of the rights and
liberties, enshrined in its Charter from the Crown, lived with him from the
very beginning.
There is little doubt though that prior to and following the election of
1755, Sulivan worked in what might be termed a conspiratorial manner
towards achieving control. Within the Company Stephen Law worked in
close harness with him. From 1756 he provided advice and information
within the Direction and on the Committees of Accounts, Shipping and
Private Trade. Sulivan used networks of contacts and a variety of approaches
among his fellow Directors, shippers, returned Bombay servants and friends
in the City. The aim behind all of this was to project himself.
THE COURT OF DIRECTORS 1755-58 39
This need for prominence and exposure pushed him to make as many
friendships as possible. It is what also lay behind his membership of the
Royal Society of Arts. He was gathering support for a bid for greater office.
The importance of keeping in touch with influential contemporaries and the
possibility of making new contacts are both reflected in his entry to that
body. He was proposed by Dr. Manningham; a relation (and probably father)
of his friends and business colleagues of that name, resident in London and
Bombay.
The Royal Society of Arts might even have had a hidden agenda in that
era, operating as a quasi-political club, possibly Whig orientated, such was its
membership. It was popular because titled wealth and the landed gentry
could meet there with the lower orders on common ground: the pursuit of
knowledge and of new developments in science and the arts. Stephen Law
had joined the Society shortly before and was obviously the inspiration
behind Sulivan’s move. Law was accepted as a member in May 1755, Sulivan
in June of that year.
This manoeuvre did help his acceptance at the highest level, and within the
city’s business community. It eased his rapid ascent by ensuring a sound
position in London society, helping his private business in the City and, most
important of all, improving his standing with Company Directors and
Proprietors alike in the shortest possible time. It was one of the soundest
steps taken by him and his benefactor Stephen Law.1
It seems more than coincidental too that a ‘Mr. Clive’ was present at a
Society meeting on 26 March 1755, at a time when Robert Clive was in
London, and in very close collaboration with Messrs. Manningham. The
Royal Society of Arts (and the Manningham family in particular) might even
have provided the background for the early friendship of Sulivan and Clive,
1755 being a year when both attended meetings. Their mutual friend, Charles
Manningham, son of Sir Richard Manningham, was fourth in Council at Fort
William by April 1758. He was the agent in India for his relatives and had
business connections with both Clive and Sulivan.2
Yet it must also be said in his defence that membership of this society was
not all about politics. He did have a strong interest in Indian culture and had
brought many pieces of Indian craft home; the Royal Society of Arts was an
excellent institution for discussions of such topics. He also encouraged the
artist Tilly Kettle to proceed to India and paint portraits of Asians as well as
Europeans.
Sulivan found the Society useful because it provided a web of connection
stretching from London to India. He had social capital to exploit here too, in
that there had to be an underlying informal set of values or norms shared
with those he encountered that encouraged co-operation. As a member of a
group, those in it would expect that he was like them. They trusted one
another, they would trust him. He deliberately identified with a group or
groups wherever he went: fellow Bombay servants, ‘City’ businessman,
Commanders of East Indiamen, Company shipping groups, shipping
insurance people, and ships’ husbands. He expanded his circles all the time,
maintaining contact with all previous groups if he could.
His thinking on economic matters displays how suitable he was to be head
of this Company. Basically he was pre-enlightenment, pre-Bentham in
outlook. He was heir to the tradition that had grown among Britons trading
in India, which said bullion had to be kept in reserve; excessive war was
detrimental to trade - that it increased costs and multiplied the expense of
bringing commerce onto a stable footing. Unfortunately for him, he faced an
ever-growing need for military and naval activity; and was aware of the attack
being mounted against its chartered rights, although not yet sharpened and
honed by Adam Smith.
In 1755 Sulivan appreciated that he was in an age of compromise, where
the views of Government ought to harmonise with the Company’s
commercial interests. Preserving this harmony was to be one of the
overriding and lasting considerations of his life. His efforts at negotiation
with leading Governmental figures in order to hold on to privileges and
chartered rights, is one of his most worthy achievements. Perhaps more than
most, he understood the delicate balance between the requirements of
Administration and private interest.
His own superior qualities shone all the brighter throughout the period
1755 to 1758 because previously the quality of those in control was so
indifferent. A languid approach to affairs characterised the executive; and
commercial interests were suffering because there was nobody of real weight
on board, and few with first-hand experience of India. He was helped by the
continued and concerted push of his friends; largely the same groups and
individuals who backed his entry to the Direction.
Probably even more important in explaining his rise to power was the
threat to the Company’s possessions in India, growing since the hostilities
with France had re-opened in 1740. These apprehensions over possible war
worked on his behalf when in 1756 open war with France broke out.
Knowledge of the Indian theatre was needed.
It is too easy, however, to ignore Sulivan’s talents. He had initiative, could
seize an opportunity and possessed powers of persuasion and perseverance.
Although approachable, he also had a genuine superior attitude; he oozed
confidence at all times, and would use this commanding presence in his
executive role. He understood perfectly when to tack in the face of
opposition; and was able to bounce back from adversity. All these qualities
he combined with dogged hard work; he pored over the minutest detail of
Company’s business. He was aided by experience of how things actually
functioned, but even so, to reach the top required intricate planning.
It would be clear to many during the years leading up to 1755 that here
was a man destined to make a mark. It might even have appeared that he was
being groomed for the purpose. Such immediate recognition of his abilities
was apparently the case within the Court of Directors where his skills were
quickly and thankfully received. His name immediately appeared on several

committees: accounts; private trade and a standing Committee.
With the Court of Directors Sulivan found the arena which suited him
best. It is probable that no other man made its executive machinery more his
own. It was to be the scene of his greatest triumphs and disasters. A
somewhat hostile colleague during his later years, Richard Atkinson, was
absolutely correct when he said, ‘I think the ruling passion with him is the
vanity of being supposed the head of the India Company’.3 A good
proportion of men in the years 1755 to 1758 and onwards saw him as the
man of the moment; the one best suited to face growing problems. As far as
Company affairs were concerned, he was ahead of his rivals in understanding
men and systems; and from the beginning he was to show indications of
planning ability.
Sulivan was under no illusions whatsoever that ultimate authority in the
Company rested with the holders of India stock assembled as a Court of
Proprietors or, as it was more generally known, the General Court. On the
surface at least, it appeared a very democratic body for the age. Few were
barred from it; and no one excluded on the grounds of sex, religion or
nationality. The General Court voted by ballot for the Company Directors.
Although subject to the Company’s shareholders gathered as a General
Court, the executive, or Court of Directors, thus constituted, controlled the
Company. As a body the twenty-four Directors made all appointments home
or abroad and held ultimate responsibility for most things. In reality,
however, authority was apt to gravitate to quite a small number of principals,
some with remarkable acumen and grasp of what was going on. Sulivan quite
quickly became one of this number. Mervyn Davies supplies an excellent
picture of these individuals and of what generated their authority:
The Directors were men of substance and great self-

importance. They liked to surround themselves with
ceremony and to exact ample respects from the Company
servants. When the officers of the Company’s ships
appeared before the Court they had to wear full dress. The
Directors lunched and dined at the Company’s expense and
always in great style, their banquets at the London Tavern in
Bishopsgate Street on state occasions being famous for their
lavishness and magnificence…What made their office highly
sought after was the prestige and patronage; particularly the
patronage, which was extensive and extremely lucrative.4
Dame Lucy Sutherland confirms this picture: ‘Their position gave them many
opportunities for personal advantage.’5
Certainly Sulivan stood to gain in various material ways as a Director; but
with his conscientious nature he would have felt keenly another pressure
from occupying the office. He had to deal with a conflict of personal and
public duties in an age when there was no real standard of public morality.
No financial necessity propelled him into the Direction; he wanted to be

there, to be accepted as if in his rightful place. It is even possible he
deliberately shouldered the greatest burdens and took on board an inordinate
volume of work to fulfil what was fundamentally a psychological need.
Yet he did not want to be a mere titular head. Instead, he set out to lead,
to cut out new avenues of thought, action and inspiration, and apply these.
The minutes of the Court of Directors form the best memorials to his
endeavour and genius. He was present on 62 occasions between April 1756
and April 1757. This earned him the confidence of the shareholders. Nor did
the exclusive and self-perpetuating appearance of the Company’s executive
appear to be threatened by him.
When, the Proprietors considered the Company’s fortunes in India, they
were not at all reassured. The English feared the French and the Maratha
tribesmen in the Bombay area. They were scared of a French alliance with the
Nawab of Bengal; and shuddered at the French presence in Madras, where
they supported the Subahdar of the Carnatic, while the English clung to his
feudal vassal, the Nawab of Arcot. The fears were reflected in a fall in credit
and declining exports. The total bullion exported to India to promote trade
fell from £668,893 in 1754 to £620,378 in 1756; merchandise exports
dropped from £259,602 to £221,131 in the same period.6 It would have been
clear to some that something had to be done and a responsible leader chosen.
2
Coincidental with Sulivan’s entry into the Direction, sporadic outbreaks of
fighting in India were overtaken by the onset of the Seven Years War.
Hostilities were officially started again in 1756 between the rival French and
British companies, with further calamitous impact on business in London.
Sulivan’s knowledge of Indian affairs now made his opinions even more
valued. The unstable position in India meant the Proprietors were even more
fidgety and a general feeling of inadequacy prevailed.
He understood, however, what had to be done. Having just come from the
sub-continent he was up-to-date with needs and responsibilities there. He
knew that the anxiety and pressure in the settlements, engendered by fear and
defensive preparations, required urgent relief. The despatches he helped
shape sent to all the Presidencies, displayed his perception and
understanding. Sound knowledge of the Company’s possessions, not just
those of Bombay, is revealed in his maps and plans. He was prepared for
war.7
He was given added insight through the friends he had made in Bombay
who were still there; and others in Madras and Bengal. His trading partners,
such as John Spencer and Samuel Hough provided information to augment
that coming from the Governors and Councils. The detailed answers,
comments and instructions, show an aptitude and capacity for
comprehending difficulties; and are evidence of his grinding industry. He also
had the capacity to relate complications overseas to important and influential
people in Government. It was a skill that was to prove vital to himself, to

ministers and for the good of both country and Company in the dangerous
years ahead.
Such tremendous application had its reward. On 6 April 1757 he again
became a Director, taking the oath before his shipping friends Peter Godfrey
and Charles Gough. He was then elected by motion to the Deputy
Chairman’s place. This put him in position to be a real driving force in the
Company. Nor would there be any lack of supporters when he made his
charge to the top, eight of the ‘Bombay Squad’ accompanied him into the
Direction. The rest, led by Stephen Law, acted on his behalf in the General
Court.8
So it was merit as well as the solidarity of the ‘Bombay Squad’, shippers
and other supporters that brought him so quickly to the position of Deputy
Chair. (The terms ‘Chair’ and ‘Deputy Chair’ were commonly used.) Thus, a
mere two years after entering the Direction, he had taken a major step in
gaining control of the Company and achieving his dream. He never forgot,
however, how necessary it was to have a body of support, preferably hidden
from the eyes of political enemies.
As Deputy Chair, Sulivan was a recognised public figure, important in the
eyes of Company servants at home and abroad. The minutes show that it was
he who now took the important decisions, not the Chairman John Payne,
who was incapacitated and absent. He began to dominate the important
Committees of Secrecy, Correspondence and Treasury, where detailed work
was delegated before going to the full Court. In fact, his touch was felt
everywhere as he was drafted, ex-officio, on many Committees.
The minutes also demonstrate that he was handed an almost impossible
task, given the distances and time lag. He had to fight a war yet keep a tight
rein on finances; and faced a rapidly deteriorating situation everywhere. His
knowledge was called upon constantly, particularly in the Company
Accountant’s office; and he passed regulations governing the office of
Collector of Rents and Revenues for all the stations. This, on a grander scale,
was based on the post he had held in Bombay and had reformed so
successfully.9
He complained of servants being undisciplined. In another he grumbled
that the Madras Council was not providing sufficient information. His
document, 0bservations on the Bengal Establishment with such Alterations and
Amendments as appear Absolutely Necessary, was sent everywhere. It was perhaps
the first evidence in England of the care and thought he could bring to bear
upon Indian problems; a conscientious survey of troubles arising in this part
of the world. A major work, it served as a template for constructive
planning.10
Two months after Sulivan entered the Direction a chain of events took
place in Bengal that would irrevocably change the Company’s whole future.
On 4 June 1756 the new Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daula, attacked and took
the Company’s factory at Cossimbazar; he then took Calcutta where he
allegedly perpetrated the atrocity of the ‘Black Hole’. However, by January

1757 an expedition from Madras, under Robert Clive, recovered the city.
News of the outbreak of the Seven Years War, which reached Calcutta in
January 1757, also helped conclude matters; and a treaty was signed on 9
February 1757. The immediate result of this for the Company was a
confirmation of its privileges, such as the imperial grant (called the firman*),
which confirmed the right to trade; the restoration of all plunder; the
authority to coin rupees; and the fortification of Calcutta. On 14 March the
English then attacked the French at Chandernagore, and the French
surrendered on 23 March. What had transpired amounted to the first stage in
a revolution regarding the Company’s status in India. It was completed by the
Battle of Plassey on 23 June 1757 and the negotiations that followed.
The expedition launched from Madras in 1756, with Clive in command
(supported by Admiral Watson), was, therefore, of the greatest significance
for the Company’s future. It was to be of equal importance for Robert Clive.
The Madras Council had invested him with a Squadron of the Royal Navy
and a King’s Regiment. He enjoyed complete military independence, contrary
to all Company custom. A despatch from the Directors to the Governor of
Madras, George Pigot, on 3 August 1757 condemned this precedent. It was
written by Sulivan.
The new Nawab, Mir Jafar, faced a crisis hinging on lack of finance. He
was forced to hand over land in lieu of money to the English Company in
return for military help. In this way ‘a mere trading corporation acquired
territorial interests and ambitions. Its servants became king-makers.’11 It was
Clive who had made Mir Jafar; and to establish him he rid Bengal of the
French. Mir Jafar’s authority was nominal, however; his prestige completely
undermined. Clive set about the strategy of ‘rendering military assistance to
the Nawab on a subsidiary basis, combined with his policy of affording
protection to his prominent chiefs and officers’.12
Sulivan’s entry into the Company also coincided with a crisis in the affairs
of the Madras Presidency. The straightened circumstances in the Carnatic,
from December 1755 to March 1758, seemed just as alarming overall as
those which shook Bengal. They created just as much panic in London and
the combination of troubles there as well as Bengal helps again explain his
rapid rise.
From India House he took steps to guard Madras by having the defences
in the settlements strengthened, and military instructions were forwarded. He
was in close liaison with the ministry over naval movements; and made skilful
use of the Company’s Secret Committee. Constructive administrative
measures were designed and set up, modelled upon those of India House.
They were also implemented at Calcutta and Bombay.
In the end, the Carnatic war left the Madras Presidency struggling for its
continued commercial existence. It reduced the Company dividend from
eight to six per cent. The Select Committee at Madras was censured because
of a show of power that almost signalled independence. The withholding of
vital information was severely criticised. Again ‘astonishment, regret and

apprehension’ was expressed over the complete power that had been given to
Clive on his expedition north to Bengal, even though this had resulted in the
retrieval of Calcutta.13 They were told to slash costs because ‘the Company’s
capital was bleeding almost to death upon the coast of Choromandel’.14
His list of advice was endless: on shipping; the making of gunpowder and
ammunition; plunder regulations; the repair of fortifications; and the security
of the Company cipher. All the groundwork required for these instructions
appears in Sulivan’s own scrawl in the records. It was certainly a critical time,
as the despatches of 23 December 1757, 27 January 1758 and 15 February
1758 show. Fifty chests of treasure were sent to Madras, together with naval
stores and recruits. Then two and a half chests of gold (equal to thirty chests
of silver) were despatched on the Pitt.
In London, Sulivan was able to build a great deal of credit for himself
from all this. He was at least trying to do something. John Payne’s continuing
incapacity was not well received. Sulivan’s style was exemplified in his reply
to Dutch accusations that the English Company unjustly brought troops into
Bengal following the seizure of Calcutta by Siraj-ud-Daula in June 1756:
The English did not commence war against Surraja Dowla. He

came down upon Calcutta, destroyed it and murdered many
valuable men, their blood called upon them to seek vengeance
against him, as we should in like case against the Mogul himself
had we the power – Our privileges were certainly part of the
quarrel for he had taken them all away and drove us out of the
country.15
This was an answer that most fitted the sentiments of Director and
Proprietor alike. It incorporated patriotism and Company interest; and
constituted a blunt response to the allegations of the hostile Dutch. It was
well received.
While Payne’s suspicious illness continued, Sulivan dominated the
Direction. He made strenuous efforts to comprehend what was going on in
India, as extracts from the many papers he gave the Company historian,
Robert Orme, illustrate.16 He stood on the grounds that the February 1757
treaty confirmed the Company’s territorial claims to areas around Calcutta,
first granted in 1711. But he understood the change created ‘by men at the
head of a victorious army and that this army still kept the field’.17
The news, from Bengal in particular, produced other developments, none
of them beneficial to the Company in the end. The suggestion of fortunes to
be plucked quickened interest in India; reports were hurried to friends and
relatives. The rush for favours increased dramatically; and those holding
influential positions were swamped with applications. Many Directors and
Proprietors basked in the glow of attention, revelling in the patronage-
inspired power they held.
Intelligence of the successful turn of events in Bengal during 1757 relieved

tension somewhat in London and in Madras. The supposedly overflowing
Fort William treasury was to supply the other two Presidencies. The upshot
was that thirty chests of silver were diverted to China because of this belief.
However, by the close of l757 Madras had still received a colossal amount of
gold from home; by Sulivan’s calculations, equal to £795,000.
The total worth of all the bullion, goods and stores despatched to India in
1757 was £1,108,430. Yet Sulivan realised that despite this help the crisis in
the Madras funds would continue until the Presidency had built up sufficient
money to ensure a profitable Investment* over several years. With the war
against France still in progress he could not foresee this happening. It was
this ability to build a precise picture of situations, and make forward
projections that helped make him pre-eminent. It was based on endless hours
of work which few, if any, of his colleagues could or would match.
The memorandum, in his hand, written sometime in 1757, stating that
because of the Chairman’s illness he was caring for the Company’s affairs in
Bengal, was something of an understatement. It was a staggering load, and
although he was a willing workhorse, too much, when the startling events in
India were interwoven with the factional strife growing within the Company.
The evidence of his personal endeavour is overwhelming. Reams of
correspondence in his handwriting exist on every concern imaginable, and are
relative to all settlements, to the Company’s personnel and to wharves and
warehouses, home and abroad.
He wrote most of the General Letters to the Presidencies himself; the
originals are in his handwriting. More able and knowledgeable than the bulk
of his colleagues, he perhaps reached the peak of capability during these
years. Later in life he maintained that: ‘From 1757 to 1763 at the India House
my power was absolute for this plain reason the vessel was sinking and no
man had courage (or to my son I may say ability) to take the helm.’18
Everything points to this being true. As Deputy Chair, and with the
Chairman absent, he was responsible for all major decisions; and there is
nothing to contest his view that he now exerted total control. Despite being
only one of the twenty-four who constituted the Court of Directors, he
operated as the chief executive or managing director. His views on what had
to be done seldom encountered any opposition, until Company politics
turned ugly.
3
Sulivan’s level of skill and energy were rare in the Direction, and such was
his prestige following election to the Deputy Chair it seemed a foregone
conclusion that he would become Chairman in 1758 with a minimum of fuss;
it was also customary. Ordinarily, the Deputy Chairman one year would
become the Chairman the next. This had been the case in 1753 and 1754 and
again in 1756 and 1757. That such a progression did not readily occur, but
required the ‘first of the great contested elections’ was a symptom of the
effect events abroad were having in India House; and in particular, over who
would control the amazingly rich field of patronage that had opened up.19
The fact was that while in an administrative sense his ability was accepted,
his power, in the shape of political control of the Company, was not. The
Chairman, John Payne, and his friends were determined to thwart him
because of the enhanced value of service in India.20 The struggle that
developed for the Chair and with it political control of the Company, was
simply the determined efforts of one group to keep the reins of patronage
and that of another (Sulivan and friends) to rip these from their grasp.
That Sulivan’s automatic promotion was to be challenged also suggests
that his appearance had stimulated some (albeit stifled) adverse resentment.
His success was probably viewed after the event as the result of calculation
and opportunism. Belatedly he was to be prevented from becoming in name,
what he already was, the supreme power in the East India Company.
The course of the struggle can be briefly sketched. Sides were taken over
the future of Roger Drake, Governor of Bengal, and several members of
Council, following their flight from the Nawab of Bengal’s attack on Calcutta
in June 1756. This transformed into the fight for control within the
Direction. Apart from deciding who would take charge in Bengal, the contest
also decided what structure the government would take there; whether a
rotation system, or a return to the President and Council format.
From the beginning Payne wanted John Zacchary Holwell to be
Governor, superseding other Councillors. Sulivan favoured Charles
Manningham and upheld the principle of seniority.21 At the outset, the split
in the Direction over the issue was roughly even, with Payne apparently
enjoying a slight majority.22 Holwell, a member of the Bengal Council who
had remained in Calcutta during the attack, had scrambled back to England.
Sulivan was particularly suspicious of his exploitation of proceedings. His
dislike hardened during the ‘various meetings consisting only of the two
chairs, Mr. Holwell and the Secretary’.23 The suspicion of Holwell was now
joined to the unease he felt over the rotation of chairmen issue.
‘Governor and Council’ versus ‘rotation of four’, arguments continued,
broken by news of the revolution in Bengal, and of Clive remaining in
Bengal. Payne’s ‘majority’ urged a continuance of the rotation after Clive had
gone; the Sulivan led ‘minority’ thought it was no longer needed.24 Payne
then gained his objectives by trickery; placing his proposal that ‘the rotation
of four take place in his (Clive’s) absence as before appointed’, into the
already agreed motion that Clive should be appointed Governor of Bengal.25
Sulivan, of course, stressed that these questions were separate in character. In
the vote Payne’s ‘majority’ won decisively.
Soliciting a big turnout, Sulivan notified Proprietors through the papers of
‘matters of the utmost importance’ to be considered at the quarterly General
Court in two days time.26 It was only part of a bigger, well thought out
campaign. An article he wrote was also timed to appear, accompanied by a
canvas of the Proprietors, excellently organised by him. It played upon latent
opposition to the rotation system.
At this General Court, on 15 March 1758, he appealed against the

‘majority’ decision that the rotation would be continued after Clive had gone.
This too was novel; until then, if a General Court was called for other than
routine affairs then ‘special business’ was signified. His action took the
‘majority’ by surprise. The Proprietors would not adjourn, and there and then
voted the end of the rotation system for Bengal and a return to the single
Governor and Council structure.
The Chairman and his friends went ahead, however, and elected Holwell
to the Governor post, by their full number. Although Holwell turned this
down, Payne’s ‘majority’ then voted that while Manningham should succeed
Clive, Holwell would follow him. Amid great acrimony, Payne’s decision was
tested at the election of Directors on 5th April.27 The two lists of prospective
Directors were intimated in the Public Advertiser of 23 March, and then
advertised on 31 March. Unaccountably Payne’s ‘House’ list had Sulivan’s
name. He voiced his indignation at being double-listed.
The 1758 election was fought entirely within the Company and was unlike
those that were to follow. Sulivan won with his list, and had command of 14
of the 24 candidates voted for. He was made Chairman; Roger Drake, uncle
of the Governor of Bengal and Payne’s friend, became Deputy Chair.
Holwell admitted later that the ‘majority’ did not pay enough attention to
electioneering. Sulivan, on the other hand, had perfected his system of
canvassing referred to later by other enemies: ‘Sulivan prints lists of
Proprietors in small pocket-books with broad margins for use of his
canvassers...we have followed his example in this pursuit and commodious
books they are for the purpose.’28 The election result also signified another
important change: The traditional type of Director was out. Groups such as
the ‘Bombay Squad’ would now dispute power in the Company.
It was immediately obvious who was in power. By holding back the sailing
dates of the Warren and the London, both of which had on board the
decisions made by the previous ‘majority’, and by changing the command in
Bengal, he indicated a personal and absolute control. Holwell verified that the
composition of the new Bengal Council was all his work.
The events of 1756 to 1757 in Bengal, and the reaction they produced in
England in 1757 and 1758, together with the 1758 contest, ensured that the
Company and its management would never be the same again. Holwell,
although writing with all the vitriol and partiality of a disgruntled loser,
pointed out many of the features that would cause more trouble: patronage
issues would separate those involved in the Company; public figures would
be drawn in; merchants and bankers would be affected by the disruption to
trade. He also correctly spotted that factional fighting within the Company
could only follow now that the General Court had been seen to overrule the
Court of Directors.
Sulivan would remain in control of the Company’s executive for the next
six years. He would never pacify those whose control of the Company he had
usurped, but, temporarily at least, they were powerless. He had succeeded
because he was better organised than his opponents; because the times were
right for him; and because he was hungry for power. His knowledge, work
rate and insight proved keener than most. From 1757 he had asserted himself
and shown his mettle. British success at Plassey made the prize of being ruler
of the Company appear even greater; but it would have been no less
rewarding, in Sulivan’s eyes, to be in charge of the organisation as it existed
prior to Clive’s victory in 1757.
4
With all the work, worry and vituperation involved, it seems difficult at first
sight to understand why Sulivan was so keen to be leader of the East India
Company, not just in 1758 but during all the years to come. Yet, the desire to
be seen and known to be sovereign over this organisation was everything. He
appeared to be satisfying a deep emotional need. As the undisputed leader of
a great institution he was respected as such, not just in London, but in
Britain, Europe, and the East Indies.
Analysing why this organisation should be his first choice and chosen
milieu is quite revealing. Apart from the monarch, the first minister and a
handful of men (such as the King’s favourites and the greatest of the
landowners, and some Church leaders) Sulivan was on the next rung of the
most powerful.
As Chairman he ‘exercised political and financial powers that were second
only to the Crown itself’.29 His well nigh personal control of the Company
and its extensive patronage assured this; as did being in touch with those
occupying prominent public positions, who needed him. For a man with no
lineage that counted in Britain, unsuited by birth and breeding and bereft of
patronage, he had reached the top flight, joining those with power and
influence in British life. In no other way could he have attained such heights.
Sulivan was a businessman, efficient and shrewd. An out-and-out
capitalist, he relished his life in the ‘City’. He was excellent at management;
and paid attention to detail. Although he often said he was a dreamer, in
every day affairs he always started with the possible, with what he knew. He
was forever making plans. The drafts of countless manuscripts and letters in
his handwriting are evidence of how much he was doing.
The Company served as a platform; it gave scope for his intellect, and for
particular skills that were so useful in political and commercial fields. Because
of the organisation’s importance nationally, he was also given an
exceptionally elevated profile. In size and extent the Company was
unequalled by anything else in the private domain – a real power base.
Unfortunately, the total control he came to exert was so great that it stirred
severe criticism. He was abused right from the start for the power he could
bring to bear; and accused of being dictatorial and intolerant of any rival. It is
true he harboured the authority granted through the Company, extended it
where and when he could, and fought any attempt to belittle or negate it. He
strained to lay his hands on and operate the levers of power, to make things
happen.
A superb Committee man, adept and astute, analytical and informed, he
used his political expertise. He knew how to organise a faction or interest in
order to get his way. At first sight, these committees in India House seem
anything but exciting. Composed mainly of merchants and shippers, they
appear to spell out dullness. Yet blazing, exciting struggles that took the
public by storm flared in Courts and Committee rooms.
Knowledge and advance information were everything to Sulivan, and his
intelligence network was unmatched. Secrets came to him whether in or out
of the Direction. Many were supplied by the Company’s Secretariat –
Secretary, clerks, solicitors and notaries. Data came from those officials
allotted to the various Committees, from the mailroom, the warehouses and
elsewhere. He had spies and informers everywhere, many of them within the
shipping interest. Even before the ships were docked their commanders had
carried the all-important packets of mail to him. Messages flowed to him
from inside and outside Leadenhall. This ensured that he had the vital
relevant facts fast; he could test the information for accuracy and was
normally more up-to-date and far ahead of his adversaries.
He accepted spying as integral to life, indispensable; it was all around him.
He understood that an excellent spy network was the best and the quickest
way for him to get to the highest tables where decisions were taken. There is
little doubt either that through nature and necessity he would continue to
play espionage games all his life. His career attests to the paranoia, selfishness
and intransigence of one who would have power. What is more, having
served his time getting to the top, he believed that others must do the same
before they be allowed to ‘play the game’. To him, authority only came with
knowledge and experience. Even when outside the Direction his powers
were operative.
Understanding him comes from appreciation of these features. They
underpin scrutiny of this part of his career, which he considered to be his
most glorious. At this stage in his life he still saw himself as seeking for truth,
while achieving fulfilment. He must have appeared very much a man of
mystery. In the mere twinkling of an eye he was commander of the vessel
that was the East India Company. His wish to achieve something, to be
somebody, was realised. Henceforth he would be utterly devoted to the
organisation that had proved to be the means of his reaching high dominion.
He was the authority on Indian affairs.
4
Priorities
1757-65
Even before he became Chairman, Sulivan might have shuddered at the

enormity of the tasks that awaited solution. The immediate problems were
bad enough, but it was only as he spent time analysing and sifting that the
deep-seated nature of what was going wrong fell into place. Yet even as he
explored, more troubles washed up and over the old ones.
The easygoing Direction of former years was transformed into an
extremely busy forum. The work was endless, the responsibility enormous.
He was at the centre of everything and all problems and disputes ended up at
his door: Company elections, the strife in India, patronage issues and the
ghastly state of the Company’s finances. Yet a dividend had to be conjured
up, the Company run well, and plans made for a better future.
Not to be daunted, he attacked everything vigorously; so much so that he
succeeded in stamping his mark on the Company to the extent that his
imprint lasted for the rest of its existence. These years were to be among the
fullest he ever experienced. It was a unique and sustained era, in which one
man enjoyed control of the East India Company and its destiny. It was never
to be duplicated.
Throughout most of this period he was impervious to attack, commanding
support everywhere: in the Company, in Parliament and in the City. His grasp
of all aspects of Company business, and the protection afforded by
supporters and backers (who were carefully cultivated) left him supreme. Nor
can it be doubted that he was impassioned by his complete command. As he
said, ‘from 1757 to 1763 at the India House my power was absolute’.1 He was
indeed the leader ‘a man of real weight’.2
Sulivan eclipsed everyone else in every way. He derived tremendous
enjoyment from being able to preside over every aspect of Company
business. His word was law at Leadenhall. The appearance given was that
everything was his work; but it soon becomes obvious that many others were
involved, a colony of people: spies, clerks, lawyers, advisers, readers and
researchers. He can never be regarded as functioning alone; many were
involved in his schemes.
Nor would it be proper to regard him as the only capable executive. There
were able men who grasped a great deal. He was never faced with utterly
feeble and subservient colleagues. Some had a wide and general
comprehension of how things stood, home and abroad. A few had genuine
depth of understanding in one or two spheres. Others were involved in the
cut and thrust of politics and were good at it. Many were appreciative of the
finer points of patronage, of finance, legal matters, shipping and freight.
What made him different was that he knew it all; and this width and depth
of knowledge, experience, plus a willingness to work, made him rather
unique. He possessed something else: the ruthlessness needed in applying his
many skills to the seizure and application of power. The annual political
exercise necessary to retain executive control received his total and undivided
attention; and in this he demonstrated great political skill. He was really a
workaholic; the Company was his life, his sole interest. He was as much
married to it as to his wife.
It is in the sense of being the prime mover in all that transpired that
Sulivan was doing things single-handedly from 1757, and certainly from 1758,
despite all the help he commanded. He was one of only twenty or thirty
individuals at any one time capable of taking any sort of lead within the
Courts and Committees; but his was the hand on the tiller. Few were
interested in contributing continuously, although perhaps some were
knowledgeable enough; and they looked towards him and a few others for
proper direction.
Like a composer who hits a peak of creativity, or a statesman whose time
has come, so must Sulivan’s work, plans and achievements be viewed during
the years that stretched from 1757 almost to 1765. These were heady days.
He was working at full capacity and under tremendous pressure. His
portfolio ranged across governmental, territorial and commercial concerns;
measures that spelt out war or peace with European powers and Indian
potentates; the finance and operation of a large and complex business empire
stretching around the world.
The many items dealt with and decisions reached regarding affairs in the
Presidencies were dealt with in General Letters. This was done in the name
of the Court of Directors and signed by them – some even contributing; but
most of the time they were vehicles for Sulivan. The official directives and
advice promulgated there would be backed up in his private correspondence,
much of it confirming the single-handed nature of his government. It did not
matter the area under discussion or what was involved; whether mere
instructions, guidance, dealing with corruption, insolence or evidence of
double-dealing, he provided the answers. Again, the voluminous manuscripts
in his hand verify this.
PRIORITIES 1757-65 53
This evaluation – that most of what was achieved at Leadenhall was almost
all due to Sulivan’s endeavours and that in essence it was the work of
one man – is an important question. It is also one that might be disputed.
Should he be considered in isolation, separate from his colleagues, fellow
Directors, Proprietors, and from those who made up his party? Can Sulivan
really be singled out when he was only one among many operating within a
series of Courts and Committees governing the Company? Shouldn’t he be
envisaged simply in the sense of leading a faction inside the Company; or
(later) of being at the head of a Parliamentary group?
Allowing for the obvious in such views – that yes, he was all of these
things – the indications are that for most of the time he was working alone (if
espionage agents and secretarial help are disregarded). Once more the
enormous morass of papers covered with his scrawl is evidence of his
diligence and will to keep informed, and of his alone; there are no discernable
depositions of any sort by other Directors during these years.
Single-handedly he could bring about the appointment of any person he
wanted. He created bodies of men; set them together to work as teams, and
gave them leaders. Home and abroad, he was the one who directed all and
sundry towards solving problems and abuses. The fact that these orders were
not always followed is a separate issue.
Some fellow Directors and Proprietors came to resent such domination;
but most were more than happy to let him get on with it, as long as the
dividend was good. Resentment of his supremacy and sole direction of affairs
continually revisited him, however. Printed broadsides, newspaper articles
and verbal attacks make it obvious that almost anything of importance
originated with him, because only he is constantly attacked. Such prominence
is underlined by the fact that within the Company it was Sulivan who always
led a faction, he was never a follower. There was even a Sulivan party
operating within the Company’s Courts when he was out of office; and such
a group only ceased to exist with his death.
The degree to which he stamped his personality on management tells of
great strength of mind. Time after time his colleagues proved that they were
lost without his guidance and vigour. As leader he was forced to deal on a
number of fronts, usually simultaneously. Yet, no matter the question or
problem, whatever the complexity or obscurity, he had to display qualities of
command and find answers.
The position of Chairman gave him all the rewards of power, patronage
and rank; and he enjoyed these to the full, cutting an ostentatious figure in
society at large. He experienced great satisfaction when presented to the King
on Saturday 9 May 1761; and kissed his hand on 5 August 1761.3
At some point during these six years, the imposing power and
responsibility he wielded also brought about a subtle change. He did not lose
any of the fundamental qualities that helped place him in high office, but
with success and prominence a different attitude was noticeable. This is easy
to comprehend, although not to admire. Negative features, a form of
arrogance, and an increasingly autocratic manner, reflected in his
authoritarian language, began to appear. He became ‘a powerful

figure…domineering and dictatorial’, symptoms that were encouraged by
pressures now constantly in attendance.4
He was forced to use this stentorian voice to try and bring order and
discipline to errant servants in India, and this probably pushed him further
along the path of autocracy. It was distasteful to members of this committee-
based organisation. Several of those he chose to disparage were able men and
only opposed to some of his views. In their eyes and those of others, he
came to exert an overweening power; and eventually he came to be actively
disliked by many.
The clearest picture of what Sulivan was really like, his character and how
much it changed during these years is to be derived from what he did then. It
is best drawn from the way in which the many problems and crises at home
and abroad were handled; and from his entry into Parliament and the English
Establishment. His days were full, both in public and private. This was the
reality of his world, a time when he was fully alive.
He was a powerful and controversial figure, regarded as one of London’s
leading citizens: a town gentleman, ‘City’ businessman, as well as leader of
the East India Company. He went about the process of consolidating his
position in social life, entwining his public, business and private affairs as he
became established. At the same time, with the outbreak of war in 1756, the
work for which he should ever be remembered, without disparaging the
colossal contribution of later years, had begun.
2
Sulivan was the focal point of all interaction. What went on in India and in
Britain came to roost with him. It was no paltry task confronting him in 1757
when he was virtually left in charge through Payne’s indisposition; and things
had become much worse by the time he took the Chair in 1758. In fact, the
situation was deteriorating so quickly it might even be said from the outset
that without his presence and the effort he expended, it is conceivable that
the Company would indeed have sunk under the cumulative weight of the
troubles it was experiencing.
In his list of priorities the survival of the Country and with it the Company
came first. Accordingly, his most immediate mission was the task of fighting
the Seven Years War. In India this took place principally in the Carnatic,
mainly against France. But he was involved in the pursuit of war in all of the
East Indies, against all enemies; and had responsibility for continued
successful advances in the territories most contested in the sub-continent.
Sulivan’s theatre, therefore, embraced every settlement as far as China, all
of which had to be armed and defended. His planning had to guarantee the
continued provision of men and materials; he had to provide an adequate
strategy for survival; and he must ensure the defeat of any Indian allies of the
French, as well as the hostile Dutch. He was in constant fear that the
Company would succumb in the face of never-ending warfare and the

financial drain imposed on it.
The main outlines of the Seven Years War within the Indian theatre are
well known – and only how events relate to Sulivan are they of direct interest.
The war ended with complete British victory. In fact, as early as 1757 the
Bengal, Bombay ramifications of the struggle had been resolved, as had the
first skirmishes in the Carnatic and at Hyderabad. The fight with the French
in South India was to re-commence in earnest in April 1758, the very month
that Sulivan came into his own as Chairman. Combat was almost totally
confined to a pattern of sieges in the Carnatic area.
From September 1757 the English Company was defenceless in the south;
and when the French under Lally landed there in February 1758, they
enjoyed an overwhelming superiority. Fortunately Admiral Pocock’s defeat of
his equivalent, Admiral D’Ache (twice) was to prove decisive. Despite
marauding across the Carnatic Lally gained nothing. At Madras a war cabinet
was created following a directive from Sulivan that all power should be
placed in a committee of the Governor and the four principal military
officers; and Fort St. George held out. Nevertheless, from October 1758 only
Madras remained in British hands. The French siege only ended with the
appearance of the British naval squadron in February 1759.
Further British successes in the Northern Circars and against the French
were rounded off when Salabat Jang, Nizam of Hyderabad, who had been in
alliance with the French, was defeated; as were the Dutch forces hostile to
the Company. The end of the Madras siege in 1759 and a British victory at
Masulipatam marked a watershed.
From that point onwards the initiative was with the British. On 10
September Admiral Pocock found D’Ache again and forced him to retire to
Pondicherry, from which he departed for good on 1 October, leaving the
British fleet to continue the blockade. From his arrival in October 1759, until
April 1760, Sir Eyre Coote was victorious everywhere, especially so at
Wandewash on 22 January 1760. Both Coote and General Monson then
conspired to achieve the fall of Pondicherry. It surrendered on 16 January
1761. The fall of the other French posts at Jinji and at Mahé on the West
Coast, soon followed.
The outcome of the war hinged upon certain factors. Probably the most
important was British command of the sea roads, which ensured the safe
conduct of vital munitions, bullion and of reinforcements. Superior finance
also contributed, as did the support that came from Bengal, and the weakness
of Lally’s character. The stultifying control exercised by the French
Administration could also be mentioned; the quality of the military
commanders Lally faced, particularly Coote and Forde; the constancy of the
Nawab of Arcot to the English Company; and the supplies in money and
recruits at vital moments from the British Government.
Nevertheless, these do not adequately explain the triumph of the English
Company. Behind the scenes, but central to everything that happened, was
Sulivan. He was in command, supported by the most able of his fellow
Directors. He directed, planned and assumed responsibility for everything –

other than for what actually happened in the field of conflict. Most
significantly, he collaborated with Chatham in that Minister’s overall strategy
– at a time when the Company was an independent body, free of any
Government control.
It is true that he was far away from the scene of action, and given the time-
lapse before the arrival of his instructions, there existed a never-ending
discrepancy. Vital weeks passed before he received information; and there
were critical passages when speedy action had to be taken without referral to
Leadenhall. It might seem, therefore, that what he had to say was academic.
Not so. Sulivan was only too aware that he could not interfere with field
operations. What he did know was that he could give a directing and
controlling influence from India House.
He knew the importance of liaison with the ministry upon overall military
and naval strategy. He was well aware that the provision of men, money and
materials was essential for success and that it was up to him to provide them.
He could and did inspire confidence at home and abroad among those
actually fighting or involved in the conflicts.
It was particularly important that the Company had the right military and
naval leaders on the spot with an almost free rein. This too was his job,
within the constraints of committees and sub-committees of the East India
Company. To meet the aim of speedy execution he had created almost a war
cabinet with the very strong Secret Committee, over which he presided.
Sometimes he chose the wrong man, sometimes he interfered where he
ought not to, such as when Coote was superseded by Monson in 1760; but
generally his strategy was sound. There are countless indications that Sulivan
masterminded the war effort in India, as he did everything else at this time
that remotely involved the Company. The General Letters to Madras are full
of detailed instructions; and his concern and intimate knowledge can be seen
from his plans and history of events. Even Clive’s letters admit that Sulivan
was indispensable: ‘Sulivan will continue at the head of the Direction and in
all probability will remain so long as the war lasts.’5
He raised the establishment of European officers and soldiers in India
from 2,600 in 1755 to 6,900 in l765. This was achieved despite the failure to
secure a well-organised military recruiting programme – blocked by the army
and its spokesmen in Parliament. In this era troops were raised through an
intermediary in possession of a ‘contract’. Taken as a whole, however, the
number of fighting men involved abroad swelled to some 26,000 by 1763.
The Company’s immediate financial troubles in 1758 determined that
numbers were slow in building up. This meant that during some crucial
periods the organisation was dependent upon the Government for help.
Nevertheless, by April 1760 Sulivan had despatched 2,020 Company soldiers
and conveyed them and 1,035 royal troops abroad in EastIndiamen. In 1763
and 1764, the statistics show that 2,757 officers and 2,118 non-commissioned
men were shipped out.6
He demanded to know the details surrounding every event, such as those

concerning the loss of Fort St. David in 1758. He dealt with the divisions in
the Madras Council over military authority, especially those arising in August
1759 regarding the right of the Council to place a Company officer, Caillaud,
over royal troops. It was with extreme difficulty that men could be recruited
for the service in Madras. Sulivan attended to this. He advised upon the
arrival of reinforcements, such as how and when Eyre Coote and his
battalion would arrive. He laid down precise military regulations; decided the
payment of troops; and advised on recruitment procedures in India. He also
handled unreasonable demands, such as those put forward by the Swiss
mercenaries.
Nor was he foolish enough to ignore the strength and wisdom of his finest
commanders and ablest men in India who alone could deal with the situation
on the spot. He applauded Clive’s plan that the armies of all the Presidencies
should help one another as the situation demanded. He thought the despatch
of a force to Masulipatam, under Col. Forde, ‘sensible and judicious’; and so
it proved.
It was Sulivan who picked the men who would bring success in the
Carnatic. He ordered that Caillaud was to follow Polier as Major at Madras.
Colonel Coote was to be Commander-in-Chief of the Company’s forces
under the orders of the Governor in Council in Madras.7 Robert Palk (after
being created Governor of Madras by Sulivan) was used to help General
Lawrence consolidate alliances with neighbouring states and tribesmen, such
as those of Mysore and Tanjore, and with the Marathas.
He was also the one man who could resolve head-on collisions between
the Madras Governor and his Council on the one hand and the Commander-
in-Chief, Coote, on the other. He had to do so, often. Direction of military
affairs was to continue long after the war with the French had ceased. Before
he fell from office in l765, he had ensured that those he felt to be efficient,
such as John Caillaud and Major Sir Robert Barker, were duly promoted.
The same degree of expertise and firmness was exercised in directing naval
affairs. He issued orders regarding the deployment of all ships belonging to
the Company, synchronising their movements with ships-of-the-line. He
appointed squadron commanders, such as Admiral Cornish in March 1759;
and tried to make life as smooth as possible: ‘On Cornish’s arrival at Madras
he is to be supplied with all useful information and treated in a friendly and
obliging manner.’8
As well as transporting all troops (King’s and Company’s), Company
shipping was used to convey stores, munitions and other supplies for war.
While doing so, some semblance of commercial freight had to be maintained.
Much of his other work in this field involved sending details of shipping
movements and intelligence of the whereabouts and strength of the French
navy to Government. For example, he gave details of French ships off Brazil
in January 1759; referred to a squadron at Mauritius in November 1759; and
gave news of those in Ceylon in March 1763. He also sent important
Government advices abroad, showing, for instance the true state of the
Dutch armaments at Ceylon in 1763.
Among the shifting sands of native alliances, he more than once expressed
himself happy with the unfaltering friendship of the Nawab of Arcot,
Walajah Muhammad ‘Ali. He seems a rather empty-handed ally, with
enormous debts, but to Sulivan he was ‘The Company’s most faithful grateful
and generous friend, and heaven is my witness that in this confidence he has
had my invariable support.’9 He maintained there could be no reliance placed
on others, such as the Marathas; Nizam Ali; Salabat Jang; Mahfuz Khan; or
later, Yusuf Khan.
Throughout the national emergency, a most important feature was to be
Sulivan’s excellent working relationship with Chatham and his successor, the
Earl of Bute. This was particularly the case with Chatham. There was a fine
understanding between them; so much so it would not be too much to say
that the war in India was concluded so successfully primarily because of their
good liaison and common goals.
As Chairman of the Company, Sulivan had paramount responsibility for
conducting the British war effort against the French in the east. Chatham was
more than happy that this should be so. Strategy and financial considerations
decided for him that the Company, with its own army and navy, bases,
supplies and, above all, money, should go it alone. He needed only to
strengthen the Company’s existing war machine, when and where required,
with additional troops and Government funds. A man of Sulivan’s calibre
and powers of leadership was tailor-made, as far as Chatham was concerned.
A biography of Chatham by M. Peters puts it in perspective: ‘For India the
issue was not one of planning and implementing expeditions, but of
responding to requests for help from the East India Company, which came
through the Southern Secretary.’10 Ships and troops (sent at first by
Holderness) were continued by Chatham, who initiated contacts with the
Company’s Secret Committee headed by Sulivan.
The ‘Great Commoner’ could not only pick the right men for the field of
action, he could recognise and accept the talents of a strong man like Sulivan.
Besides, it would seem only right to many that such a formidable Company
figure should command affairs relative to the Indies. Sulivan’s replies (in his
own handwriting) to the separate heads of the Bengal General Letter of 5
March 1759, illustrates this liaison well. He referred to the national
emergency, stressing that stores of naval articles would be in strict supply to
the Company, but even then, only after the royal forces had been furnished.
The Prime Minister also made use of the Company’s administrative, naval
and military apparatus. It was very advantageous to be able to graft the royal
forces and the best-suited commanders on to this structure. At vital moments
reinforcements and funds from the national exchequer were provided
without hesitation, no matter how hard Chatham had to fight for them in the
Commons. In January 1759 two ships-of-the-line and two gunships were
despatched; so was Col. Coote with 1,200 soldiers. In 1760 large numbers of
recruits were again sent out. In turn, Sulivan ensured easy relations at Madras
by putting Coote’s royal battalion on the same footing as Col. Draper’s.
In April 1759, at Sulivan’s prompting, Chatham proposed to the House
that an annual subsidy of £20,000 be made to the Company to assist it during
the rest of the war. Sulivan answered for the Direction, and ‘gratefully
confessed the Ministry’s care of the Company’.11 His rejoicing was every bit
as great as Chatham’s, when, as Chairman he informed the Court of
Directors of the defeat of the French; and that the Pondicherry colours had
been captured and sent by Coote to England. It was fully deserved that he,
the leader at India House, should then present these to the King, together
with a loyal address.
Following Chatham’s resignation, Sulivan was to honour the man he
considered a great statesman and the nation’s saviour. In 1762 he declared
that the Company ‘not only owed their present glorious situation, but their
very existence to his (Chatham’s) generous protection’.12
Chatham’s own fame owes an immense debt to the contribution made by
Sulivan and his control of the Company at that time. The words acclaiming
Chatham were just as deserved by Sulivan. He said as much to his son, later
in life:
Bengal (June l757) and Fort St. Davids taken (May 1758) Madras
Besieged (February 1759)…I boldly attempted and successfully
prevailed upon that glorious Minister Mr. Chatham to send out
instantaneously Fleet and troops to India which saved the
Company, saved the Nabob of Arcot, and from desperation laid
the ground for the prosperity of both.13
The first minister created a strong impression on Sulivan. Chatham was able
to concentrate exclusively on foreign affairs and the direction of the war,
planning expeditions and raising war loans (£16 million in 1760). His skill in
raising such amounts was something Sulivan appreciated. Their discussions
were fruitful and a great deal of planning took place. One document,
evidently from the Company to Chatham, demonstrated Sulivan’s thinking.
Appended were his sentiments regarding military expenses; and three
separate plans on how to achieve peace with the French.
The national leader also gave him freedom of action, such as deciding the
fate of Pondicherry after its fall. The Chairman determined that the
fortifications should be razed to the ground; adding that he thought the
French had ‘been the authors of their own ruin’.14 Looking to the future,
Sulivan showed his line of thought by saying that his ideas would ‘be
confined to our mercantile interest, we ought not, we cannot, look further,
Government may.’15 He meant only that it was not the role of a commercial
organisation to deal with the war in its global framework.
It becomes apparent too that Sulivan was encouraged to converse freely
with the Minister. Each piece of India news was immediately carried to
Administration, such as acquainting them of the surrender of Mahé. He
would also give his view of the situation in India whether asked or not; and
was quick to put forward his plans. For example, he held to the view that the
Company should retain all its possessions to the total exclusion of the
French. Any concessions he was willing to make were of a limited nature.
Chatham’s direct intervention also saved him from the repercussions of
events in India, such as happened after His Majesty’s officers Coote and
Cornish took Pondicherry, claiming and possessing it for the Crown. This
action was dictated by a history of bickering over booty between the King’s
land and sea officers and those of the Company. Governor Pigot, obeying
Sulivan’s explicit instructions, had declared that, ‘if the King’s officers did not
surrender Pondicherry to the Company he would stop every advance for pay
and support of the King’s troops’.16 Although the royal troops evacuated the
place, a furious protest was sent to England. Sulivan expressed approval of
Pigot’s ‘judicious behaviour’. He was then saved from the ‘menaces of great
men’, such as the Chancellor Lord Camden, because Chatham shielded him.17
Sulivan’s clear vision was again evident in several expeditions, especially in
military counter-actions against the Dutch, and in opposing the Spanish in
the Philippines. The scale and ramifications of these operations were to lose
him much valuable time consumed in negotiations; and it was the same after
the event, because he was extremely useful to ministers when Dutch and
Spanish recriminations landed in London.
After hostilities with the Dutch began in 1757, Sulivan refuted their
protests that British troops had been used illegally against the Nawab of
Bengal. Then in 1758, after Clive ensured that Mir Jafar would be Nawab,
they failed in attempts to supplant English influence with the new prince.
Sulivan answered fire with fire in his haughty replies to their protests.18
Late in 1761 he was again confronted with Dutch complaints, but this time
these were sent first to the British Government. It was an astute move since
it tied the Company’s hands at home. Bute asked the Directors their ‘opinion
in regard to procedure’; and Sulivan was expected to reply to the Dutch
Memorial personally.19 He was faced with the task of soothing the King’s
desire to end all disputes with the Dutch, yet had to maintain the Company’s
position in Bengal. He told Bute that in the treaty the English were only
involved as guarantor. He then wrote to Clive for supporting materials.20
These negotiations involved the King, Bute and Jenkinson; and for the
Company, Sulivan, Clive, Hastings and Sykes. Sulivan called upon the legal
expertise of John Dunning, who drew up a document on behalf of the
Directors, using information from his friend.21 To decide what would be their
joint action on the Commission that was then set-up, Jenkinson collaborated
with Sulivan and Rous. It was agreed that the Dutch should have some
support. Sulivan was given approval to explain this stand to those at Calcutta;
and also to the Proprietors, who wanted no truck with the Dutch. He, Rous
and Dorrien then became the ‘commissaries to treat with the Dutch
gentlemen,’ and eventually agreement was reached.22
Projected moves against the French-controlled base at Mauritius in 1761
and 1762 were likewise based upon his detailed recommendations. Like
Chatham, he always felt that the conquest of Mauritius would ‘lay the axe to
the root’ of French aspirations in India.23 In a letter to the minister’s agent,
Robert Wood, in February 1761, he showed that a definite plan to take
Mauritius had been drawn-up. He advised on how to breach defensive
fortifications there and supplied information on stores. He even offered to
buy the plunder; and supplied the name and address of a deserter who could
give inside information. Yet even he was left in the dark as to why the Royal
Squadron failed to press home the planned attack. Nevertheless, it was 1784
before the islands once more become useful to the French, only to be taken
by Britain in the years 1810 to 1814.
Excellent documentation of the British conquest of Manila, 1762-63, is
provided by the Royal Historical Society. General Draper and Admiral
Cornish headed an expedition that set off from Madras in June 1762,
supported and enabled to reach Manila by the East India Company’s marine.
All was complemented by Company supplies, arms, and general organisation.
The surprise attack against a settlement neither aware of a declaration of war,
nor prepared in any way for defence, led to victory in October. The loss of
life was considered small; and the conquerors were offered bills on Madrid
for one million pounds sterling, in lieu of pillage.
Sulivan’s role was important. He was consulted even before preparations
were begun: ‘The Chairman (Laurence Sulivan) informed the Court that Lord
Anson, First Lord of the Admiralty, had given indication of an attack to be
made on Manila and that he requested the Company’s help’.24 This was
readily given when the monarch indicated the Company would possess
Manila and all other places conquered. Sulivan pinpointed the advantages this
offered in his paper, Reasons and Considerations upon the Enterprise against the
Philippine Islands, which was passed to the Committee of Secrecy.25
The new Manila government was to be the concern of the Madras
Council. Instructions from the Secret Committee envisaged the despatch of
2,000 troops from there; and the Council would care for revenue, trade and
native affairs. It was hoped to have no repeat of previous troubles between
royal commanders and the Company’s governing personnel. Instructions
regarding the division of booty and plunder were made clear; and there was
to be full reimbursement of all expenses incurred.
The success of the operation was wholly dependent upon the Company
providing troops, ships and stores, and appointing a provisional Deputy
Governor and Council for Manila. While aware of a risk to Madras, when so
many troops and supplies were drawn off, he believed the expedition would
expedite the despatch of silver from there to settlements in China. He also
endeavoured to gain a station on the island of Mindano using Royal troops.
Unfortunately, security problems arose in the Carnatic; and financial strain
was placed on Madras. Great ill-feeling developed between His Majesty’s
troops and Company officials; so much so that the backwash from General
Draper’s complaints disturbed Sulivan’s relationship with ministers. Disputes
arose over captured cannon and military stores, although Sulivan had gone to
great pains to have it understood that the plunder taken should be halved.
General Draper and Admiral Cornish clashed with Governor Pigot at

Madras. He referred to Sulivan’s directions, insisting on the half share.
Captain Thomas Backhouse, in command of the royal regiment, was furious:
‘From such another Governor and Council good Lord deliver all honest
men.’26 The acrimony remained until the British departed from Manila in
April 1764; and the ramifications in London paralleled the growth of party
conflict.
In the end the Company received only one third of three separate
distributions of booty; and the Spanish Court refused to recognise either the
Treaty signed at Manila or the ransom that was demanded. However, Sulivan
kept an exact account of all disbursements, and these were eventually
deposited in the Government’s lap.
These successes were of significance for the Company’s future, and for
State-Company liaison. His performance as a war-leader was outstanding.27
Yet his concentration on the war arena forms only a portion of what he
attended to during those years. There seems to have been only one question
in his mind: could he help save Britain from her enemies, while preserving
the Company and its personnel? He remained true and steadfast to these
objectives.
He did not seek praise for what he did; commendation was not sought,
although he accepted the thanks of his fellow Directors on occasion. As far
as can be deduced, he looked upon his travails as part and parcel of his duty.
It is amazing, therefore, that no credit has been given to him for his
contribution at such a critical point in Britain’s struggle. The usual recitation
that success was due to the Chatham Administration on the one hand and
the quality of the military and naval forces on the other is not enough. This
view was even paraded at the time (deliberately and vindictively) by political
enemies, such as Luke Scrafton.28 The truth is that Sulivan guaranteed that
‘superior organisation, military, political and financial, not sheer fire power,
which explains British victories in eighteenth century India.’29
3
It is no exaggeration to say that the momentous changes being wrought in
India were rivalled by what was happening in London. A veritable flood of
problems and emergencies engulfed Sulivan and he struggled with some
alarming developments. All of this was just as important to the future of the
Company (and to him) as the changes being wrought abroad. Many of the
difficulties stemmed from bad news from overseas; or bad tidings would
inflame what was already taking place at home. Other troubles stemmed
from complications originating in the capital. Some of these instances
required a deliberate plan to solve; others were dealt with as they cropped up.
Sulivan’s leading part in rooting out why things had come to such a pass
and seeking remedies was partly due to his position at the head of the
Company’s administration. Yet, as seen in his handling of the war, in or out
of the Chair he provided leadership and solutions. The common cry was that
Sulivan would deal with them; and although these taxed him to the limit, he
tackled all and every new calamity with energy.
Nevertheless, as early as 1758 he was forced to increase his pace of work
to breaking point, such was the volume of business, responsibility and
agitation. The effort now needed was probably more than one man could
give; something that he might have realised, but would not admit. Even he
could not keep a tight grip so far removed from problems that required
immediate solutions.
An ever-increasing threat to stability accompanied the impact of these
Indian troubles on the Company’s management. From the emergence of
political faction inside India House arose the spectre of internal collapse.
Company headquarters was to become the scene of furious infighting.
Consequently, while Sulivan dedicated an amazing amount of time and
enormous effort to the Company’s well-being, an equal amount of energy
was needed for political survival. The make-up of the Company dictated this
was how it would be.
Abroad, loss of control in the face of greedy servants and an increasing
sense of autonomy and separateness had to be faced. Carefully laid plans for
the future administration of the settlements were thrown into disarray in the
face of a different reality from the one envisaged at home. Clive’s pre-
eminence and views upon the way forward in the sub-continent would create
further trouble.
News of the success at Plassey reached the ears of the public in February
1758 and Indian affairs rocketed to prominence. It was the first British
success in the midst of the gloom and bad tidings that shrouded war with
France. However, it was not received with carefree abandon in all quarters,
because a few discerning individuals – such as Sulivan – were pre-occupied
with other trials. The stark reality was that the Company was in great danger
from a fast deterioration in its finances.
A hiatus was reached, set against the backdrop of war. Additional costs,
especially military ones, were testing already overstretched funds. Although
signs of a slide were there before the outbreak of hostilities, the deterioration
led to a chain of threatened crises that called upon all Sulivan’s skill to
circumvent. Some measure of all this might be gauged from a later
calculation that in the seven years between 1753 and 1760, the Company
managed to ‘lose’ £2.5 million.
For the knowledgeable Irishman in charge, tenure of office rapidly came to
mean a never-ending effort to keep the Company afloat. Overriding anxiety
stemmed from this seemingly endless threat of insolvency, escalating military
costs, and multitudes of accumulating expenses, particularly in Bengal.
Avoiding financial collapse and the catastrophe that would follow demanded
the utmost in stamina and perseverance.
It began for him with his very entry to high office. Between 1757 and 1758
he discovered that the financially fraught Company faced a liquidity
emergency. The whole mighty East India organisation was on the verge of
bankruptcy. The crisis that threatened in 1758 was due to several factors, but
the immediate, urgent situation arose from ‘unexpectedly large demands in

the form of bills transmitted from India to London – which embarrassed the
Company’.30
It is ironic that Sulivan faced an impending disaster which, unintentionally,
he had helped create. In exchange for cash paid into the treasury in Fort
William, with which to make the Investment in Bengal, he had offered bills
redeemable in London. The acceptance of so many bills of exchange
boomeranged with a vengeance. His good intention, to benefit the Company
and private individuals alike, was abused. Too many bills began arriving. The
drafts drawn by the servants in Bengal increased enormously and were falling
due for payment before the money from sales could be realized.31
Sulivan severely curtailed his own remittance activities upon realising how
far wrong things were in Bengal. But it was too late. By November 1758 he
was at his wit’s end, and even thought of refusing to accept any more drafts.
Only the risk to the Company’s credit from this course of action made him
stop. Nevertheless, he then took a firm stand: ‘No persons shall be suffered
to pay more into the Company’s cash beyond what the Company’s occasions
absolutely require.’32
His peremptory orders to Company servants abroad to stop remitting their
fortunes proved impossible for them to accept meekly. Combined with his
measures to curb customs-free privileges, they felt that it was too much to
bear. Clive and other senior servants in Bengal thought he was too deeply
implicated by his own private activities. His change of face, for so it appeared
to them, was not acceptable. They simply did not appreciate the seriousness
of the position, despite Sulivan’s best efforts.
The Company’s trade was suffering: ‘Because it was forced to buy from its
own employees at prices which they themselves fixed in their capacity as
agents of the Company.’33 In this way the Bengal servants, in particular, took
away the very wherewithal to pay their bills when offered for payment in
London. Sulivan’s advices became frantic and his tone increasingly severe. In
November 1758 he listed the criticisms levelled against Bengal. Instead of
requiring no supplies that Presidency had ‘drawn upon us for £167,000 and
bills for a larger amount are thought to be on the way.’34 He was furious:
The very being of the Company depends upon the practice of the
utmost frugality...the unaccountable conduct of Fort William and
Bombay, who have drawn heavily without sending adequate
cargoes has involved the Company in great difficulties. Even if
they had sent cargoes it would have been impossible in time of
war to raise the necessary sums within 3 months.35
November 1758 was one of the blackest periods in the Company’s history. It
was a real crisis, brought on by the accumulation of events following Plassey
and complicated by war and the weaknesses abroad that made India ripe for
exploitation. But above all, the Company was being crippled in November by
these excessive numbers of bills, payable at a shorter date than expected.
There was extravagance in the terms offered by the Bengal servants, the
same people putting up the money. However, it was the timing of when the
demands fell due that was of most concern; and with the drain of funds in
England, ‘Sulivan’s admiration for what he had called, the Company’s “old
and most capable servants” began to wane.’36 The Company was almost
insolvent.37 On top of the bills fiasco, the drain upon commerce from war
costs was unbearable, with convoy expenses, increases in shipping hire and
losses of ships to privateers. Things reached their lowest point just a few
months after he became Chairman, and he found the Company foundering
under him. Roughly from May 1758 to March 1759 he faced, as he said, ‘the
Company bankrupt at home in credits, not even £5,100 could be borrowed
on their name from man or men’.38
But he was equal to the occasion. Many years later he described the drama
and his rescue of ‘an ungrateful Company’:
In this dreadful hour my fame and fortune (perhaps my personal

safety) were hazarded to save them. I concealed their danger,
comforted the Proprietors, lent them the last shilling (£40,000)
by which I lost £10,200 by selling out of the funds, pawned
myself for near as much more, and...secured its tottering internal
state.39
This would mean that he had personally raised some £80,000, and had placed
himself in an impossible position if his gamble did not succeed. If his figures
are to be accepted his fortune was certainly insufficient to cover the bills due.
The Company ledgers show a record of cash paid back to him in the period
1759 to 1761 that totals only £3,500. But it is more than probable that the
remainder of the money loaned to the Company was included in the sums of
£105,300 and £52,000, entered under the headings: ‘paid several’, dated 28
February and 31 July 1759, respectively.40
He must have borrowed much more than admitted later in life; and it
would seem that he used every ounce of persuasion upon connections in the
London money market. These are undoubtedly the people included,
anonymously, under the headings ‘paid several’. On 24 March 1758 £100,000
in cash was received from the Governor of the Bank of England. Another
£50,000 from that source came on 31 May 1759. £70,000 was repaid to the
Royal Assurance Company on 20 March 1759; and various individuals were paid
back in 1759 and 1760, including Henry Savage, Sulivan’s Bombay colleague,
who was repaid £4,000. By these exertions, it appears he rescued the
Company from financial disaster in the winter of 1758-9. From these figures
alone the Company borrowed just under £400,000; sufficient to cover
requirements and allow the danger to pass.
Meanwhile, he reaped benefits. His position was consolidated; and the
policy he must pursue in Bengal became very clear: ‘Territorial acquisitions
(were)...a course of unjustifiable expense.’41 The Company was back on its
feet; and at the Court of Directors of 10 January 1759 this feat was
applauded. He had justification, therefore, in feeling aggrieved beyond words

by the infamous Bengal General Letter of 29 December 1759, when it
arrived, signed by Clive, Holwell and other Bengal Councillors.
He had been reproached, just after straining every sinew to rescue the
Company. What is more, he had saved it from havoc wrought, in the main,
by those very same Bengal servants. The reply, drafted in his own
handwriting, showed his feelings in no uncertain manner. He castigated their
‘cruel’ censures, and looked back ‘with wonder’ at the difficulties
surmounted, seemingly impossible ‘with our contracted capital’. He thanked
the Proprietors for ‘generously and without a murmur consenting to reduce
their dividend’.42
4
As well as solving the immediate crisis of 1758-9, as Chairman he had to
tackle the long-term problem of constructing a solid financial basis for
commercial operations. He approached the problem in two ways. In order to
relax pressures and controls on the Company at home, caused by having to
acquire bullion to export to the Presidencies, he inaugurated a policy of
cutting back specie, encouraging the settlements to find their own, and
promoting the export of merchandise. Secondly, he commenced cutting costs
and expenses in the civil and military establishments, backed up by severe
and stern censure. Wherever possible he urged Governors and Councils to
throw costs upon the shoulders of the Indian powers.
In the first of these approaches he was totally successful, in the latter he
brought down enemies upon his own head. Whether or not he foresaw the
possibility of a contest in the future, Sulivan gave no sign; and the deadly
tone of some of his letters suggests that the critical importance of stopping
the drain on funds was all that mattered to him.
From various tallies made in 1766-7, directly related to the Government’s
new interest in India and the affairs of the Company, a fairly accurate
appraisal of how things functioned, and the changes in finances between
1754 and 1766 can be put together. Also, Charles Townshend, Chancellor of
the Exchequer in Chatham’s administration of 1766-8, had the Company
draw up lists giving a truer reflection of its business prior to and during these
troubled years. Included are accounts of all the bullion and merchandise sent
to India, the total ships at sea and tonnage.43
The lists also give the full war expenses in India from 1753 to 1766 and
the Company’s exports for these years, which approximated to 1,000 tons
annually, exclusive of men and baggage. Included as well are conflicting
statements regarding the Bengal accounts drawn up by Clive and Sulivan.
Much of what was stated can be added to and checked from other sources.44
They show that from a steady export of bullion in 1754-55, worth
£668,893, there was a drop in 1756 to £620,378. This can be explained by the
outbreak of the European war, by subsequent demands upon the Bank of
England, and by the risks of capture at sea. There was also a shortage of
specie from the New World via Portugal and Spain. The surge of bullion
exports in 1757 to £795,007, far exceeding the 1754-5 figures, can be
explained by the desperate demands made by the Presidencies. The onslaught
of war cut across all other priorities. Troops had to be paid, stores, bullocks
and other supplies purchased.
From this high point, bullion exports dropped in a dramatic manner. In
the two years, 1757 to 1759, they fell to £172,000 (this was a massive drop of
£623,000); then lower still to a mere trickle of £27,089 in 1764. Between
times, in 1763, there was a slight rise to £46,876, caused by the threat of war
with Mir Qasim. There was another, fairly steep rise throughout 1764 and
1765, reaching a total of £366,526, before slumping again.45 Undoubtedly this
spurt was in response to Clive’s return to India and to the troubles expected
there. By 1766 bullion exports had levelled off and then fell slightly to
£315,161 by 1766. This followed the end of immediate and severe military
troubles in India; bolstered by Clive’s claim that that enough specie would be
raised in India.
This limitation of bullion exports to India during Sulivan’s period of
power was developed by him as a deliberate policy. It was done upon the
understanding that there was sufficient gold and silver in India; at a time
when there was a general European shortage of bullion. The policy was also
due to the Company’s credit being on very shaky foundations, particularly
with regard to securing funds from the Bank of England. Regrettably, the
severe crises in India and the political struggle for control of the Company
that paralleled these events combined to create a volatile picture and the
image of mismanagement.
On the other hand, the Company started to show a marked improvement
in the export of merchandise throughout the whole period. This fact also
influenced Sulivan’s decision to deliberately reduce bullion exports while
raising exports of every kind. Such a complete turnabout achieved in the
relative exports of specie compared to merchandise marks a watershed in the
development of the Company’s commercial policy.
The figures for exports of merchandise improve dramatically, proceeding
in an unbroken climb from £259,602 in the years 1754-5 to £497,395 in
1766. To some extent this can be explained by more markets, by the added
territories in India, and by a natural addition to the volume of trade that
might be expected over a decade. The increase also reflects the rapid strides
taking place in the industrialisation of Britain. Yet Sulivan’s vision was vital.
His dogged pursuit of merchandising is underlined in the figures. By 1766 the
Company was dependent upon each Presidency for most of its bullion for
the Investments and for other activities requiring capital. The Directors were
then placing full emphasis on the export of goods.
In truth, without the increase between 1758 and 1762 of approximately
£200,000 worth of merchandise from England, the total Company
commerce in the period 1758 to 1766 would have been disastrously
unbalanced. The damage done might have been insurmountable. To some
extent the increase in goods from Britain had balanced the £324,000 cutback
in bullion exports from there, and which were not made up in India.46
The Company’s straitened circumstances can be realised from the
following figures. The total value of all exports to India from 1754 to 1766
amounted to £8,212,009. This sum was expected to realise enough wealth to
keep the Company solvent and pay dividends. To this can be added
£5,940,987, the amount the Select Committee of the House of Commons
calculated (in 1773) that the Government had injected, mainly through
investment. The total was some £14 million, all the money at the Company’s
disposal throughout the years 1757 to 1766; and it was supposed to pay all
costs, some of them enormous. It was quite insufficient.
There was a little more money that would be raised in India stemming
from the Company’s changed situation there – and from the new territories it
now controlled. However, because of the unreliable and varying calculations
elicited, it became necessary to put this to one side, temporarily. Military
expenses alone were calculated to have been £8,510,360 for the period 1753
to 1766, with Bengal claiming over half of the total. The cost of the
Company’s military and naval charges could scarcely be borne even before
Siraj-ud-Daula’s aggression of 1756. The mounting costs of the struggles in
Bengal and Madras created intolerable strains.
From the council chamber in Calcutta, even Vansittart ranted to Palk in
Madras about the massive military charges and costs. Sulivan told Coote,
campaigning in Madras, ‘Our military expenses are amazingly large, even
beyond what we can possibly support for any time. Pray manifest your regard
to the Company by cutting off every necessary charge.’47 He was also against
the Company lending large sums to the royal army or navy; or of taking on
the cost of demolishing hostile fortifications. No ill-will was meant, just that
it would be impossible to recover the money spent so quickly, if at all.48
The General Letters to the Bengal Council continually reflect Sulivan’s
concern, such as that of 3 March 1758, where he remarked, scathingly, that
Bengal appeared only useful for the saltpetre it produced; while its territorial
acquisitions were again adjudged the cause of unjustifiable expense.49 Nor
could he recoup war costs. Although the Government helped with these, it
expected the Company to withstand the worst of the French challenge in
India on its own. Worse still, Sulivan could not afford to divulge the
seriousness of the Company’s position because of the disastrous lack of
confidence this would create, particularly during a national emergency.
On the 8 March 1758, even after hearing of Clive’s success, he urged ‘our
servants (to)...set down carefully and diligently to the Company’s as well as
their own affairs in the usual mercantile tracts...carrying on the business at all
the subordinates without parade, military forces and at the most moderate
expense.’50
From the very beginning he urged and pleaded for frugality. He referred
continually to the immense expenses swallowed by Madras and to its scanty
returns.51 He also said at one stage that while the charges of Bengal were
great, those of Bombay went beyond all bounds. Each Governor and Council
was called upon to justify heavy expenses drawn; and special reference was
made to inordinate lavishness when entertaining the Indian princes.
He urged reduction in field allowances and standardized these for all the
Presidencies; and berated the fact that allowances for military officers and
others were being ‘concealed in the Commissaries books by the entry of large
sums under general heads’.52 In 1762 it was determined that the end of the
war with the French, should be fully utilized to procure a good Investment.
Madras was called upon to retrieve ‘the circumstances of the Company,
harassed and almost exhausted by continual and immense expenses’.53
He desperately explored trading possibilities and commercial
measures that would ease the grinding costs. He sent no treasure to India in
the season 1758-9, believing, erroneously, that Bengal would have sufficient
bullion following Plassey; and that Madras would support herself from the
‘quick stock’, that is, cash readily available from local trade and remittance
money. Other requirements, he believed, could be met by bills drawn upon
Bombay. He also developed trade between China and Sumatra. Profits were
being made by the sale of pepper in the Canton market and in the carrying of
opium to China. He depended too upon Madras sending 10 chests of bullion
(worth £1,000 each) further east. In England he had been able to lade only 10
chests on to each China ship; he wanted Madras to increase this to 30 chests
per ship.54
Meanwhile, the Company had become the centre of attention in City
business circles. Excessive speculation in Company stock was taking place,
both in London and in Europe. The credit boom only collapsed in 1763 with
the end of the Seven Years War. The financial dislocation started in
Amsterdam and affected London. Thus, even after the critical situation of
1758/1759, the Company still seemed to be set on the road to financial ruin;
and this appeared even more the case as India House became wracked with
political infighting. The confusion this struggle created exacerbated the
already unstable financial situation, preventing constructive policies from
enjoying success.
The growing issue, therefore, of whether the monopoly should continue as
a commercial or a territorial body was worked out against an alarming
background. It all contrasted with the visions of immediate wealth that
whetted the appetites of ignorant shareholders and feckless, uninformed
Directors, provoking enormous pressures. The cost of such fruits could only
be the loss of the Company’s future independence, as Sulivan saw all too
clearly.
Probably the events in India of 1760 and 1763 shocked people in Britain
the most. For Sulivan, the 1760 revolution in Bengal (followed by the disaster
of 1763) painfully corrected the impression he had gained from Clive that it
would be the El Dorado he had been praying for. It was also made clear to
him and his fellow Directors that working for the Company’s future benefit
was of secondary importance to many people in India. If all else had been
well this might not have mattered just as much; but there was an insatiable
thirst for money. What is more, despite the Nawab of Bengal not being able
to fulfil his financial agreements, the Government still expected the

Company to defray the cost of the military establishment while the war
continued.
The uncertainty surrounding the actual state of the Company’s financial
circumstances during these fateful years is illustrated by separate and
divergent calculations made in 1766 by Clive and Sulivan. Both men were in
the best position to know the true state of affairs in Bengal at the end of the
1757-65 period, yet there was no agreement between them.
Bengal was by far the wealthiest and most important Presidency in India,
and Clive’s calculations showed it to have produced a surplus of £607,000 by
1766. Sulivan, on the other hand, reckoned that it had made a loss of
£708,000. Multiplications of these differences appeared in the Company’s
ranks, by men with less knowledge and competence; and there was wide
confusion and uncertainty.
To his consternation, Sulivan had never been able to fathom the true state
of Bengal’s resources. He had been forced, by circumstances, to rely on Clive
and his successors for what he took to be the real condition of the Bengal
treasury; and he was similarly reliant on the Governors and Councils in the
other Presidencies.
He looked in vain, for example, for payment of the £1 million recompense
from the Nawab of Bengal following the 1757 treaty, but ‘nothing has gone
in and to the Company’s returns’.55 Clive had later promised £2 million per
annum, which never materialized. The Nawab of Arcot’s worsening debts
throughout the period in question only made everything more confused: ‘The
immense sum owed by the Nawab is a weight too heavy for the Company to
support much longer.’56 The calculations Sulivan made, which were meant
for the Company’s future and long-term solvency and based on Clive’s
information, were almost useless:
I grounded my opinion upon the veracity of his [Clive’s]

statement of the revenues….Soon after the Battle of Plassey,
Luke Scrafton by Lord Clive’s order, copied from the King’s
books, the nett revenues of the three provinces, which Mr. Walsh
brought home, and by Clive’s order, delivered to me privately.57
The gap between what the Company expected and what was actually realised
was incredibly large and completely unpredicted by those in London. Exact
figures were impossible to obtain.
It was a state of affairs that perplexed Sulivan for a long, long time. In the
1770s he was still making computations and including them in his
correspondence to Warren Hastings when Governor General. He said that
Hastings might easily see the most glaring absurdities: ‘Many arise from
incorrectness in our materials, or ignorance in the persons who collected
them. The persons were Lord Clive and our auditor…the materials were
public papers, laid before Parliament by the Company.’ He added, ‘No man
has taken more pains (I think none so much) as myself, and yet it is
impossible for me to form a statement that will in any degree accord with our
present circumstances in Bengal…I cannot make out a corrected account.’58
What happened, therefore, as the years progressed was that while
outwardly the Company appeared to become rich very quickly, it was really
shouldering massive debts which would have to be reckoned with. Eventually
other criteria ensured there would be further crises. From 1757 to April 1764
Sulivan was at the centre of it all. Faced with war commitments, uncertainty
about how things would develop in India, muddled figures and a
mushrooming of evils produced by such a sad state of affairs, his grasp of
what was going on was affected. The distorted view he was given led to
erroneous calculations, virtually impossible to correct.
Some evidence of his efforts to redeem things does emerge, however. In
1758 and again in 1761, he pointed out that the Company’s capital was too
small for the role that it was now asked to play. In a letter to Clive he said,
‘we only want our capital doubled to reap those advantages which other ways
we cannot grasp’; and of course, he had changed the balance of specie and
manufactured exports.59 Be that as it may, sporadically he was still forced
back upon the Government for help, although wary of the difficulties this
could land the Company in relative to its future independence.
Smooth control of finances proved impossible throughout the period, and
stupendous effort was needed to maintain credibility. In truth, Sulivan’s input
really was crucial; this was so in his eyes and in those of his contemporaries.
Mid 1758 to mid 1759 was the critical period, and the fact that during this
crisis Sulivan gave all the money that he had and could raise to keep the
Company solvent was indeed the vital factor.
Even during his fight to become Chairman of the Company he had been
aware of approaching financial emergency. When it happened, it was
something that had to be handled alone; by the very nature of the trouble
public disclosure was impossible. Publicity would have speedily brought
about the very state of affairs that he wished to avoid – a disastrous lack of
confidence. In the end, he failed to plug the drain on the Company’s cash,
though not for the want of trying. Yet in the reversal of roles, whereby the
export of manufactures replaced that of bullion, he was triumphant in the
long-term. This established long-term viability since exports would continue
to rise and flood ready-made markets in India; and East Indiamen carried
these goods from rising British industry to these markets. This produced
further stability within the organisation and led to better standing in City
circles. That this was not entirely the case, however, was to be reflected in the
financial crises of 1766-7 and then 1772; although additional influences were
present at these emergencies. What must be said, though, is that without
Sulivan’s presence throughout the 1757 to 1764 years the Company might
have ceased to exist; or would have been poorer and less prepared for the
strenuous years to come.
5
India
Developments and Plans
1757-65
Winning the war and securing the Company’s finances were Sulivan’s
priorities, but he had problems without number to face, particularly in India.
The Mughal Empire was in meltdown; trade stagnant, there was
administrative turmoil and breakdown. Abuse of trust and mismanagement
was rampant in each of the main provinces, but especially so in Bengal,
which now preoccupied his mind. What went on there affected everything
else. Disturbing administrative and financial developments were bad enough
in themselves, but there was hostile reaction to his orders, to his ideas and to
Leadenhall control. The activities of Company servants and free merchants
grew as they strove to get rich quick.1
The Company’s matchless military machine caused enormous problems as
well. Native weakness was highlighted by its power; and although to begin
with officers and Company servants had no systematic scheme for using such
might, they were able to employ it to increase profits for themselves and for
private traders, and to wring concessions that resulted in territorial gains. The
example given by Clive and his use of the army did not help; nor did the
increasing need to pay and feed troops.
Upkeep of the Company’s armies became the biggest incentive to extract
grants of revenue, and led to control of territory. Eventually the Company
was providing the troops, and they were paid for by the Nawab out of
revenue; a policy Sulivan deliberately pursued. This resulted in British forces
taking over the duties of administering and collecting the taxes from those
territories allocated for their payment. In this way, ‘the whole revenue of
Bengal was taken over’.2 Thus began ‘the gradual process by which the whole
raison d’etre of the Company shifted from trade to tax collection’.3
After Plassey the Company was de facto a territorial power; and supervision
was by men on the spot. A potential, if not actual, state of empire was
achieved, not solely by military success, but by the respect accorded the
INDIA DEVELOPMENTS AND PLANS 1757-65 73
Company by the native populace. The English changed from being in Bengal
on sufferance to one of fawning reverence. By 1765 the Company had
moved from being an ally of self-reliant Nawabs, to exercising a military
protectorate, reducing the native overlord to a nonentity.
Following Plassey, there was a noticeable change in attitude among
Company officials in Bengal. Latent imperial designs developed, stimulated
by territorial and administrative duties that now accompanied commercial
ones. Ominously a lack of deference and loyalty towards the Direction also
appeared. Clive again has responsibility for fostering these feelings of
separation, as well as encouraging conquest. He calculated that 2,000
Europeans could conquer all the territory the Company might require; with
the Mogul Emperor paying for it.4 His pre-eminence was another problem;
he was held in equal status to the Directors themselves. This was
consolidated by what was interpreted as a deferential attitude by the
Company executives towards him.
Later, in his ‘History’ of Bengal, Vansittart vouchsafed that the Company
had become a military and territorial power. Calcutta fortifying itself
extensively was proof enough, he maintained; and all was put into effect, with
or without blessings from Leadenhall. Sulivan, although raging against money
being spent building walls, had given Clive carte blanche. He also had a wrong
conception of what constituted reality. Before corrective action could begin,
loss of control had commenced.
He tried, nevertheless, to minimise the growing sense of separateness in
India; he rode events, harnessed and channelled them, disciplined and
legislated wherever and whenever possible. As he became aware that
Company servants were embroiled in endless intrigues, he also began to
suspect they were not fit for, and in some cases not remotely attentive to,
their duties.
From his first day in office as Chairman, the scenario in Bengal riveted his
attention. The terms of the Treaty with Mir Jafar and the manner in which it
came about displayed machination, greed and corruption. Clive had made an
agreement with the prince before Plassey, and had entered into the plot
against the incumbent Siraj-ud-daula. While Mir Jafar was made Subadari* of
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Zamindari* rights and twenty-four Parganas* of land
were confirmed as the Company’s; 40 begahs* of land were added. The Dastak*
was confirmed and ample compensation paid.
Clive received the equivalent of £234,000, then later, his jagir, worth
around £27,000 per annum; presents, trading rights, gifts, perquisites, bribes
and contracts were all handed out or exchanged.5 Henceforth the English
Company compelled obedience; while the roles of arbiter and judge were also
pushed upon its officials. ‘Successive Nawabs were exposed to a series of
demands which destroyed their authority within ten years’.6
Soon afterwards, an invasion of Bihar by the Shahzada, the eldest son of
the Mughal Emperor, led (through retaliation) to Company forces thrusting
up the Ganges valley and into Oudh. Sulivan heard about this, of course, but
long after it had taken place.7 Clive’s return to England in 1760 left Mir Jafar
with an empty treasury; and there was fear in Calcutta of a period of

‘intestine war’ and barbarism.8
It was October 1760 before Sulivan heard of the deposition of Mir Jafar
and the substitution of Mir Qasim by Vansittart and Holwell. After Clive’s
departure, all had foundered on the basic supposition that there was enough
treasure in the Nawab’s exchequer. Vansittart stated he was left a bankrupt
state of affairs, and that ‘it was Colonel Clive’s good fortune to leave India
before the Company’s treasure was totally exhausted.’9
Yet the most important and far-reaching point Clive had made was that
Bengal would need no money for three years. Sulivan had believed this. It
was an error with immense consequences. Based on Clive’s estimates, he had
believed there would be a massive infusion of capital, easing Investment
problems and war costs. This optimism faded with successive advices.
Both Holwell, (in charge until Governor Vansittart arrived from Madras)
and his new master saw the substitution of Nawabs as a means of solving
financial straits. They felt no obligation to continue with someone who had
proved so disastrous.10 Another round of ‘presents’ then commenced; too
much for an already empty Bengal purse.
On hearing of Mir Jafar’s deposition, Sulivan (mistakenly) informed
Chatham via Robert Wood, ‘of a revolution in Bengal…wherein Pres.
Vansittart has shown masterly abilities’.11 Unwittingly, by deposing Mir Jafar,
Vansittart also created trouble for himself with his patrons. Whereas Sulivan
applauded his actions, Clive did not; and influenced by the growing struggle
with Sulivan, came down hard against him.
Vansittart insisted that the price of Mir Qasim’s appointment was to be a
grant of lands to the Company, not to mention private emoluments. Thus the
Company acquired Burdwan, Chittagong and Midnapore worth £625,000 per
annum. Because Vansittart was his man and the Company’s financial needs
were pressing, Sulivan had to support the substitution of Nawabs. At the
same time, the two lakhs of rupees sent to Madras for the siege of
Pondicherry pleased him. But if Vansittart hoped for peaceful co-existence,
he was badly mistaken. Mir Qasim aimed to become independent.
The history of Bengal, between the revolution of 1760 and the next
upheaval of 1763, makes disastrous reading. The Governor’s indecisive
nature perfectly suited grasping Company servants, free traders and most of
all Mir Qasim. He was unable to withstand the Nawab’s never-ending
arguments. Mir Qasim was ruthless, efficient and irritated by the greed he
saw at every level of European society. He wished to restore native powers to
what they were before Plassey, but misread the situation. The desire at India
House to incur no expense in the administration of territory created an
utterly wrong impression. He also seriously underestimated the force the
Company could quickly put into the field, and its superiority in arms.
Sulivan sent Sir Eyre Coote to Bengal in 1761, where he upset everyone
then faced up to Emperor Shah Alam.12 The defeat of the Mogul ruler that
followed (and of his French allies) allowed Mir Qasim freedom of action. He
murdered Ram Narrain, Governor of Bihar, and attacked European trading
abuses. He criticised misuse of the Dastak; and set up Customs of his own,
even stopping Company ships.
Vansittart was aware of Europeans unlawfully commandeering the salt and
tobacco trades and sympathised with the Nawab over these and other abuses.
Although supported by Hastings, he found himself in a minority in Council
when it came to sanctioning these actions. The upshot was that he set the
military and civil branches of the Company against himself, and created a
wrong impression in Mir Qasim’s mind.
He was accused of irresponsibility and of supporting the Nawab. He could
expect no disinterested opinion, there was too much to lose. His compatriots
could not contemplate either a powerful Nawab or erosion of wealth.
Vansittart had appeared to abdicate the powers won at Plassey and
afterwards. The English servants and traders in Bengal could not allow this
and refused to agree. The Governor was hated because he appeared to have
turned against his fellow countrymen.
Mir Qasim then allowed all his subjects to trade from March 1763 without
payment of duty, thus destroying the value of the Dastak. To most
Europeans this meant war; the Council was split even further. Vansittart
complained to India House; and although it took time, Sulivan dismissed all
his opponents on the Board.
To add to the troubles, a serious rift had opened in 1761 between Sulivan
and Vansittart that did not end until 1763. Sulivan had confided a passing
exasperation to Clive’s ears, which his Lordship and Holwell used against
them both.13 Sulivan, who could make no more claim upon this man’s loyalty
than could Clive, sent a letter on the subject to the Governor, which was
received with hurt and alarm. Despite all Vansittart’s efforts Sulivan remained
sceptical of his integrity.
The rift deepened and the tone of Sulivan’s text was resented, ‘a vein of ill-
humour running throughout the whole which is displeasing and also
discouraging’.14 Relations were only restored when Sulivan understood this
misunderstanding was just what their enemies aimed for. The renewed
friendship was also due to the efforts of Robert Palk.15
The attempts by Mir Qasim to revive the privileges that would have been
his under the Mughal regime resulted in war, and yet another revolution. He
seized the Seth bankers who might have financed a rising against him. Hay
and Amyatt, the two Company representatives sent to remonstrate with him
in May 1763, were refused all their demands. With the Nawab’s confiscation
of a consignment of arms and then the beheading of Amyatt in July
hostilities were inevitable. On 4 July he declared war.
Company forces under Major Adams retook Monghyr, but Mir Qasim had
already set out for Patna. On the way there he murdered the Seths, and then
brutally massacred the Company garrison and civilian population of Patna. It
was October before Major Adams retook the city, though the Nawab had
fled. Mir Jafar was reinstated on 8 July, and all was restored to what it had
been like following Plassey, with regard to the native administration and the
Company. Unfortunately, once more Company servants alone were exempt

from taxes.16
What then happened in Bengal from 1763 to 1765 was only further
demonstration of all that was going wrong in the sub-continent. Mir Jafar’s
restoration cost a donation of £375,000 to the Company’s army and navy,
£300,000 to the Company for costs; a total sum almost equalled by the
£530,000 doled out for individual losses. Free inland trading rights were re-
imposed.
Continued military operations in 1764 against the deposed Mir Qasim
continued. Carnac was replaced by Major Hector Munro who arrived on the
Sulivan with 100 Highlanders; and on 24 October 1764 he defeated the
Imperial forces at Baksar.17 It was a decisive victory. Mir Qasim escaped, but
by February 1765 Munro had taken Allahbad. The ex-Nawab, in an alliance
with the Marathas, was defeated in May 1765; Oudh was cleared, and some
stability (at least in English eyes) was regained.
From 1763 to 1765, however, Company interests and those of the Nawab
were neglected; personal objectives came before all others. Mir Jafar
complained of the loss to Asians of the inland trade, the very grievance that
proved the catalyst of revolt for his predecessor. Numerous opportunities for
Europeans in salt and opium dealings brought enormous wealth.18 George
Dempster, a leading director, summed it up: ‘Few fortunes acquired in the
East will bear a very minute investigation.’19
In November 1765 Vansittart resigned the Presidency and was replaced by
another friend of Sulivan’s, John Spencer.20 This brought no change of
policy, and no improved control; although Spencer expressed his (usually
negative) opinion on everything. Fortunes continued to be made.21
2
Although Bengal demanded much of Sulivan’s time, he by no means
neglected the factories in Madras, Bombay, Sumatra and China during these
years. Events in Madras would determine the future of the Company in India
just as much as those in Bengal. The bulk of the fighting was conducted
along the Coromandel Coast; although by 1764 the threat from a
combination of French forces and other support from Mysore had been
stilled at Baksar. This victory prevented the very real possibility of a collapse
in the Carnatic.
The strong military presence in Madras caused problems, especially
disagreements between the armed forces of the Company and the Crown.
Sulivan was forced to clarify the position: ‘His Majesty’s officers should never
interfere in the promotion of our officers or meddle in any way with the
management of our affairs. The Legislature alone can control the rights
derived from our Charter.’22 Yet they still clashed; and he feared their
combined might was being used to further private ends; and that military
commanders were manifesting imperialist tendencies.
The main task confronting Governor and Council was to restrain the
Nawab’s aggression towards his smaller neighbours. Maintaining peace with
rival princes at Madura, Tanjore and Tulja-ji was at the heart of this. They
also formulated relations with Salabat Jang, master of the Deccan, and his
brother, the Nizam Ali Khan. Their other major duties were to keep both the
Company and its army in funds; and supply men and materials for
expeditions.
Heavy expense was involved in such an expedition to Golcanda; and in
keeping the French out of Kandy. Dutch jealousy determined that delicate
negotiations with its King were also required. Sulivan decided, however, that
trade should be secured in those parts of Ceylon not subject to Dutch rule;
and in February 1763 sent out John Dunning’s opinion that the Company
had a lawful right to form settlements.23
As always, the main concern was that provision was made for the
Investment, and maintaining sufficient bullion in the Company’s coffers.
Each Presidency was to help the other: thus ‘flowing cash’ from Bengal was
expected to supply Madras and China.24 It did not always happen.
Nevertheless, the Governor (Pigot followed by Palk) was to maintain contact
with Spencer in Bombay, and Vansittart in Bengal, forming the third portion
of the ring of command that Sulivan had worked for.
Distance and separate growth had led to a sense of independence and of
indifference. Sulivan’s attempts to change such attitudes brought its own
backlash. His orders were increasingly regarded as peremptory and aroused
barely concealed hostility.25 Repeated attempts made to reduce the price of
copper in order to break the dealers’ ring; and regulating officers’ ‘privilege of
trade’ came to nothing. His demand of absolute obedience was, of course,
ignored.26 Some of his decisions stimulated trouble. Robert Orme, who was
to succeed Pigot as Governor, was superseded by Palk.27
Initially, Sulivan’s favoured policy was to maintain the traditional
commerce of the Carnatic; but by 1761 a change had taken place, one not at
all in line with his approach to Bengal or the Company’s settlements
elsewhere. This new outlook was summed up in a letter to Chatham:
The reduction of Pondicherry has given us entire Possession of

the Choromandel coast. In a commercial light the advantages can
never be extensive, there are but few manufactures and no ports.
The great benefit then must arise from possession of countries
either by cession or usurpation, whose revenues must maintain
armies and draw riches to Europe.28
This outlook explains the expeditions sent out among the country powers. It
hearkened to the Dupleix-Clive view, yet in the same letter to Chatham he
could maintain ‘my ideas Sir, will be confined to our Mercantile interests.’29
Sulivan relied quite a lot upon personal ties to connect India House with
the Madras Presidency. When he nominated Palk in November 1763 he
placed a close friend in charge, one who would be attentive to his bidding.
Palk colourfully expressed the debt he owed to him: ‘God almighty bless you,
Mrs. Sulivan and the Irish Register.’ The appointment can be seen as a
reward. He had been angling for a seat at Ashburton, and for this had been
dependent upon Palk.30 Palk was to play a large part in Sulivan’s public and
private life.
Privately he amassed a large fortune and was helped in this by Sulivan, who
received in return the odd cask of Madeira wine, and newspapers. He was
able to maintain some form of control through this pliable lieutenant, even
though executive orders were being largely ignored elsewhere.31
The 1756-61 war left Muhammad Ali Khan of Arcot undisputed Nawab of
that territory. The 11th article in the Definitive Treaty, composed by Sulivan,
confirmed this; but at times he had to remind the Nawab of where his
allegiance lay.32 The biggest problem, however, was the matter of his debts.
He had become heavily indebted to the Company because of its assistance
during the war and for personal expenses. Territory had been ceded and
assignments granted on his revenue to many individuals, and especially to
Madras Councillors. Yet he was forced to continue borrowing to pay the
original debts.
At first, Sulivan was one of only a few who grasped the need to do
something urgently. The liabilities worried him; as did the complications they
created.33 He was scathing about his fellow Directors - that they never read
the Madras books and knew nothing of the issue.
The Nawab was made to pay, however, since it was his interests that were
being defended. Thus a jagir (Tuinally, situated near Madras) was obtained for
the Company’s use, as part-payment of his dues.34 No progress in reducing
the sums was possible, however, because too many individuals had a
pecuniary interest in the debts remaining unpaid. Also, since no
comprehensive and reliable estimate of the Nawab’s obligations existed, a
solution was not possible. Sulivan could only pass the problem on.
3
It was natural that he should treat Bombay with special regard after so many
years of service there; and so many of his friends, like Hough and Spencer
still in the Presidency was a spur to his interest. Charles Crommelin,
Governor from 1761, was not particularly attached to him, but a coldness
grew only as Sulivan’s ties with Spencer developed.35
Sulivan had done a great deal to ensure good government and sound
commercial organisation at Bombay. Although considered a backwater, the
settlement demanded a great deal in military provisions from the other
Presidencies for war costs, disruption to trade and Maratha raids. Also, its
defence had to be maintained because the security of all the Company
settlements in India depended ultimately upon control of the Malabar Coast.
He demanded, nevertheless, that Company servants cut back and stop
squandering precious financial resources. Smuggling was to be investigated;
better-ordered accounts kept; costs and wages cut – especially Crommelin’s.
The accusation that he had Bombay ‘in his pocket’, is probably justified; but
he deserved one oasis of seeming normality. Bombay spoke of custom and
tradition, of barter and of control from Leadenhall Street. He asked for little
else.36
4
His responsibilities also encompassed interests in the East Indies archipelago
and in China. The settlements included Fort Marlborough, Bencoolen and
Gombroon, all on the island of Sumatra; and Canton on the Chinese
mainland. He kept a keen eye on the China trade, stipulating that it had to be
‘plentifully supplied’ by both Madras and Bengal.37 This concern is best
illustrated in an address to the Tsen tou (or Viceroy) of Canton, who was in
charge of Chinese territory around and including Canton. He was a principal
Governor, and the Chinese Emperor’s representative for Kwantung and
Kiangsi.
Sulivan feared the loss of a hundred year old privilege to trade; and of the
Company being superseded by the French or Dutch. The Chinese overlord
(or Hsan-fu) was displeased at the level of misbehaviour among Company
merchants. In reply to a charge of fraud, Sulivan maintained in defence that
the Company’s representatives only desired redress against severe trade
restrictions. He suggested a variety of expedients to settle the dispute. In view
of the continuance of trade, he was evidently successful.
In Sumatra the need, as always, was to maintain, a brisk trade. The
Company was involved in buying and selling opium, silver, timber and
pepper. Sumatra also dealt extensively in slaves. Sulivan’s personal views
regarding this unforgivable trade in human lives does not appear in any of his
correspondence. His orders and decisions can only be regarded, therefore, in
a purely business-related sense, and in accord with the morality of his age.
East Indiamen were directed to Madagascar and the Guinea Coast to
purchase slaves for delivery at Fort Marlborough. Instructions were precise.
The slave owners received £15 for each human being. Two thirds of those
seized were to be males aged 15 to 40; one third females aged 15 to 25. Boys
and girls aged 10 to 15 were to be reckoned on the basis that two of them
were the equivalent of one male.
The Captain and Chief Mate of each ship received 20 shillings for each
slave taken on board; and a further 20 shillings was paid to each of them (and
the surgeon) on safe delivery at Fort Marlborough. The Company’s ship the
Royal George (400 tons), its Captain a Nicholas Skottowe, was used for this
type of traffic. In 1764 she was, ‘despatched to the Guinea Coast to procure
slaves for the Sumatra settlements’.38
In May 1762 Sulivan intimated that he ‘intended to move the Court to
take off the dependency of the Company’s important Settlement in the West
Coast of Sumatra from the Presidency of Fort St. George’.39 He proceeded to
use examples of what he had created elsewhere, especially in Bombay, as
blueprints for the new Presidency at Fort Marlborough; and laid down the
settlement’s complete organisation. Rules, regulations and the numbers of

employees required were all settled.40
Despite Dutch opposition, he was determined to make the Indonesian
settlements a success. He refused an application from Shelburne, for a
change of position for his friend, Alexander Hall, who wanted away from the
unhealthy Bencoolen climate. Sulivan stressed his reliance on someone of
Hall’s ability, who knew the people and their manners, ‘to raise these
settlements to the height I hope to see them’.41
The Sumatra settlements desperately needed defence against
overwhelming Dutch power. Holland had assisted French destruction of
Bencoolen, Gombroon and Fort Marlborough in 1760. The French had then
given the factories to the Dutch, who promptly destroyed all fortifications. In
1763 Sulivan expressed satisfaction at their resettlement. The Dutch were
also to be compelled to hand back the two factories at Natal and Tapanuli.
The Dutch and French continued to stir trouble, such as among the
Chinese inhabitants; so he sought assistance from Government, asking for
men-of-war and troops. He received none.42 When two French ships cruised
off Sumatra in the 1761-2 period, he had to appoint Admiral Stevens to
guard the area. In February 1762 he sent a letter to Bute asking whether it
would be wise to send off the Bencoolen ships considering the state of war
and the paucity of English forces, and appealed for Royal Navy protection.
Yet again no action was taken.
Nevertheless, in the 1762-3 period, penetration of the archipelago
continued, and was marked, in particular, by the expeditions of Alexander
Dalrymple to the north coast of Borneo. In 1762 he made a treaty with the
Sultan of the island of Sulu.43 Dalrymple was then criticised by Sulivan for
being too independent in negotiating with the Sultan. The Dutch, already
bristling at the strong British presence in Sumatra, took exception to the Sulu
expedition, and sent out a force to ‘dislodge whoever might be there’.44
Sulivan informed Palk that he wanted the Sumatra settlements protected.
Like its predecessors, the Grenville Ministry ignored the request made in
1763 by the Company’s Secret Committee (comprising Dorrien, Sulivan, and
Amyand) for protection against Dutch and French attacks. Then in February
1764, a second application by this committee was also rejected. Gaining
intelligence of Dutch designs against the new settlement at Sulu; and of their
plans to disrupt the new passage found round the Philippines to China, once
more two ships-of-the-line were requested. Again this was refused, despite
continued French and Dutch threats. This level of fear and uncertainty was
to remain, despite such efforts; and following Sulivan’s exit from the
executive in 1765, the archipelago was almost totally neglected.
5
Apart from dealing with troubles from abroad as they arrived on his
doorstep, Sulivan was responsible for fashioning the road ahead. His prime
commission, as Chairman or leading Director, was always to increase
efficiency, bringing a greater volume of trade and thus larger profits. Nothing
was to interfere with this design. In the Presidencies, ensuring the Investment
for the next ships took precedence over all other things; just as every ship
hired in England was of the utmost importance. Financial considerations
always guided his course of action.
Securing his objectives, however, depended upon dominance at India
House, upon those he chose to fill the leading positions overseas, and his
methods. His aims also had to be attainable. His normal course of action was
to send a full exposition of requirements to the settlement concerned. This
was the thinking behind his ‘Observations on the Bengal Establishment…,’ inserted
into the General Letters despatched to every Presidency. Detailed statements
were included in his private correspondence, supplementing the directions
given in the General Letters.45
His predicament was that although circumstances might have changed,
with no precedent he must pursue the traditional mercantilist route both
inherited and favoured. Also, after 1757 and the revolutionary transfer of
power, agreement had also to be reached with any Indian prince who had
power over the Company’s material goods, because it had become a feudal
vassal with territories. He thought it possible to provide adequate supervision
and control because in theory he was able to see the whole picture. His vision
was to bring into existence a perfectly run organisation, one that would last
throughout his life and beyond; and he set out by attempting to define the
role of the Company following Plassey.
Every plan for India was centred on Bengal; and he spent immense time
and effort in planning more efficient forms of government for it. The other
settlements were only peripheral. His policy for Bengal was: ‘The security of
their present possessions and privileges, the preservation of peace,
maintenance of the Nawab and prevention of border raids.’46 However, from
the start, despite a fundamental need to plan ahead he encountered
antagonism, in both India House and the Presidencies.
The Company being in India solely to barter and carry goods to and from
England was guaranteed by Charter, which also maintained its independence.
The question being asked was whether power over so big an area, and one
that involved territorial possessions, could be left to an assembly of
shareholders.47 He reflected upon this in 1761, four years after Plassey:
It is extremely easy to parcel out upon paper, kingdoms that are

infinitely larger than Great Britain, but to carry such schemes
into execution might prove an arduous task, even to government;
surely then too bold and imprudent for a trading Company.48
In other words, he still adhered to the commerce-only policy that dated from
1757. He rested satisfied with this, plus the limited territories ceded in
Bengal, and informed Chatham, ‘my ideas Sir, will be confined to our
Mercantile interests.’49
Sulivan had enunciated his resolve not to endanger the commercial

foundation of the Company when in 1759 he restrained it from entering into
a territorial role by rejecting the offer of the Diwani. He kept to this aim: the
Company was to function as a trading organisation.50 Even after the events
of 1757, 1760 and 1763, when it was obvious the English no longer relied on
the native government and that they themselves compelled obedience, he
would not change. He maintained the policy of not accepting the Diwani, and
Vansittart was warned against this in 1764.
Over the years, however, he had to use ever more forceful directives to
have his orders fulfilled. He was particularly angered at continued defiance
and neglect of his orders to concentrate on trade, cut military costs and not
interfere in internal struggles. Even though he came to see that his former
rigid views had to be loosened, and indeed were by 1763, he still could not
contemplate full-blooded territorial aggrandisement in every theatre. The
danger to the Charter was too acute.
In 1761 he planned to regain the initiative abroad, particularly in Bengal.
The ‘General Letter to the Governor for the Time being of Fort William’,
dated 6 May 1761, demonstrates as much, with strict instructions on naval
and judicial matters. He placed a priority on the Investment and upon
efficient management. Customs dues were to be paid; with an improved
conduct and bearing among officers. Better relations were needed among the
Presidencies. These enjoyed only limited success; although Bengal purchases
grew from £350,000 per annum in the early 1760s to £1 million in 1770, and
to more than that in the 1770s.
That same year, he sensibly used Palk to change direction in the Madras
Presidency, from a purely commercial strategy to one that embraced limited
territorial ambitions. It was a course partly dictated by hostile native powers,
by French intrigue, and by the rather limited trading opportunities available.
Between 1760 and 1763, the direction in which events turned in Bengal
and the Carnatic; and the changed circumstances flowing from war and
protection of sea routes forced him into new channels of thought. Only
Bombay could be treated in the old familiar ‘trade not conquest’ way; but
even there, strategic requirements began to superimpose upon traditional
commercial policy. In Bengal, however, he merely wanted to trade as before;
and to draw the territorial revenues and customs dues from the new limited
area granted around Bengal, but no more. Such demarcation required strict
regulation and it became increasingly impossible to curb ambition, acquisitive
tendencies and autonomous inclinations, despite severe condemnation.51
Sulivan had no wish for conquest. He neither wanted, nor thought it
proper to create subject peoples and then legislate for them, but could not be
rid of this problem. Whether western concepts of government should be
introduced in India was something he could not decide upon. The initiative
for subjugation, in this period, always came from those abroad; although,
apart from Clive, there was little idea at first of a systematic design for
acquiring territory. Most Company servants agreed that this was not in its
best interests. But neither was there any effective restraint upon them from
superiors abroad. Directives and censures from India House were

circumvented or ignored with shattering effect.
Until 1761 and decreasingly up to 1765, Sulivan still denied Dupleix’s
doctrine that only revenues derived from possession of territory would
‘maintain armies and draw riches to Europe.’ He said in 1761, ‘if I could not
clearly confute his reasoning...that no trading company can support itself
unless they adopt similar methods...I should wish our trade to India at an
end’.52
His view was a reflection of a mercantilist frame of mind under pressure
from laissez-faire ideas, and endangered by the accretion of territory. He was
certain the Company generated sufficient impetus to satisfy the needs of
India’s internal commerce; that it could create surplus wealth for growth,
reinvestment and dividend, over and above costs. Such beliefs were an echo
of the seventeenth century belief that: ‘Profit not grandeur is our end in
trading.’53 The opposite view, espoused by Clive then and later, was summed
up in a quote by Gerald Aungier: ‘The times now require you to manage your
general commerce with your sword in your hands’, that is, sword first,
commerce afterwards.54 Sulivan struggled in vain to keep the sword as the
handmaiden of commerce.
In the sub-continent he was utterly reliant on the Governor and Council in
each Presidency to promulgate his wishes. The Governors were particularly
important. Yet events took a line of their own despite a constant stream of
directions promulgated by handpicked men, like Vansittart followed by John
Spencer in Bengal; Pigot and Palk in Madras. Sumatra and China were
ancillary to his overall design, but of importance in that they served as
windows upon the Dutch; and gave finger-holds in potentially lucrative
markets.
These Governors and some Councillors, like Hastings, tried to comply
with his policy of a limited interference in country matters and minimum
involvement in Indian politics. Nevertheless, even they began to listen less
and less to what their employers had to say. The reality of life forced a
different approach from that wished for at Leadenhall. Governors continued
to be involved in illegitimate trade and in the receipt of presents. The
temptation of accruing great wealth affected everyone, in every Council.
Sulivan tried to take temptation out of the way of the Governors through
larger emoluments, but to little effect. In complaining that the 24,000 rupees
commission he received from trade was not enough, Spencer illustrates the
extent of the problem. He also echoed the feelings of his predecessor.55 Such
concern for their pockets by employees at the very summit of their careers
portrayed the change in attitude wrought, and the need for adequate official
remuneration. However, the attraction of easily acquired riches would
maintain its allurement well into the future.
As all this became clear to Sulivan, the leading servants were deemed to
lack personal clean-handedness. He went too far in his expectations, given
the morality of the times and the personal needs driving the men involved.
Nevertheless, Vansittart (then Spencer) made some effort to follow his
dictate where possible; activities were confined to commerce and the

administration of the territories granted to the Company in 1757 and then by
the various revolutions. In Madras, Governors Pigot and Palk likewise
deviated little from what Sulivan required him to do; and Crommelin in
Bombay, felt it was in his best interests to do so too.
Unfortunately for them, the Governors were hemmed in too much.
Sulivan was extremely rigorous with instructions and detailed in his answers
to each clause in the Despatches. There was little room left to manoeuvre if
orders were obeyed to the letter. The enormous bulk of material sifted
through, and answered by him, reflects the restrictions placed upon his
acolytes, and the limited role he expected them to fill when faced with his
direct observations. Bombay really had to increase revenue from the farms;
Bengal was advised to base the proposed Presidency at Scindy (Ceylon) on
the Bombay model. Madras was warned that too much ‘private’ cotton was
being sent to China; and so it went on.56
Yet even although each settlement was swamped with orders and advice,
he demanded strict control by strong men over unruly servants harbouring a
predilection for independent action. The Governors were also expected to
counter moves by hostile country powers. It is a pity these men were asked
to do the unpalatable and impossible: be servile to him while being all
powerful in each Presidency. All in charge found it impossible to stick to a
policy of non-intervention. Yet a new, more dynamic role was needed
between the Directors in London and the Governors and Councils.
In Bengal, the appointment of Vansittart had seemed at first to guarantee
Sulivan continued control, and Clive’s backing for his successor had helped.57
Friends were sent out to be of assistance, while enemies like Sumner,
Maguire and Carling Smith were on their way to England. Regrettably the
new men would also succumb to the temptation of easy pickings.
In Vansittart he also made a mistake. He held a high, yet unsubstantiated,
opinion of him: ‘From his character he is high in my esteem and from his
virtues and abilities I expect that lawless settlement of Calcutta will be
reformed to decency and order.’58 In fact, Vansittart proved rather weak; and
Sulivan was not entirely happy about the deposition of Mir Jafar, or his
friend’s moneymaking schemes.
The trouble was Sulivan did not feel comfortable giving more authority to
his Governors, always afraid of signs of irresponsibility and self-government.
He did not trust anyone; and was uncertain of what had developed. In April
and again in September 1762 Vansittart sought more authority. A third
request was sent in the form of a reminder in October. But in December the
Governor still awaited explicit directions. He called in vain, because Sulivan
and his fellows could not give him what they could not envisage, and were
fearful of even making a stab at.
Spencer echoed Vansittart’s plea, while commenting that extraordinary
powers could create a dangerous precedent. Eventually, however, both
became certain that the policies they were trying to implement went against
forces that were too powerful to dam. The Company had to govern or
abstain completely from involvement in Indian affairs. The latter path they
considered impractical; and were stuck, therefore, in the position of judging,
in an arbitrary manner, how far their own jurisdiction stretched.
In the end there was a loss of control. But in Bengal, blame cannot be
laid solely at Vansittart’s feet. He had only one vote, and all decisions were
made by the Governor in Council. Most men under him were quite
irresponsible, and gave no loyalty or cooperation. They were eager to exploit
the freedom of action allowed by the new situation. In Madras, most
Councillors were intent on becoming the Nawab’s creditors.
Sulivan and others in the executive were not helped by having no clear
picture of ongoing events. It was impossible to work out in advance what
might happen. Deposition of Mir Jafar in 1760, and then of Mir Qasim in
1763 brought additional money and territory, but this camouflaged the true
state of affairs. Ostensible gains in Bengal soothed rank and file Proprietors,
creating a false rosy picture, just when the economic reality was being
recognized by Company leaders as desperate.
It was not surprising that a sense of independence and indifference to
India House grew. Company officials were civil administrators, not trained
government officials; and low salaries drew them further into clandestine
activities, and away from the Company and authority. There was little wish to
be regulated from London. This feeling and outlook is reflected in the boom
in private trade; and more ‘country’ ships being engaged in the coastal trade.
Although limited amounts of trading privileges were considered right and
proper, to top up the miserable Company pay, it had all gone too far. Indian
traders now wooed the lower ranks of Writers and Factors as well as Senior
Merchants and Council members. Evasion of customs dues, and misuse of
the Dastak continued; adventurers were illicitly involved in the internal trade
in salt, grain, bullocks, betel-nut and tobacco. Secret partnerships existed with
native merchants; money was loaned to rulers and to the Company.
Sulivan pursued those he considered personal opponents and hostile to his
Governors and the Company. His aim was to demonstrate support, and
show that the Direction was still all powerful. Carnac, Johnstone, Hay,
Batson and Watts, for example, all senior Councillors at Calcutta, were
dismissed. The authority of the Directors was being minimised, however,
because many dismissals were overturned later. John Johnstone secured his
reinstatement by a vote of the Court of Proprietors. In this way, command
continued to slip away; private interest took over from public concern.
Thereafter, the studied indifference paid to instructions and the contempt
shown accredited representatives was all too apparent.
When Sulivan left the Direction in 1765 the objective of re-establishing
control over all the Presidencies, and in particular Bengal, was not achieved.
He had discerned, however, that he must cancel out the lure of easily made
money. He strained to provide ‘noble and exclusive emoluments for the
Company’s senior servants’; particularly for the man at the top, and tried
hard to put the Governor beyond pecuniary interest.59 Vansittart was granted
two and a half per cent commission on all money coming into the
Company’s accounts in Bengal.60
His policy of non-interference, however, ran into trouble. In Spencer’s
view the Direction would have to take over eventually, because in 1764
governing requirements and the Company’s involvement were already nearly
blended. Also, to continue with a mercantile policy limiting Governor and
Council duties to trade, and the preservation of existing territory was well
nigh unworkable. Sulivan’s view, however, was that he supervised a Company
with a limited fiscal capacity, and he had to check expansion. He also
believed that finding a solution to the Bengal troubles would put the whole
organisation back on an even keel. All plans, therefore, were subordinated to
this; but with the inaccurate data supplied by Clive it had no hope of success.
In the end, it was not possible to keep Company servants in check; deal
with latent independence symptoms or head off the cash crises that had led
to the revolutions of 1760 and 1763 – all to the accompaniment of general
and local wars. His directives emphasising avoidance were just too idealistic
in the aftermath of conquest. Unhappily for him, the reluctance to go
forward was unable to withstand ‘the many forces that sought constantly to
draw the Company in deeper and deeper’.61
6
Feuds and
Peace Treaties
1757-1763
I t is absorbing to think that parallel with everything else that had to be cared
for during these years, Sulivan was forced to fight for his political life. The
struggle that developed with Clive for control of the Company was to have a
remarkable impact on the future course of events. It was one of the most
engrossing contests on record; the colour and furore that surrounded the
protagonists has lent the whole a sense of spectacle. It is almost the only
portion of Sulivan’s long life that is generally known; and even that has been
severely distorted. The aim here is to give a more balanced view of what
happened.
It was a bitter clash, and coloured their lives to a degree that neither man
could have anticipated; and would dog their steps until death. India House
was the main, but not the only arena in which the fight for primacy was
played out. Members of Parliament and ministerial figures would be involved
as well. The followers of both maintained a ferocious hostility that can be felt
echoing through the Impeachment of Warren Hastings.
It ensnared and cut-across everything else: business, politics and
patronage; and in its first phase coloured the negotiations ending the Seven
Years War. The extreme denunciations that issued from either camp,
expressed in the press and in pamphlets, underlined the extent to which the
Company was divided. As well as intensifying faction inside India House and
Parliament, the rivalry deepened discord and confusion in India, sucking in
everyone who had an interest in Indian affairs. Sides were chosen, and
numerous changes of alliance continued throughout the struggle.
The Company was such an integral part of the London money market and
of the public credit system that the feud even made its mark upon the
nation's finances. In many ways it helped create the circumstances that led to
the Company being swallowed by the State. A connection can he made from
these events through to the Parliamentary enquiry of 1766-7; and from

thence to North's Regulating Act of 1773.
Their opinions upon how the Company should develop in the future
might be incompatible; but the outcome of their struggle would shape the
way ahead in India until 1773. The ‘Dual System’ used by Clive after
accepting the Diwani in 1765 was in may ways like a compromise between
trade (Sulivan) and conquest (Clive).
As the quarrel advanced, it became increasingly difficult to separate
wilfulness from principle. They were easy bedfellows. Perhaps the curious
fact that both were disposed to quoting Alexander Pope tells something of
their natures; and (continuing the literary parallels) they seem almost 'star-
crossed' in the manner in which their destinies entwined. Each was at the
pinnacle of his career when they clashed, which in both cases was set firmly
within the East India Company. Both were ambitious and self-made, with
dominating personalities. One was sovereign in Bengal; the other monarch
over all the Company’s operations. Each saw himself as superior to any other
in the organisation; and was willing to fight to retain the prestige associated
with being the leading force.
However, even when flushed with conquest, Clive was still a Company
servant, and as such had to report to the Court of Directors, then under
Sulivan’s control. That they would collide seems certain, since Clive could
not bear to be thwarted in his purpose; and viewed opinions opposite to his
own with great suspicion. Sulivan was equally stubborn, though able to listen
to others.
Yet strangely, whereas the name of Clive has lived, indeed, has been dwelt
upon, time has not been so kind to Sulivan. It took the two of them to make
a quarrel, yet he seems to have become invisible. Mervyn-Davies put forward
probably the first positive statement emphasising his significance: ‘He
(Sulivan) was, during the most critical years in its history the uncrowned king
of the East India Company.’1
The general approach among Clive’s many biographers has been to portray
Sulivan as jealous of the great man’s success and aimed to bring about his
downfall. Dodwell’s depiction of him as ‘a man without an idea in advance of
the low level of his time’ is both a false and demeaning estimation. His
personal qualities and the policies he proposed have been completely
ignored, if recognized in the first place.2 Sulivan’s influence was as important
as Clive’s, and in the eyes of most contemporaries with knowledge of
Company, City, and political affairs, much greater.
The struggle really sprang from Sulivan’s domination of the Company. He
was regarded with a mixture of respect and jealousy. The jealousy persisted,
the more so because of his very success. The autocratic tenor he developed
helped stir feelings of resentment. The tone of the General Letters cut deep;
and there were many eager to stir trouble. At first Sulivan felt impervious to
all this. He was fortunate in being able to add to his impressive armoury an
unequalled grasp of Company politics. He knew his way around the labyrinth
of tangled interests and felt no fear.
FEUDS AND PEACE TREATIES 1757-63 89
A new development accompanied his appearance as Company leader, old

and new-found money was used to buy Company stock, not just for its gilt-
edged intrinsic worth, but because of its accompanying votes. Large amounts
were split into £500 blocks for this purpose. Many who bought stock did so
only to oppose Sulivan. They had no interest or understanding of Indian
affairs, of how to reform the administration in India or of furthering the
Company’s business interests. India Stock came to be regarded as a ‘stake’ in
the scramble for wealth. Riches could come via the stock market; through
prime jobs abroad, or contracts at home. It was bought to manipulate
proceedings at India House and to further personal interests. Attention was
paid to financial circles where large sums of money necessary for its purchase
for use at elections could be found.
Following Plassey, the insolence and insubordination employed by a clutch
of Bengal servants, most of them censured or sacked by Sulivan, began
transferring to London. These returned servants joined opponents of his
dating from the 1758 election, and everything with which he was concerned
was criticised: leadership, management of the important Committees, and the
patronage he controlled. They congregated in the General Court of
Proprietors. This was the supreme political body; and until changed in 1784,
could override any decision of the Directors. The very number of special
General Courts now held outside the regular quarterly meetings (which had
to be called by a quorum of nine Proprietors) signified the growing
antagonism and division.
Sulivan and his supporters, known as the ‘Sulivanites’ or ‘Bombay Squad’,
had filled the Court of Proprietors from around 1755. Now, with the influx
of disgruntled, rich senior servants, who came to be known as ‘The Bengal
Squad’, the ‘Indian’ interest was split. Soon, dissension was also heard in the
Court of Directors as well as the Proprietors Court. These new voices acted
as the catalyst for much that was to follow; and set the acrimonious tone.
Jealousy and commitment led to parties becoming entrenched. The Courts
and committees became noisy, ill-tempered political arenas where
disagreements were aired. The annual April election became a showdown,
and only then was it possible to know anyone’s true interest. It was also from
here that the shrewd politicians in the Company, like Sulivan, built their plans
of campaign for the following year.
Collectively these Courts and Committees (such as that of treasury,
shipping and correspondence) were where the major interests now tested
each other. The Committee of Correspondence became a political arena;
while the Committee of Treasury gave ammunition and the means by which
executives could get at the truth, if properly understood. However, only a
small group of Directors knew the reality about anything. Needless to say,
Sulivan was one of them.
The attack on him targeted the Secret Committee, the strongest executive
instrument. Its formal existence as a piece of administrative machinery had
been developed by him because of the call for confidentiality during the war,
and the need to re-establish firm control over the settlements in India. Used
increasingly from 1757 onwards, it became a vehicle for application of the

Company’s full weight and authority. By means of this committee, it was
easier for three or four men at India House to handle all the essentially secret
business in a time of national and Company danger.3
It attended to delicate matters as they arose; many were military, others
were political in nature. Members would wait upon ministry regarding items
such as naval protection; or were engrossed in negotiations, such as in the
peace terms concluding the Seven Years War. The Committee almost always
incorporated the two ‘Chairs.’ Invariably, Sulivan was to be found there.
Unfortunately, a greater personal attack than he could have foretold
accompanied its use. His enemies accused him of exercising exorbitant power
through this channel; alleging that it had become a cabinet council where
everything was prepared for the Directors to sign rather than approve.
The factions fought for power, prestige and the right to dispense
patronage, the only secure road to continued success. Loyalties became
strained, cynicism and distrust reigned supreme. Just as in 1758, he was
blamed for showing partiality in return for the promise of votes at annual
elections. Newspapers, broadsides and pamphlets were full of scurrilous
attacks. He was the one to approach, it was alleged, because he could
corruptly ‘influence how votes would be swung’.4
As the dispute grew, a section of the general public was awakened to
eastern matters. There was a feeling that India should be the nation’s affair,
not that of a private company. Among a few there was acknowledgment of
her separate identity and concern over her despoliation. There was genuine
resentment too, at the sordid and petty pursuit of gain at the Company’s
expense; and annoyance with the mushrooming political interests at India
House. Company servants, home and abroad, were portrayed as despoilers
and parasites. Unfortunately, lust for wealth from the Indies affected even
more of the public, many of them now deliberately associating with the
Company and its affairs. Greed and the prospect of untold riches, created a
bad public image. This was the background to the feud proper.
2
Their separate views appeared immediately after Plassey, grew rapidly after
Clive’s return in 1760, reaching a decisive point on 17 February 1763. Yet, it
all began so well. On 20 February 1758 Sulivan wrote to Clive offering his
congratulations following the success at Plassey. He urged him to stay and
consolidate the government of Bengal and put the ‘noble colony beyond the
reach of danger’. It was a warm letter, full of praise.5 A few weeks later he
became Chairman. Clive expressed his personal satisfaction at Sulivan filling
the Chair in his reply on 30 December 1758. He also directed his family and
agents to support him at future elections; even to the extent of employing his
funds.6 He expected great things from Sulivan.7
This letter of 30 December from Clive was very rare; nothing like it was
ever repeated to Sulivan. He seemed to think the Chairman’s view of things
would be exactly the same as his own; and the display of his nature and
stance throughout the manuscript was most revealing. It indicated how he
envisaged the future in India; and the extent to which the despised the
indigenous population.
In fact, if Clive had deliberately sought a breach with Sulivan he could not
have written a letter better calculated to cause one. Racialist overtones were
predominant, advocacy of even more military plundering, with an army of
occupation and government by the sword. The fear and distrust that had
accompanied the Company’s first voyagers to India lay behind this attitude. It
was to be answered by creation of the same fear and distrust in native
minds.8
Sulivan replied to this communication in a cool, rather detached way.9 Yet,
his humanitarian, as well as commercial, instincts must have been shocked at
the language of conquest and expansion. He was never reconciled then, or
ever to a policy based on blatant force and favoured persuasion and
bureaucratic control; might was to be kept ready in the background. He
comprehended a growing desire for some sort of justice for the peoples of
India – to be called forth later by Edmund Burke at the Bar of the House of
Commons. This was never equalled by Clive.
Clive mirrored another feeling spreading among Britons, the need to
expand, to seize territory and riches; that if they did not do so they were weak
or fools, or both; that another state would certainly do so. Like Dupleix,
Clive wanted to exploit at once what he had gained by conquest. He
maintained that ‘Force only can preserve and prevent acquisitions in the face
of the Mussulman’s lack of gratitude, narrow conception and method based
on everything by treachery rather than force.’ He foresaw further conquest
when the ‘luxurious, ignorant and cowardly’ nature of the ‘Moors and
Gentoos’ was considered.10
It was his opinion that only a strong and commanding military power
could give continued stability: ‘Peace…must be made sword in hand in this
country if we mean to preserve our possessions.’11 In many ways he was
merely furthering principles laid down earlier by Sir Thomas Roe, that
peaceful co-existence was impossible. The development from factory to fort,
he argued, was a defensive necessity, backed-up by the power of maritime
traders to enforce their demands at sea. Relationships with locals built on fear
could only continue on the basis of fear.
Clive also perceived the importance of placing control in India, especially
military authority, in the hands of one man. He did not yet know that this
was, and remained, one of Sulivan’s objectives; albeit that the man chosen
would still come under the control of the Direction, and of himself.
By 1760 Clive knew that he and Sulivan held divergent views. He thought
Sulivan’s policy of non-involvement and concentration on commerce
impracticable, but nevertheless promised to comply.12 At this stage, he only
paid lip-service to what came from London. Later it was common knowledge
how much their policies differed.13
Clive’s letter of 30 December helped determine Sulivan’s future attitude

and approach to the hero of Plassey. Clearly, the great man did not really
know his titular employer; but more revealing was his lack of prudence in
expressing views without knowing how they would be accepted. It did not
seem to occur to him that Sulivan might not want territorial acquisitions. He
must have thought it inconceivable that the Chairman could refuse such a
rich prize. Sulivan, on the other hand, revealed that he was cautious; that he
wanted no involvement and envisaged a mutual regard between Briton and
Indian at the point of commercial contact. He would agree to change only
after extensive tests; and usually only after unavoidable dictates demanded
these be made.
3
For some time after Clive’s return to England in 1760 Sulivan did not
conceive of him as a serious rival for that power over affairs that he relished
so much. While Clive remained in India he had regarded him as inferior to
himself, but first in command on the spot. Clive had still to answer to him,
and only in times of dire emergency, such as war, was he to be answerable to
nobody. Clive could never really accept such a role; but it was only in the
run-up to the hero’s return that Sulivan realised master–servant restraints no
longer applied.
Clive’s eulogisers viewed Sulivan as being fearful and envious of their hero.
This was not the case. Even a minimum understanding of his power and
prestige reveals that the Company’s chief executive had no need to feel
jealous of a soldier who had just won a battle; indeed he was very happy
about it. To Sulivan it would have been inconceivable that his position was at
risk with Clive’s return. He was too deeply involved in London politics to be
susceptible to any danger. He had more pressing problems.
Unfortunately, Clive’s letter of 30 December 1758 was written a bare two
months after the Company’s General Letter to Bengal, dated 1 November
1758, which expressed critical views that were very definitely Sulivan’s. The
letters crossed each other. The severity of the criticism, which appeared to
include Clive, and cutting tone of the despatch was dictated by concern over
mounting costs.
The crossing of these letters meant Clive became aware of Sulivan’s
sentiments just after he had bared his soul. Sulivan’s confidence too was
shaken by what he regarded as betrayal by the servants he had trusted. The
scenario in Bengal was quite unlike the one envisaged from the figures Clive
had given him. To make matters worse, even before the arrival of Clive’s
letter, full of camaraderie, Sulivan had despatched yet another General Letter,
on 23 March 1759, which was also acid and bitter. Thus, Clive received two
severe jolts, when he had sent only friendship. It was a crossing of letters so
contrasting that neither would have written in the manner he did if each had
received the other’s letter first.
The second letter condemned everyone in Council, including Clive,

although Sulivan later tried to maintain this had not been intended. He faced
the spectre of a credit crisis towards which there was indifference in India;
Clive alone had drawn bills upon the Company amounting to approximately
£40,000. Moreover, Sulivan was involved, having participated on the
understanding that Bengal had wealth enough. In a sense, he had been made
a party to things. The dam burst and he poured out his frustration and
indignation. Accusations of extravagance and disregard for the Company
piled one upon the other, as the ending indicates:
In short…you seem to have acted like men divested of your

understanding...If contrary…to our expectations, your conduct
should not be entirely reformed we must then be under
indispensable necessity of doing ourselves justice.14
In a letter to Chatham on 7 January 1759 (eight days after the one to Sulivan)
Clive developed the views that were so wounding to the Company. He urged
the annexation of all that had been gained in India, and advocated that the
nation should declare its sovereignty over the new territories. British rule in
Bengal should be extended as opportunities offered: ‘So large a sovereignty
may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company; and it is to
be feared they are not themselves able, without their nation’s assistance, to
maintain so wide a dominion.’15 He would also have remembered that the
offer of the Diwani from Shah Alam had been rejected by the Sulivan-
dominated Direction.
He was aware that this letter would eventually reach his employers, yet
seemed able to bypass the Company’s need to exist as a commercial
organisation. He appeared to expect no obstacles to the Company handing
everything over to the state; and did not seem to realize that they could not
be so disinterested as to surrender a possible income of some £2 million per
annum; and all because of their alleged inability to run things properly – even
if that might be true.
It must have been even more galling that the proposal came from a
covenanted servant. Clive was certainly not empowered to suggest or make a
present of anything that belonged to the Company. To Sulivan it must have
appeared that he was contemptuous of their executive prowess; and ready to
betray every effort to guard chartered rights from encroachment by the
crown.16 Cost and inadequate knowledge, among other factors, made
Chatham turned down Clive’s suggestion.
Sulivan, meanwhile, was resisting ministerial pressure to pay back a large
part of Company borrowings. He also harboured suspicions of self-seeking
servants, Clive included. He was dismayed at military expenses. Clive’s
predicament was different, he had been publicly ‘spanked’ by the two
General Letters, and seen to be chastised. He had lost face.17
These two men, who followed vastly different approaches to the future
development of the Company in India, had found each other out. To Clive’s
mind, a conqueror could never relinquish his gains. Also, his touchstone was
the England he knew. Sulivan opposed Clive’s way forward; was alarmed at
the way he had gone about things; and was shocked that he was oblivious of
the hurt and resentment engendered. The Chairman begrudged such blind
disregard and was concerned at Clive’s lack of tact. He had to ask himself
what the man was doing in other spheres if this was his approach.
The struggle was much deeper, therefore, than just expressing ideas of
territorial acquisition versus commercial enterprise. Clive was suspected of
not merely holding a contrary view, but was actually scheming against the
Company – his employer; and advocating surrender of its possessions. He
was also displaying an independence of mind that signified trouble in the
future.
While to Clive there was a world to be won, practical reasons dictated to
Sulivan that additional territories had to be rejected. So long as the Company
did not become a major territorial power it was safe for a while behind the
shield of its charter. In the 1758-1765 period the State, as Chatham
confirmed, did not want to shoulder the costs. The Company, as Sulivan
never tired of maintaining, could not afford to voyage upon a course that in
his opinion was the wrong one.
Both men were greatly annoyed at the letters they received – Sulivan’s
worst fears being confirmed when he got wind of Clive’s letter to Chatham.
The Directors’ savage despatch of 23 March 1759 and its precursor
thoroughly traumatized Clive and his colleagues. The great man was knocked
out of his stride and the communication drew an immediate response,
contained in the ‘infamous’ General Letter to the Court of Directors of 29
December 1759. The signatories proceeded to write in a fashion that aped in
tone the despatches that had so incensed them: ‘Permit us to say, that the
diction of your letter is most unworthy of yourselves and us, in whatever
relation considered, either as masters to servants, or gentlemen to
gentlemen.’18
It was a grossly insulting letter for the Board in Calcutta to send to the
Directors of the Company that employed them. Sulivan was incensed. Similar
phrases to servants had been used on numerous occasions. Never had such
language been received in return. It signified a challenge that could not go
unanswered. At the head of that challenge stood Clive.
Clive’s eulogisers maintain that the General Letter was specifically aimed
at Sulivan who they all knew to be in charge at India House. Perhaps the
Council members were justified in feeling offended at the severity of the
allegations, but it was a different thing to reply in like kind. Besides, by mid-
1759 Clive was aware of the Company’s difficulties, being kept informed by
Walsh. It is possible that he made a mistake in what he did, and only the
smart from Sulivan’s bitter recriminations made him do it. He was perhaps
too hasty in putting his name to something at least partly concocted by
Holwell, a man he knew disliked Sulivan, and who understood exactly how
to get under the Chairman’s skin.
It is still not certain who wrote this reply; yet Clive had made a fortune
and a reputation and he was quitting India anyway. To all intents and
purposes, he had ‘wearied of his employers and of Bengal’, and was
‘determined to throw up the service’. This, and alleged ill-treatment by the
Directors, was the substance of his address to the European inhabitants of
Calcutta before his departure.19
This ‘infamous’ letter was the last despatch to the Company before he left
for England in 1760. It reached London the day before the regular quarterly
meeting of the Court of Proprietors, at which, as fate would have it, he,
together with Vice-Admiral Pocock and Colonel Stringer Lawrence, were to
receive the thanks of the Company for their services. Consequently, it was
January 1761 before all who signed the despatch were dismissed; with the
exception of Clive.
Sulivan was then criticised for the removal of these men. It was certainly
his work, even though he was out of the Direction by rotation. He had made
a major blunder, however, in turning a blind eye to Clive’s participation. The
flimsy excuse that not one of the charges was intended for him, and were in
response to negligence prior to his being connected with Bengal affairs,
simply does not stand up. The truth was that Sulivan felt he was too
powerful to treat in the same manner as his fellow signatories; and wished to
avoid the storm such a criticism would evoke with the hero of the hour
present and being lauded in London. It was probably his biggest mistake.
The hurt felt from these letters and despatches marked a decisive shift in
attitudes. Clive’s sentiments are expressed in a letter written later to
Vansittart: ‘Sulivan…could never forgive the Bengal letter.’20 But it was
probably Clive’s lack of care for the Company that provoked Sulivan the
most. The other (dismissed) signatories eventually transferred themselves to
England. Others Sulivan had either sent home or exposed returned with real
or pretended reason to dislike him, such as John Johnstone. More were to
be added.
The ‘Bengal Squad’ they joined was now dedicated solely to bringing the
Irishman down. The group attacked his integrity as well as his leadership.
Most had been followers of Clive in Bengal; they continued this allegiance.
The Court of Proprietors reverberated with incessant, virulent harassment.
That Sulivan was both roused and wounded is reflected in a comment to Sir
Eyre Coote: ‘The ungrateful wretches, late of Bengal have hurt my temper.’21
Even before Clive’s return to Britain, the attack by the ‘Bengal Squad’ had
led to a sharp change in fortune for Sulivan; and to a strained atmosphere at
Leadenhall. Clive’s homecoming would not have been very comfortable
either, because it marked a complete reversal in stature. From virtually
master of all he surveyed, he became an ordinary mortal. Perhaps this return
to earth shook him, and might even have ensured that eventually a contest
for supremacy would come about, for emotionally he required a substitute
prestige for the one enjoyed in India. Sulivan, entrenched like a spider in his
lair at India House, would have appeared a challenge.
Yet, despite the coaxing of erstwhile Bengal friends, he did not join in
their opposition, although identifying with them. He had good reasons to be
restrained: he had been absolved of all blame for the chaos in Bengal; and
his signing of the ‘infamous’ letter of 29 December 1759 had been skipped
over. He was also concerned about the safety of his jagir, the basis for much
of his future wealth; and he was not certain of the political strength at
Sulivan’s disposal.
Nevertheless, in the coming years Clive was to preside at the infamous
Bengal Club, a centre for returned ‘Nabobs’. There, he gave the appearance
that he would join them against Sulivan at a time he chose. He was also
decidedly unhappy at receiving only an Irish peerage; and this added to his
general disgruntlement. He held himself in check, however, secure in the
knowledge that the ‘Bengal Squad’ was at his beck and call, and would
respond whenever he saw fit to make a move.
4
Sulivan had already faced several serious crises at Leadenhall, and was in the
midst of an increasing tangle of problems associated with events in Bengal
and in India at large. He was an extremely busy, preoccupied man, who quite
naturally would not relish adding to his trials; and for two years at least, had
no fear of Clive. The fact that the great man had been excluded from all
criticisms and had ‘every honour and compliment paid to his great abilities
and extraordinary services’, vouches for his being cared for. Even his baggage
was delivered free of charge, and he was given a present of plate worth
£2,500.22
He now knew that Clive’s views were unlike his own, but would have seen
no need to box him out of things. The returned hero was hardly inclined to
indulge himself in Company business, altogether too boring. He was more
inclined, Sulivan thought, towards a Parliamentary career. He was annoyed,
however, by the activities of the ‘Bengal Squad’. Their accusations lies and
half-truths built up. From the Chair, he expressed his awareness of the
personal attack being mounted against him by ‘many persons without doors’;
and in open Court he spelled out the extent of the temptations offered to
him, such as £28,000 ‘for Governments alone’.23
He upheld his honour, principles and honesty emphasising that he had
never taken a bribe or allowed others to take one for him; and had never
received a present ‘to the value of £20’. He would take no inducement from
anyone. The Directors accorded him a vote of thanks ‘for great services
rendered’.24 By late 1761, however, things had deteriorated; control over the
Court of Proprietors was slipping. This was serious because the authority of
the Directors’ Court was vital for the proper conduct of affairs.
In November 1761 he protested to Clive at ‘the falsity of those assertions
that have been thrown out against me’. He was referring to the accusations of
the ‘Bengal Squad’, whose influence on his rival had been steadily growing.25
At this stage, Sulivan still placed a great deal of confidence in Clive’s candour.
It was misplaced. Clive used a letter of Vansittart’s, placed in his hands by

Sulivan, to try and break the Sulivan-Vansittart bond. A bare four months
later, in February 1762, he informed the Governor of Bengal how hostile he
now was to Sulivan, although this was still veiled from his adversary. He also
showed Vansittart another letter of Sulivan’s to Eyre Coote, no friend to
either Clive or Vansittart, which was portrayed as full of ‘treachery’ against
them both.
Clive’s own ‘treachery’ was symptomatic of views hardening on either side.
Between November 1761 and February 1762 severe irritation entered into
things. Sulivan became apprehensive of a united front composed of the
‘Bengal Squad’, Clive and the envious Director, Thomas Rous. It now
became apparent he could also be faced with the opposition of the Governor
of Bengal. The quarrel with Vansittart was patched up. The challenge to his
power grew stronger in 1762; and with this, the Court of Directors and
General Court experienced essential changes in function. They became
venues where control of the Company, via the annual election of Directors,
took precedence over all else.
Meanwhile, Clive’s frustration grew. He informed his friend Pybus:
‘Sulivan…follows the same plan of keeping everyone out of the Direction
who is endowed with more knowledge or would be likely to have more
weight and influence than himself.’26 The ‘Bengal Squad’, quite willing to
harass their great enemy in any way, backed this view.
Yet in February 1762 there still seemed no intent on either side to give
harm.27 Nonetheless, setting them at odds continued to be the goal of the
returned Bengal servants. In July 1762 Sulivan was hitting back. By making
enquiries into the so-called losses claimed by the European sufferers in
Calcutta in l756, he threatened many.28
In the spring of 1762 Clive, in attempting a Parliamentary career, linked
with Grenville. The courtier held no brief for Sulivan because he had tied
himself and the Company with the Bute Administration. Clive now openly
espoused the opinion that since affairs in India had assumed proportions
greater than those of a mere trading enterprise, the whole had become a
matter for gentlemen; that Parliament understood better than merchants the
arts of war, politics and diplomacy. He had associated himself with the
natural enemy of the commercial interests of London, offering its traditional
adversaries the very gains won in India. Sulivan believed his mistrust justified.
As Clive’s Parliamentary hopes faded, Sulivan suspected that he would
settle on his second choice, the Company; and focus on penetrating the
executive, using his great wealth to fill it with his own nominees. He feared
that implementation of his ideas regarding India would follow, and the
Company would be swallowed up by the State.
There was too much for them to differ over; and Sulivan was as stubborn
as Clive, wily and with a mind of his own. He would not give way to anyone’s
wishes with regard to policy, patronage or anything else. They began to fight
over the distribution of favours. Frustration turned to anger; and eventually,
serious quarrels over patronage broke out; and especially over military
promotions, where each thought that he should have the last word.
Clive was annoyed that Sulivan had not followed his recommendation and
promoted Colonel Forde to the Bengal command. Sulivan had not denied
Forde’s merit, but he did not like his ‘over-lucrative views’.29 He was also
determining a point: denying anyone the right to absorb patronage that rested
in the hands of the Directors alone. In September 1761 a friend, ‘Sir
Rowland’s son’, could not be placed, because Clive’s own relation, Judge
Clive, had Sulivan’s last nomination.30 Sulivan answered: ‘Whenever it was in
my power last year to offer you a good voyage for any friend you might
name, I did it with pleasure. But could I be influenced by any other motive
than my regard for Col. Clive? And if so, why do you ask me if the same
reason subsists?’31 Clive ignored this pointed remark, and went on to press
the claims of his favourites: Carnac, Knox, Forde and Caillaud.
They continued to disagree over military policy and personnel. Squabbles
developed over the merits of Carnac and Knox; and they remained at
loggerheads over Forde and Coote.32 Sulivan’s appointment of Coote at the
expense of Forde was a main irritant. Clive hated him for many reasons.
Nevertheless, the Irish General’s honesty had been marked by Chatham as
well as Sulivan; and in Coote’s version of Plassey, Clive was not such an
heroic figure. It might also be significant that Coote patronised Sulivan’s
nephew-in-law, Colonel John Wood. Clive was alarmed at a Coote-Sulivan
alignment. When he heard of his grand reception from the Directors he
seemed to think that a man who had been a thorn in his side had stolen some
of his glory.
Sulivan’s public cancellation of Forde’s appointment was done on
purpose, as a reprimand for Clive. He also publicised that in his opinion the
hero of Plassey came second to General Lawrence, ‘the greatest military
officer that ever was in Asia.’33 He also praised Coote to an embarrassing
degree, his intention not so much to discredit Clive, as make the point that he
was not unique. Others had done as much for the Company, though not with
such flair for self-publicity.
For some time he had entertained the suspicion that Clive wanted to exert
indirect control in India through Vansittart, Forde and Caillaud. Before
leaving for home in 1760, Clive had laid down what he proposed to do in
London: fix Vansittart in government, and place Forde and Caillaud at the
head of the armed forces, with Major-General Commissions for Governors
of the Bengal and Madras Presidencies. Upon arrival in England he urged
Sulivan and his fellow Directors to implement these proposals. Sulivan was
opposed; he believed Clive was trying to put into practice what was paraded
in the letter to Chatham of 7 January 1759.
Sulivan’s promotion of Coote to be temporarily in charge in Bengal was
probably done to foil Clive. With Coote’s temperament it was impossible for
him to exert military control in India through him. Clive was certainly
incensed enough at Forde being passed over to justify such an interpretation.
In a letter of commiseration he promised to rectify things. He failed.34 One
of Clive’s eulogisers, Gleig, thought that he had gone too far in his
disparagement of Coote, but this is to miss how crucial the appointment was
to his strategy.
Yet this did not mean Clive would quit Company affairs; he now set about
removing the obstacles to successful accomplishment of his plans. Sulivan
had to be crushed. He now decided an effort to discredit him had been made
with promotion of a favourite, Forde, being brushed aside, something he felt
involved his honour. This only came to the fore after his overall plan had
been foiled. Throughout 1762 he was prepared to argue every point. Military
patronage flared again, and only Sulivan’s withdrawal from the Direction
saved a possible confrontation. He probably sensed that an altercation had to
be avoided at that point.
5
Adding to their growing dissatisfaction were disagreements over aspects of
both the Preliminary and Definitive Peace Treaties with France of 1762-63.
In both agreements, Sulivan was deeply involved, formulating those clauses
dealing with the Indian theatre of war. He also played a principal part in the
discussions with the French, stretching from 1761 to the Peace of Paris of
1763.
He was immensely proud of the outcome because the wording of that part
of the final Definitive Treaty dealing with India was wholly drafted by him
and accepted by Government. The views portrayed in the document
reflected his thinking developed as early as 1760. The closing settlement
determined for the foreseeable future the course the Company would take
regarding the Carnatic. That he saw the clause he drew up enacted in the
shape in which he had framed it was (in his own eyes) one of the major
achievements of his life:
My power tho’ on the wane existed in 1762, and the Company’s

terms in the Treaty of Paris settled entirely in my own words, not
with the inclination of the then Directors, but from their inability
they were drove to ask and adopt my ideas…The plan for peace
which was adopted is every line my own.35
He was quite correct regarding the significant role he played in those events.
Despite mounting hostility within the Company and the complications of
ministerial involvement, he stuck to his views religiously.
Of just as much consequence, however, as regards his public life, was what
transpired in other spheres because of involvement in these treaties. As well
as figuring in his deteriorating relationship with Clive, they reckon in his
Parliamentary dealings; and had much to do with what happened in
Company politics in the lead up to the 1763 Company election.
Although initial talks with the French broke down in 1761, Sulivan’s
connection with members of the Parliamentary front bench was to continue.
A letter in his handwriting, which from internal evidence is dated 1760, and
addressed to Chatham and Egremont, shows that even at that early date he
had been studying what was required to bring about an acceptable peace.36
Another Sulivan letter to Chatham, of 27 January 1761, formed his ‘Private
sentiments of a plan that may best secure...solid and permanent
advantages...to...our Company.’37 In this early communication, he pleaded
with the first minister not to injure the Nawab of Arcot; a plea emphasised
throughout the subsequent transactions and honoured in the final treaty.38
After the fall of Chatham, he conveyed the same thoughts to the new
government. Charles Jenkinson wrote to him in January 1762 that Bute had
perused his memorial on the proposed peace terms and that it had given him
great pleasure. Jenkinson added, ‘It is certainly well drawn and will be of
much service to the Company. Alterations, if any, will be very few.’ He
desired him, therefore, to ‘expedite the French translation’.39 Before going
out of the Direction in April 1762 it is the case, therefore, that Sulivan was
involved in propagating the same plans that he had kept in mind for at least
two years. The evidence shows the reliance placed upon him by ministries,
despite internal wrangling at India House.
In the end, the peace settlement secured the original aims of the war and
satisfied most people in its final form. However, during the course of events,
the India clauses of the preliminary settlement, signed on 3 November 1762,
and then those of the Definitive Treaty of 10 February 1763, aroused
criticism within and without the Company. A general hatred of Bute lay
behind much of this, fuelled by a never-ending prejudice against Scots. The
dislike was abetted by his position as a royal favourite. Nevertheless, real
controversy existed over the provisions for the settlement in the East Indies.
The Bute government assumed the attitude that it was conferring a favour
on the Company by involving it in the talks. However, through his friend and
fellow Irishman, Robert Wood, under-Secretary to Lord Egremont, then
Secretary of State, Sulivan maintained communications with the ministry. In
June 1762 he, together with the Chairman, Thomas Rous and his Deputy,
John Dorrien (Sulivan’s friend), were involved in consultations using this
channel.
Following renewal of negotiations with the French, Company claims were
based on Sulivan’s letter to Chatham of 27 July 1761; its contents were used
as a basis for ‘systematic consideration’.40 This was then followed by an
outline of the Secret Committee’s plan, delivered to Robert Wood for
consideration in September 1762. He passed this on to Egremont.41 The
Government remained unhappy with the proposals, and only a modified
version of the claims was to be pursued by the Duke of Bedford in Paris. The
negotiators left out French recognition of Muhammad Ali Khan as Nawab of
the Carnatic, and English agreement to Salabat Jang as Subahdar of the
Deccan.
This caused disquiet within the Company and in the Secret Committee.
Government’s proposed conditions regarding the Preliminary Treaty were to
be placed before Parliament in November 1762. This sparked a furious
reaction in Leadenhall. Sulivan, who was still out of the Direction, favoured
agreement with the ministry, wishing to retain confidence in himself. He had
an eye on a better long-term solution; and (privately) seems to have been
promised inclusion of clauses regarding the Nawab in the final settlement.
The Government then used force. The first step in the peace settlement
was to be concluded before the end of the Parliamentary session. Egremont
wanted agreement or India House would be left out of all negotiations. He
hinted at future compromise by Government should the Company concur;
and gave it two days to produce suitable proposals. After some moderate
changes, the Directors accepted this dictat. The Government left the
impression that other points would be sorted out in the final treaty.
Thus the Preliminary Treaty of 3 November 1762 included clauses
relating to a French presence in Bengal for commerce only; and the
restoration of French possessions held before the start of hostilities in 1749,
as against 1745. In exchange, the Company would receive the return of the
comptoirs* in French possession before that date. Dissatisfaction in the
Company over the preliminaries continued, however, and it was also
denounced by Chatham in the Commons. Nevertheless, Sulivan continued to
back the ministry. This was vouchsafed in a letter to Shelburne on 12
October 1762. He proceeded to give the minister advice on how to win
acceptance for the Preliminary Treaty in the Commons.42 Shelburne
recognised his ‘zeal for the Public interest’. As it turned out, the ministry won
a vote of confidence convincingly.43
Talks upon the Definitive Treaty followed, and the ministry’s hint of some
better terms took on some substance. There were only slight variations in the
two treaties in general terms, but there was, ‘Greater precision’. It was
conceded within the Company that overall the terms were more
advantageous than the preliminaries.44 Instead of the French handing over
those factories held ‘at the start of hostilities in 1749’, they had to restore
what they held ‘at the beginning of the year 1749’.45 Most important,
however, as far as Sulivan was concerned (and to most in Parliament and in
the Company too) the final treaty reintroduced the clause concerning Salabat
Jang, and Muhammad Ali Khan.
In 1762, although out of the Direction, Sulivan’s power in India House
had been little affected. His follower, John Dorrien, was Deputy Chairman
and a member of the Secret Committee used in planning the Company’s
approach to the peace settlement. Sulivan remained friendly with
Government through Shelburne; and earlier he had given Bute a copy of his
sentiments regarding peace terms with France, with regard to the Indies.
The degree of ignorance inside the Company, as well as the dependence of
the new ministry upon the few knowledgeable men, such as himself, decreed
that little difference was made whether he was in or out of office. He had
continued to play a part midway between the Directors and the Government,
acting as a mediator and conciliator, bringing them together to accept what in
many ways were his own plans.
Within the Company, however, things were not going well. In many ways
Sulivan’s view of himself as chief executive, whether in or out of the formal
Court of Directors, was to blame. It was particularly irritating to the growing
ranks of discontented returned servants; and especially so when flaunted
before Clive.
The Company’s Secret Committee made a point of consulting both great
men throughout all proceedings relating to the Definitive treaty. Their
combined wisdom and experience contrasted starkly with the ignorance of
others.46 Unlike his rival, however, Clive had played no part in the initial
talks; and was now aware that Sulivan, whose views were being pushed in the
Secret Committee through his friend Dorrien, was upstaging him. What is
more, he appeared to be forging ever stronger bonds with the Bute ministry.
Sulivan was assuming the type of position that Clive had probably seen
himself occupying.
Fox and Bute were trying to link up the City in defence of their peace
policy, which made it sensible come closer to Sulivan so that the Company
and the prevailing ministry could remain closely bonded. Nor were Clive’s
ties with the previous Chatham-Newcastle administration easily forgotten.
The closeness of Sulivan with Dorrien, and with the Bute ministry was
common knowledge. Newcastle was satisfied they were both ‘Creatures of
Lord Bute.’47
Clive disliked the final article, but not principally because Sulivan’s
memorial upon India affairs found more favour with Bute than his own.
Clive saw the threat to English possessions as being very real; that territory,
not just commerce was the magnet that would attract unwelcome attention
from other powers. In his Memorial as to the East Indies, he again followed
Dupleix’s argument that commerce in India was already too regulated and
not nearly enough to make a continued European presence in India feasible.
A policy of military conquest was needed, from which territorial revenues
would stem.
Of course, in the end, apart from the clauses concerning the Princes,
Clive’s reasoning led to the very same thing Sulivan wished for, the entire
exclusion of the French from Bengal; only it had very different motivation.
Sulivan’s view (the antithesis of Clive’s) was that the French had failed
because they had not remained a mercantile body. Only with regard to the
Carnatic alone, did he modify his ‘seventeenth century ideas’.48 He still did
not want conquest, but embraced limited territorial revenues.
The one absolutely discordant note that existed over the peace to be
agreed upon with France was the inclusion of the native Princes in the treaty.
The fact that it was a clause from Sulivan did not at first enter into
consideration. Apart from everything else, Clive also felt the French should
be given no role for fear of giving them a future pretext to interfere in
Mughal politics. Sulivan managed to have the clause reintroduced into the
Definitive Treaty; but he had to fight hard for it. He referred to these events
later in life:
In the article that included the Nabob of Arcot I was opposed by

Lord Clive as an unnecessary clog which the French would resist
and in his opinion useless for another reason, to wit, ‘that gratitude
would never be found in an Asiatic’.49
He mentioned this issue again in the ‘Letterbook’: ‘The late Lord Clive, who
was consulted, opposed the 11th article as of no importance and the Duke de
Choissieul the then French Minister, contended strongly to expunge it.’ He
continued: ‘The honour of the Company was pledged to secure this faithful
ally; that the eyes of Asia were upon us.’ The strength of his resolve over this
clause is further indicated when he said: ‘I kept firm and my friends in
Government succeeded.’50 In yet another letter he commented: ‘The Minister
gave it in my favour.’51 Sulivan hinted in this correspondence that events, as
they transpired, vindicated his earnestness over the matter.52 The Clive party
in Leadenhall after 1765 was unable to efface the terms of the treaty or those
clauses dealing with the position of the Nawab of Arcot.
In 1763 Clive voted with the minority in the Company against the peace
treaty; this was done mainly on party grounds. In a pamphlet to the
Proprietors he was sure that they would all benefit; but was fearful that
guaranteeing the Indian Princes might be the cause of later disputes between
the Companies. Nevertheless, the Definitive Treaty was accepted, probably
because the views held by all sides could be read into the document.53
Clive’s admirers generally take the line that although Bute followed the
suggestions made by Sulivan and the Secret Committee, he had displayed
much the same ideas. Yet this is not really the case. At the time (and not as
written up after the event) his views regarding the native princes were
immovable.54 The withdrawal of the clause regarding the Indian princes in
the preliminaries is also depicted as a triumph for him. This is a false picture,
conjured up by the heavily charged atmosphere that came to exist in the
Company. In fact he had chosen not to speak up on the issue before the first
stage began.55
Sulivan’s pursuit of harmony with government at every stage of
negotiations had dismayed Chairman Thomas Rous and his friends. They
were against compromise and resented his interference. The scene was set for
major trouble within India House. The course of the final treaty stirred these
factional disputes; and by his opposition to re-inserting the Nawab of the
Carnatic and Salabat Jang clauses, Clive was viewed as again crossing swords
with Sulivan.56
Rous charged Sulivan with being to blame (through his purported
ignorance) for initial errors made in the proposed terms of the earlier
Preliminary Treaty. He was also held responsible, together with Wood, of
deliberate deception in getting Egremont to agree to them in the first place.
The whole issue was too good an opportunity for the ‘Bengal Squad’ to miss,
and they helped stir up Rous and his associates. Yet Sulivan also exacerbated
the situation by totally ignoring all their views, such was his contempt.
Ostensibly, the argument was over the qualifying date for the comptoirs to
be agreed upon with the French. It was only during the run-up to the signing
of the Definitive Treaty that it was realised Dupleix had gained more territory
before the war began. Rous was blamed for this slip, although the phrase was
subsequently corrected, with Government help, to read in the final treaty, ‘at
the beginning of the year 1749’. Both Sulivan and Clive claimed the credit for
spotting and correcting the comptoirs error, but there is no doubt that Sulivan
deserves the recognition. His letter to Pitt of 27 July 1761 also shows that he
had wanted the date of the comptoirs reckoned even earlier.
Among the many dramatic scenes to be played out, the one in the General
Court before the election, that of 22 December 1762 proved most difficult
for Sulivan. His enemies put forward a hostile motion that he should explain
his reasons for keeping so close to the Bute ministry throughout the
negotiations. According to an open letter to the papers, this enquiry was only
suspended, ‘because of the importance of affairs’.56 Sulivan was certainly
angry and fired up by then, he was not the kind of man to endure censures by
the likes of Rous; or accept Clive’s moves to have his views quashed.
In many ways the whole issue of inserting or keeping out clauses on the
Indian Princes constituted a trial of strength. The measure of Sulivan’s fight
back is seen in their eventual inclusion the Definitive Treaty. In so doing he
got the better of Clive. It was also a struggle between the ministry and Clive.
While Sulivan’s advice had been asked for from the beginning, Clive had
been ignored, and he had to force his attentions upon ministers. Then,
despite making a point of having the clauses removed, Bute had them
incorporated in the final treaty. What was worse, Sulivan’s own words were
used. It was difficult for Clive to forgive the ministry. He probably did not
recognize that Sulivan had, at the very least, an equal right to have his words
and views enshrined in the document closing that chapter of history.58
The omission in most histories, of Sulivan’s prominent role in the peace
negotiations of 1761 to 1763 is regrettable. He was clearly the major
inspiration as well as drafter of the Indian clauses in the treaty. Even Clive,
who certainly knew enough about events in India, could not comprehend the
whole picture like Sulivan. In addition, the Irishman was really the only man
able to supply the crucial liaison required between the ministry and the
Company. Bute, and seemingly Chatham before him, realised this and were
themselves dependent on his knowledge. He alone in the Company seemed
to appreciate that Government had to be given as much help as possible in
negotiations that dealt with the Indian theatre. Finally, it was surely right that
the man who had done more than any other to wage successful war against
the French in India should be called upon to provide the concluding words.
6
Sulivan and Clive had moved from friendship, to coolness, to collision over
fundamentals and were heading for estrangement; but Sulivan was not yet
prepared for confrontation. Ever the politician, he was aware that he was not
adequately prepared. He would not duck a fight, but merely chose his own
time and weapons.
His absence from the Direction in 1762 was at his request; he pleaded
illness and neglect of his own affairs. To Chatham he complained of poor
health; and had been absent from India House a good deal. The volume of
work and weight of responsibility were taking their toll. Yet, the move was
also a rather diplomatic one, in view of the disputes with Clive and the
disturbed state of the Direction. The reality, however, was that he remained
firmly entrenched, virtually invincible. His close friends formed a constant
majority in the executive.
What caused Clive most disquiet was the question mark that hung over the
jagir* he had enjoyed since 1759, because the Company had still to be
convinced of its legality. According to Clive, the Secret Committee was
willing to meet him halfway in some amicable agreement. He was then too
sick for discussions. It was an opportune time to be unwell. Clive knew he
was expected to surrender the jagir after a few years, so he continued to be
too ill for any meeting. Nothing was accomplished; and the issue remained
unresolved.
In February 1762 his stance changed; friends in India were urged to get the
gift confirmed. Amyatt was to have it corroborated by the Mogul Emperor.
Vansittart was pestered and asked to go to impossible lengths; serious
enough to endanger his friendship with Sulivan. In November he was still
pressing the Governor hard, but failed to have the jagir ratified.59 It was a
bitter pill to swallow. It showed once more Sulivan’s mastery; his control
over the Governor; and (as Clive saw) an extended governance over Bengal.
His own arrogance could scarce endure this.
Clive’s possession of the jagir had created an unprecedented situation, and
it had a curious legal position; so much so, his claims were never formally
accepted and were eventually challenged. Sulivan was perplexed and seemed
to think it better to let sleeping dogs lie. It continued to confound him and
his advisors. Clive was also too popular for harsh treatment. The last thing
Sulivan wanted was a public outcry over enormous riches going to a ‘Nabob’.
Clive considered the jagir a life-rent. He also came to see that through the
grant he and the Company were firmly linked, that it gave him a vested
interest in the organisation’s continuance. The apparent loss of such an
amount every year was a tremendous irritant to Sulivan. He thought that by
1762 the Company could have been enriched by around £100,000. He knew
too that Clive was wealthy enough; and felt the jagir money was due to the
Company, not to Clive alone. Yet he was stuck with the fact that it had been
presented to him by Mir Jafar.
The customary view has been of a vindictive Sulivan threatening Clive’s
jagir to keep the national hero from involvement in Company affairs. Sulivan
did indeed warn him of a general threat to his prize, leaving the implications
deliberately unsaid. It was not difficult for his Lordship to see that he wanted
them to live in peace. He was also cautioning Clive against serious
collaboration with the ‘Bengal Squad’. Nor is there any doubt that he wanted
to paralyse Clive in terms of Company politics.
The unspoken pact was in force from 1760, the Leader blocking any
efforts by others to enquire into it. Writing to Vansittart in 1763, Sulivan said
that stopping the grant ‘would have taken place years ago’ but for his
personal intercession.60 The jagir appeared as an issue only when Clive was
thwarted; and it was only after his Lordship ran against him at the April 1763
election that Sulivan made any move against the prized possession. Until
then, the instrument fashioned for his own enrichment had been used as a
muzzle, and as security for his good behaviour.
The jagir, however, had become a financial necessity, not a luxury, as Clive
spent furiously in an effort to establish himself in Parliament and as a country
gentleman. He had made himself a ‘hostage’ to the Company, and this
dictated a great deal of his future actions. He seemed to feel a threat to it in
February 1762, but was reluctant to make a move.61 On the same day he
talked to Pybus of keeping Sulivan in awe of him by threatening to join the
‘Bengal Squad’. He added, ‘Though I do not mean to hurt him, I can do such
a thing if he attempts to hurt me...My future power my future grandeur all
depend upon receipt of the jaghire money.’62
Still, it would be wrong to pick out the jagir as the factor that drove Clive
into open opposition. The truth was that he had been thwarted in his plan
for control of India through Vansittart and Forde. Nor was his word law in
India House – that belonged to Sulivan. He was frustrated and envious. He
had been stalemated over the jagir; his military appointments bypassed; and
his advice looked upon as secondary by the Bute ministry. Nor was it clear
that the Company’s future course would be to his liking. He had to be
content, on the other hand, to witness Sulivan’s excellent handling of the
aftermath of war and the deliberations upon it; and observe his rival’s
political artistry within the Company.
In addition, high hopes of a dazzling career in national politics were
dashed. He had thought his political future lay with Newcastle and Chatham
and using his great wealth had built up a Parliamentary interest. It all fell
through when Bute came to power in 1761. As 1762 advanced he found
difficulty in remitting money to England; he no longer had Sulivan as an
agent. He faced closed doors both in the Company and with the ministry;
and could not bear the thought of losing his jagir. His temperament and the
insistence of the ‘Bengal Squad’ made things worse. It became increasingly
impossible to withstand these urgings.
Throughout 1762 their positions had become entrenched. There was also a
decline in any sense of unity and responsibility within the Company; and it
was with difficulty that Sulivan focussed on Indian affairs. During the last
months of 1762 and the first quarter of 1763, while the final enactment of
the Definitive Peace Treaty was taking place, a series of quarrels split the
Direction.
The Company also reverberated with the first salvoes of the approaching
election, and Rous attempted to shift the blame for the earlier mistake over
comptoirs made in negotiations with the ministry. Clearing his name took pride
of place. Yet in spite of the mud-slinging, Rous had been slipshod in his
scrutiny of the proposed Definitive Treaty. It had taken Sulivan’s perception
to make the final draft watertight. This was again referred to in the Public
Advertiser some time later.63 Sulivan was also openly contemptuous of Rous,
made worse by knowledge that the ‘Bengal Squad’ cultivated and abetted
him.
Rous promoted the view that Sulivan was too much under governmental
influence for the good of the Company. Clive felt much the same. In
November 1762 the Chairman and his followers publicly joined with the
‘Bengal Squad’; and news of the continuing confrontation within India
House spread in Parliamentary circles.
As the election grew nearer, Sulivan was accused of high-handed action
over the Definitive Treaty, and that he had forwarded answers before they
were called for through formal channels. Rous alleged only a show of
consulting the Directors was going on and that Sulivan was using the
negotiations to have himself ‘considered at the West End of the Town as the
Dictator to the East’.64
More than anyone, Rous brought the invective against Sulivan down to
gutter level. The personal and vindictive tone of the attack was astonishing,
even in an age of very free expression: ‘Truth and justice did not exist’ in his
‘little soul’. He was also charged, perhaps more accurately, of indulging in
Machiavellian politics.65
In an effort to implicate Sulivan and exonerate Rous, the terms of the
preliminaries were raised yet again in the Court of Directors and in the
General Court. Rous claimed that he wanted to give the Directors a full
account of the transactions, but was only prepared to do so at a later date,
that is, after the Company election. In an open letter to the press Sulivan’s
‘crime’ was enlarged upon. He had not informed the Company’s Secret
Committee of his action over the comptoirs.
At last Sulivan’s enemies tasted success among the Proprietors. Rous was
absolved of blame for the miscalculation over the comptoirs, and this was
interpreted as a censure on Sulivan. It was a real setback that his supporters
were unable to stem; and executive cohesion immediately disappeared.
Clive’s sense of opportunism told him the moment was right to make his
move, and on 17 February he published his junction with Rous.
Later Clive stated that his ‘opposition originally arose from the defects in
the preliminary articles’.66 He probably pin-pointed the moment when he had
finally made up his mind to go against Sulivan; and then waited for the best
opportunity to do so. It arrived in February 1763. He also said later that his
involvement ‘arose from a conviction of his (Rous’) integrity’.67 This is hardly
satisfactory when the build up of ill-will towards Sulivan is considered.
When their rivalry was made public in February 1763, it served to focus all
the opposition that had built up to Sulivan’s command. However, he did not
intend to see his predominant position changed; or his network of
connections and ties in Parliament, in the City or elsewhere destroyed. Clive
was correct, however, in thinking the right opportunity had presented itself.
Sulivan’s alarm was real. He wrote to Bute seeking his help ‘against those
nobles now rallying to his enemy’. The united front that he had been so
afraid of was poised to deal with him. Concern is obvious in his letter to
Shelburne on the 24th:
Those I depend upon were frightened and kindly took upon

themselves to seek Mr. Rous and picture to him his situation, sent
him to break these connections (with Clive and the ‘Bengal Squad’)
promising if he did, their endeavours with me; that I would suffer
him to continue in the Direction.68
Inside Parliament, however, nothing was very clear, but Bute’s suspicion of
Clive turned to distrust when in February 1763 he voted with the minority in
the House that condemned the peace. It was believed the minister
determined to crush him from that point; but in his letter to Shelburne, of 24
February, Sulivan demonstrates that this was not so.
Clive claimed later that ‘Sulivan might have attached me to his interest if
he had pleased’; but it is doubtful if such a union could have taken place.69
The armed camps were lined up: Sulivan and his friends, together with the
Bute ministry; versus Clive, the ‘Bengal Squad’, the Rous party, and the
Parliamentary Opposition.
Sulivan might have asked himself what had really fired Clive to fight. He
perhaps thought of the crossed letters in 1758; and the vexed General
Letters. Clive’s failure to secure patronage for his acolytes, underpinning his
grand plan for control was another sharp blow. Or perhaps Sulivan knew too
much about his financial affairs.
From Sulivan’s point of view all was quite clear: obedience to the
governing body had been flaunted; the day of the over-mighty servant had
arrived. He took exception, and applied himself to the task of elimination, as
he would any threat. Unbelievable determination had got him where he was;
Clive’s equal sense of worth meant a fight to the death.
The major difference between the two men was the manner in which they
esteemed the Company. Sulivan could not stomach it being viewed as an
instrument for the plunder and sack of India; or that it might be given over
to the State, abandoned. He cherished everything about it. Where Clive
would destroy, Sulivan would protect. The next Company election would
provide the setting for their first public battle and might provide an answer
to whose views would prevail.
7
Activities Public and Private

1757-63
D uring these tumultuous years, Sulivan was no less busy regarding his
personal affairs. By strengthening his interest in the City, purchasing an
imposing estate in the country and a grand mansion in the town, he was
buying himself into the establishment of the day. He adroitly used the years
of power to scramble up the social ladder; consolidating his position within
the upper echelons, entwining his public, business and private lives. His
superior position in society was then employed to bolster even further an
ongoing Company career, while laying down roots for his son and others
connected with him.
Apparently, it was all made possible by private trade through Bombay;
remittance activities; profits from the ‘Marine Society’ (the trading triangle
involving himself, Captain Samuel Hough, John Spencer and others); and
through savings. The latter, by his account, amounted to at least £40,000.
From 1761 his prosperity was markedly apparent; and that year saw a
significant change in style and manner of living.
He joined the ranks of the well-to-do merchants ‘whose country houses
ringed London…near enough to town for their owners to ride easily into the
City in summer.’1 In doing so, he aped his fellows who had returned enriched
from India, of whom Clive was probably the grandest. Nevertheless, he was
also investing capital in the securest manner possible, in land; while providing
a good foundation for future prosperity.
Ponsborne Manor, the estate he purchased in 1761 (some 900 acres), was
in Hertfordshire and lay within four miles of the county town and about
seventeen miles from London. He bought it for £13,590 from a William
Strode. The necessary Private Bill had already been passed in Parliament in
1760, whereby the land was vested in trustees for the purpose of sale. It was
an extensive and respectable property. The South Isle of the Chancel of
Hatfield Church was acquired as well. The estate was to remain in the Sulivan
family until his son Stephen sold it in 1811 to a William Busk, MP for
Barnstaple.2.
It was also situated near that of his greatest friend, Stephen Law, who had
already moved from Queen Square to Broxbourne Manor, in the vicinity of
Ware. Ponsborne was only a short ride across the fields. The friends shared
adjoining pews in Hatfield Church. Nearness to Stephen Law, therefore,
would seem to explain Sulivan’s purchase of an estate in that particular part
of the English countryside.
A great deal of information exists concerning his purchase of Ponsborne,
all of which indicates he did not do much to the property. Yet despite this
neglect, because his attention was nearly always focussed in the ‘City’, the
estate managed to do well; and land prices continued to soar. With the
amount of work his eminent position demanded, he could not have spent
very much time there. His heart and soul were to remain always in the
commercial world of London.
There is reason to think that his purchase reflected more a desire to be
seen as a man of property and substance than anything else.3 Being buried in
the countryside was not something Sulivan really wanted. Prestige and social
position lay at its core. He was certainly not typical of the ‘Nabobs’ beginning
to figure within British society by mid-century and richly parodied in verse
and play.
Ponsborne was in sound order with good woodland breaking up the
meadowland, pasture, enclosed arable, gardens and orchards. Curiously,
although the Sulivans sold part of the estate in Bishops Hatfield to a
Christopher Hooke, the records state that in 1811, Sulivan’s son, Stephen,
who inherited the estate, still had 900 acres. There might have been some
undisclosed enclosure of common ground going on. The estate was rich in
history, which Sulivan might have appreciated; and it traced its existence to
the thirteenth century when it formed part of the Bishopric of Ely.
The old manor house was described as, ‘Very stately and large...will cost a
considerable sum annually to keep...it was built of red brick having two wings
with the entrance door in the centre.’4 Nonetheless, he elected to pay £1,300
to knock it down and have the bits and pieces carried away. It cost him a
further £450 to have Hill House demolished and the materials removed, and
he did not rebuild this mansion. He built his new manor on a higher site, in
the centre of the estate. The style and appearance was not changed too much
It was surrounded by seven acres of walks and lanes.
Some of the more unusual items belonging to the old house were
purchased; such as the circular windows and glass, the stone ball, large
fireball, the brass hearths with their brass wings, and the marble chimneys.
The old stables had held a turret bell and clock; and among the outhouses
once stood a Brew house and offices. To complement all this, he bought a
coach house, pavilions, greenhouses and dove houses.5
Sulivan had quite a few tenants: twelve held their land freehold, three
copyhold. Land held freehold amounted to more than 389 acres; copyhold
ACTIVITIES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 1757-63 111
totalled over 451, spread over the lands at Ponsborne, Berkhampstead and
Bedwell Louth. There were six farmhouses and six cottages, some with
gardens, orchards and meadows. Altogether some fifteen families lived on
the estate.
It could have been a time-consuming occupation, but Sulivan, aged forty-
eight when he became ‘Lord of the Manor’, clearly spent little time there. His
name is infrequently mentioned in the county records. This might suggest
that he was humane in the treatment of his leaseholders, but all the signs are
that he was a rigorous, though paternalistic master. Although he had a sense
of the obligations that came with power, he would never allow liberties to be
taken.
The entries in the County records suggest a strict, but also protective,
attitude. There is a reference to a James Clapham of Bayford, yeoman, being
indicted (though found not guilty) of stealing ‘2 boards worth 10d’ from him.
There are also indications that he provided employment. Under the heading
‘Entries of Gamekeepers’ he hired a John Barraclough from 1761 to 1771; a
Joseph Clapham from 1771 to 1777; a Jonas Pratt from 1777 to 1785; and a
James Ellis in 1785.6
When in the country he would have led the life of a country squire. His
family would have enjoyed all the trappings of their position and hunted over
the pastures and meadows. He might have been seen, occasionally, calling on
his tenants and checking stock on the home farm. On the Sabbath the
Sulivans would attend church at Hatfield, sitting in their own pews on the
south side of the chancel beside the Law family. Obviously, a very close bond
existed. The friendship formed in Bombay was renewed in London in 1753;
it was consolidated in the depths of rural England.
2
Although 1761 was a very busy year for Sulivan, in the midst of everything
else he made a first attempt to enter Parliament by contesting the seat for
Ashburton, in Devon. As in everything, his shift into national politics was
linked more with business in Leadenhall and with what was taking place in
India than with anything else. He also wished to impress, and this would be
an indication of his climb up the social scale. Westminster was the best club
in town. But there was more to it than that. Deference to Parliament defined
what it was to be British: King, Lords and Commons stood for ‘sovereignty’.
In this he believed, and was no different from his fellow travellers. It made
sense to publicly proclaim as much.
The impact of India on British life was being felt at Westminster. MPs
were becoming embroiled in its affairs; and the Commons would serve as
another arena where contests for supremacy in the Company would be
fought out. Sulivan would soon face the dominant Parliamentary force of the
landed gentry.
Returned enriched servants or ‘Nabobs’, represented the new wealth from
India. They came to be envied and derided in equal measure as they bought
their way into land and into Parliament. At one and the same time they were
found attractive and repugnant, scorned and admired. There was some
revulsion at ostentation built on the back of poverty and exploitation in
India; but in both Houses covetousness overwhelmed embryo humanitarian
sympathies. Landowners sought the wealth and patronage the East Indies
promised, to the extent that gentlemen from the ‘West End of Town’
jockeyed increasingly with their fellows ‘East of Temple Bar’. Members and
leading political figures became increasingly interested in the parties within
India House, and were willing to use Parliament to help achieve their ends.
A mounting number of East India Proprietors and Directors became MPs.
In 1764 Clive calculated that 66 were so involved; with 181 between 1764
and 1774. Many others held India stock for political, financial and speculative
reasons. MPs, who were also Company Directors, included: George Amyand,
Crabb Boulton and Robert Jones. Proprietors like George Colebrooke,
Peregrine Cust, George Dempster, George Johnstone and John Stephens
(who were to become Directors) would also be elected to Parliament. Two
others joined Sulivan at this time, both former Governors of Madras: Robert
Palk, and George Pigot.
Men of high rank and influence operating through Parliament had always
enjoyed weight in the Court of Directors and among the Proprietors. For
generations there had also been harmony with ministries. This too began to
alter. Ministers increasingly came to believe they could exert more influence
in the ‘City’ through direct contact with the Directors, so their entry into
Parliament made everything so much easier.
Groups and factions within Westminster took sides in the struggles that
erupted at Leadenhall. They did so according to interests and personalities,
but also with the ever-growing desire of gaining some of the Company’s vast
patronage and revenue. Parliamentary figures began fishing for friends at
India House. Through private channels they sought to influence decisions
there. The interests of MPs and individuals within the monopoly became
hopelessly entwined; and the fate of the Company and what would happen in
India came to depend just as much upon groups and conflicts in Parliament,
as upon their counterparts at India House.
Parliament then lacked political organisation and on the whole was
unaffected by public opinion. It worked through a ‘fragile balance between
public and private interests expressed in the system of political connection
and political management’.7 This did not make it any easier for the
government to handle, because the Company defended its Charter well. War,
the accession of a new monarch in 1760 and a succession of ministries
combined to give it an astonishing amount of independence. The first
intrusion appears during the contested election of 1763.
It was natural during Sulivan’s years of absolute power that he should
develop strong ties with Westminster; good connections were needed there.
This was so, independent of a wish to be an MP or to further a Parliamentary
career. Nevertheless, becoming a member of the House made sense. It

helped maintain his government of the Company, and might benefit the
organisation too.
Association with well-known public figures was important; and it might be
thought his candidature for the borough of Ashburton in 1761 would
indicate who these were, and show which Parliamentary interest he lined up
with. Yet until 1761 his progress was most marked for the lack of attention
to him by ministry. This was partly due to the coolness of Newcastle who
had supported the old Directors led by Payne, ousted in 1758.
A positive relationship developed, however, with Chatham during the war
against France. The extremely amicable way in which they integrated led the
first minister to view Sulivan in a favourable light. Relations with Newcastle,
nevertheless, remained cool, and Sulivan was never invited to the ‘cockpit’.
Yet the continued need to renew the Company’s Charter dictated (as far as
Sulivan was concerned) that the Directors and Administration must always
be in close contact. That is why he clung doggedly to the Chatham-Newcastle
ministry, ignoring Newcastle’s snubs.
With King George III upon the throne in 1760 the political situation was
about to change. Chatham’s anti-Hanover speech meant he would be on his
way out of office as soon as the exigencies of war allowed. The revolution in
politics that took place under the new monarch was thus delayed. It was to
be the end of political stability for a number of years. Fluctuating ministries
and uneasy factions were to mark nearly all Sulivan’s years in Parliament. It
was a situation that had its parallel at the India House.
On 5 October 1761 Chatham and Temple resigned. Bute took control of
the ministry, although Newcastle remained its nominal head until May 1762.
Sulivan was faced, therefore, with the awkward task of creating and
cementing ties with the royal favourite, the Earl of Bute, while keeping in
touch with Chatham. His own eventual entry into Parliament was to ease this
transfer of allegiance to Bute; and the way it was achieved led to a personal
and Company interest with members of the new Government.
Nevertheless, upon hearing of Chatham’s resignation, Sulivan was
immediately in touch. He was of the opinion that the Company had been,
‘Tardy in its respectful acknowledgements to Mr. Pitt’; and followed this
tribute by sending Lady Hester Pitt a ‘Lury’ bird from the Spice Islands.8
These can be seen as moves to retain Chatham’s friendship. He wanted a seat
in Parliament and it suited his purposes to have an influential man like
Chatham on his side as he intrigued to gain favour inside the Westminster.
Even after he had acquired his seat he would not relinquish this
acquaintance. In June 1762 he wrote, ‘I beg you’ll always honour me with
your commands, be assured Sir the East India Company retains very grateful
sense of their obligations to Mr. Pitt.’9
These harmonious relations with Chatham were retained through the good
offices of a fellow Irishman, Robert Wood. He was Under-Secretary of State
in 1756 and became Chatham’s right hand man. He remained in office after
his chief’s resignation, and aided Sulivan in transferring his own, and the
Company’s allegiance to the new ministry.
Wood continued to act as a linkman, keeping his old leader in touch with
Sulivan and with the City interests, as well as remaining a source of
information for all that was going on. It was useful to Sulivan that Wood had
already done good work as Lord Egremont’s secretary; and Egremont was
very close to Bute. It was with some justification, therefore, that later in life
Sulivan could refer to this man as his very good friend. He had handled all
confidential communications; and taken charge of the patronage Chatham
disbursed, emanating from Sulivan. It was he who made the arrangements
when the King formally received him as Chairman of the East India
Company.
As a go-between, Wood was central to everything Sulivan attempted at this
time remotely involving Westminster. It was through him that he was able to
count on the Parliamentary support of Charles Townshend. This courtier
made an appointment to see him on 2 January 1762. This early contact was
to bear fruit later, in 1766-67, during the Parliamentary enquiry into the
Company’s affairs. It is also possible that Townshend’s visit was a direct
consequence of Colonel Isaac Barré’s attack upon Chatham in the Commons
in mid-December 1761; and that he was checking on Sulivan’s political
stance. Was he a Chathamite still? Barré was a friend of Sulivan’s through the
Earl of Shelburne.10 This might also partly explain Sulivan’s protestations of
friendship sent to Chatham in June 1762, as he tried to retain the tie.
Sulivan’s connection with Shelburne and Bute had been forged by late
1761. For this he owed a great debt to John Dunning (afterwards Lord
Ashburton) and to Henry Fox (later Lord Holland). Sulivan’s friendship with
Dunning was attendant upon the connection he had already made with
Robert Palk. Both men were natives of Ashburton. Shelburne, Sulivan,
Dunning and Barré were in close association. In the 1760-61 period, Sulivan
met with them often, and was introduced to more of the Earl’s followers.11
After Chatham’s downfall he tied himself closer.
It wasn’t until the advent of Bute, therefore, and Sulivan’s personal
association with Shelburne, that the close links with Government he desired
could come about (outside the exigencies of war). Only then were the bonds
created in any way similar to those enjoyed by his predecessors in the
Company’s executive.
It is rather likely that at first Sulivan did not trust Bute. This would have
been in line with the anti-Scots feelings the Earl engendered. In the
beginning Shelburne was to be the bridge between them; and Sulivan’s
connections were to be very heavily weighted towards the Earl. Possibly
shared interest in areas of Counties Cork and Kerry strengthened the
relationship. He was accused, however, of insinuating himself with the
minister, and there is evidence to justify this allegation. Even while sending
Chatham’s wife the unusual ‘Lury’ bird, he was introducing to Bute a Mr.
Hyde, Governor of the London Insurance Company..
Sulivan was keen to immerse Bute in City of London interests, and desired
to bind together himself, the Company and the new ministry. He vouched
for Hyde’s respectability in the City, and took the opportunity to present him
once more, at Bute’s levee. The wily Chairman was interested in the financial
implications as well as the political features of such a connection. He told
Bute that he would wait upon him to ‘further explain’ himself.12 By October
1762 he was acknowledging his high opinion of the minister in a most
sycophantic manner. Charles Jenkinson assumed the position with Bute that
Robert Wood had filled for Chatham. Information on India business was
channelled to and fro in this way. Two-way patronage was initiated.
What Sulivan had managed to do was get close to Bute through Shelburne
while maintaining a connection with Chatham. It was a not inconsiderable
feat given the instability of ministries and faction within Parliament and the
Company. Nevertheless, his great respect for Chatham and gratitude for all
the help he had given also influenced him. Once the great man stood aside,
however, the Company was once more allied with the King’s Government.
The election for Ashburton, a little woollen town in Devon, was held in
1761. There is nothing mysterious about why he should choose this particular
borough. Although their joint interest was not overwhelming, Lady Orford
and Sulivan’s friend, Robert Palk, controlled it. Palk’s influence dictated his
candidature. However, it was the Devon man’s lack of complete control of
the borough that in the end was responsible for a contested election, which
Sulivan lost, much to his mortification and cost. He took some time to
recover from the shock. It was the first defeat in public since his emergence
as Deputy Chairman of the Company in 1757; and it came at a point in his
career when the influence he could exert was at its maximum.
The Ashburton contest reveals, and typifies the springs of action behind
elections for the unreformed Parliament; the amount of bribery required and
attendant costs. What it also demonstrates is the intimacy of contact with
borough-mongers and the degree of influence exerted from Westminster,
especially at ministerial level.
Briefly what happened was that in 1760 Nathaniel Newnham, an East
Indian Director and London merchant started an interest there. This was
abandoned upon the discovery that he would have opposed the Duke of
Newcastle. He suggested that Sulivan should use this commercial interest. He
could promise, in return, the export of Ashburton long ells (lengths of
woollen cloth).
Four people fought for the two seats. Thomas Walpole, a cousin by
marriage to Lady Orford was assured of one. A John Harris had held a seat in
1754, and stood again upon the strength of these fourteen years of
representation. He had the friendship of Chatham and the neutrality of Palk.
Sulivan faced Chatham’s pleading that he must not hurt Harris; and Palk also
urged him not to clash with the man. John Duke was the other candidate and
like Sulivan was an outsider.
Sulivan seemed to have a very good chance of success. He could not hope
to compete with Thomas Walpole, but certainly carried the highest
expectations for the other seat. In London he enjoyed the influence of
Shelburne, Henry Fox, and thus the Earl of Bute, and appeared to have the
neutrality of Chatham. He was also an important man in his own right. He
had money, influence, and could place orders with the local cloth industry.
His first canvas was made in December l760. Robert Palk went with him.
It cost over £171 in expenses for treating ‘ringers and wool combers’ at
public houses. But by January 1761 Palk was already having doubts about the
outcome. It all went wrong, despite well-meaning help from Palk and the
activity of Dunning. He was enraged at the result and determined to petition
against it. This in itself, while revealing for posterity, is indicative of the
embarrassment felt and the degree to which he felt betrayed. His entry to
Parliament was considered very important at this particular stage of his
career. The uncertainties of Parliamentary affairs, as well as the attendant
political patronage, were better understood by him from that moment.13
Sulivan claimed to have polled a greater number of votes than either
Harris or Walpole; and had overcome wholesale bribery and ‘every species of
wickedness’ including control over the returning officers. He added that his
opponents had created ‘false and base’ votes, pronounced good by ‘the
wretch that had sold himself’, namely, the Portrive (the returning officer).14
He was also bitter at the enormous cost of the enterprise. ‘So much my estate
suffers by this contested election.’15 At this stage his expenses totalled over
£1,994. Palk’s requested that Sulivan deliver them to him.
His counter to being outmanoeuvred by Walpole and Harris was
immediate and so characteristic. Although in April his opponents were
formally returned for Ashburton, fifteen days earlier he had intimated to
Chatham his determination to petition Parliament. He solicited his support,
while complaining bitterly at the treatment he had suffered.16
The determination to pursue what he considered a fraudulent election was
to prove lengthy; but the blow to his pride, although severe, was probably
timely. He carried his cause forward for a year; and again it cost him. He paid
out a further £775. This heavy financial drain was obviously not borne
foolhardily. Eventually, his petition, plus that of the Freeholders of
Ashburton, was forwarded in January 1762 and heard at the Bar of the
House of Commons on 9 February. The truth was that Sulivan did not really
see any chance of reversing the election result. Rather, he was playing a game
of political blackmail with those leading figures whose support he had relied
upon. If they wanted continued access to the patronage he commanded,
something would have to happen.
It appeared he stood on very strong ground, a supposition strengthened by
the efforts made to prevent his petition from coming forward; and by the
strenuous pressures put upon him to desist. There was furious activity at
Westminster and Whitehall. He said that he faced Newcastle and the power
and influence of ‘the greatest familys in England’.17
He contacted a host of eminent politicians, among them Chatham, Henry
Fox and Shelburne. The latter interested Bute enough to give help. He even
got in touch with Clive: ‘I am heartily glad that the Honours are settled (a
reference to Clive’s peerage) but in a selfish light I must wish they may not
take place until my contest is ended.’18 He canvassed well and had real
support. In his daily occurrence book, he gives the best account of what
subsequently happened:
The Friends I had obtained amazd and terrifyd corruption

(Harris, Newcastle and their friends, including the Walpoles) and
as a defeat which they foresaw would have been distruction to
their famous power – the D. of Newcastle wrote me a letter
promising to take care of me if I wd withdraw my petition, the
offer I rejected contemptuously.19
He also discarded Lord Hertford’s overtures; while to Newcastle he haughtily

declared, ‘I never made a proposition to your Grace, the Duke of
Devonshire, Lord Anson, or any other person concerning my election for
Ashburton.’20
Finally he heard what he wanted to hear, that a seat would be made
available. Bute put pressure upon him in February to give up the election, to
which he agreed, and then changed his mind. He had not yet heard what he
wanted: the guaranteed promise of a place. He didn’t have long to wait:
The whole Phalanx (Newcastle and Harris’ supporters) then

applyd to Majesty, and Ld Bute by a card desird to see me. He
told me things were going into such a flame that at this juncture
might do infinite mischief, to avoid which the King wd take it
kind (wd my Honr. permit me) if I withdrew my petition, and in
return I shd come into the first vacant Borough...as a good
Subject I instantly submitted.21
He had won, even although Henry Fox avoided making the presentation
until forced to do so.
Sulivan’s petition appeared to have been enough to threaten disruption to
whatever harmony still existed within the ministry in 1761-2, and excited
many national figures. It did help that it was a time when new permutations
were forming, stimulated by pressure from the new King and his favourite.22
He was prepared to upset the calm required in the corridors of power at that
crucial time. This was not forgotten.
Hurt pride drove him on to this end. However, the seriousness of his
intent clearly belies something deeper. He felt that he had every right to
expect a sure seat from ministry in return for the firm support given by him
throughout these years of war. Moreover, he still enjoyed unprecedented
control over India House. He was disgruntled that Chatham had not ensured
his success at the election. His sense of grievance is seen in the determination
to push forward the petition, and in a further swing away from Chatham and
Newcastle to Bute. Besides, the more the Great Commoner’s friendship with
Clive increased, the more disenchanted with him Sulivan became anyway.
Other reasons underlay his desire to enter Parliament. The gathering
uncertainty and heightened interest relative to India affairs, and their
intrusion into national affairs, meant he would concern himself even more
with events there. A place in the Chamber to keep track of what went on was
needed; as was the maintenance of political connection. In this period, his
allegiances within Parliament were determined by those who backed his plans
for the Company; and who wished to maintain its independence. National
politics were regarded by him as an adjunct to Company politics.
The imminent conclusion of hostilities with France added to the pressure
to enter Parliament. The Company (and his own reputation) would be helped
if he was present during the deliberations over the terms of peace in the
Parliamentary sphere as well as at India House. He must not be absent from
any discussions that related to India. Increasing rivalry with Clive also
dictated it was prudent to be there.
Already Clive had a Parliamentary interest, which was later to be in
opposition to Sulivan. He too wanted entry to Parliament, because it would
reflect the level in society he had attained. He was rooting himself and his
family into English life. He was a City of London man, the head of probably
the most powerful, instantly recognised, independent institution in Britain.
Parliament was the perfect vehicle for promoting himself, and where he
identified with the great Whig families he seemed to favour. He wanted to be
seen as one of the well-to-do; an image that would have been strengthened
with his purchase of Ponsborne Manor, bought in the year he had expected
to enter Parliament.
Bute, through Shelburne, arranged that he be elected MP for Taunton in
March 1762. It was an open borough but subject to the influence of
Government, and especially of Egremont. Yet Sulivan was left to feel that he
was ‘under no Tyes or Clogs whatever, just as free as I shd have been at
Ashburton, and without a Shilling Expenses’.23 He finished this note to
himself in the same self-congratulating manner:
So extraordinary a Triumph with so much honour to myself I

deem an ample recompense for my infinite Trouble and great
expense...to his honr. (Shelburne) and thro’ the goodness of a
gracious Prince I very soon recd a message from Ld. Egremont
acquainting me that there was a vacancy at Taunton…and the

King had recommended Mr. Sulivan and for this place I was
chose.24
He also thought that he owed his success to having no opponent. Whether

his constituents thought along similar lines is another matter. Although not
unusual, there is no evidence that he brought any benefits to them
whatsoever.
Sulivan was certainly given the Taunton seat to silence him. He used
blackmail or leverage to bring this about. In his eyes the tactics were sound
because they achieved their ends. He was a tough and resilient man. In his
world, there was the quick and the dead; he could not afford a conscience,
nor was it expected of him. He had undergone yet another baptism of fire in
the effort to enter this new arena.
He remained MP for Taunton until his transfer to Ashburton in March
1768, through an arrangement with Palk. The ex Governor of Madras had
vowed his friend would return there on the first vacancy; and so it came to
pass. Dunning supervised the whole business, and Shelburne was once more
active on his behalf. With Orford’s agreement, Sulivan and a Charles Boone
filled the two seats on offer, and received the combined support of Palk and
Orford. It was a compromise which lasted until 1774, his last year in
Parliament.
Sulivan did not attempt both a Parliamentary and a Company career only
to risk falling between two stools. Nor did he endeavour great reforms in the
administrative system of India using ministerial influence in the manner Clive
entertained. Edmund Burke was correct when he stated that India House was
always more important to him. It is hardly coincidental, however, that 1761
marks the date of Clive’s entry into Parliament and his own attempt to do so.
He had to monitor what was happening; and if the occasion so required,
thwart Clive’s designs using a Parliamentary base.
He made no pretence of brilliance as a Parliamentarian, although a
competent speaker, making some thirty-three speeches, invariably upon, or
referring to India business. He was inclined to use a well-known orator, such
as Barré. Outside of anything connected with East India affairs he was non-
committal. There is no mention of any participation by him on national
issues; or on the two boroughs he represented between 1762 and 1774.
At root he was a proponent of English Constitutional government; a
Whig. He was never too committed to one party or the other, always leaving
his options open, willing to change allegiance as and when it suited him,
seeking after privilege with a number of leading Ministers.
In doing so he laid himself open to the charge of capriciousness, and
worse, especially in the eyes of Edmund Burke; but this did not bother him
much. It might be that the confrontations he found in Parliament excited
him. In this theatre, where he lacked the levers of power he had at
Leadenhall, he might have felt panic; but as usual he would have kept this
well hidden. In one instance, however, he was to know real fear, when as he
left the Commons he was mistaken by a mob for the Speaker, Onslow. He
only narrowly avoided injury.25
3
Soon after he took the reins of power at India House, Sulivan had set about
a wholesale internal reform of its secretariat. Good management was
perennially difficult and routine clerical and administrative work, added to the
fine accountancy detail required, took its toll. Innumerable copies of nearly
everything were sent by different ships, such was the loss en route. In
addition, the Company’s diverse, sprawling nature, and its dependence on sea
links, made it very difficult to govern. On top of this, there was an incredible
increase in the amount of work to do in the years after 1757 with the rapid
expansion in terms of territory, manpower and commerce.
He set about reorganising India House in a manner that reflected his own
efficiency. It came to be regarded as a model administrative structure. It was
done in cooperation with the Company Secretary, Robert James, to whom he
paid high tribute, and with whom he formed a good relationship.
As Chairman, Sulivan was first to receive intimation of a request, a
complaint, or whatever. In his absence the Deputy Chair claimed this right.
Depending upon confidentiality, the matter would then go to the Secretary
and from him to the Committee concerned. Invariably, Sulivan would pass to
James any subject not requiring his own touch or supervision. This is seen in
a letter to Mrs. Watson, the wife of Admiral Watson, in 1760: ‘Our Secretary
Mr. James will…receive your commands, who is entirely master of the
subject, and whose province it is to have the immediate inspection of these
matters.’26 That Secretary James had to work hard is reflected in a reward of
£500 for ‘his good works’ in March 1761.27
This revamp stood Sulivan in good stead. Sooner or later it would have
been required to reorganise the ramshackle way in which things were run; but
given the increase in pressures brought about by war and by what was
happening in the sub-continent, it became imperative that this be done
quickly. It had become a much more formidable task to collate material and
make estimates, with the volume, complexity and variety of occurrences.
Unnecessary lumber and outmoded practices had to be abolished. He
overhauled the establishment at India House; and ended the taking of fees
and perquisites by the clerks of the Secretary’s office.28
Unbroken communications played a vital part in keeping him informed;
and links were to become even more important as difficulties abroad
accelerated. At each Presidency, Secret or Select Committees were set up,
modelled by him upon the one in Leadenhall Street. Like the one in India
House, they functioned as an inner Cabinet. Sulivan depended upon these.
Equally vital was the private correspondence with Vansittart, Palk, Spencer
and others. Vansittart passed on all inside information that came his way,
giving him time to plan ahead.29 The ties among these protégés were
consolidated by their friendship and correspondence with each other; a state
of affairs he welcomed and actively cultivated.30
Apart from routine business, there were some unusual matters to attend
to. One concerned six Russian officers sent to Madras, in order to ‘Perfect
themselves in the science and business of navigation.’31 Then in 1761 he and
Secretary James had to organise the presentation of gifts from the Nawabs of
Bengal and the Carnatic to the Royal family and to the British Museum.
In October 1760 a request was received from the Royal Society for the
Company’s help in making observations of the transit of Venus. Charles
Morton, Assistant Observer at the Royal Observatory of Greenwich, thanked
Sulivan in advance for all the help he could give.32 The King had agreed to
pay all the expenses of the expedition and provided a ship-of-war to carry the
observers. Sulivan gave orders for their proper accommodation if they
should land at Madras, en route to Bencoolen; to be paid for by the
Company. He wanted to send observers as well; and Governor Pigot
confirmed they had people in Madras qualified to make the observations.
There was just one snag: there was ‘No good time-keeper with instruments,
etc. for adjusting its (the sun’s) motions by apparent time.’33
Organising this expedition was a light-hearted affair compared with the
problems posed by smuggling; an activity that gave great worry and cost the
Company dear. It involved all kinds of goods and all classes of personnel. It
was on board ship that the greatest mischief took place, such as that going on
aboard the Delawar. In mid-February 1759 he once more brought up the
subject, where it was discussed at length. There was no satisfactory outcome,
however, and customs evasion become more serious.
Throughout 1760 and 1761 there were many further instances: Copper
was being unlawfully shipped aboard the London and the Egremont bound for
India; large quantities of unlicensed goods were being laded upon the Neptune
and the York. Orders to stop this illegal trade had little impact. He produced
evidence of more smuggling. Diamonds were being brought home from
Madras in the Company’s small packet ships without being registered. Sulivan
instructed that public notice was to be given that all those unregistered would
be deemed illicit trade. However, he found it almost impossible to control. In
January 1764 the Company Secretary informed Governor Palk in Madras,
that 100 boxes of hats, scarlet cloth, coral and other materials had been
clandestinely laded on the Caernarvon. She was to be searched upon her
arrival, and cargo not covered by the manifest was to be confiscated and sold
on the Company’s account.
4
The events of 1763 were to have a seminal impact upon Sulivan’s career. He
faced the greatest danger from his political enemies. In the weeks leading up
to the April election, Company politics built to fever pitch. It helped being
out of the Direction, and he kept his head down, and only with Clive’s entry
into the fray did his passion show. It clearly astounded him, as his terse
words to Shelburne indicate:
It is too true...Thursday (17 February 1763) he published his

junction with Mr. Rous – Friday and Saturday (18 and 19
February) he canvassed the City in person and made
qualifications by dozens – and yesterday (23 February)
…suffered his friends, as I am told, to declare that he had altered
his instructions at standing for Director. Lord Clive stands.34
Clive’s move was a clear signal to others, and all that was needed to rouse
Sulivan’s opponents. Their feud had been made public.
Sulivan’s obvious apprehension underlined the fact that the situation was
serious. He had been confident of handling Rous and the Bengal
malcontents. Now, it was indeed a ‘civil war’, as Namier called it. Clive was
fairly confident of success or he would not have entered into such a struggle
against a foe he did not underestimate. He could count upon his own
support, sure of their tenacious backing, but did not really understand the
depth and spread of Sulivan’s connections, or his stubbornness.
It was also an election fought at great expense; and drove the contestants
to unprecedented lengths. The importance (and value) placed upon winning
meant massive propaganda campaigns. Courts and Committee rooms, ante-
rooms at Westminster, coffee and chop shops all over the city were full of
gossip – and the press echoed with propaganda. There was an edge to the
contest, because a public confrontation between figures of such substance
was not too common. Also, a pyramid of public and private interests relied
upon the outcome.
From his letter to Shelburne of 24 February, Sulivan was taken aback to
think of Clive standing for the Direction. His Lordship was rather
embarrassed himself, as he remarked to Vansittart: ‘I have no thought of ever
accepting the Chair; I have neither application, knowledge, nor time to
undertake so laborious an employ.’35 In many ways this was an unconscious
compliment to Sulivan. His decision had also been taken out of pique; and he
admitted his opponent was, ‘better versed in such business’ than himself.’ He
never put himself forward at Leadenhall, and worked through intermediaries,
especially through his follower, John Walsh.36
He also maintained it was the resolve of Sulivan and his friends to keep
him out that determined him to seek in. This does not excuse him from
censure, for instead of the public spiritedness that he claimed was the motive
for engaging with Sulivan, he was willing to sacrifice the Company’s structure
and stability by admitted ignorance, to further his own interests and satisfy
his ego.
The scene was set for a stirring contest, and generated tremendous
interest. The election was better prepared, harder fought, and more wide-
reaching in its repercussions than the 1758 one. Its specific features consisted
of the personal dislike Clive and Sulivan had for each other; the introduction
of Asiatic wealth into the political arena; and machinery for the creation of
voting qualification by the splitting of Company stock into £500 blocks.
The attack launched was made in a manner calculated to appeal to as many
as possible who nursed some grievance. Clive’s personal feelings and
involvement were camouflaged. Much was made of Sulivan’s support for the
unpopular Bute ministry. On 17 February the factions began to solicit
support in earnest: contact was made with bankers and other types of
financiers; and people in Parliament, especially in the Opposition were
sounded out. A bewildering network of ties came into being as the factions
struggled to influence those that they could, and to qualify others through the
requisite £500 of India stock.
Probably the most striking feature of the election was the role of the
Proprietors Court: its assumption of real power and the weight it brought to
bear on the Direction. The anti-Sulivan forces within this body also used
rights that were seldom exercised. Sulivan’s own accession to power in 1758
had witnessed the last stirring example of this. The powers of the Court were
vast. The executive could be questioned on all aspects of policy, their salaries
cut, or be dismissed. The Board was accountable to those who had entrusted
it with their money, the share holders. These assemblies, as Lord Macaulay
said, were now large, riotous and stormy, full of trickery and corruption, ‘the
debates indecently virulent’.37
Sulivan enjoyed support from various quarters. The ‘Bengal Squad’ aside,
he remained popular with many who had seen service of some kind in India,
and especially ex-Bombay colleagues Stephen Law and John Browne. There
was assistance from Madras servants such as Timothy Tullie; and from
Bengal, William Barwell, who was no friend of Clive or his fellows from
Bengal.38 Sir Eyre Coote backed him, and because of Coote, John Purling
too, just as he had done from 1758 to 176l. Robert Palk in Madras, because
he was also a friend of Clive, kept a middle road in relations with both
contestants.
All the Irishman’s many connections within the shipping interest were
used. He virtually monopolised this body, an area in which Clive had little or
no presence. His friends included assorted mercantile, insurance and
seagoing people, like Charles Gough, George Stevens, the Godfrey brothers,
Samuel Hough and Thomas Lane. He also drew on those who represented
the old merchant banker type of Proprietor; and upon great numbers of small
shareholders in the City. Friends in business rallied, such as George Amyand
and Frederick Pigou. They were sure of their man and knew his capability for
serving the commercial side of the Company. He enjoyed the continued
loyalty of most employees at Leadenhall.
Most important, he was able to draw upon the influence of the Bute
ministry, and used Government funds to create faggot votes. He pooled the
King’s influence (and that of courtiers and leading ministers) using the weight
of the monarch’s friends in the Commons and the House of Lords. He was
able to call upon Government officers, members of the Secretariat and Post
Office and innumerable dependants.
Bute and Sulivan had been in league for some time; they had collaborated
as early as November 1761 in settling the peace with France. India patronage
(through Sulivan) had also been funnelled to the scions of powerful families
north of Berwick with the purpose of securing political backing at elections
in Scotland. Many Company posts were being granted to Scots according to
Government wishes.39
Sulivan had been alarmed because at first he could not count upon
Government intervention in the coming clash. His consternation at Bute’s
lack of action was shown as early as October 1762 and then again in a letter
to Shelburne four months later:
Do not blame me if I feel neglect in a juncture so nearly affecting

my honour and the interests of a great Company. A line from Lord
Bute (and I have seen his letters to those I look down upon) would
have been esteemed by me to have the extent of my
expectations…could I know what dependence I may have upon the
Ministry.40
With ministerial funds in mind, Shelburne suggested Sulivan keep in touch

with Fox, who controlled the Pay Office. This he did, all through the months
from October 1762 to March 1763. Shelburne also suggested he call upon
Fox personally – which he did.
Bute’s hesitancy is explained by Clive’s formidable interest in Parliament,
which the minister did not wish to rouse. He kept in touch with Clive
through the Proprietor Joseph Salvador for as long as he could; or at least
until it was certain his independent position was shading towards the
Opposition. Only then were Sulivan and the ‘House’ list fully supported. It
was never the minister’s intention to bring Clive to heel using Sulivan. Soon
the continual prodding paid off. In March Henry Fox took out voting
qualifications and was followed by Shelburne, which enabled Government
supporters, who knew nothing about Company business, to know which way
to turn. The Secretariat used its influence; and the enormous resources of the
Pay Office were put to use.
It is futile to blame Sulivan for the disasters that befell the Company
through deliberately bringing Government influence to bear in Company
elections. Clive’s great wealth, combined with that of the ‘Bengal Squad’,
meant he had to seek funds and take whatever he could find. He might also
have felt justified in seeking help from the ministry against a threat to
monetary confidence. It was imperative that Government, the Bank of
England, the great monied Companies and the City as a whole worked
closely with one another. That Government support was required for a
struggle within the Company might have seemed justified in his eyes.
Clive threw his massive resources into splitting stock, which were then
transferred to friends to vote with. His endeavours were gargantuan, and he
created large-scale machinery for the purpose, such was his determination to
destroy his opponent. Sulivan commented at the time, ‘I confess myself a
novice in the business.’41 He could only have referred to the scale of the
operation. He soon emulated his enemy. Nor does his observation to
Shelburne that ‘Clive and a select band of Eastern plunderers first taught the
creation of nominal votes’, stand up.42
Splitting machines were remarkable organisations; and the men who
managed them and organised the campaigns were closest to the main
adversaries. They were usually bankers or prominent in the City. These
managers paid great attention to those with large holdings of India stock.
They also worked hand-in-hand with ‘stockjobbers’, using stock that
otherwise would have been permanently immobilised, placing these holdings
in the hands of one controller or the other. Smaller jobbers and brokers split
their own stock, or split the blocks of stock entrusted to them by trustees.
There were also those who ‘split’ their holdings among friends and relations.
Clive used the firm of Cliffe, Walpole and Clarke, and that of Francis and Robert
Gosling.
Sulivan really ran his own campaign in 1763, although Thomas Lane acted
for him a great deal. Much was expected of Shelburne: ‘If your Lordship or
friends have interest with the bankers they are the men that can do us infinite
service.’ He added, tongue in cheek: ‘Messrs. Fox and Calcraft Bankers may
do great things.’ Calcraft was Fox’s man and in charge of the Pay Office.
Sulivan was convinced that this support could: ‘Make a number sufficient to
overturn all opposition.’43
There is evidence of some success from this quarter: Lord Eglinton used
his weight with associates; the financier Aaron Franks helped through a Mr.
Talbot, after clearance from Bute; Shelburne influenced a Colonel Scott and
Lady Betty Germain, and made public his support for Sulivan’s list. There
were limits to Government influence, however, Sir Mathew
Featherstonehaugh still split for Clive.
Bute’s involvement was a signal to his compatriots, and many became
involved. London-Scottish bankers, such as: Drummonds; Grant; Fordyce; and
Coutts, and the Dutch Hope firm, (with Scottish origins) lent money to both
sides engaged in splitting. With support and help from the ministry Sulivan
was convinced that he would have sufficient to win the day. In the end, of the
votes created for him at the election, 100 were directly due to Government
influence and money.44
Although optimistic, the crafty campaigner was well aware of the hostility
he now faced, even in the City. He was also rather apprehensive of the
antagonism roused against him because of the Scottish minister: ‘The
supposed regard Lord Bute bears Mr. Sulivan has lost me my influence at this
end of the town.’45
The other camp, controlled by Clive as if he conducted a military
campaign, was extremely busy. It comprised a rich, amoral group of men.
Especially vicious were those most recently returned from Bengal, and the
Rous faction in the Direction. This was the hard core of opposition to
Sulivan. Goslings Bank backed his Lordship; and the Newcastle-led
Parliamentary Opposition drew towards him - the Duke working through his
friend in the Company, James West.46 Clive’s entrance provided the landed
gentry with the excuse to search for more footholds in the Company. Sulivan
referred to this development, ‘A noble Duke – the race of Walpole and Clive
opposing me.’ The nobility and gentry still looked upon the Indian scene
with distaste – but with greedy eyes.47
Clive’s stake was enormous. The total stock amounted to £3,200,000 and it
was not easy to obtain. Yet he bought up £100,000 of this through the firm
of Cliffe, Walpole and Clarke, creating 200 votes. His ally, Rous, split his stock
and that of his friends. He also lied that he had struck an understanding with
Bute, implying that Sulivan had little hope of support from that quarter.
Sulivan was ‘thunderstruck’ at his ‘effrontery’.48
The notoriously clannish Johnstone group also joined Clive. The brothers
George, John and William (Pultney) Johnstone, sons of Sir James Johnstone
of Westerhall, led this formidable party. Since 1761 they had been buying
stock for splitting activities, and working against Sulivan in the General
Court. They used a variety of funds, including those accumulated in Bengal
by John Johnstone. The Proprietor, Andrew Stuart, of Craigthorn and
Torrance, a relation of theirs, made loans to them all.49 The Johnstones were
infuriated at Sulivan’s dismissal of John Johnstone after the Patna massacre.50
For the campaign, Clive followed Sulivan in the use of small canvassing
books, ideal for drumming up support. There was to be a preliminary trial of
strength at the General Court of 15 March, followed by the ballot proper.
The exoneration of Rous from any blame during the preliminaries to the
Peace of Paris was again to be the issue. The real aim, however, was to stir up
resentment by heaping blame on Sulivan and the Government. Enormous
heat was engendered; controversial issues were picked out and used as
targets. Anonymous letters in the papers spread lies and propaganda. One in
the Gazetteer, which Clive was sure had been written by Sulivan, accused him
of abusing his Bengal office.
Both factions realized the importance of this General Court, held in
Merchant Taylors Hall. They rallied their respective supporters the night before.
Clive’s followers and the Rous group went to the Queens Arms Tavern, St.
Paul’s Churchyards. The Sulivan party gathered at the Kings Arms, Cornhill.
There was a very large attendance of 800 Proprietors at this Court: 657 voted
in the ballot, and it cleared Rous. A show of hands beforehand also seemed
to indicate that Clive would have a comfortable majority of the Proprietors
on his side at the forthcoming election. Clive thought his party would
become even stronger, but tempered his enthusiasm, noting that Sulivan and
the ministry were active, canvassing and persuading all they had a call upon.
Sulivan’s hectic electoral activity meant that his ‘House’ list was ready
before Clive’s. He gave a copy to Shelburne. Clive presented his ‘Proprietors’
list for Newcastle to peruse, much later. The Duke expressed his pleasure at
his promising calculations. On 9 April the two lists appeared in the press. Of
the twenty-four names shown on Sulivan’s list, fourteen appeared on that of
his rivals, that is, they were double-listed.
At 7 p.m. on 14 April, and following a preliminary skirmish over the use of

the prestigious ‘House’ list title - where precedent won, the ballot was held. It
showed that Sulivan had scored a handsome victory. Greater numbers had
turned out than either Clive or Newcastle expected. It was also represented
as a triumph for the Government over its enemies. The ‘highest in Lord
Clive’s list was 81 below the lowest in Sulivans.’51 The entire ‘House’ list was
voted for, and the new Directors thanked the Proprietors for their success,
‘After so warm and extensive a contest as never to have been equalled since
the Company has existed.’52
The backing for Sulivan and the impact of the ministry’s influence and
cash had been badly under-estimated. As James West remarked, acidly, to
Newcastle, ‘Lord Clive must have been strangely misled in his calculations.’53
Thomas Walpole sneered, ‘We have been cheated out of the election by the
clerks of India House.’54
The moment of victory was one for Sulivan to savour. He had shown his
worth as a Company politician and had fought back against his detractors
with a vigour that inspired further confidence. Clive had sustained his first
defeat, and this in a contest he was sure he would win. But the nature of the
struggle indicated that this joust would be only the first of many. As Holwell
had prophesised in 1758, the factions in the Company were now at
loggerheads. The annual elections meant that each April there would be a
challenge; success or failure would depend on who enjoyed Government
support.
5
In 1763 Sulivan moved from his villa at Mile End Green, to number 46
Great Ormonde Street Bloomsbury, a very fine, dignified mansion on the
north side of the Street, which ran into Queen Square. He was the second
largest householder, and immediate neighbour of the Venetian Ambassador.
Aesthetic appreciation of what the street had to offer might have figured in
his mind, ostentation certainly did. It was in his nature, and such a residence
was expected of a man in his position.55
He had spent at least thirteen or fourteen years in a very unhealthy Indian
climate; and there was always the danger this would cause difficulties in later
life. But his general health (and that of his family) remained good, though he
was ill in 1761 and suffered breakdowns.56 Many small gifts, tokens of
respect, flowed into London, not just from those who owed their careers to
him. They are indications of the high regard in which he and his family were
held. Vansittart sent muslin, via a Captain Jamieson. Then he despatched
‘attar of roses’ and Dacca muslins, through a Captain Richardson.57
In June 1763 his son Stephen, aged twenty, was admitted to the Middle
Temple. Many assorted Sulivan, Owen and Irwin relations were also reaching
young adulthood. They looked towards him for help, and he responded. John
Sulivan, second son of Benjamin of Cork, was sent to the ‘Academy of
Greenwich’, before being found a position as a Writer upon the Madras
establishment. He continued to care for his nieces, Anne (Nancy) and

Elizabeth (Betsy) Owen. The girls were now of marriageable age. This
created some discomfiture while they remained in England. But soon the
problems were set at some distance when in 1761 both sisters proceeded to
Madras on the Fox, travelling with Mrs. Palk. In Madras they joined the Palk
household.58
Within a year of their arrival and before they were both twenty, the two
sisters were married. Darvall, Nancy’s husband, later became an agent for
him in India. Betsy was married, in July 1762, to Captain (later Colonel) John
Wood of the Company’s army. Sulivan and his wife were kept informed of
their well-being by Palk, who acted as patron and mentor. During his
lifetime, Sulivan remained sole executor of their trust. According to Palk,
there was some disagreement between the sisters. ‘Betsy’ Wood complained
that her uncle was only allowing her £150 while her husband was away
fighting in Manila.
There are many indications that from 1760 onwards he begun to get
wealthier. He had at least £40,000 in 1758 which was certainly larger by 1761.
He enjoyed the proceeds from the sale of his house at Mile End Green; and
the capital he had invested would have brought a return. This would have
been much reduced by the purchase of the Ponsborne Estate and his town
house in Great Ormonde Street, but overall his portfolio was much
enhanced.
He remitted nearly £32,000 from Bengal in the 1757 to 1759 period,
working mostly alone. Around 10 per cent of this, would have remained in
his hands.59 Separate accounts with Captain Hough showed a distinctly sound
balance of around £4,000 credit in 1762; and with him he had shares in the
freight of various East Indiamen, and a stake in the country trade. In 1763
the scale of these operations became even bigger.
His main activity, however, was the ‘Marine Society’. This was a syndicate
in operation from Bombay days, consisting of himself, Henry Vansittart,
Robert Palk, Charles Crommelin, John Spencer, Peter Amyatt and Captain
Samuel Hough. Distribution of shares in the Winchelsea for the twelve months
from April 1763 to March 1764 exemplifies how it operated. Vansittart,
Spencer and Crommelin took three sixteenths each; Palk and Amyatt took
one sixteenth each; Captain Samuel Hough (who was ship’s husband) took
eight sixteenths. Sulivan shared with Hough, Spencer and Vansittart. For
political reasons, his name did not appear on the records. It paid handsomely.
His duty was to ensure that everything would be to advantage when it came
to the sale of freight. Nor did the news that this ship had been run aground,
cause much concern. Vansittart ordered his attorneys to take two sixteenths
freight of the new vessel.60
The ‘Marine Society’ continued to prosper, growing ever more profitable;
and a list of subscribers was built up. Vansittart took out a second
‘subscription’ in March 1764. A safe channel was found in Captain Tinker,
but remittances were be forwarded through other channels.61 Sulivan also left
some money in India for general investment in the country trade.
Most of his fortune, however, was almost certainly placed with the London
Assurance Company. It would have been managed for him by Thomas Lane,
his close confidant and a Director of that company. He had many other
connections there: with Governor, John Hyde; the shipper Thomas Godfrey
was a Director; and with Crommelin Pigou, the brother of Frederick Pigou
(another East India Company Director) who was the assurance company’s
Accountant. Around 1760 Thomas Lane ‘bought’ a total of £7,500 East India
stock from Sulivan. In all likelihood this too was transferred to the London
Assurance Company on his behalf. It was politically expedient for him to keep
such transactions out of sight.
Between October 1759 and January 1760 he accumulated £8,500 India
stock; but had ‘sold’ £7,500 in dribs and drabs to Thomas Lane by April
1761. He then bought £1,000 stock needed to qualify as a Director. Much of
this money Lane would have invested with the London Assurance Company.62
In 1765 his fortune would have amounted to between £40,000 and
£50,000, and outright ownership of Ponsborne estate and his London town
house. Possibly there was more. In September 1763 Robert Palk
congratulated him on, ‘The subject of the letters from the Lords
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations.’63 In August 1765 Palk alluded to
another transaction, saying, rather cryptically, ‘I congratulate you on the
credit you must be in of purchasing in Ireland or Scotland.’64
On a personal level it was a very rewarding period. Launching into
Parliament, becoming a country squire, life at Great Ormonde Street, all
opened new fields of experience. His family and relations coming of age
added new elements to everyday life. They became part of his growing
network when they penetrated to India. His affairs were in a prosperous way;
and he had not yet succumbed to any foolish gamble that might throw all at
risk.
8
Challenge: Defeat:
And Reflection
1757-65
S ulivan faced a constant stream of hostility in newspaper and pamphlet

form as the April 1764 election approached. The major features in the papers
were about how obnoxious the Nabobs were, and the party divisions
appearing in the Company and Parliament. Unavoidably, the ongoing
struggle with Clive acted as a focus for everything and he found himself in
the eye of the storm. He was also controversial because he was so central to
the turn of events in National, City and Company politics; so much so it was
scarcely possible to find an impartial appraisal of his contribution. Men
feared him because he was in a position to help or hurt them.
The broadsheets reflected envy of his ability and meteoric rise to power.
His ruthless cold-blooded approach to executive decisions and ready
criticism had earned him enemies. Yet he was not being innovative in
applying this level of censure, the 1754 Direction had railed against
licentiousness in Bengal. His censures echoed the even earlier ones of Sir
Josiah Child in the 1680s.
Perhaps the best pro-Sulivan statement is that which appeared in the Public
Advertiser on 9 April 1768. Referring to these earlier years, it maintained that
he had been at the head of affairs ‘in the most dangerous and perilous hours
that the Company ever experienced.’ He had conducted himself with
‘unquestioned ability and an unsullied character’, at all times ‘distinguishing
himself for an honest and disinterested attachment to the Company. Nor was
he the man to swerve in his devotion to the Company in its days of
prosperity when he had more than once saved it in adversity’. Sulivan made
much the same claim himself in 1778: ‘My fame and fortune (perhaps my
CHALLENGE: DEFEAT: AND REFLECTION 1757-65 131
personal safety) were hazarded to save them.’1 These views, however, are
more than balanced by the opposite interpretation his enemies gave.
Two collections of real hate stand out. One was written by Thomas Rous,
no name was appended to the other.2 It was a much more formidable
document; in pinpointing Sulivan’s thoughts and actions during these years
and in strength of attack it outshines Rous’ work. In the eyes of both, every
evil that beset the Company had its origins with him. He was portrayed as the
‘arch-villain’. The author of the more formidable piece accused him of
creating all the ‘violent dissentions at home’; of ‘aspirations to a despotic
sway in the India Direction, symptomatic of an overbearing spirit that could
brook no control’. The catalogue of alleged misdemeanours was endless.3
Readers were solemnly assured that Sulivan had created the struggle with
the ‘good-natured Clive’ with his ‘shining qualities’.4 It was denied that he
extricated the Company from the danger and distress it had laboured under
in 1758 and 1759. This refutation is in itself significant, showing it was a
commonly held view. Saying that it took the efforts of Dudley and Rous to
put things right, must have appeared absurd to contemporaries who knew
even a little of these men or of Company affairs. It was an endless tirade, but
at least one truth was admitted, doubtless distasteful to them: Sulivan’s
diligence.5
Parts of the stream of disinformation and character assassination were very
wounding, especially the assertion that his plans and instructions had nothing
to do with success in India. This honour was awarded to the soldiers and
servants of the King and of the Company alone. Such efforts to exclude his
name beget the truth. The reality and the commonly held view was that
Sulivan’s input at this critical time was absolutely vital.6
Diatribes like this must be read in the context of cabalistic journalism. Yet,
what his enemies said dampens any tendency to admire him uncritically, or to
dwell on his many attributes without adverse comment. It is sobering to
come across denial of features that he was praised for elsewhere.
A truthful picture, however, would be that he was honest; that he had the
gift of instilling confidence in others; and reacted to critical situations without
flapping. He was well-informed and knowledgeable of the ways of the world.
His frustration can be readily imagined, faced with enforced ignorance of
recent events abroad and confronted by baying enemies at home. Most of
these were entirely unmindful of anything other than dividends and driving
him out of office.
2
Of course, apart from policy-making, administrative duties, personnel
problems, tumultuous events in India and remorseless attacks in the public
newspapers, there was the little matter of resolving the struggle for mastery
with Clive. The first round had gone his way in 1763, but before the contest
was resumed, as it was certain to be at the next election, Clive was to be
made to pay the price of defeat. Sulivan launched an attack on the jagir.
In April 1763, almost immediately following the election, Vansittart

received orders to pay the jagir money accruing for the current year into the
Company’s treasury at Fort William. Sulivan had held misgivings about the
jagir from the time it was granted, but had turned a blind eye. Following his
challenge at the election, Clive could scarcely expect preferential treatment to
continue.
The day after the instructions to Bengal had been signed the great man
received word of it. He was indignant, and wrote immediately to Vansittart,
Amyatt and Carnac in Bengal urging that they delay the implementation of
the Court’s resolution. Vansittart was to, ‘act like an honest man and a man
of honour’ over the issue.7 Incredibly, he then went on to warn Vansittart
and the Bengal Council not to comply with the orders they had received
from their superiors; and Amyatt and Carnac were to bring an action against
them if they obeyed their instructions.
Meantime, in England he looked for a loophole to prevent the Company’s
instructions being complied with. The Directors refused to give him a copy
of its proceedings relating to the fate of the grant, so he filed a Bill in
Chancery and placed the case in the hands of his friend Lord Hardwicke.
Three separate writs of subpoena were served: upon the Company, the
Chairman, and Deputy Chair. The machinery of the law then took over and
its ponderous slowness suited Sulivan.
To Clive the Company was only the collecting agency, and the annual jagir
payment, though drawn from the Bengal treasury in essence did not belong
to it. The lawsuit stifled his wish to be a Director, however, and he fumed ‘of
making the aggressors pay dear’.8 Meanwhile, the executive wanted to know
the real state of affairs regarding the jagir.9 Vansittart and his Council were to
discover how Clive obtained the grant; and it was to be examined for any
imposture. The Secret Committee did not think there was any valid patent or
title to it; and did not want to become ‘tributary as it were to its own
servants’.10 Clive was depicted as having failed in his duty by procuring the
jagir for himself rather than for the Company’s benefit; and the committee
did not want this to set a precedent. Additionally, since Mir Jafar was
deposed in 1760, any original grant must be obsolete.
Revenge seems to have been uppermost in Sulivan mind in the summer of
1763. Nothing had happened regarding this matter until Clive’s public
opposition. Yet the move against the jagir was not altogether petty; a very real
struggle for supremacy was going on where Clive’s money was hugely
important. Also, the sorry state of the Bengal treasury suggested that such a
sustained drain on it would have a devastating effect.
Sulivan’s enemies considered his action spiteful as well as illegal.11 It was
certainly his decision because he masterminded nearly everything. Yet in
letters to Vansittart, he stated that Clive had forced his hand. John Dunning
ably answered Clive’s legal argument. Clive had charged that Sulivan’s
resentment of his wealth led to his (supposed) ill will; and that he had also
approved the jagir arrangements from the start. Dunning pointed out that
Sulivan had since given his reason for suspending payment, and this satisfied
most Proprietors. Even if their friendship had ended, there was still the
position of the Proprietors to be taken into consideration. Sulivan no longer
stood in the way of the jagir payments being stopped. As Dunning put it,
Sulivan had not actively pursued an end to the payments; he need only agree
with the body of opinion in the Company. Dunning also thought it was only
natural that Clive’s personal enmity and opposition would mean Sulivan
could have no further confidence in his Lordship.12
In stopping the jagir Sulivan was only doing what everyone expected. To
most contemporaries it was well deserved. What has made his action seem so
sinister was the swiftness of it all. Yet the reason was quite simple. A positive
move had to be made before the April 1764 election, which could change the
whole complexion of the Court of Directors.
Clive now sought the influence of his Parliamentary friends: Chatham,
Lords Hardwicke and Powis, the Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire. They
were all unable to help. He then promised his support and Parliamentary
interest to the new Grenville Administration, to no avail.13 The Company was
approached and offered a deal: that he keep the jagir for twelve or at the least
ten years more, in return for abandoning his East Indian interests. The terms
were unanimously rejected.
However, with Bute’s replacement by Grenville in April, Sulivan lost his
principal Parliamentary ally. He was then approached by Lord Sandwich, on
behalf of the ministry. The Company was an integral part of the City where
the new Government sought backing. This was also why Grenville and
Sandwich tried to stop the Sulivan-Clive feud. Grenville had discussions with
Sulivan and John Dorrien on 12 December. Clive thought the minister ‘too
sanguine’ in his hope of success.14 He was right. In September Sulivan had
already written to Shelburne on hearing of his resignation from the Bute
party and vowed his continued support.
It was at this juncture that news arrived of the revolution in Bengal, and all
Sulivan’s feelings of safety were cast to the winds. He was caught off guard,
mainly because of the on-going struggle at home. The later official
despatches were panic-stricken. Bengal had ‘become a scene of bloodshed
and confusion’.15 Nothing else was talked about at Leadenhall.
It was utterly incongruous, however, that he, who for years had grappled
with the emergencies erupting in India, might be struck down because of one
of these crises. It was even more derisive that Clive, in this period at least
anything but a public-spirited servant, should find his fortunes retrieved by
the same sequence of events.
Reaction to the bad news soon appeared. The Proprietors were alarmed. It
was feared dividends would suffer; India stock plunged; and news that
Vansittart had dismissed some of his Council sent its price even lower.
Differences with Clive were forgotten, and it was urged that his return to
India was the solution. It was a heavenly opportunity for him, and the
disconcerting news breaking so near the April 1764 election, made the
moment even more opportune.
All his Lordship’s forces from the 1763 election were still there to be
called upon; and the newly dismissed Bengal Councillors swelled the
numbers. The attack was launched when nine Proprietors, supporters of
Clive, demanded a General Court to consider the situation in Bengal. It was
fixed for 27 February 1764. Sulivan was charged with being responsible for
the dismal state of affairs in Bengal. Aware that his attackers might suggest a
vote of no confidence, he agreed with a resolution that Clive be asked to
return to Bengal. He managed to make his followers do the same. Clive
would give no reply there and then. However, the Proprietors were made
aware that his going out at all depended on his rival being ousted and the jagir
question settled.
Clive and his friends were also lobbying in Parliament, where Charles
Jenkinson and the Treasury promised their support. By intervening on the
‘rebel’ side, however, the Grenville ministry did not act in the public’s best
interest. In choosing to reject the incumbent Directors (Administration’s
normal allies) the move challenged the traditional alignment; as did rejecting
it because of good terms enjoyed with the ministry’s predecessors.
On 1 March Sulivan and his group narrowly won the ballot on whether
the executive was responsible for what had happened in Bengal. Yet another
General Court was fixed for the 12th March. It was boisterous and
clamorous. The Clivites again proposed that their leader should go out; and it
was agreed that he should be made Governor and Commander-in-Chief in
Bengal. He would supersede General Lawrence. Four others were to be
nominated to form with him a Select Committee, empowered to act without
reference to the Bengal Council. Sulivan could see very well the need for a
strong man exercising vast powers; but Clive was not the man he thought
best suited for this work.16
An attempt to force a ballot on whether his Lordship would accept these
positions there and then was unsuccessful. He would only go if the Directors
(meaning Sulivan) were as well-disposed to him as the General Court. A
resolution was also passed that all proceedings against the jagir be dropped so
that on that account he could make no objection to taking ship for India.
Again Clive deferred giving any decisions. It suited his purposes to leave
everything hanging fire just before the April election. Just as equally, it was to
Sulivan’s benefit to have him fixed in position.
The next thrust in this deadly ‘game’ came from Sulivan on 16 March.
Pleading the seriousness of affairs in Bengal, Clive was urged to embark
immediately, all being prepared. Clive, of course, had to stay for the election,
as Sulivan would have figured. But at least he was given a new line to pursue
– that the ‘saviour’ was dragging his feet. Whether he was the right man for
the job must be looked at anew.
A showdown was expected at the quarterly General Court on 21 March.
Again Clive declined to accept the posts until after the Company election.
Sulivan and his followers seized upon this as a refusal and tried to annul the
offer. They pointed out that on four separate occasions the great man had
declined to give a firm acceptance of the posts offered to him.
Sulivan’s move failed, however, because most Proprietors were persuaded

they wanted him out to India at any price. If he would not go until after the
election, they were not prepared to argue further. His Lordship was again
asked if he accepted the offices and once more declined. Then, in the middle
of heated exchanges, he rose and stated blankly that before he would under-
take the management of the Company’s affairs in Bengal, Sulivan had to be
removed from office and from power.
Pandemonium ensued, everyone was on their feet, and nobody could be
heard. Sulivan only just managed to maintain his composure. The Proprietors
were forced, against their will, to choose between them. When the hubbub
had died down Clive continued, stating how much he differed from Sulivan
in policies and plans for the future; and that he did not consider him a right
and proper leader. He said he could do nothing while Sulivan continued in
power, because his enemy would simply cancel out all he attempted; adding
that in his opinion Sulivan was ignorant of the real nature of East Indian
affairs.
Once more there was uproar. This last assertion was staggering, such was
the overwhelming evidence of Sulivan’s adroitness and unimpeachable
knowledge of India matters. The next accusation that Sulivan was his
personal and inveterate enemy was an attempt to imply that all rancour
stemmed from his opponent.
Clive’s outburst was not liked. Sulivan contrived to be heard above the din.
Cleverly using the current of sympathy, due to the predicament his enemy
had placed him in, he painted Clive with his own words of hostility. By
restating his wish for friendship, appreciation of his talents and a desire to
cooperate, he made him appear boorish and placed his adversary on the back
foot. The Proprietors pushed for some sort of amicable agreement. Clive was
asked upon what terms he would engage in the Company’s service. He
requested a few days to consult his friends before giving his reply. Seven days
later the letter sent to the Directors was published simultaneously in the
newspapers. He would not accept the position if Sulivan continued in
control. The Proprietors must choose between them.
As the election approached Clive appeared to have all the advantages:
prestige; a majority support among the Proprietors; and some backing in the
Direction. The ‘Bengal Squad’ was ready; he had his dazzling wealth; and the
splitting machinery used in 1763. Most important of all, he had the support
of the Grenville ministry.
Shelburne had left Bute and gone over to Chatham, so Sulivan drifted
back there too – although still managing to keep some links with Bute. He
also wanted to reach Grenville, but by November 1763 Clive had made the
strongest connection with the minister through Jenkinson. Thereafter,
Grenville would permit no approaches from him.
Within the Company Clive again worked with Thomas Rous and John
Payne. The same old spurious arguments appeared and repeated ad nauseum in
the press. However, the attack on Vansittart eased because he was making
the Governor’s followers hostile. His Lordship was also making converts.
Sulivan, however, faced the opposite. He lost the support of Henry Crabb
Boulton and Henry Savage. The Johnstones were actively engaged, as they
put it, in ‘making a great push to turn out one O Sulivan, a Damned Irish
Scoundrel who is chairman of the Directors’.17 They entered the lists,
desperate to have their brother John reinstated after being dismissed by
Sulivan for receiving presents. Jenkinson, meanwhile, touted among the
ministry’s supporters; and was busy among officers of the Customs and
Excise and clerks of the Post Office. Joseph Salvador, canvassed the
‘Proprietors’ list. Defeat, it seemed, was out of the question; Clive had the
kind of backing that Sulivan enjoyed in 1763.
Nevertheless, the outcome was not at all clear until the very end. Once
more Sulivan brought into play all the entrenched support he had enjoyed in
1763, minus ministerial backing. He verified later that this was decisive, but
claimed that the desertion of someone like Amyand proved just as fatal. He
also said the ‘SCOTCH’ were against him, referring to the Johnstones and
their connections.18 In Parliament only Shelburne, Barré and Calcraft of the
Opposition stirred themselves on his behalf.
Yet ‘the real natural strength of the Company’ was still with him.19
Colleagues from his service days in India gave unreserved backing. The
bankers, brokers and underwriters were called into action once more. He
summoned friends among the Proprietors: the Barwells, James and Lane; and
from the Direction: Boyd and Thornton. Streams of connections were
canvassed, such as the families of friends in India like Palk, Vansittart, and
Spencer. The results were impressive.
Altogether both sides produced well over two hundred votes. Clive had
between ten or twenty more. Thus through his ‘natural interest’ Sulivan had
neutralized the Indian wealth of Clive and his allies, and almost that of the
Government. Twelve candidates were ‘double-listed’, leaving the twelve
remaining places to be contested. The Clive party gained six, Sulivan the
other six, giving a dead heat. Sulivan, however, was only just returned; and it
was reported in the Gentleman’s Magazine, that ‘Mr. Sullivan’s being elected
into the Direction depended upon a very nice question, whether Mrs.
Drummond, Lady to the Archbishop of York, could be considered as a
stockholder in her own right.’20 It was decided that she could not, and this
left Sulivan with a majority of one vote over his nearest challenger.
He also had an edge over his rival in the early stages of the election. First
indications suggested he would have twelve selected, while Clive could be
sure of only ten. Then additional Clive money and the waywardness of
relationships in this cauldron of interests took over, and John Harrison
appeared in Clive’s list.21
Precedent had long established that the Deputy Chair automatically
became Chairman the next year, but Sulivan’s desire to be placed in the Chair
without a ballot was denied, despite a majority for him in a show of hands.
The reason given for a ballot was that the ‘draw’ in the election of Directors
had been without example. The denial was crucial, however, and marked the
watershed of Sulivan’s control in these years.
Yet it was a close-run thing. An alarmed Clive-Rous camp had thought of

coming to terms. The ballot result saved them: the number for and against
was equal, which Sulivan interpreted as a personal insult. More importantly,
he knew that he had lost the confidence of most Proprietors. He and some
friends withdrew from the Court in what was described as a very strained
atmosphere. Sulivan said afterwards that he would not vote for himself or he
would have had the Chair. The humiliation was made complete with the
immediate election of Rous and Boulton. It was reported that it was with
some difficulty he was persuaded not to sell out his stock; and that five of his
close friends, including those who had walked out of the General Court with
him, also meant to sell out. That none of them did meant that the struggle
for outright supremacy continued for at least another year.
3
Sulivan’s withdrawal from the Court and not voting for himself appeared
foolish then and seems so even now; he still commanded half the Direction.
His withdrawal was interpreted, correctly, as a win for Clive in a trial of
strength. Meanwhile, Company stock rose with the abatement of bad news
from India, the cessation (it seemed) of the political contest, and Clive’s
imminent return to Bengal. His Lordship had three things to do, however,
before he could safely go abroad. He had to secure the jagir money; obtain
the favourable terms he had demanded for his government of Bengal; and
make certain that Sulivan would no longer offer a political challenge.
For Sulivan the initiative was largely lost. He could only reply as best he
could in the Courts and Committees, and prepare for the 1765 election. He
would use his latent support to prevent Clive from achieving overwhelming
supremacy at home and abroad. Without such action, the ground lost would
be irrecoverable.
The struggle recommenced on 19 April 1764 when Clive expressed his
views on the state of the Company’s affairs and how far these diverged from
Vansittart’s (and thus by implication, from Sulivan’s). He seized the reins of
Company patronage, but had little to work with. Before the next Court
assembled, however, the Direction was made aware of what he expected: the
jagir issue resolved; John Spencer returned to Bombay; and the end of the
Nawab’s independence.
Ten Directors, Sulivan included, had already voted against or abstained
regarding these terms, repeating their objections on 27 April. Sulivan strove
to stop Clive from stamping his will on Bengal. To his relief, the enemy (who
had just received the Order of the Bath) did moderate his demands, fearing
he might endanger renewal of the jagir by alienating the Proprietors. He was
only sworn in as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Fort William.
Spencer, however, was returned to Bombay. The jagir issue, and other terms
that would give him special powers were left unresolved.
The rest of the Company only heard about all this at the General Court on
2 May, recorded as one of the stormiest ever held. It witnessed the struggle
to see whether Clive would return on the Company’s terms or his own.
Sulivan launched an attack upon the jagir hoping to further weaken Clive’s
hand. Limiting his Lordship’s Bengal’s powers was as important to him as the
jagir money was to Clive. This was of such importance to the great man it
dazzled him; and symbolised the personal vendetta with Sulivan.
His terms were just as asked for in December 1763 – that he should enjoy
the money for ten years more. The Proprietors, while they wanted him in
India, had no wish to give him this money. It was an angry debate. Twenty
Proprietors, all Sulivan’s friends, voted against the jagir motion. Sulivan also
pressed for a regulation that would shackle Clive and the other servants in
India from accepting presents. A vote was called for.
Luckily for the Clivites, Grenville, Jenkinson and Joseph Salvador were
busy, and when the ballot was held on 6 May Clive won, and the jagir was
safe for ten more years. On the other hand, the powers he wanted were still
not granted. Finally, on 17 May it was resolved that he and a committee of
four would be given full authority in Bengal until the restoration of peace
there. Even then, eleven Directors, including Sulivan, voted against these
‘extraordinary powers’, on the grounds that they were both ‘unnecessary and
dangerous’.22
Sulivan had every reason to be disturbed, Clive was almost unassailable.
His Lordship was now President and Governor, Commander-in-Chief, and
Chairman of the Select Committee of four, all of them hand-picked by him
(Sumner, Carnac, Verelst and Sykes). When all powerful, he had planned
similar powers for Vansittart, with the important difference that he would
govern him from India House. There was no shackle on Clive. Sulivan was
also aware that this further defeat over the jagir issue, plus the powers Clive
had been given, were signs of failure to stop his foe; and his support drained
away. In this sense, the jagir issue certainly merited its widespread infamy.
Although almost down and out, there was no mistaking his opposition
until all was lost. A letter to his fellow Directors, on 1 June expressed
‘Objections to signing the General Letter to Bengal with the certain powers
contained therein to Lord Clive and a part of the Council there’.23 Yet,
although his enmity is understandable, the new Governor needed more
authority to remedy things in Bengal. Sulivan was refusing to give Clive what
he was prepared to give Vansittart. Suspicion and belief that some sort of
control from India House had to be maintained governed him.
Clive sailed on 4 June 1764. His jagir was secure; he had a majority in the
Court of Directors and had powers sufficient for his purposes in Bengal. He
envisaged the final collapse of Sulivan in April and control of the Company
shifting with him to India. Sulivan remained embittered. Even while Clive (as
reported by Walsh) was intimating that he did not intend to ‘enrich himself
one farthing by any pay or emoluments he might receive’, he remained
convinced his enemy’s return to India was for pecuniary advantage.24
Despite Clive’s absence, strong forces were at work on his behalf during
the build-up to the election. John Walsh wrote that Grenville would give
every assistance against Sulivan, of whom ‘the Court have a personal
resentment…to the point of shutting him entirely out of the Direction’.25

Within the Company the Clivites strengthened their grip. They knew Sulivan
was capable of taking advantage of their splits and disagreements, and this
held them together.
By February 1765 Clive’s supporters were encouraging friends to split
stock; and £4,300 of Clive’s, and £20,000 in Walsh’s name, was divided. The
‘Bengal Squad’ gave their usual backing; and before the election proper they
were sure of fourteen of the twenty-four Directors. Yet the group’s instability
remained; that it did not break up was owed almost entirely to Walsh.
Backing for Sulivan was uncertain, both in the Company and in
Parliament. Bute influenced some great Whigs, such as the Duke of
Northumberland.26 Luke Scrafton put it down to ‘petticoat influence’.27 To
cajole support, Sulivan declared publicly, at The Feathers tavern, that he had no
designs against Clive. Bute and Colonel Barré echoed these sentiments in
Parliament. Walsh, not unnaturally, thought Sulivan was lying. Now in a
minority in the Direction, he would not succeed, as Orme put it, ‘until the
Shelbournes Calcrafts and Barrys succeed in the Administration’.28
However, at first he had some success. Walsh wrote of the ‘greatest
alarms’ Rous and Boulton were under, because he ‘opposes all their measures
and perplexes them much’. These two could scarcely get thirteen Directors to
sign a letter merely advising the arrival of a ship.29 His campaign really
commenced in November 1764, when Walsh said he was ‘very active and
preparing for another tussle...He relies, I conclude, upon his orators.’ He
referred to Barré and Dunning. He also spoke, warily, of his great support
among the shippers and ships’ husbands.30
In the interim Clive lost the backing of the Johnstones and their Scottish
allies. They disliked his effort to take John Johnstone’s wealth from him in
the Court of Chancery. It brought them over to Sulivan’s side. He,
meanwhile, had been building his own Scottish support, adding the powerful
Proprietor John Stewart and Charles Boddam and all his relations. He also
secured the backing of George Dempster, a firm friend of Bute; and inept
electioneering by Rous won him the support of Sir James Cockburn, his
relation John Stewart of Buckingham Street, and Sir Gregory Page. By
February, though, he was hard put to find other backers. Captain Hough’s
death was a heart-felt blow. His plan seemed to be to set his own name singly
against Crabb Boulton.
At the election he used the dexterity perfected in almost a decade of
Company politics, employing the hand lists purposely developed. Again
Walsh referred to them: ‘Sullivan certainly means to make a push this
year…printing off lists of Proprietors.’31 The steady stream of desertions
grew, nevertheless, as he shouldered the unpopularity from opposing the
supposed saviour. The support of Luke Scrafton was lost. Walsh said he had
opened his eyes to what he was really like.32
The loss of the financier Aaron Franks and the bankers Devon and Child
was catastrophic.33 Pigou, Chambers, and even Barwell followed. Walsh also
hinted that Shelburne was half-hearted, and that Sulivan’s friends, Lord
Howe and Robert Wood, would make peace with the ministry. He believed
the Irishman was finished ‘unless our friends (Rous and Boulton) prove
themselves as impracticable in business to the ministry as they have done to
me’.34
The Clivites and their Parliamentary associates also blocked Sulivan’s
effort to stop the creation of fictitious votes through the splitting of stock.
They believed, probably correctly, that Sulivan tried to trick them when he
split his own stock at Christmas, then tried to stop them from doing so. The
Company (really Sulivan) had presented a petition to Parliament, followed by
a Bill, to this effect. He threw all his weight behind both petition and Bill, as
he saw them as a last chance to turn the tables. The Bill was defeated on a
technicality.
It was the first effort to stop an iniquitous system; and a typical Sulivan
mixture of public and private interest. Although of help to him, it might also
have secured the Company’s welfare. He probably over-emphasised its
importance to his cause, however, because it is doubtful whether the
prevention of about 200 votes for the Clivites would have changed the final
result.
The passage of the Bill is interesting. It was thrown out at the second
reading, according to Walsh, for: ‘Not being drawn up conformably to the
Company’s Petition…it arose from accident not design.’35 Walsh’s analysis
does not tell the truth, however. Sulivan had made it impossible to go against
it on principle; but Grenville was under no illusions that it had to be stopped.
The ‘technicality’ excuse was too coincidental.36
Again, as the election approached, the tirades in broadsides, and
comments in daily papers increased. Scrafton, having renounced Sulivan,
informed Clive that he would be ‘turning pamphleteer’ against the ‘crafty
insinuating little dog’s application to the Proprietors’.37 Only Mr. Cave’s
Gentleman’s Magazine tried to give the truth, and in a remarkably fair
assessment, Sulivan was both condemned and praised. He was chastised for
his hostility to the Rous-led Direction and to Clive; had signed no General
Letters to Bengal; and had shown too much favour to Vansittart. Nor had he
paid a big enough dividend. Here the writer was quite wrong, there was no
spare money.
He was then praised for his ability, his honesty and the fact that he was
against the splitting system. He was needed ‘to save the Company from
ambitious and greedy servants’, not to mention ‘blundering and biased
Directors’. His presence was essential to ‘prevent another tenth of their
whole capital from being granted away to the next officer who…shall
demand £300,000 payable in England for a frivolous claim extracted by
violence in India’.38
Newspaper harangue gave way to the election itself, which resulted in a
sweeping victory for the Clivites. Scrafton’s thought that out of despair ‘the
wretch (Sulivan) would now sink into oblivion’. He could not have been
more mistaken.39 His defeat was total, however, and every Clive supporter
displayed relief. Boulton was elected Chairman and Dudley was made Deputy
Chair.40 In Bengal, Clive rejoiced at his rival’s overthrow, and now portrayed
him, unbelievably, as a dangerous enemy to the Company. His continued fear
of him as ‘a very great rival’, is revealed, however, in a letter to Joseph
Fowke.41
Nervousness among Clive’s disciples that their adversary might stage a
revival continued until December 1765; and Sulivan might have been
prepared to end all connections with the Company at that point. In
Parliament his associates, headed by Sir James Hodges, tried to revive the Bill
stopping splitting; and at Leadenhall attempts were made to rekindle interest
in his fortunes.42 All this was ignored. It was only in February 1766 that
Clivite fears were finally put to rest. Scrafton wrote: ‘Sulivan is making
application for single votes for himself but I don’t hear anything of a list.’ He
was still politically alive, but only just.43 His defiance remained, however; and
for his enemies a continued attention to Company affairs was ominous.
4
By 1765 the English had reached the point where they would never
voluntarily relinquish the position that military prowess had won in India.
The territories ceded and the degree of individual exploitation revolutionised
everything. Control transferred to the Company; and with it went the burden
of responsibility. Much of the native country trade was added to existing
commerce, bringing economic ascendancy. Sulivan failed to stop any of this,
because neither his agents (the Governors) nor indeed any serving Nawab
was heeded. An army resolved the situation; and all was finalised at Baksar in
October 1764, ‘Squashing any nonsense’ of native independence, and
determining the English hold on a lucrative commerce.44
Sulivan had attempted to place the right men in India, with proper systems
to work with. However, the men and systems had to be chosen by him, and
the men had to take his guidance. Through Clive, Vansittart and Spencer he
attempted in vain to have his policies implemented in Bengal; it was the same
with Pigot and Palk in Madras, and Crommelin in Bombay. But no man
would have been equal to the task. All the forceful directives, forward
planning, instructions and attention to detail only worked to some extent in
reversing the trend towards independent action in India.
He abhorred the abuse of Dastucks; and warned servants to keep their
hands clean.45 He tried to ‘build a spirit of trade, industry and mercantile
engagements’; but could not curtail private enterprise and corruption. Clive’s
non-compliance and his own failure to maintain obedience were fatal. It was
all in vain; and to most Asians the English appeared, ‘vile, worthless, without
honour and gratitude.’46
He was on the right lines, however, in attempting adequate payment for
the Governors. His uncertainty over the correct course of action, especially
slowness in empowering Vansittart, did not help either; and the same doubt
explains some tardiness in implementing regulations. He was not prepared to
go as far as was required; hesitating to give Governors powers to quell
insubordination and disobedience without referral to London. Those given to

Vansittart and his Council in 1764 could be considered a late move, a
grudging acceptance that the feeling in India of separateness from India
House should be acknowledged.
The expected opposition to such a development appeared at Leadenhall,
expressed in a memorial from Governor George Johnstone and George
Dempster. They referred to the ‘extraordinary powers entrusted with Mr.
Vansittart’.47 Nevertheless, an irreversible shift in the position of the
Company and its servants in Bengal had taken place.
Some praise is due however. In this era, only his activity and stentorian
voice prevented even more serious loss of control from London. He
managed to put some kind of check on the move to autonomy because he
dominated for so long, and was able to implement one-man control. As a
consequence, executive control from India House, although diminished, was
not doused. Later the Governor-General concept would embrace the
development of semi-independence, beginning with Sulivan’s nominee,
Warren Hastings.
As far as his long-term blueprint for India is concerned, it was successful
in the methods laid down, and in the direction given. The idea of limited
sovereignty and maximum trade was tried and failed; but the transformation
from trading post to empire that followed was established on his pragmatic
approach to difficulties and realisable solutions. Contemporary ideas could
wither and die while underlying arrangements served as guidelines for future
developments.
He had preserved order when faced with chaos; and in clinging to the
sanctity of the Company’s Charter mapped the way ahead in State-Company
relations. His cautious approach also saved his precious Company from
bankruptcy, disintegration and collapse. On a personal note, the degree to
which he enjoyed these struggles should be noted. He thrived on them. He
did not want to be anywhere else; only India House could give him what his
heart desired.
5
The dispute with Clive was not all about pride and vanity. They both had
clear visions of what they wanted – reflected in their contrasting futures for
the Company. However, there were very obvious differences in
temperament, not just those reflected in their occupations of soldier and
businessman. Generally, Sulivan reacted to how he was treated or accepted.
Clive found it easy to have a love-hate relationship with people. Sulivan was
startlingly honest throughout his public career.
From the start Sulivan was a conservative force, opting for slow change.
Keeping the Company solvent was his prime objective; buying time to make
adjustments, correct abuses, curtail military expenditure and put the
Company on a sound commercial basis in India. Swamped by traumatic
events he tried in vain to find a settling down period.
Company independence was maintained, and Parliamentary intrusion kept

at bay until the day Clive fully committed the Company to a territorial role by
acquiring the Diwani. The fact that developments then took a different path
was outside his control; and led to State intervention. The wealth his rival
brought to bear was a problem, and to match it he was not too fussy where
the money came from. This allowed infiltration by undesirable elements. Yet
it was never his intention to undermine the Company by this, or permit the
Parliamentary control Clive wanted.
As far as he was concerned, Clive was a traitor; a servant bent on the
Company’s liquidation. And to him it was scandalous that he had to counter
someone working against its best interests from within its own body. He also
found it astounding that he, the acclaimed leader of the Company, presiding
over everyone, was forced to combat an employee who insisted upon placing
himself before anything or anyone else. He, on the other hand, knew his
duty: ‘The Company’s interest must ever with me supersede all other
considerations.’48
Clive respected his rival, but did not really understand him. This gave
Sulivan an advantage, because he had come to know the military-Governor
type of mentality. He had spent fourteen years close to successive Governors:
Horne, Law, Wake and Bourchier. In fact, Clive’s two secretaries, Walsh and
Strachey, probably understood Sulivan better than their master.
6
As long as Sulivan had power, everything was kept strictly within the
framework of how well the Company’s best interests were served. Its
monopoly, independence and chartered rights, wrung from successive
Governments, were untouchable. What he did was of tremendous benefit to
the British nation, not just the Company. He had been a very effective war
leader and organiser of victory in the East; planning and executing
expeditions and campaigns against the French, Dutch and hostile Asian
powers, most of which were successful.
His aim of reforming the administration of India was only partly achieved;
but increasingly he came to see this as his life’s work; and his labours helped
shape what the Company would become. The next twenty years of his life
would complement this. He looked to the future and carefully plotted long-
term measures for the better government of the Company’s possessions in
India. Towards this end he introduced sound organisational bases and
efficient methods that would stand the test of time; improvements that were
recognised, long after his demise:
The East India Company’s three presidencies of Calcutta, Madras

and Bombay stood out like oases of order and comparative
plenty. The inevitable happened. Efficient organisms swallowed
inefficiencies...the old trading Company...graduated into one
centralised all-powerful bureaucracy.49
He has been unjustly traduced over the part he played during these years.
This wise man was more than equal to the responsibility placed upon him
during a period of dire emergency.50 No charge of mismanagement of
Company’s affairs can be laid at his door. On the contrary, he maintained and
perfected its traditional policies. He wished to avoid the complications that
accompanied imperial design; wanted no involvement in Indian politics; and
had no wish to bear the brunt of the legalities and expenses that would arise.
Nor had he any wish to be caught up in the moral and material problems
arising when one culture becomes involved with another. He hated what
might be termed racial imperialism that he sensed developing with Clive.
An exceptional clear-sightedness was combined with determination to see
a thing through to its conclusion. In this period of great stress, he provided
drive, grit and guidance. His diplomacy is reflected in the way he deferred to
Chatham during the war, while carrying inordinate responsibility himself.
Colleagues praised him for numerous rescues. His discernment and grasp
were recognised and remarked upon despairingly by enemies. From 1757
until April 1764 he enjoyed complete control over all facets of Company
business never before enjoyed by any man, and never enjoyed by him or any
other again.
As far as he was concerned the East India Company had to pay its way,
and produce profits. This would also stop the State from threatening its
independence. Strict bookkeeping kept the whole rambling structure within
practical bounds. Hard-headed men of business, like himself, ran the
Company and put their money into it. They might have spent early careers
elsewhere, as traders, insurers and bankers, or they might be from the landed
gentry; but when they became Directors and Proprietors of the East India
Company, all was different.
The vast quantities of money invested dictated that each situation had to
be looked at principally from a business point of view: the value of the stock
and the soundness of the commercial organisation. Then as time went on this
came to mean something else – although always kept secondary to making a
profit. Any other manner of control would have meant bankruptcy.
This balance-sheet-conscious man helped lay down the foundations for a
host of future developments. His groundwork during such a troubled era,
later both amended and defended by himself and others, was to last as long
as the Company existed. He was certainly the central figure in all that
happened, just as he would be later. He would fight to regain the power
within the East India Company that he valued above all other things; and for
the Company’s independence from Governmental control, which he
associated with British liberty.
The high regard he was held in was reflected in a number of ways. A street
in Madras was named ‘Sulivan’s Gardens’ in his honour. Two East Indiamen,
the Sulivan and Ponsborne, echoed the popularity he enjoyed among ship
owners. This mixture of approval and awe is reflected in the words
commonly used to describe him: ‘Leader of the Company’; and even more
evocative: ‘Uncrowned King of Leadenhall’.
7
With his exclusion from the Direction and with Clive in India, the feud was
removed from the forefront of Company and national news. The struggle for
dominance had been long and painful, but Clive’s success could only be
temporary. The confrontations would only flare again as Sulivan strove to
regain the position in the Company that his ability warranted and his enemies
denied. Nevertheless, their first clash had been very severe. The personal
nature of the quarrel led to further feuding that continued for a quarter of a
century.51
He kept himself abreast of events after 1765 through place-men within
India House and correspondents in India. He was too good a politician and
too revengeful to be permanently exiled from power. With so many
nonentities in control, it was always possible that his exclusion might be of
short duration. John Walsh summed up the qualities of his allies:
As to our friends, the Chairman and Deputy, they go on as might

be expected of them. It is certainly the greatest joke upon all
government to see such people jostled into the management of
affairs of such extent and of so much consequence to this
Kingdom.52
That he did not return quickly, however, was partly due to the fatigue felt by
many, and their relief to have an end to the seemingly never ending struggle.
It was also partly because Sulivan needed longer than a year to fuse into a
party the disparate interests and numerous adventurers who now jockeyed
for position among the Proprietors.
The tight control exerted by Clive’s able deputies, John Walsh and Luke
Scrafton, also kept him at bay. These same lieutenants sifted through papers
at India House, but could find nothing incriminating, and Clive was forced to
admit Sulivan’s honesty. His Lordship had also transferred his support to
Rockingham when the Grenville ministry fell in mid-1765; and was helped in
that no major East Indies questions had to be faced; there were no issues
demanding Sulivan’s kind of expertise.
In Bengal, Spencer was indignant at the speed with which he was torn
from office. He eventually left Bengal for Bombay on 25 October 1765, his
bitterness deepened by the death of his wife from the ‘dropsy’.53 On arrival,
Clive found that Mir Jafar was dead and Spencer had made the prince’s
second son, Najim-ud-Daula, Nawab. The Prince was totally unsuited to
govern, but had no power to remove his leading ministers, now appointed by
the Company. Clive had only to complete the alliance desired by the Mughal
Emperor. The Vizier of Oudh, Shuja-ud-Daula, desired reconciliation as well,
following Baksar; and ceded lands at Benares and Ghazipur.54
Clive’s activities in Bengal kept proprietary influence inclined towards his
continued direct rule in India and indirect control at India House, especially
with his acceptance of the Diwani. The Company received the entire revenues
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In return, it was responsible for paying the army;
had the accountability and expense of government; collection of revenues;
and administration of justice. The Nawab, now a mere cipher, received 50
lakhs annually.
The new Governor used the Bengal Select Committee to great effect. He
ignored criticism of it expressed by Sulivan, the Johnstones and George
Dempster in the General Court. They were especially fearful of its secrecy
and the threat it offered to the civil authority. He also fixed an income for
himself and friends in salt, involving the sum of £30,000. Warren Hastings
was refused a part of this because he was Vansittart’s friend.55
Implementation of the ‘Dual system’ of government enabled him to
further his plan of bringing the new territories under the nation’s control at
the expense of the Company. He was lucky that the Company Proprietors,
apart from the likes of Sulivan, did not see this and that the Company did not
fold. Fortunately, the Irishman’s earlier overhaul of the organisation’s
commercial basis enabled the system to function. His Lordship lost no time,
however, in blackening his rival’s name. John Spencer’s information was that:
His discourse in common talk respecting you is most improper,

nay, even to me he can scarce contain his contempt…You
honestly express yourself as having no Personalities as to Lord
Clive, that is not his case respecting you. You are so frequently
the subject of his discourse and that in so indecent a degree…I
cannot subject you to the insult and wrong.56
Spencer thought they could never reach an accommodation. Astonishingly,

and true to Spencer’s report, no words of blazing anger or expressions of
everlasting enmity towards Clive can be found anywhere in Sulivan’s
correspondence.
9
Fresh Start and New Game

1765-67
Sulivan quickly picked up the thread of his public life and concerned himself
with what was required to return to power. He was not yet prepared to sink
into obscurity, to be remembered as a once powerful man who had been
swept to defeat and ignominy. Not a year was to pass in which he was not
preparing to contest an April election. He clutched tightly to Shelburne and
his circle, especially to John Dunning and Colonel Isaac Barré. With their
support, inside and outside of the Company, he would begin his climb back
to power.
Even after his defeat, he remained a figure to fear. He carried with him a
permanent support within the Company, his so-called ‘natural strength’.
What is more, his artistry in bringing together individuals and parties made
him dangerous. John Spencer had alerted him to the fact that the Johnstones
had abandoned Clive, and they came over to the Sulivan–Vansittart alliance,
even though John Johnstone and the Vansittarts had always been at variance.
Henceforth, Sulivan set out to be receptive to this Scots phalanx, regardless
of like or dislike. The addition of Henry Vansittart (family and connections
too) was very welcome. It followed Clive’s ill-advised criticism of Vansittart’s
governorship.
A veritable maelstrom of public sentiments now affected Leadenhall. The
general feeling was that shackles on trade should be loosened. The attack
centred on entrenched monopoly and chartered rights; that force was still
being used to back up so-called ‘open barter’ in India. Within the Company
the feeling spread that accretion of military and naval power in India was
uncontrolled. Pockets were still being lined; military costs continued to rise,
shattering any real expansion in trade. The Company’s financial structure was
too limited to allow it to ease over these hurdles.
There were new interests in the General Court; groups whose numbers
were continually added to. Sulivan had to develop his talents in fresh
directions to deal with these intruders. They were also threatening the
Clivites; and grappled with the old commercial interest. The most menacing
was the ministerial grouping. In return for promoting within India House the
initiatives of their Parliamentary friends, many, such as George Wombwell,
and Robert Jones, received contracts and Government business. Courtiers
like Lord Sandwich began to gain more influence. Luckily Sulivan had kept
his connection with the Godfreys and other prominent ships’ husbands,
because the shipping interest became even stronger.
He wooed many people, aiming at bringing diverse individuals and
factions together, merging their desires with his own to create a new political
force. His mantra was that all their wishes would be accomplished if a party,
led by him, predominated at India House. They formed a motley collection:
ministerial friends; former associates from the Court of Proprietors; his
confidants within the Company’s shipping interest; contacts from the City’s
commercial world; and ‘Indians’ who were, in the main, contemporaries of
earlier years.
The new people merged with the supporters he still had within the
Company. Their one common denominator was opposition to Clive or to
anyone he influenced. He added Leycester, Gray, Burdett and Senior, all
disgusted with Clive’s ‘reforms’ in Bengal. He aimed at pitting the wealth of
these returned Company servants against that of Clive and his colleagues.
Gradually he began having more success, and ever more strenuous efforts
were needed to keep him out of office.
His exclusion from the executive had led to a serious lowering of
standards. Neither of the ‘Chairs’ had his kind of expertise; and they
remained highly suspicious of him.1 Their general level of incompetence and
the fact that his Lordship backed such men gave Sulivan every incentive to
harass them. Clive’s absence until 1767 was also a great help, because a
growing unease at his untoward control enabled him to work up a dislike of
over-rich Nabobs. He also fanned into life his anti-splitting Bill to counter
the influence of rich men like Clive.
What developed in Bengal during Clive’s last sojourn there was to have a
bearing on the Company’s development and Sulivan’s manoeuvres. The
Battle of Baksar in 1764 had removed the main threat to stability in the
Bengal region. That, and the defeat of the exasperated Mir Qasim, who died
in 1765, led to relative tranquillity. But Clive’s return put a stop to plans
Sulivan had already launched for a proper system of joint-government,
centred in Bengal, which was in operation before his arrival.2 With Clive’s
implementation of the ‘Dual System’ (following assumption of the Diwani in
1765) Sulivan’s administrative system, better suited to trading concepts, was
pressed into other uses, and employed in ways never intended.
Under the ‘Dual System’, each position had its European and Indian
counterpart. It turned into a disaster, creating a burgeoning bureaucracy, and
led to corruption, brutality and inefficiency. Neither redress of grievance or
FRESH START AND NEW GAME 1765-67 149
accountability became possible. It created intolerable strains. The

dispensation of justice, policing and keeping of law and order generally was a
nightmare.
Yet at first Clive reinforced order in the military and civil establishments.
He quashed a threatened mutiny; and struck at illegal private trade. This
created new and dangerous enemies who, on return were welcomed by
Sulivan who was blind to real worth in some of his adversary’s early attempts
at reform. Seen through his eyes, Clive could not be allowed more laurels,
which would have made a return to the Direction even more difficult.
Besides, his Lordship supported all attempts to exclude him; and in Bengal
was flushing out his men and replacing them with his own.
In Britain, sovereignty over such large areas of the sub-continent sparked
off an attack on three levels. First, Edmund Burke voiced a growing belief
that the Company should not be allowed to hold the, ‘Delegation of the
whole power and sovereignty of this kingdom sent into the East.’3 Secondly,
it was proposed that the situation could only be corrected by Parliament, a
perfect opportunity for MPs to interfere in Company business
The third consequence was a massive new interest in Company affairs
among many with money to spare. It centred on India stock, and Leadenhall
became a magnet for speculators. Sulivan was in a difficult position; political
ambitions dictated he did nothing to dispel speculation, although
uncomfortable with it. However, he was driven to using ‘jobbers’. His need
for rich, allies was desperate. He took refuge in the figures Clive sent home,
which gave the impression of great wealth in Bengal; and envisaged money
flowing into the trading network, propping up all commercial activity abroad
without recourse to bullion from Britain. Trade to the Far East would also be
encouraged.
By Clive’s estimates, the Diwani would bring a surplus of £2 million per
annum. He had instructed relations that his money was to be invested in
India stock; and with this the great boom began in March 1766; intense
speculation broke out in the London, Amsterdam and Paris. Also, the
character of the stock altered, until then it was regarded as a Security; from
that point it was to become ever more fluctuating until the world credit crash
of 1772-3. Speculators, many now allied with Sulivan, saw a way of making
money through using the Company’s vote-making machinery. Any man or
measure promoting a boom in the price, which in turn made possible an
increase in the Company’s dividend, was to be helped, encouraged and voted
for.
He had persuaded himself his return to the executive would be beneficial
all round, and found working with these gamblers useful and effective to this
end. They provided money for splitting campaigns; while he brought
immense knowledge and political skill. He integrated the speculators aims
with his own, and applied himself to increasing the price of Company stock.
The higher dividend paid could bring success at Company elections. His own
anti-splitting desires were temporarily forgotten. Also, in pursuit of high
dividends he now wished to retain revenues from the new territories, but was
prepared to allow a payment to the State.
At times, however, it was difficult to reconcile efforts on behalf of his
stock jobbing connections, such as promoting the end of the ban on
dividends in 1766, with plans for the Company’s benefit. He had placed
himself in a weak position through alliance with those ‘dealing in the alley’.
Throughout the summer of 1766 the Directors blocked every attempt to
raise the value of stock. In August the speculators turned to political
measures, and became set on gaining a majority in the General Court. This
brought them into even closer contact with Sulivan. The stock jobbers then
organised a press campaign, mainly using the East India Examiner. The East
India Observer, produced by the Directors, replied.
In September a great splitting campaign began. Sulivan was involved, but
did not use his own agents. The upshot was a victory for those ‘bulling’ the
stock, and the dividend was raised to ten per cent. Sulivan was prepared to
ally himself with the stock jobbers because of the need for votes. He would
have been in two minds, however, over damage created by allowing the
speculators full rein; but it is doubtful if he could have stopped them anyway.
After his defeat in April 1765, the general belief was that he would not
contest the 1766 election. However, he managed to blend several important
men to his cause, such as the influential Henry Fletcher, and his friend in the
Direction, William Webber. They joined Vansittart and the Johnstones.
Although none of this was a secret to Clive, Sulivan’s list, in opposition to
the ‘House’ list, was still something of a surprise. He was easily defeated,
however, Lord Rockingham throwing his weight alongside that of the
Clivites.
The 1767 election was fought against the backdrop of yet another of the
Company’s temporary financial crises, and the Parliamentary inquiry that
attended it. The need to work out a new agreement between Company and
State gave Sulivan the sort of electoral opportunities he needed. Thus,
suggestions for solving this crisis always served the double purpose of
furthering possible success at the election. Despite the hostility of the
Clivites, he felt hopeful. He was encouraged by some real growth in his party.
He also pinned great hopes on Westminster now that Chatham was back in
power; and this ministry included his friend Shelburne.
It was in the lead up to the 1767 election that he began his association with
the Ulsterman, Lauchlin Macleane, who in 1766 was under-secretary to
Shelburne. Macleane (who was also a Doctor of Medicine) was a man of
startling personality and hypnotic presence. He could press friendship on the
one hand, and prise information on the other. He was a rogue and trickster
of the highest order; the most important of the speculators and adventurers
that Sulivan thought he could use. However, it was to be Macleane who used
him.
Working with Macleane and a John Motteux, Sulivan held a form of joint-
leadership over the jobbers, many operating from within the monopoly. He
was also involved with the Scottish group: George Dempster, Lord Elibank
and his nephews the Johnstones. His own holding of India stock does not
reflect his real involvement because he made use of intermediaries.
Macleane was Sulivan’s strongest link with this motley crowd; and such
was the Ulsterman’s mesmerising clutch, he seems to have come completely
under his spell. Macleane set about uniting Sulivan with the Hope banking
firm of Amsterdam; with Goslings, Coutts, Grant and Fordyce banks; and
brought introductions to the influential Wedderburn and Leycester. For
elections, he was forever forming interests and alliances (of a very dubious
nature). However, through him Sulivan remained on good terms with
General Conway, the other Secretary of State, as well as with Shelburne.
Several other ties strengthened at this time were with old colleagues
William Barwell and Henry Savage; and with Sir George Colebrooke and
George Dudley. In September 1766, Lord Verney, together with William,
Richard (the younger) and Edmund Burke (though the latter was acting
secretly) also joined the group, via Macleane. They were all under Verney’s
umbrella. Macleane and Edmund Burke had been at Trinity College Dublin
together and had renewed their acquaintance by December 1765.4
The Clive camp feared this group would bring Sulivan back to power. In
the period February to March 1767, while acting on behalf of Lord Holland,
John Powell of the Pay Office split £43,000 for Sulivan and other
Government-backed candidates. Although forbidden to do so, Macleane
would also employ Holland’s hundred votes in favour of Sulivan and
Vansittart at the election. A surprising number of votes, from a variety of
sources, were in fact created for them.
They were not enough. Despite hoping for some agreement with Clive, by
not opposing the renewal of his jagir, he lost the election; and his humiliation
was complete when Clive’s prize was renewed for another ten years. The hero
of Plassey was unremitting: ‘Mr. Sulivan still entertains hopes of being a
Director, to which ambitious view I shall give every opposition in my
power.’5 His Lordship’s support in the Company was still too entrenched to
be moved. Rockingham’s backing for the existing Directors also helped
determine the result; as did that of Charles Townshend and Sir George
Colebrooke, the latter entering the Direction as a Clivite.
2
The Parliamentary Inquiry of 1766-67, which threatened the Company’s
independence, is best explained by the late Dame Lucy Sutherland in her East
India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics. However, Sulivan’s participation in
what happened was so deep, extensive and relevant, it needs to be made
explicit. He understood precisely how important this inquiry was for the
future of the monopoly. Also, the emergency that gripped the Company ran
concurrently with his effort to re-enter the Direction in April 1767, and had a
bearing on what transpired.
All began with yet another financial crisis in the Company’s affairs, one
that became public in 1766. Even as the dividend was being raised from ten
to twelve and a half per cent, through the efforts of the stockjobbers, bad
tidings from India arrived. The Inquiry followed – the Government’s first
direct intrusion into Company business.
When Chatham seized the excuse to interfere he had no grandiose scheme
in mind; nor did he wish for expansion of empire; he merely wanted a
portion of the income the Company was drawing from its new territories. He
envisaged an additional £1 million going into the Treasury. In exchange the
Company would receive an extension to its charter and all the privileges this
conferred. His claim was based upon the sovereign right of Great Britain to
all territories acquired by conquest. Personally, Chatham believed the nation
deserved a reward for helping the Company attain what was believed to be
great riches. Royal naval protection had been essential to success.
The first warning of impending intrusion came in August 1766, when the
right to enjoy sole profits from territorial gains was challenged by Alderman
William Beckford, who did not disguise his dislike of the concern. The
direction of the Government’s attack was soon made clear: the Company’s
Charter was to be threatened.
Realising the enormous threat to the organisation’s independence, Sulivan
gave the matter his unswerving attention. Although out of the Direction he
was to fill a liaison role that made him central to all that transpired. His seat
in Parliament also meant he had opportunities and channels at hand for
discussions with ministers and other parties concerned. As a Proprietor
operating within the General Court and knowing the competing factions
there, indeed he headed one of them, he was fully implicated.
He welcomed the role because it called upon his knowledge, abilities and
interest in the Company’s welfare. His major objective at all times was to
safeguard the monopoly’s autonomy. Paradoxically, the alliances he had made
with so many mushrooming interests within the Company placed him in the
forefront during early discussions on the monetary crisis. He was one of the
first to treat with Administration, contacted because of his knowledge, skill
and availability.
His Parliamentary connections were of even greater significance, and his
drawing room was the first port of call. He had unfettered communication
with both Chatham and Shelburne. The ties with the latter had been renewed
and greatly strengthened, primarily because of the machinations of Macleane.
By then, of course, the Ulsterman was deeply involved with him in more
clandestine activities.
Members of the Macleane-led group also had connections with the
Rockingham Opposition that could be utilised. George Dempster, Lord
Verney and William and Edmund Burke provided the links. Grenville,
though he found him useful, never liked Sulivan. Perhaps this was because, as
Charles Townshend’s, Estimate of the Strength of Parties in the House of Commons
1766/7 suggests, he was regarded as a Chathamite at this time.
Sulivan played a bigger part, therefore, than his exclusion from the
Direction might suggest; and in fact, the plans he put forward were probably
more readily accepted because of this. He was regarded as the best channel
for the receipt and dispersal of information; was to be essential for Company
dialogue with the ministry; and was used in the same way by those parties
who both supported him and had an interest in what would happen.
However, there was no attempt by any group to control the Company
through him; he was too able and too respected to be used in such a manner.
Nor was he ever a ministerial Trojan horse inside India House for any
Parliamentary party or minister.
He was not slow in recognising the weaknesses within the Administration,
although the only real disagreement within the ministry was over how the
assault on the Company should be made. He exploited the divergent
opinions ministers voiced on how to handle the whole business, with the aim
of ensuring the Company’s best interests and continued survival.
The ministry split into two distinct factions: Chatham, Grafton and
Shelburne on the one hand, with their Parliamentary followers, such as
Shelburne’s John Dunning and Isaac Barré; on the other side stood Charles
Townshend and Conway. The divergent views soon became apparent. The
Chatham group wanted, ‘A direct attack on the Company for challenging in
Parliament their right to derive any revenue from Bengal.’6 The Government
would simply deny the Company possession of the territories, allowing the
revenues to accrue to the State.
Townshend and Conway wanted the State to have a share of the gains
already made by the Company and a portion of the wealth from all its future
acquisitions as well. This was to be achieved through negotiation with the
Directors – holding the threat of an inquiry menacingly in the background.
They believed it impossible to push the view that the Company had no legal
basis for its territories. At Westminster, Parliamentary Opposition, through
the voice of Edmund Burke, condemned the Government’s proposals as an
attack on the sanctity of property.
Shareholder wishes could be summed up as a desire for a portion of the
territorial revenues; preservation of chartered rights; and a defence of private
property. Many Proprietors agreed, however, that the State did deserve some
payment in return for help in the acquisition of the territories. It was also
thought by many (in and out of the Company) that some sort of investigation
was required anyway. There was a need to sort out the confusion created by
speculation, by uncertainty over the true state of the Company’s finances, and
why there was persistently bad government in India.
Unfortunately, this was not the Administration to carry out such an
inquiry; and Chatham’s withdrawal from public life meant there was to be no
leadership. As the first minister faded into the background, Shelburne
assumed control over their joint supporters. He guided the group away from
an attack in Parliament and towards negotiation with the Company’s
Directors, the view shared by the Townshend-Conway set.
In August l766 Charles Townshend, informed the Company that he was
preparing a Bill, ‘For carrying into execution the several resolutions of the
House of Commons...and he desired to hear whatever the Chairman and
Deputy might have to suggest in relation to the subject as soon as was
convenient to them.’7 The General Court (with Sulivan to the fore) was the
first to respond to this.
Taking the initiative in ascertaining the facts, the Proprietors discovered
that between 16 September 1766 and 24 June 1767 there would be a
deficiency of £628,000 in the Company’s trading account. Various ideas on
how to resolve the crisis were discussed, such as those of Joseph Salvador.8
All of these Sulivan repeated to Shelburne. He then headed a group of
Proprietors that called upon the Directors to ask Parliament for an extension
of 37 years to the Charter, in exchange for the revenues from territories that
had been acquired after 1757. After the Company getting £480,000 per
annum for ten years (as a yearly dividend of fifteen per cent), Government
would enjoy the rest of the money.
More plans appeared, such as that by Solomon da Costa and one by Mr.
Stewart of Buckingham Street; but out of all the proposals, those of the
Directors were accepted and went forward to the ministry. In point of fact,
the views put forward by the executive were moderate enough and allowed
Townshend to avoid the threat of a Parliamentary division.9 But he now
acted a part by temporarily refusing to receive the Directors on the issue.
Having failed to see his own efforts accepted, and instead witnessed the
Directors’ proposals being forwarded, Sulivan reverted to Parliamentary
circles and was busy among his fellow MPs. In December he met the
Chatham ministry at Conway’s house to help consider the policy needed. He
did not say much there, but during the debate in the Commons a few days
afterwards was complimented by Administration upon his great knowledge
of Company business. This suggests he had really been airing the ministry’s
views in the proposals made to the General Court on 14 November (with
which he concurred), and was working hand in hand with the ministers.
In January 1767 Chatham reaffirmed that Parliament had the right to
intervene in the Company’s affairs if it so wished; and that the Inquiry was
meant to establish this fact. However, all was postponed until the final terms
offered by the Company were known; and in a sense, this marked the end of
the first phase of the Inquiry.
Sometime in January, Sulivan gave Shelburne a paper, the substance of
which was to be communicated to Chatham. He appeared to promise that
the Proprietors (whom he admitted, all too knowingly, were the source of
much mischief) might be brought around to agree with the ministry if their
own terms were used as a starting point, and not those of the Direction. His
main aims were to preserve the initiative gained by the Proprietors’ Court;
and to ensure that neither Government nor Direction should be precipitate
in their actions. He was still tenaciously pursuing the ideas he put forward on
14 November 1766: of gaining an extended Company Charter in return for
territorial revenues.
By February, however, his positive attitude had begun to wane. This was
mainly due to bad publicity – but he still urged a Government initiative along
the outlines he had proposed. Chatham would not budge. He thought
Sulivan’s paper very good: ‘It contains, as whatever comes from that
gentleman always does, very considerable lights’, but thought the lack of
restriction upon the Company’s use of the territorial revenues dangerous.10
The suggestions presented by the Directors in November 1766 were
eventually forwarded to the Cabinet on 14 February 1767. They were
immediately referred back for further explanation, only to return as quickly,
replete with additional comment, on 20 February. By then Chatham had
retired from public affairs and would give no further guidance. Grafton
fought the Townshend minority for the right to reject the Directors’ terms
and won. This split the Cabinet, and an open breach was only narrowly
avoided.
Alderman Beckford moved for the printing of all the accumulated India
papers that he had first demanded on 10 December 1766, including the
proposals made by the Directors. Townshend opposed this as being
premature. Parliamentary Opposition took these differences within the
ministry as the opportune moment to interfere. Grenville’s supporters agreed
with Rockingham’s group to organise a petition (ostensibly from the
Company) against the printing of the papers. This was effective. On 9 March
the Government was thoroughly outfaced. Beckford’s motion was dropped;
and with it went Chatham’s attempt to force the Company to give money to
the Treasury from the new territorial revenues.
The next phase of the Inquiry really opened in February 1767.
Parliamentary interest had now faded because it was no longer an open issue
between the ministry and Opposition. Sulivan again played a pivotal role as it
all unfolded. The main reason for this was that he had maintained his
contacts with Shelburne and with the majority within the split Cabinet.
By February the ministry’s original plans had been wrecked upon the rocks
of Company obstinacy and disquiet; by the opportunism of the Parliamentary
Opposition; and because of a divided and leaderless ministry. However, there
still existed the chance of an accommodation with the Company through
Sulivan. Although Chatham had rebuffed his plan, neither he nor Shelburne
(increasingly left to make do) were willing to give up; and Sulivan was ready
to re-introduce it into the Proprietors’ Court.
His accord with ministers is not difficult to understand. If successful
through them he would be received within the Company as the one who
solved the crisis in Government-Company relations. He would be sure of
Shelburne’s support and that of others within the Chatham ministry at the
April 1767 election.
In the meantime, on 12 March the Directors sent back to the House the
suggestions Government had already rejected. Sulivan criticised the fact that
there was no separation of trade and revenue, which he considered were
‘distinct considerations and stood on different ground’.11 When it was alleged
that these could not be separated, he set out to prove otherwise.
He sent two plans to Shelburne as advance notification, indicating which
one he proposed to offer for consideration. Shelburne thought his points too
detailed; however, a high regard for his friend prevented harsh censure, so he
gave his support. The plans were really continuations of those they had
discussed and promoted in November 1766, and had continued to work on

since that date.12 They were now very close in other ways; and Shelburne was
heavily involved in finding the votes that might return Sulivan to the
Direction. This is reflected in the amount of stock splitting that now
commenced in earnest as the election date loomed.13
Sulivan’s proposals were read in the General Court on 16 March. His idea
of dividing the territorial revenue from that of trade pleased Government;
and he proposed a fourteen per cent dividend, thus satisfying his followers in
the Company. In mitigation of the charge against him of purely electoral
motives, the scheme did display his general policy, clear from 1757, of
pursuing commercial revenues at the expense of territorial ones.
His proposals also had the effect of giving the initiative in Company affairs
back to him. It would appear too that these suggestions impressed
Rockingham and his followers. Woodhouse told Newcastle that the plan he
had put up was greatly commended by the majority of the Proprietors. No
objections to it were raised, even with over six hundred people in the room.
A determined attempt by a totally hostile Direction to destroy the plan was
launched, and despite the efforts of Dempster and William Burke, the
General Court voted to send it to the Court of Directors for consideration. It
was a death knell. On 24 March, and as expected, his proposals were found
to be unsuitable. Meanwhile, the Direction prepared the way for its views by
agreeing to an understanding with Parliament.14
In the General Court agitation continued; and a total of twelve proposals
were heard and discussed between 3 and 6 April. Sulivan’s was the first to be
read again. Most of the others were modelled upon his, including the one
from the Directors. The only disparity was that in that of the executive’s
there was no separation of territorial and trading revenues, and no fixed
annual sum to the State. It was then put to the ballot on 8 April whose plan
should be forwarded as the basis for agreement with ministry. This was the
day before the annual election of Directors, and how the result would
influence the election next day was widely understood. Sulivan lost by 199
votes.
The struggle of Chartered Rights versus Parliamentary control continued.
At first, however, Government refused to accept the Directors’ proposals; it
had been allowed time to temporarily patch up internal differences with no
loss of face. The Parliamentary Inquiry proper then commenced, only to be
adjourned the same month (April) and the Directors’ plan was left in
abeyance until May.
Simultaneously a storm erupted in the Company. A promised increase in
the dividend had been abandoned in the ministerial discussions, much to the
annoyance of many Proprietors, and especially the Sulivan-aligned
speculators. A stock-splitting campaign followed, with the aim of forcing a
rise in the dividend anyway. There is a suggestion that a revolt against Sulivan
was also contemplated by these jobbers. In other words, he was expected to
play ball or be sacrificed.
The ministry signalled that they would consider any increase in the
dividend at that particular point as a deliberate breach of faith. This was
interpreted as direct interference in Company business and aroused
immediate hostility. Speculators, who included Verney, Dempster and
William Burke, pushed harder for an increase. Moderate proposals by the
Directors were lost, and the dividend was raised to twelve and a half per cent.
Ministers and Commons were infuriated, and the triumph of those in the
‘Alley’ was immediately checked by a Bill in Parliament on 8 May, which
prevented the Company from raising its dividend within the next year
without Westminster’s consent.
In reply to further violent Company opposition, yet another Bill was
introduced that put a stop to the splitting of stock. Although he had asked
for this a year before, a thoroughly concerned Sulivan now joined in
petitioning against it, because in his eyes Parliament could not be allowed to
take the initiative and create legislation for internal matters without being
asked.
A wish to smooth ruffled feathers in the ministry, and a sense of
opportunity led him to propose again (on 8 May) that the ministry be offered
£400,000 a year instead of a share in the profits. In return, Parliament was to
cancel legislation controlling the dividends. The Directors refused to listen
and Sulivan and eight of his followers then called a General Court for 18
May.
His next moves, squeezed in before this next Court convened, suggest a
degree of desperation. He mustered all his strength in the Company,
temporarily abandoned Shelburne, and contacted Townshend and Conway.
They met him, together with the leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition, at
the St. Alban's tavern. Townshend pledged opposition to the Dividend Bill in
return for improvements in the Company’s terms.
Sulivan was prepared to use Parliamentary Opposition leverage to force
the Directors into offering better terms; but at the General Court of 18 May
he still did not get his way, and obtain what he had already proposed. Anger
got the better of him and he accused Rous and his friends of giving the
Government its opportunity of intruding into Company affairs via the 1767
dividend; of reducing the dividend to ten per cent when it was really worth
seventeen per cent; of issuing more bonds than the laws of the Company
allowed; and of losing the Company its chartered rights. In the midst of
turbulent scenes, the proposal to give £400,000 to Government was passed;
but no mention was made of the dividend – apart from a petition against the
Dividend Bill.
By this date the committee investigating the Company had found that the
money Clive had spoken of was just not there. Fruitless General Courts
protested against the imminent Dividend Bill: one on 19 May, another on 27
May. A motion to limit the dividend to twelve and a half per cent was even
agreed upon on 3 June. It was all to no avail, and to Sulivan’s regret, the
Dividend Bill, giving a limit of ten per cent per annum, was passed.
In return, the Company had its territorial possessions and rights to the
revenues confirmed. The Bill became law on 29 June, binding both for two
years. It was renewed in 1768. Thus Sulivan’s main objective of retaining
autonomy during this last stage of negotiations was lost; and the precedent
was set for a later, more serious intrusion into Company affairs.
A body in the General Court, headed by Sulivan continued the futile
struggle, holding General Courts on ‘special affairs’ on 15 July, and on 23
December. At these he fought in vain for a list of qualified voters for
Company elections. Finally it all fizzled out. The Company bound itself to
pay £400,000 per annum for two years, a sum of money it could not afford.
This was later extended to 1772 and was to prove disastrous to the Company
in the long term.15
In the end, nothing much was really done to alter the constitution, method
of government or calibre of the servants in India. All the old privileges were
retained and no examination of the state of the settlements or redress of
abuses was made. The State offered no help to the Company in adapting to
its enlarged responsibilities. The need for a permanent agreement between
the Company and the Government remained; as did the State’s ‘right’ to
revenues from the new territories.
The Bill checking the splitting of stock was helpful, though inadequate.
The right to vote now had to be held for six months, thereby pushing
forward the whole splitting process by half a year. The temporary statutory
limitation on the dividend did restrain speculative influence, but only for a
short time. Taken together, however, these features mark the start of a
limited degree of State responsibility; and the whole Inquiry, by linking
Company interests to Parliamentary ones, took the involvement of the House
in its affairs to yet another stage. What the Inquiry had really done was
enhance the sense of anticipation in the public mind that something really
ought to be done about Indian affairs.
Sulivan was only willing to pay the blackmail demanded by ministry,
because in return the Company had the right to retain its lands and revenues
in India. Most MPs did not like it either. They had witnessed an attack by the
State on the civil liberties of citizens and private companies. Sovereign rights
and proprietary rights remained powerful issues.
On the other hand, the Inquiry had helped immeasurably in his never-
ending efforts to return to power. At its conclusion he was again considered
a force to be reckoned with. The attack by Parliament had fused together
ambition and defence of the Company’s independence. He was certain that
he was needed to stem the assault; it suited him to think so anyway. The
whole Inquiry had put him on red alert; and the ‘great game’ imagery, usually
scattered throughout his text, is not so evident. Nor were his proposals any
worse than others; and were based on the confusion over the true state of the
Company’s financial affairs. Founded on estimates from Clive, his
calculations convinced him of a more hopeful picture than was in fact the
case.
He had become engrossed in this struggle because it mattered to be at the

core of anything that affected his East India Company. It was not for money,
but for involvement and influence. Percival Spear flawlessly captured what
was his heart’s desire: ‘And of course there was Sulivan, to whom the air of
the Court of Directors was like oxygen to a heart-sick patient.’16
10
Great Designs and Personal Struggles

1768-72
Anticipating success in April 1768, Sulivan looked forward to a place in the

Direction for himself, office in India for Vansittart and money for the
stockjobbers. Many supporters acting on his behalf in 1766 and 1767 were to
be relied upon again; and he added others. Shelburne brought in Sir Gilbert
Elliot; and a letter from Lord North indicated that he might give assistance.
Splitting of stock intensified, regardless of the new Act.1
He did not delay pressing into use the resources of his friend Robert Palk,
who had just returned from Madras; and with this help almost made the
breakthrough. Strange as it seems, he very nearly forged an alliance with Clive
too. What made this possible was the unstable situation within the Direction;
and Clive’s uneasiness following his return from Bengal. Palk, who was
friendly with both, was to be the channel of communication. This explains
why on 13 September 1767 Sulivan was itemising his terms for entering into a
‘solid sincere and hearty coalition’ with Lord Clive.2 He agreed to all Clive’s
demands. In return he asked that the coalition would be made public; and
that Vansittart be returned to Bengal as Governor. He was willing to submit
all points and the whole agreement to ‘their common friend’ Palk, who
would be sole guarantor.3
But Clive would not budge. He would only support Vansittart for
Governorship of Madras. In early 1768 his spite at his ex-friend spilled out in
a letter to Verelst: ‘I am fully convinced V--- is the greatest Hypocrite the
greatest Jesuit and the meanest, dirtiest Rascal that ever exited...and I must
request you that you must fix his guilt before you leave, beyond all measure.’4
Within the Company, John Manship’s recommendation that Sulivan be
placed on the House list created a storm of opposition, kindled and timed to
GREAT DESIGNS AND PERSONAL STRUGGLES 1768-72 161
erupt at the General Court of 8 April. Manship and Sulivan attended a

meeting at the King's Arms Tavern, Cornhill, to place Sulivan on this register,
but this was refused. An effort to appear on the Proprietors’ list was given
short shrift as well; and when scratched out, his hopes of being a Director
were gone. The only positive thing from all this was that he was assured of
Manship’s future support. For the first time in nine years he had been left off
the House list.
2
From the summer of 1768 it was common knowledge that Sulivan would
launch yet another attempt to enter the Direction. He saw a real opportunity
for success because of its disunity, largely created by Sir George Colebrooke
who could not be relied upon. His aims remained constant: to recover power
in the Company and return Vansittart to Bengal, preferably as Governor.
According to Palk, Sulivan ‘would not be dissuaded from trying his luck once
more’.5 He would be appearing upon the Proprietors’ list, and Palk thought
he would fail; but at least this might ‘put an end to all contest’; presumably
something he would have been grateful for.6
It was a fierce competition, with an unprecedented number of votes
created before the lists closed in October l768. A ‘Directors’ list fund was
administered in the names of Clive, Colebrooke, Crabb Boulton, and Lord
Sandwich’s man, Robert Jones. Clive’s opposition was pitiless; and by
February 1769 he was certain in his own mind of preventing Sulivan’s return.
This was the only issue that induced him to get involved in General Courts
again.
The efforts made by Sulivan and his friends were truly prodigious. A
tripartite executive arrangement was set up. Sulivan was the linchpin holding
together Vansittart and Lauchlin Macleane. He and Macleane had grown very
close. It was also useful to Sulivan to have Shelburne’s right-hand man
alongside; and he remained on good terms with the minister.
Macleane connived at being the confidant of both Sulivan and Vansittart;
and became the chief organiser, taking charge of money borrowed by the
triumvirate for splitting purposes. He brought into being a particularly large
fund consisting of £100,000 stock, subscribed to by at least twenty-three
persons, the cash coming mostly from John Hope, of Holland, and involving
other Dutch investors. The terms agreed upon were favourable to the
lenders: the stock was to be returned to them after the election at a fixed high
price regardless of the going rate at the rescounter.
The ‘Great Scheme’, as it was called, seems to have been initiated in
response to Clive’s exertions. Eventually about 200 votes were created. Lord
Verney and the Burkes were involved. Macleane brought in Shelburne and
his connections. Sulivan and Vansittart underwrote most of it. Stock had
never before risen to the high price they agreed to; and it was foolhardy of
them, to say the least, to guarantee this.
He and Vansittart had the backing of those Bengal servants who were
Clive’s enemies. They could also now rely on the Palk household. Sulivan had
support among City connections and ex-Bombay colleagues. As ever, the
shipping interest was with him: the Raymonds, William George Freeman,
Charles Foulis and John Boyd split £150,000. He was helped in that the
expansion in shipping had caused harm to many ships’ husbands, and led to
friction with the Direction. Robert Gregory was a strong ally; and the wealth
of the Johnstones was worth pursuing. This clique remained wary, however,
of Macleane and his speculator friends. To them, he was ‘one of those Knots
of Knaves.’7
Other Scots were involved; £100,000 of Sir Lawrence Dundas’ money was
split by Sulivan for stock purchase.8 Any real hope of success, however, was
pinned on Sulivan himself; he had the experience and promise of patronage
that still pulled men to his side. Thomas Lane, handled most of the business.
Through him and Elias de la Fontaine he was able to raise further sums while
remaining anonymous.
He made many promises of patronage in exchange for support. The
appointment and entry of Sir Gilbert Elliot’s second son Alexander into the
Company as a Writer readily reflects the way in which this worked. It
transpired that in 1769 Sir Gilbert was dealing in Company stock through
Coutts, the London-Scottish bankers. Via an agent, Andrew Douglas, £2,888
was introduced.
Shelburne placed funds in Macleane’s hands to purchase votes, but was
enmeshed by his assistant a great deal more than he realised. Meanwhile,
Sulivan had won some support from Government by promising to back the
extension of the 1767 agreement concluding the Parliamentary Inquiry.9 This
offer was indicative of the degree to which his influence was again being felt
in the field of Company business.
Although it was only a temporary occurrence, he was also supported by
Rockingham. The Marquess desired the impossible, reconciliation between
Clive and Sulivan. He certainly knew nothing of the earlier attempt by Palk
and others to bring the two together. He thought that jointly they had the
strength to resist Government interference.
Again, a never-ending tirade of abuse filled the newspapers; and a survey
of the Public Advertiser, from February to April 1769, reveals all too familiar
accusations: his so-called overbearing manner and tendency to despotic
control. These were answered in like manner, the worst rebutted on each
point. The press reflected the bitter undercurrents affecting everything. The
Public Advertiser carried a particularly mocking piece of anti-Sulivan election
propaganda:
East India intelligence extraordinary – A figure in bronze is now

preparing of Laurence O’Sly-One, with his right-hand upon his
heart disclaiming party resentment, and his left under his coat,
aiming a pocket pistol at the Chairman. This figure is taken from
the life.10
The Gentleman’s Magazine finally gave the world the names of the new
Directors, ‘After the greatest contest that has been known.’11 Sulivan was
made a Director, and became a member of the Committees of Secrecy,
Shipping, Accounts and Buying. In many ways it was a tremendous victory,
and for the most part unexpected. It was due to a change of heart by the
Johnstones and their Scottish allies. £13,000 was split on his behalf at the last
moment. The timing of the move was crucial; what probably dictated it was
the belief that stock would be boosted by his return to power.
Sulivan’s return was a major talking point. To many it was looked upon as
a blessing because of his talent and indifference to Court influence. His
feared abilities were reflected in the very finger-pointing of his enemies; as
were the use of words like ‘single-minded’ and ‘determined’ to describe him.
The success was like a heady wine. He, his supporters, and their fellows
abroad bubbled with joy. The immediate concern was to consolidate his
position; the next was to return Vansittart to India. Reform had to be
introduced; and abuses stopped before the Company (and he) succumbed, or
further ministerial encroachment came about.
His close attendance once more at the Royal Society of Arts during these
months is significant. The Society still served as a sort of club where
friendships among groups of Company shareholders, speculators and others
were cultivated or consolidated. A competition developed in 1769 for the
post of Secretary, between John Stewart of Hampstead and William (Pultney)
Johnstone. Wisely, Sulivan abstained from voting. He wanted to keep in
touch with both sides. John Stewart, who had proposed Edmund Burke for
election to the Society, was also acting as a secret agent for Shelburne, a fact
Sulivan would have known. Stewart was also Macleane’s confidant. He kept
close to Sulivan in the years to come.
That something unusual was going on is suggested by the sheer numbers
put forward for membership. Macleane and his brother Henry proposed
eleven; Sulivan sixteen. Included in his list were Richard Burke Senior and
Theobald Burke, Joseph Hickey and Stephen Lushington. He was also careful
to keep in touch with the Johnstones and other Scots. This can be deduced
from the fact that he nominated all twelve of their group for re-election.12
Then, in the midst of all his plans and great expectations, disaster struck. It
was unexpected and of colossal magnitude. His position was at once
reversed, though he managed for a time to camouflage this serious turn for
the worse. The losses incurred also dictated an immediate change in
priorities. Vansittart must return to Bengal as planned, but now his principal
task was to retrieve their fortunes. Temporarily at least, that came before
anything else.
The terrible tide that engulfed Sulivan resulted from the many tortuous
engagements he had freely entered upon to ensure a return to the Direction.
A great number of these are lost, others are hard to follow, they were so
shrouded in secrecy. The unscrambling is made more difficult since he was
working through an agent when secretly jobbing in Indian stock for his allies,
with their electoral support in mind.
His nightmare opened in May, with the spread of alarming rumours from
India, followed by official reports of great unrest, particularly in Bengal. It
put an end to the boom in Indian stock, affecting many contributors from
overseas.13 Reports said Haider Ali was on the rampage and that French
troops were massing. Although these rumours were found to be false, the
damage had been done and the slide could not be checked.
The price of stock, which stood at 274 on 1 May (meaning that at one
stage it cost £274,000 to buy £100,000 of India stock), was at 270 eight days
later. When the exchange shut on 20 June for the midsummer rescounters, it
stood at 241. On 18 July (the day of settlement for the Sulivan group) its
value had dropped to 232. By October it was 217; and finally on 28
November it reached its lowest point, 214.
Sulivan and his associates had not only purchased stock at 268 (already a
high price) they had promised to pay for it at the rescounters on 18 July at
the astonishing one of 280. The stock falling so drastically in price caught
everyone ‘before it was convenient to sell’.14 The Hope family had insisted
that Sulivan and Vansittart stand security for this money; and later Sulivan
said that he and Vansittart became security for £200,000 capital India stock.
What this meant was that they were guarantors for £100,000 worth of stock
on top of the £100,000 pledged to the Hope bank by underwriting the ‘Great
Scheme’.
The £100,000 of stock purchased by those in the ‘Great Scheme’ now cost
£280,000, but would only raise £232,000 when sold (232 being the price of
stock on the day of settlement). The net loss was £48,000 for the group. Split
among the twenty-three members of the consortium this totalled £2,100
each, which would have been borne easily. The panic sprang from the ways
in which money had been raised by members of the consortium for purchase
of stock via the ‘Great Scheme’.
Ultimately, only six members of the ‘Great Scheme’ were unable to meet
their liabilities, costing the other seventeen participants roughly an additional
£3,000 each. For Sulivan, however, who acted as joint guarantor, the ‘Great
Scheme’ alone cost him £15,000 through the inability of many involved to
pay even £3,000.
He was certainly the victim of unfortunate circumstances. On the other
hand, he was taking risks – and in this particular case had entered upon what
was a calculated gamble fraught with danger. Perhaps the high stakes forced
his hand; but for re-entry to the Direction he paid a hefty price. Just how
hefty, only became clear when he knew the full extent of his partners’
difficulties, within and without the consortium. These events would colour
the rest of his life.
He found himself in the deepest trouble when he discovered how few
were the real assets of his so-called friends. Being guarantor (along with
Henry Vansittart) of the ‘Great Scheme’, he had to repay the £15,000 now
owed because of the default of others. He was enmeshed in a complicated
financial web. There were separate ties with Vansittart; and others with
Lauchlin Macleane. He was also part of a Vansittart-Palk combination; and
caught up in a Macleane-Shelburne one too. In many of these separate
transactions he was forced to pay back the money raised, because he and
Vansittart had underwritten them as well.
Quite apart from these, and the ‘Great Scheme’, he was indebted (through
Macleane and Vansittart) in a second instance to Hope of Amsterdam. He had
joined a combination that consisted of Vansittart, John Boyd, John Motteux
and Edmund Boehm the elder. At the same time he had entered yet another
partnership with Macleane and Colebrooke. Besides these, he had financial
engagements with Lord Verney and the Burkes.
In his correspondence of later years Sulivan played down his own position
in all that transpired. He had nothing to be proud of, and was largely
responsible for his own plight, despite claims that he was treated shabbily by
his former associates and duped by Macleane. Sulivan understood perfectly
well that in such times it was every man for himself.
He admitted as much to his son, saying that what happened came from his
own weakness; and through acting as a moneylender and being a guarantor. ‘I
fell a victim’, he said, ‘ to a (then unknown to me) set of desperate gamblers
with outside characters, Earl Verney at their head and a greater rascal is not
in this country.’15 This is anything but an objective summary of these
transactions.
His fellow collaborators shared his fate. Verney lost nearly all his fortune;
the Burkes were set on the road to bankruptcy. Shelburne lost heavily; and
was fearful that Macleane would expose his part in the whole business.
Sulivan’s affairs were seriously entwined with those of this dangerous
manipulator, who hourly involved him deeper by his manoeuvres, without
either his knowledge or consent.
Sulivan’s account book tells part of these complicated arrangements with
Macleane. Most entries referred to money for creating votes. An interim
account in June 1772 of the money due, came to £8,968–15/-. Later,
Macleane admitted to debts of £90,000, and the secrecy cloaking so many of
Sulivan’s dealings with him would indicate that more was owed than was
shown in his ledger. As Palk said, he and Macleane were behind ‘all the split
votes the Dutch could furnish’.16
The depth of Sulivan and Vansittart’s indebtedness is reflected in that as
late as 1770 the Hope bank still would not ‘renew their loans without a large
additional deposit’.17 Later Sulivan related to Hastings the ‘melancholy and
confidential’ subject of the financial disaster. He also gave the sources of
more borrowed money, which totalled around £55,000.18
Yet more was borrowed from the Johnstones. These loans, raised by them
from the Hope bank, were to be paid back later, with interest. They were
guaranteed by Sulivan and Vansittart before being issued. Colebrooke later
maintained that Sir William (Pultney) Johnstone was involved separately with
Sir Laurence Dundas and Duncan Clerk in yet another loan to Sulivan and
Vansittart. The Director John Motteux gave at least £5,000. The banker, De
la Fontaine and Sulivan’s friend, Isaac Panchaud, would appear to have been
the most likely sources for the rest of the money.
It was only after Vansittart set out for India in the autumn of 1769 that
Sulivan realized they had not set out on equal terms. Whereas he had enjoyed
financial independence, his ally’s affairs were in a dismal state. As part of a
begging letter to Palk, Sulivan gave details of their joint transactions and of
sums mutually pledged. Although £12,000 had been paid back, Vansittart had
only contributed £3,000 before sailing. He left £20,000 ‘of French Bills’;
£2,000 India stock; his Company salary; and license for Sulivan to draw upon
him for up to £10,000 through his attorney John Motteux. This left Sulivan
in a ‘dreadful situation’. It was made worse because Vansittart’s agent,
Edmund Boehm, would neither part with Vansittart’s meagre resources
directly to Sulivan, nor release them following Motteux’s directions.
Throughout the spring of 1770 Sulivan was ‘almost distracted’ with the fall
in India stock, leaving ‘scarce enough to cover his and Vansittart’s joint stock
and only sufficient to support it against another fall in value’. He was sure
that a deliberate plan, to start a panic (‘complicated villainy’) was afoot to
lower it by rumour mongering.19 His intelligence network indicated that Clive
was behind things, and he was satisfied that ‘the noble lord would go to any
lengths’ to reach himself and Vansittart.20
Edmund Boehm continued on his course of signing no agreements, even
endangering a contract that involved John Boyd. Vansittart had pledged to
repay Boyd at least £9,000 whenever it was demanded. Boehm would release
nothing, and after Sulivan’s own security was refused, he appealed to Palk to
get the man to do as instructed. He was puzzled by it all, and thought if his
friend had not given his agent the power to transfer money and assets to him,
then he was both deceived and ruined. Vansittart could not escape the
consequences either.
Palk immediately loaned Boehm £5,000 with which to serve Vansittart;
and Motteux scraped together £1,500. Nonetheless, by May 1770 their joint
affairs were in a state of desperation. Raymond, Martin & Co. and the Hope
bank required payment or additional security. John Boyd, he said, ‘has nearly
distracted himself and me’.21 The only resource he had left was Vansittart’s
French bills. At last, Boehm consented to the sale of these, and he was able
to pay Boyd £12,000 in part-payment. This saved them from the ‘total ruin’
prophesied, by removing the threat of immediate legal action.
He was working for time, hoping that if he could hold on until August
stock would rise in value, and they might survive. Yet it remained at the low
price of 225 to 221 despite excellent news from India and elsewhere. By the
summer of 1770 he realised all his other high hopes from good Investments,
and profits from raw silk were to no avail. The serious state of their joint
affairs made him vow to Vansittart that ‘bad usage by those from whom
more had been expected’ now made him ‘determined to give up forever’ all
connections with the Company, ‘upon the single term of fixing you
Governor of Bengal. And if necessary I shall be bound in writing.’22
In 1773 Sulivan cast more light on what he many times referred to as this
‘melancholy subject’. ‘The whole burthen,’ he said, ‘has fallen upon his
(Vansittart’s) estate and me in a sum not less than £60,000.’23 But this figure
of £30,000 each was not the final figure. Sulivan told his son that the
‘misfortune closed with a loss to himself and Vansittart…of £80,000, each a
moiety.’24 He just did not have any resources left. No full list of his debtors
exists, but of those known, Macleane owed £9,000 from his part in the
‘Great Scheme’. William Burke was in debt to them for £6,000. A consortium
of Macleane, Shelburne (whose share was £4,000), Verney and a Mrs.
Forrest, owed £9,070 – a total of £24,070.
His personal fortune had only ever amounted to some £40,000 to £50,000,
plus Ponsborne estate and his town house. Since he had loaned just short of
£25,000 that is known about, had spent the £12,000 held in reserve, and also
his £3,500 stock, £40,500 in total, his fortune was all used up.
Resources in hand during the midsummer of 1770 were Ponsborne Manor
and his town house. The Manor would have to go on the market or be
mortgaged. Fortunately the latter course was taken, and his friend, John
Dunning took it on. After (presumably) the sale of the house in Great
Ormonde Street, he leased the Queen Square house he would occupy from
1774. All his capital and everything he possessed disappeared between May
1769 and October 1773.
The consequences were truly enormous. His fortune and ease of mind
were gone; and with them a change in life style, from one of independence
and security, to uncertainty. His son’s career prospects were ruined. Sulivan
had purchased for him a ‘reputable post in Ireland of £1200 to £1400 a year’.
Stephen was forced to sell this. This blow to his son’s prospects had a
profound effect. As late as 1778 he was still asserting that his son had ‘always
lived in a liberal manner’ and ‘had a right’ to do so.25
The great tragedies of Sulivan’s life were the death of two of his children
in Bombay; the struggle with Clive; the loss of his fortune in 1769; and the
death of his wife in 1782. Even the fitful periods of exclusion from the
Direction he endured were nothing compared to these calamities. The loss of
his fortune, however, seems an unbelievable piece of folly, destroying his
family’s independence, so hard fought for, and affecting so many people.
From mid-1768 to May 1769 he was seized by a madness, which in more
serene years, amazed him and caused renewed distress. The losses were a
result of his willingness to gamble to regain authority and influence. Sheer
bad luck was an ingredient, but he was prepared to take a chance. Of course,
in many respects his behaviour was also determined by the situation he faced.
He was persuaded that the only certain support for him was that of
speculators and finance houses, and this led him onwards.
3
His re-entry to the Direction in 1769 was marked by strenuous activity on
both public and private fronts. One of these pursuits would culminate in the
shattering certainty of his penury; the other in the long-dreaded

Parliamentary intrusion into Company affairs, followed by the crushing blow
of the 1773 Regulating Act.
As usual, he wanted to be the source of everything from within the Court
of Directors; yet now had to balance serious personal needs against what was
termed the ‘public’ good. The goal of regaining influence turned into dire
necessity with the further collapse of his fortune; because only from a base of
authority within the organisation could he hope to recover anything.
This is not to say that private aims blotted out the wish to enrich his
beloved Company. Its business always came first. Only on rare occasions did
personal distress threaten to tip the balance he held between public and
private interest. Efforts to retrieve his fortune meant he came to be
influenced still more by the same speculators partly responsible for his
situation. He was ensnared by adventurers who had penetrated the Company,
and dogged by dangerous men.
Apart from 1770, Sulivan was to enjoy a stay in the Direction that lasted
from 1769 to 1773. He concentrated his efforts in two ways. The first was to
build a strong position within the Proprietors’ Court. He had to add to his
supporters there and use their momentum to dominate the Direction by
flooding it with his followers. All long-term hopes depended upon this
course of action. His second task was to forestall further Parliamentary
intervention by correcting things from within the Company. Right away he
got down to the task of drafting resolutions for the better management of
affairs. Fortunately, his powers of application, and appetite for hard work had
not receded.
Leadenhall was witnessing many changes, and the years from 1769 to 1772
gave rise to an assortment of groups. The Clivites, Sulivanites and shipping
interest remained. The banking-cum-mercantile insurance group also held
firm, and came to be identified with Colebrooke. The newer ones forming
would represent first the desires of the Grafton ministry, then that of Lord
North (from 1770). Directors and Proprietors would also echo the wishes of
the Parliamentary Opposition: the followers of Chatham, Rockingham, and
various courtiers or Parliamentarians.
The Company’s patronage and wealth had also become objects of desire in
themselves. A new breed of administrators with experience and knowledge of
Indian affairs was also appearing, men such as John Robinson and Charles
Jenkinson – the latter having served his time in the maelstrom of 1764-65.
With their grasp of detail, and given the opportunity, they would soon be
able to facilitate ministerial designs.
As far as the Company rulers could fathom, ministerial goals remained the
same. Government, especially in the person of Lord Sandwich, working
through Robert Jones, still seemed intent upon destroying its independence.
It often seemed debatable whether Government was really pursuing the oft-
professed objective of achieving a peaceful relationship. With increased
ministerial knowledge of India business, and rivalry inside India House rife,
opportunities for interference abounded.
These new forces were to pose difficulties for Sulivan. He became

entangled with leading figures among those politicians jockeying for control,
as well as with the speculators and adventurers he had consorted with from
1766. His return to office also brought to life all the old antagonisms.
Hostility was voiced in the newspapers and in pamphlets. One entitled: A
Letter to Laurence Sulivan from ‘An Old Proprietor’, was typical. Everything
was raked up.
He based the prospect of his own future well-being and that of the
Company upon the success of a Supervisory Commission he initiated in
1769. This was a serious attempt to deal with the growing number of grave
problems in India. The need for a thorough, impartial investigation had been
recognised by late 1768. So bad was the cash situation in Bengal the revenues
collected from the Diwani territories were being used to pay for purchases of
Indian goods and of tea and silk from China.
The position was to be made worse by the 1769-70 famine in south west
Bengal. A great proportion of the revenues were irredeemably lost; and the
disaster was eventually to contribute to the credit crisis of 1773. Of course,
commercial factors pale into insignificance beside the immensity of this
tragedy in human terms. There was great suffering and countless lives were
lost. Neither Sulivan nor anyone else was aware of this calamity early in 1769.
The Carnatic did not offer much in the way of relief. With the continuing
war in Mysore, and Haider Ali’s depredations revenues were drying up.
Regrettably too, it was November 1768 before details of the private debts
due to the Madras servants began to appear in the public records, and their
lack of good faith unmasked. Henceforth, debts owing to the Company were
supposed to be recognised before those of a private nature.
Sulivan was employed in everything to do with the Supervision. He led the
nine Proprietors who, at the General Court of 6 July 1769, called for a
meeting with the ministry. After a ballot that defeated opposition in the
Company, the Commission, consisting of three members was established.
Those appointed were Henry Vansittart, Luke Scrafton and Colonel Francis
Forde. Vansittart’s inclusion was unquestionably a direct result of Sulivan’s
election success. He was placed at its head, with a large salary.
That agreement over the choice of Commissioners had been reached was
miraculous; and explained by enough interested parties being willing to
encourage the coalition. The state of affairs in India was also serious enough
to override factional strife; and since Vansittart’s appointment held out the
hope of financial salvation, it made Sulivan and Vansittart agreeable to
compromise, even though Scrafton and Forde were Clivites.
The main disagreement was over the appointment of the third Supervisor.
Clive put forward Col. Forde, to join Scrafton, because Vansittart had been
appointed leader. Desperate for financial salvation through Vansittart, and
confident in the benefit to be conferred upon Bengal, Sulivan agreed. Sir
John Lindsay, a protégé of Lord Mansfield, was to command the naval forces
that had been requested. The Government only succeeded, however, in
securing plenipotentiary powers for Lindsay.
Much was also due to the Rockingham Whigs, with Edmund Burke at the
leader’s elbow as they attempted to gain influence. Rockingham worked
through Jenkinson’s brother-in-law Charles Cornwall to bring together
Colebrooke, Sulivan and Clive. His aim remained that of creating a united
front within the Company against ministerial influence. Their hope was that
the Commission, together with the coalition would create a formidable
opposition to the Administration’s control.
Clive agreed to the Commission because he thought he was preventing
Vansittart from becoming Governor of Bengal; and that he was forcing a
compromise from both. Cornwall (with Charles Raymond as intermediary)
was used to secure the agreement. Sulivan was uneasy that the pact was only
to be concluded verbally, and it awoke all his deeply-held suspicions.
However, acting upon Clive’s instructions, Colebrooke was able to fob off
his request for documents and signatures. Sulivan was only satisfied after a
public airing of the proposed share of offices; but a struggle developed over
the instructions the Supervisors were to follow. It was only after pressure
from Westminster that this was settled.
Finally, the Supervisors sailed in the frigate Aurora in October 1769, only
to be lost at sea in December after leaving the Cape of Good Hope. Apart
from the dreadful loss of human life, Sulivan’s hopes for financial salvation
disappeared with his friend. Even the portion that was due to Vansittart’s
estate from this enterprise was too little and too late for his immediate needs.
Sulivan certainly wished to influence the work of the Commission through
Vansittart. He intended to employ his collaborator in the same way he had
used him throughout 1760-65. They would form an all-powerful London-
Bengal link. The Commission was meant to implement the plans thrashed
out in intimate discussion. His shrewd eye had picked out the areas to be
examined; and Vansittart was urged to gain the confidence of both Haider
Ali and the Nawab of Arcot. Weight was placed upon the beneficial effect of
this on both Company stability and stock. Treasure was to be sent home as
quickly as possible; the remittance of half a million pounds in gold as well as
raw silk, within the year, would consolidate the Company’s position.
In October 1769 the features that had led to the Clive-Sulivan-Colebrooke
coalition began to disappear. Sulivan, in his need for political support from
some source went over to the Grafton ministry in return for backing at the
April 1770 election. His move, or defection, as it was regarded, created a stir.
Nevertheless, as Edmund Burke noted, he could not be blamed. His position
had become untenable. Reduced circumstances and the absolute necessity of
being returned to the Direction dictated the switch. It meant the end of
allegiance to his long term ally Shelburne. Both were less enchanted with
each other anyway. Because of Macleane, Shelburne still owed Sulivan
money; while the Earl was unhappy that he had not found Macleane a place
on the 1769 Supervisory Commission.
Sulivan was well aware of the acrimony he would bring upon his head by
the move; but ever a realist, he chose his own route through the political
quicksand. However, from harmony with the Opposition groups, his
relationship changed, to the point where he earned the undying hatred of the
Rockinghamites, and especially of Edmund Burke. From that point onwards
he was also increasingly distrusted by others across the parliamentary
spectrum; but particularly by Burke, who had financial losses, many of which
he could conveniently blame on Sulivan.
He lost much support in the Company as well. This was more than just
unfortunate, because his switch coincided with the growth of influence there
of various ministries, starting with that of Lord North. From 1770 he was
persona non grata to so many more people.
Although at first Charles Cornwall believed he had broken off the treaty
because of pressure from his anti-Clive friends, the truth was that Sulivan
was convinced in October 1769 that his position was desperate. He had put
no trust in the coalition with Colebrooke and Clive. He embraced the
ministry of the day to insure himself against his so-called partners turning
against him. Clive’s correspondence with Colebrooke illustrates how right he
was. In November he met Sandwich’s man, Robert Jones, at the Half-Moon
tavern to form a list for the 1770 election. His schemes were dashed,
however, with Grafton going out of office in January 1770 and North’s entry.
Quite a struggle ensued in the run up to the 1770 election where again he
had to face Clive’s hostility. By December 1769 their respective forces were
once more facing up to one another. This lingering hatred and fixation with
his rival is glimpsed when Clive grumbled to Verelst about the admission of
Sulivan into the Direction in April l769. He even listed this as one of the
reasons for the low standing of India stock; talking of anarchy and confusion,
while pretending, feebly, to be exempt from it all. In March Palk said that
both sides, Clivites and Sulivanites, were confident of success. He added,
more in hope than anything else, that this might be the last great contest.
Sulivan lost, and did so for several reasons. By his connections with
Grafton and Sandwich’s man Robert Jones, he damaged his prospects of help
from the North Government; and he was deserted by the Johnstones. He
vowed (wrongly it was to prove) that he would never talk to them again.26
Although out of the direction, Sulivan was bubbling with enthusiasm in
May for what he thought was a flourishing state of affairs. He told Vansittart
(unaware of his death at sea) of an expected surplus of £510,000 for the
period August 1769 to August 1770. It was proof, he proclaimed, of the
Company’s ability to pay dividends and satisfy the ministry. The Directors
would be able to provide a million pounds indemnity on tea; cover the cost
of loading the freight of 31 ships, and still have a handsome surplus of
between £4-500,000 per annum. In the light of future events, it is a pity he
was so mistaken; yet he can hardly be censured for making calculations based
on the only information he had.
Because of the additional financial distress he faced, Sulivan played no
significant part in public life from April 1770 until his re-entry into the
Direction in April 1771. His selection for office was safeguarded, principally
because of Lord North’s desire to achieve some sort of peace within the
Company. This, the minister knew, could only come about by re-admitting
Sulivan; and to this end, he backed and encouraged a coalition between him
and Colebrooke. Again, Charles Cornwall was the go-between.
For this election Sulivan had a higher estimation of his bargaining power
than was really the case. Not knowing of Vansittart’s demise, he blustered
that he could ‘raise a storm that may shake them’.27 The truth was that he
tried to cajole North into giving him one of the Chairs, with two or three of
his friends allowed into the Direction. He thought he had sacrificed North’s
sustained support by his connection with Grafton. But the minister, although
he was not prepared to back Sulivan against his old rivals, would not back
them either. Before the election, therefore, the Irishman knew that North
would bring him into the Direction singly.
He knew the game was up; but had to return to the Direction on any terms.
In December 1770 Robert Palk described his friend as being given the
‘amende honorable’ with his re-admittance; adding shrewdly that it was ‘clearly
necessary that there should be somebody there a little acquainted with India
matters’.28 In April 1771 Sulivan, ‘humbled but in no way daunted’, returned
to the Direction.29
Palk was amazed by Sulivan. After all that had passed, the state of the
times, and all his friend’s bad luck in ‘so unprofitable an employ’ as Indian
business, he found it incredible that to his mentor it was still the ‘summum
bonum’. Palk might also have asked himself where else could his friend
possibly find financial salvation.30
Sulivan was made a member of the Secret Committee; and by December
1771 Leycester was informing Hastings, ‘If he remains united as at present
with Sir George (Colebrooke) he will...very shortly lead the India House.’31 In
fact, it was Sulivan who took charge within this marriage of convenience and
was left virtually in charge of the Company. This was due to his greater ability
and experience; and because Colebrooke’s stock jobbing activities took his
interest elsewhere.
He had no fear of failure, therefore, when the 1772 election came round.
The support of Colebrooke’s friends was assured; and they joined with his
followers. The Barwells: William, Richard, Roger and Mary brought 30
votes.32 He was assured too of substantial backing from the shipping interest.
The policy followed from 1769 of using fewer ships continued when Sulivan
became Deputy Chairman. Thus fears of an increased share-out, and a
diminution in returns because of would-be interlopers, was avoided.
Nevertheless, he almost lost the post of Deputy Chairman. In April 1772,
he said, ‘Colebrooke and I had the game in our hands, but by an indecision
habitual, almost natural to him, we lost that ground which we never could
recover; and in place of bringing in firm friends I carried the Deputy Chair by
my own vote.’33
However, the happy scene he had depicted in his letter to Vansittart didn’t
exist. Troubles that the lost Supervisory Commission might have rectified
had become more acute. Yet he had to maintain a façade of confidence. He
made efforts to preserve the credit-worthiness of Company shares; and
continued to do so in the face of events which, in the ordinary run of things
must depress their value. It led to accusations of bulling for personal reasons.
If he did indulge, there is no record of this because he would have used an
agent; but it would also have to be with borrowed money, he had none.
Apart from financial troubles, Sulivan and his fellow Directors faced other
difficulties. Much of the worry abroad sprang from Clive’s earlier assumption
of the Diwani in Bengal; and the inadequate administration that accompanied
the dual-system of government experiment. At home, he had to accept as
irreversible two developments against which he had fought tooth and nail:
the growing influence of Government upon the direction of Company
affairs; and the principle of the Company being a territorial as well as
mercantile power. His dependence upon ministerial support since 1769, and
the naked power exhibited within the Company’s Courts by Parliamentary
groups, hammered home the first of these developments.
Nevertheless, the continuance of commerce as the Company’s prime
function remained a cardinal point with him. Once again he became familiar
with the real state of Bengal: the extent of famine there; and the condition of
its administration, trade and revenues. His considerations on these issues,
together with those of Clive and the two ‘Chairs’, were laid before the
Committee of Correspondence. He drew up a similar methodical assessment
of Carnatic business.
Sulivan was truthful when he said that at this juncture the General Letters
(embodying so many innovations) were all drawn up by him, and done in a
‘spirit of fairness’. The cumulative effect of his endeavours was that in these
years ‘the Court of Directors managed to send to Bengal a series of
despatches of epoch-making importance’.34 That the credit for this must go
to him is more than backed up by the amount of materials carrying his
imprint among the India records.
His energy is attested elsewhere. Efforts were made to establish a
settlement at Balambangan, in Sumatra. All the plans came from Sulivan and
Gregory. Palk also told of his friend’s opposition to the ‘oceans of
people…gone this year to India’ with no provision made for them.35 Yet, no
matter what he did, it was not enough; and soon events affecting the
Company, and the course of Sulivan’s life, would take an even more serious
turn for the worse.
11
Defences Breached
1769-73
For the Company’s financial crisis of October 1772 Sulivan has received an
unwarranted bad press. The emergency would lead to another Parliamentary
inquiry, to Lord North’s Regulating Act of 1773 and loss of the Company’s
independence. Because of these enormous consequences and the blame that
has attached to him, the record needs to be set straight.
He was still one of a few men who could be relied upon to get to the heart
of a problem and try to do something about it. This being the case, it must
then be asked (as it was by contemporaries) why he did not, or could not,
change the course of the Company’s fortunes before the crisis. The major
criticism has been that he placed his own needs first; and was deeply involved
in activities that were diametrically opposed to the good of the concern, such
as in the speculations of Sir George Colebrooke. It is alleged that as the
private affairs and executive control of both became ever more linked, so
personal circumstances affected their decisions – to the detriment of the
monopoly. This is the view that is challenged here.1
The major requirement, before even looking at Sulivan’s involvement, is to
enumerate the many factors that came together to create this crisis. Abroad
the situation was appalling. When Sulivan re-entered the Direction in 1769,
the Nawab of the Carnatic’s debts continued to be the source of corruption;
and Clive’s ‘Dual System’ of government for Bengal had been a failure.
Extortion and misdemeanours there by Company and native officials alike
continued. There was also the threat of a military coup; and corruption plus
penetration of local business by army officers continued.
Expensive defensive alliances, large military establishments, and a strong
presence in border regions drained funds. The threat of French sea attacks,
and Haider Ali’s marauding raids into the Carnatic had a severe impact on
DEFENCES BREACHED 1769-73 175
commerce. There was a growing shortage of silver in India, a state of affairs

scarcely realized in Britain, but which was to have severe long-term
consequences. This was to be made worse by the Company’s acceptance of
larger bills of exchange from the Presidencies.
On top of everything else, nature played a vicious stroke, when the famine
struck Bengal in 1769. The effects of it were still visible twenty years later.
The result, in financial terms, probably accounts for the decline in territorial
revenues to the Company of about £400,000; at a time when military costs
rose by £160,000.
The Company was also being undermined by loss of revenues from tea.
Three and a half million pounds of the commodity had been imported in the
1750s, which turned into an over-supply in the 1760s and early 1770s.
Meanwhile, the lack of a distribution network and any control over
consumption had resulted in massive smuggling. This threatened to the core
the ‘legal’ traders and led to an appeal for reduced tax duties on the
commodity.2 By February 1772 a mountain of unsold tea had built up, by
which Sulivan calculated that the Company had become the losers to the
tune of £1 million.
Apart from dismay at the accumulation of bad news from abroad,
sensationalism in Britain helped depress the value of Indian stock further.
There were ugly stories circulating that referred to the wealth and
ostentatious living of Nabobs. The scandal surrounding one such gentleman,
William Bolts, was common knowledge. Accusations and counters to them
spread like a rash in the newspapers. They were accompanied by various
‘histories’ from people like Alexander Dow, who wrote a History of Hindustan.
This, and Considerations on Indian Affairs by Bolts, had a determining influence
on the public mind. Sulivan’s long-running quarrel with Clive was even
dredged up as contributing to the disruption.
The monetary crisis fast approaching reached a critical stage with the
arrival of an international credit crisis in 1772. By virtue of its financial
position the Company could not escape. It was not helped by its dependence
on a short-term loan type of financing from 1769.3 The cumulative effect was
to further depress stock, making exports impossible and loans imperative.
Sulivan believed the failure to maintain a cash flow began in March 1772.
He was probably correct, because it was understood at the beginning of the
year that an injection of £500,000 was required. Yet, where was this sum to
be raised? It could not be elicited from the settlements abroad, cash
problems were just as serious there; and to meet Investments, Presidencies
were increasing their bond debts.
The large number of bills accepted in Britain between March 1771 and
March 1772 probably did more than anything else to exacerbate an already
impossible situation. Altogether, the Company was liable to meet (during the
three years 1772-4) no less than £1,578,000 for bills drawn upon the
Presidencies. As early as March 1772 there was nothing with which to meet
these obligations, neither from sales nor reserves. Tea had been stockpiled,
which tied up funds. Money could not be found in the ‘City’. Banks had been
weakened by the efforts of the Dutch to become involved in India stock.

Finance houses began to fail, caught in the grip of the credit crisis. Alexander
Forsyth's bank crashed, Drummond's only just survived.
The crisis built quickly from March 1772 onwards. The Company needed
money to tide it over between the sales of March and September, but could
not get this, or was forbidden to raise it. On 22 September the Directors
informed the Proprietors that they would not be able to issue the half-yearly
dividend. The publication of this state of affairs, and the resultant outcry in
the newspapers, then activated the Government. The Directors, with Sulivan
at their head, were involved in negotiations with the ministry for a loan,
realising that the Bank of England was the single hope of survival. The terms
offered were deemed unacceptable; and the Bank of England then refused to
enlarge or renew its loan beyond 29 October. The Company had reached
breaking point.
As Deputy Chairman, able and interested in all that was going on, Sulivan
was in a position, it would seem, where he could have done something to
avoid this crisis. Why did he not take the positive action needed at the
opportune moment? The answer is that it was outwith his power to do
anything; and he was not a member of the executive when restorative action
should have been applied. His past record demonstrates that without
exception he always put the Company first, no matter if his own situation
was desperate. Just as he became aware of how bad things were, events
quickly snowballed. He had no opportunity of remedying an emergency that
had reached massive proportions long before he re-entered office. He did not
return to the Direction until April 1771.
Most accusations concern the period September 1771 until the crisis of
October 1772. He and Colebrooke were charged with encouraging the policy
of borrowing money from Government and of making no reduction in the
dividend. They are depicted as concealing the true state of affairs from their
fellows. Sulivan also stands accused of permitting the excessive bills of
exchange during these vital months, to the extent that they completely
prevented any remedial action being taken. This last allegation can be
discounted; it flies in the face of all contemporary evidence, which casts the
blame on the disobedience of Company servants in India and upon their
avarice.
It is also alleged that even between July and October 1772, when the crisis
was upon the executive, the efforts he made were not in the best interests of
the Company. This would be difficult to substantiate given that he was one
of a committee of thirteen Proprietors formed to consider ‘Proper
regulations for the Better Management of the Affairs of the East India
Company at Home’. He wrote a pamphlet, entitled Plan for augmenting the
Capital and Extinguishing the Debts of the East India Company. Also, by the end of
July his proposal for another Superintending Commission was up and
running; and he was a member of the Committee of Treasury which, in July
and August, borrowed a total of £100,000 from the Bank of England over a
short-loan period of two months. These are not the actions of a man who,
can be accused of neglect. His long-held general policy, all his plans and last
minute efforts, negate such a view. When his personal dependence upon a
thriving and independent Company is considered, it becomes even more
absurd.
Bad tidings were aired for the first time at Committee of Treasury
meetings held in July 1772; and it was obvious to everyone then that the
difficulties to be faced were incapable of being easily solved. To allot the
blame to Sulivan it must be shown that despite being out of office from April
1770 to April 1771, and a Director (not one of the Chairs) only from that
point until April 1772 that he was instrumental in fermenting the crisis that
was only generally recognised in July.
He might have been severely encumbered by difficulties of a personal
nature, but early in 1772 he really believed the Company to be performing
adequately. His convictions were based on figures provided by Clive, upon
whom, in this field – and despite all else, he placed a degree of reliability. In
addition, Sulivan felt absolutely certain of continued Government support.
He considered that because of the risk offered to national security and
stability it would not be allowed to falter.
The first shock in July 1772 was the seriousness of the Company cashier’s
report, which confirmed the financial miscalculation made in September
1771. The second jolt came when North would not fully come to the rescue.
This was even more surprising to him since he was on friendly terms with the
minister. He and Colebrooke, as a matter of course, had expectantly notified
Lord North on 11 August that the Company needed a further £1 million; the
minister merely referred this to Parliament for a decision on 5 October.
Only after April 1772 would Sulivan have had the opportunity to peruse
the accounts relating to September and October 1771. In his account of what
happened, he firmly placed the 1771 Chairman, John Purling, in the
forefront. In September 1771, the Committee of Treasury had brought out a
dividend of six and a quarter per cent. John Manship had opposed this,
because he had worked out (correctly it proved) that the bills of exchange
paid from the funds would mean that the Company would have to borrow all
of the money needed to pay the dividend.
Purling and the Company accountant made a projected assessment of
expenditure as far as March 1772, and they calculated there would be a small
surplus without borrowing. Manship’s opposition to Purling’s calculation
continued, and he called a General Court in October 1771. According to
Sulivan, the Proprietors were beaten back by Purling who said the
Accountant would vouch for his estimates. Thus, in early March 1772 his
figures were accepted as correct, and a dividend of six and a quarter per cent
was agreed upon. Even Manship acknowledged that he must have been
mistaken. Sulivan had nothing to do with all this; a fact brought up by
himself and by ‘Honestus’ in the Public Advertiser for 6 April.
In truth, he had little to do with consultations on the Company’s financial
position up to this point, because he was so tied in with Colebrooke. They
probably had the same friends engaged in ‘jobbing’; and he was prepared to
accept any figures that appeared favourable. Yet his cool stance must be set
against a background of depressed shares. He must have had reservations
about Purling’s claims, but had to argue for their acceptance, or the
Company’s credit was gone. The impact that a further fall in India stock
would have on his personal circumstances must also have been in his mind.
It would be completely wrong, however, to hold him responsible for what
happened before April 1772. It is also extremely doubtful that he had any
control over John Purling, he had been in the Clive camp for years. Sulivan’s
own way when in power, such as in 1758, was to play down danger and
conceal it from the public to prevent a loss of confidence.
According to Sulivan, he had been content to accept Purling’s figures
down to March. In April he was one of the ‘Chairs’ and privy to information
of all kinds, and still was not stirred by a sense of impending catastrophe. In
his reminiscences, Colebrooke said that the Bengal bills and the guaranteed
payment of tea duties to the ministry created the crisis. He too pinpointed
Purling as the culprit and promoted the view that the difficulties could have
been overcome even without the help of Parliament. This was always
Sulivan’s assertion. Colebrooke mentioned one of Sulivan’s ideas, which was
to raise a loan in Holland through a Mr. Wentworth who would speak to the
Dutch banker Hope, on the subject. The Company’s tea stores, worth £17
million, were to be surety. North axed the scheme.
The impact of interest groups, and peculiarities in the Company’s
operating methods in London did not help this evidently avoidable liquidity
crisis; nor did the Company’s bureaucratic strength. It was so good, it
allowed business to continue as usual, despite the growing difficulties. The
efficient India House clerks and the adaptable system (perfected during
Sulivan’s period of absolute power) were geared for survival.
It is in the executive arm that most interest and blame for what happened
has been attached. To be more precise, it is alleged that by 1772 the
oligarchic structure of the Direction ensured that only a few men had real
power and influence over Company policy. Central to this was the undue
control exerted by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. This is where the
spotlight has been focussed and why Colebrooke and Sulivan who filled
these positions stand accused. The fact remains, however, that the
emergency, which still had not manifested itself clearly in April 1772, was not
their doing. It only became obvious in late June, that something was very
wrong.
When the gravity of the situation was realised by North in August, all the
Company’s accounts were asked for. Stock fell to a new low of 160. At the
first indication of distress, the Treasury had indicated that it was willing to
help, just as Sulivan thought would be the case. Only the extreme seriousness
and depth of the crisis stopped this then happening – or so it was alleged.
Later Sulivan could say to Hastings, ‘stock purchases were all remembered,
the sufferers were violent in the extreme and it must be acknowledged
(though I believe the parties innocent of any sinister views) that appearances
were very unfavourable’.4 His own innocence, suggested by the objectivity in
this letter to Hastings, can be substantiated by the fact that both the Palk and
Vansittart estates were hurt in the crash, and he would surely have helped
there if he could.
The attack upon Sulivan’s integrity and the loading of blame upon his
shoulders remains unjustified. Indeed, it can be construed as a compliment to
his ability and unsullied behaviour that he faced such rancour after the event.
He was the one they all depended upon in the end. The losses to so many
gave added venom to the later accusations. This measure of blame was
doubled with realisation that the Company had fallen into the hands of the
ministry.
Yet, here was a leader with a long and proud history of service and
responsibility. Accusations of guilt, when challenged, cannot be
substantiated. The real question to be asked is why the ministry refused to
give succour to the Company in its hour of need? The Government and
Bank of England refused to provide the kind of help normally given. That
the Bank did not do so was due to circumstances beyond Sulivan’s ken – but
could guess at.
All he tried to do was keep quiet about the organisation’s financial
troubles, for the best of reasons, to maintain public confidence. Colebrooke
more or less corroborated this, by saying that his colleague was ‘never
disposed to show the weakness or inability of the Company and always
thinking its resources more than sufficient to surmount its greatest
difficulties’5 Rockingham also noted that Sulivan kept his mouth shut and
borrowed when in debt rather than lower the dividend. Even after the event,
Sulivan maintained that if the Direction had remained united, if Boulton in
particular had not betrayed the situation, then the ‘storm might have been
weathered’.6 When the crunch came, his involvement at the centre of things
made him a convenient scapegoat.
2
It is typical of the man that just as his personal credit was reaching its lowest
point through impecuniosity and undeserved blame for the Company crisis,
Sulivan was trying to do something about it all. He had already embarked
upon what can only be described as outstanding endeavours to eradicate the
evils bothering the Honourable Company. These were launched through
both Parliamentary and Company channels.
The attempts originating within India House were ongoing and introduced
in a variety of ways. Behind all of them lay the aims of correcting abuses and
reforming administration within the settlements, and especially Bengal. He
also wanted to keep at bay Parliament’s growing interest in Company affairs
– reflected in the King's speech of January 1771. At home, he and
Colebrooke made efforts to reorganise the Company’s recruiting service. The
measure fell through, partly because the necessary Parliamentary Bill failed.
They were also unable to prevent a Bill going through limiting the
Company’s tonnage, one initiated to save timber for the Navy.
The early months of 1772 found him very busy in Parliament. He had been
an MP for ten years and knew his way about. The Judicature Bill he
introduced was a step in the right direction. This measure was intended to
make the task of creating good government in Bengal a lot easier. In addition,
at his insistence, Warren Hastings had been newly appointed to the post of
Governor of Bengal. The proposed new legislation was designed to give the
Governor more power by extending the authority of the Court of Justice at
Fort William. The Bill also contained clauses for preventing unlawful private
trading and strengthened the Company’s control over its servants.
Messrs. Nuttall (the Company solicitor) and Sayer helped him prepare the
clauses. Opposition within the Company was checked because opinion was
overwhelmingly in favour of reform. It was also resolved to apply to the
Crown for a new ‘Charter of Justice’ in Bengal as well as the Act to regulate
the Company’s affairs and servants there. On 30 March Sulivan introduced
the Bill into the House personally.
The Bill’s objective was to redress the disobedience and malpractices
among Company servants in India. The desire for autonomy rampant in the
Presidencies was a development that Sulivan had fought against from 1757 to
1765. In Parliament it was mistakenly interpreted that he hearkened back to
Clive; and this was reflected in the increasing number of attacks (by others)
on his old enemy. There followed an increasingly bitter but knowledgeable
debate in the Commons upon the proposed measure.
Clive spoke fully, aware that his whole career was under attack. Believing
that Sulivan had deliberately engineered things against him, he openly
declared this conviction in the House. By inference it had to be true to some
extent, though there is not a scrap of evidence. Sulivan must surely have
harboured feelings of animosity; it would have been difficult for him to avoid
such sentiments given the continuing open rivalry between the two. Yet he
had been fighting corrupt and ungovernable servants in general since 1757.
In this instance it was resurrection of the authority of Leadenhall that he
sought.
Certainly, Clive’s constant enmity would give ample justification for
Sulivan’s repugnance. Yet, the truth was that he was more interested in
sorting out the problems he saw in 1772 than shifting the spotlight onto the
past. Regrettably, as far as the course of the Bill was concerned (and for
Clive-Sulivan relations) it was impossible to delve into the evils in Bengal
without Clive’s contribution coming under scrutiny, in turn awakening a
sense of the overwhelming authority he had enjoyed there.
In the Commons discourses the great man contrived ineffectually to place
the blame for the present situation in Bengal upon Sulivan’s shoulders. In
turn, he faced an interminable and vicious attack mounted by the Johnstone
family. Clive responded and repeatedly managed a few scathing and
detrimental remarks against Sulivan, who he believed (wrongly) to be in
harness with the Johnstones.
Lord North spoke for the Bill, Townshend and Edmund Burke against it -
he thought the Bill a lame one, but later said nothing better appeared. It
received its second reading and a motion for going into a committee upon it
was passed. Disagreement then broke out over who had the power to
nominate the judges to Bengal. The Directors were refused this power, and
the passage of the Bill became unstuck. Sulivan’s response was, ‘If the
Attorney-General and his friends meant at this clause to make a stand against
the Bill he would sooner give it up than see the Company suffer.’7
He had read the situation perfectly. The intention was to kill it off by
dragging things out to the end of the session. Wedderburn, who owed his
seat in the House to Clive, while annoyed at such delaying tactics, then
demeaned himself. He seized upon Sulivan’s manner of speaking to the
Commons, took him to task, and expressed feigned surprise at his language.
Referring to Sulivan as ‘The Dictator of Leadenhall’ he asked:
where and to whom does he think he is talking? Is this the House

of Commons or the room of the Secret Committee in the India
House? I protest I am obliged to look around me to see whether I
cannot recognise this to be St. Stephen's chapel...this is not the
place to act the monarch.8
This tirade marked the end of the Judicature Bill’s life. It is, however,
possible to hear the honed, viper like recriminations of his old enemies, Clive
especially, coming from Wedderburn’s mouth.
Thus Sulivan’s effort at reform through Parliamentary legislation failed
because the hostility of the House towards the Company had been brought
to bear. Scandalously, grave problems were dealt with in very brief fashion,
due to lack of interest and great ignorance among Members at large. As
before, Parliament wanted the riches that India seemed to offer, but had no
wish to shoulder the responsibilities entailed.
Again it says much about Sulivan that even before all this had become
public knowledge, he had initiated yet another move towards reform through
Company channels. In July the desperate monetary situation confronting the
Company became all too clear to him, and on the 29th of that month, by
means of the Committee of Secrecy, he proposed sending out another
Superintending Commission to India to regulate the Company’s affairs. By 29
September the Proprietors were resolved to appoint a Commission consisting
of nine men. Six of these would be despatched from London. They were to
act in conjunction with the Governor of Bengal, with the second in Council
there, and with the military commander-in-chief. The whole Commission was
modelled upon that of 1769, and Sulivan was author of both.
It was then that his plans went awry. The days from 29 September to 23
October were taken up with the financial crisis itself, and with political
scheming among the Proprietors and Directors over who should be
appointed to the Supervision. The whole operation became an exercise in
patronage. Eventually, by ballot the Directors chose Lt.-General Robert
Monckton, Edward Wheler, William Devaynes, Peter Lascelles, Daniel Wier
and George Cuming to be the six Supervisors. Sulivan insisted on sufficient
remuneration and advised that the Commission should be of three years’

duration. In this, the 1769 format was again copied.
He still hoped to stave off Parliamentary interference at this stage; and
aimed to relieve his own dismal fortunes by inviting Supervisors of his own
choice: ‘The Supervision...will end all my difficulties.’9 His hopes rested with
Andrew Stuart, a friend of Macleane. Supporting this ‘Scotchman’ brought
him great ill-will; and he described Stuart as having been ‘scoured to a most
illiberal degree’.10
Unfortunately for him it was not to be. The aversion of North to the
whole idea marked its demise in December 1772. Despite contacting Burke
through Macleane, he had been unable to convince anybody of stature to
take a post, apart from General Monckton. George Dempster had also
pushed Burke to accept the position, ‘to give the Supervision a good name’.11
He had even thought of going on the Supervision himself; and Colebrooke
later insinuated that he was offered the Governorship of Madras. It would
have meant certain death.
Despite an appeal to ‘Chartered rights’, the Act prohibiting the
Supervision was passed. The Company was in disarray, made helpless by its
financial collapse. All initiative lay with Government; it alone had the power
to remedy affairs. All Sulivan’s efforts had been in vain. That he had failed in
his efforts to reform the Company from within and via Parliament, can only
be described as a calamity. His hopes were now centred upon the man in
Bengal. With doors closed to reform via Parliament and through the
Company, he turned to Hastings. It became vital that North read letters that
contained details of his efforts to crackdown on things in Bengal. The
minister was to be aware things were progressing, and how well the new
Governor was handling things.
Even though Sulivan thought the Company’s independence could endure,
he was really not seeing things right. By December 1772 the House had
become the arena where the struggles that would define the Company’s
future would now take place. Such activity was already underway and the
shift of power from India House to Parliament was effective from that date.
The worst outcome was that the Judicature Bill, and all that preceded and
attended it, led to Burgoyne’s motion to set up a Select Committee to
investigate the abuses in the Company’s government. When this was passed,
to widespread acclaim, Sulivan was faced with a threat of the governmental
takeover he had always feared. While the Committee was to act as a tool to
investigate scandals, it could also serve as a means of settling old scores. It
did not solve current problems and only interrupted the good work he and
Hastings had planned for the years ahead.
It is quite probable, therefore, that the Deputy Chairman foresaw his own
ejection from power in April 1773, a disastrous finale for him to face – set
against the high hopes of recent months and his increasingly perilous
financial condition. The final ironic twist was that his latest skirmish in the
Commons with Clive took place when Parliamentary control of the
Company, the course Clive had always favoured, was becoming a reality.
With the end of the Company’s credit by late 1772, and failure of the
attempted reforms, the North ministry was given the opportunity, through
no effort of its own, to evolve an Indian policy; and it had achieved a
cherished ambition of direct entry into Indian affairs. The Government’s
problems were formidable, nevertheless. Not least of these was opposition
from within the Company, fortified by Parliamentary Opposition.
Sulivan was prepared to give his strongest support to anyone who would
resist measures that further eroded the Company’s independence. He would
never in any circumstances advocate that the Government should administer
Company territory; nor would he ever promote force in the collecting of
revenues. This would be the antithesis of everything he stood for. Every
attempt at reform he initiated was made to avoid just such eventualities.12
From January 1773 onwards India House was virtually lawless, its leaders
and the Direction as a body were immobilised because of dependence on
Government help. The General Court was in temporary command of sorts;
and the great opposition to ministerial interference Sulivan saw there meant
he could lead a challenge to threatened chartered rights. He hoped to prevent
Government from succeeding in its grimmer demands.
The ministry was split. One side wanted a sweeping extension of
responsibility. The other side, which included Lord North, was less inclined.
The first minister was inundated with plans from people like Clive. His
advisers, however, such as John Robinson, did not think the machinery of
Government was strong enough to take over the responsibility of running
affairs in Bengal and elsewhere. What remained true, however, was that the
Company’s future was out of its own hands. Eventually, it would have to
succumb to those changes in its organisation and rule suggested by others
from outside its body.
North’s Government, (notably Charles Jenkinson) carefully prepared a
plan of action that was to begin with the speech from the throne. First,
however, Parliament was to inform itself of the true state of the Company’s
affairs. Throughout December and January Sulivan was extremely active,
preparing proposals to forestall these ministerial designs. He realised that
constructive moves had to be put forward. If not, he could see a situation
where the Company would just do as it was told. Chartered rights would
become outdated, wither and die.
He wanted reform within the Company, while giving minimum
concessions to any outside body. That is why on 3 December 1772 he laid a
plan before the Court of Directors that would ‘enable the Company to make
a dividend on the Company’s stock.’ In other words, he wanted to show to
the world the monopoly’s continued viability, and its healthy future.13
On 14 January 1773 he met Lord North to go over ‘thirteen points’ of
discussion, pertaining to the reform of Company business, the financial help
to be received and Parliament’s rewards. These far-sighted ‘thirteen points’
came from Sulivan, were part of his own initiative and proved to be
immensely important. They also served to represent the views of the
Direction.
The more important heads of conversation included: renewal of the

Charter; and £200,000 to be repaid to the Exchequer in £50,000 instalments
– after all debts were reimbursed. Government was to loan a total of
£1,500,000 at four per cent interest for four years. The country was to
benefit from the Company’s territorial revenues; Proprietors would receive a
fixed dividend of eight per cent – the remainder to be divided between
Government and the Proprietors.
Regulations regarding the administration of justice were to be granted,
based upon Sulivan’s Judicature Bill of the previous year. Parliament was to
be given copies of revenue books, charge books, copies of consultations, and
supplied with every help to understand Company affairs. Tea was to be
exported duty free; and two ships were to be sent direct to America, annually,
with tea and other India goods. They would return to England loaded with
American commodities. (It would appear that Sulivan’s initial proposal led
eventually to the ‘Boston Tea Party’.) On 23 January 1773 North let him
know that he was ready to consider these measures.
It was February before Colebrooke, Sulivan and Wheler presented a
formal petition to Parliament for relief from financial distress. This was based
broadly on the ‘thirteen points’ outlined by Sulivan and shown to North on
14 January. Carefully excluded, however, was any mention of grants of
revenue to Government from territorial acquisitions. Sulivan suspected all
along that North was grasping at control of the Company, the ‘glorious
object’ as he described it to Hastings. Colebrooke too indicated that he was
sure North was after territories, possessions and trade. The Proprietors,
however, had no idea of the extent of the minister’s claims. As guessed,
revenue from commerce and from territorial gains was exactly what was
expected.
When these demands were aired through Burgoyne’s Select Committee,
there was a general revolt in the Company. The challenge to chartered rights
and to the Company’s territorial acquisitions caused outrage. North was
informed there could be no acceptance of the loan unless the Company’s
views were incorporated in future proposals.
The course of events, and of Sulivan’s future, was further complicated by
the looming election of April 1773. This was recognised to have immense
importance. The make-up of the new Direction would reflect which interest
had succeeded at Leadenhall. It was fully understood that the Directors
returned would be important to the continuing negotiations with
Government, which had reached a delicate stage
Electoral activity had already commenced by October 1772, but Sulivan
put no great effort into putting forces into the field. He did not have the
wherewithal in terms of patronage and support. His mind was also distracted
because Colebrooke, who owed him a great deal, had just crashed.
Nevertheless, his confidence in being returned to the Direction was well-
founded at this stage.
Inexorably, though, events turned against him. This might have become a
little obvious when he found out that he alone of all the Company leaders of
1772 stood for re-election. He did not consider himself constrained in doing
so, in the face of public accusations, many of them ministry inspired. He
took the minister’s approval of Purling’s request for and inquiry as an indirect
censure upon his own behaviour, and so made it clear to all and sundry that
his conscience was untroubled. He made a public statement that he feared no
interrogation and, furthermore, declared his intention of standing for re-
election. He would do so because not to offer his services would be
tantamount to an admission of guilt. Besides, he argued, the pressing state of
the Company’s affairs demanded the endeavours of its most experienced
servants.
Sulivan’s speech was much approved of. He depicted himself as the only
pillar of strength left in the Direction. He expected the ministry’s attacks
upon him to be violent, and they were, because with him gone the Company
would be completely at North’s mercy. He said to Hastings, ‘could I be
prevailed upon to retire, every art was practiced, to cajole, to intimidate me,
but nothing could move me for I had nothing to fear.’14 So vicious was the
censure, he was forced to issue a printed declaration that outlined his
position and his interest; and gave a reminder of all that he had done for the
Company.15
The election proper resolved itself into a struggle between Crabb Boulton,
heading the Proprietors’ list and supported by Ministry, against Sulivan and
the House list, with such support as he could muster. Sadly for Sulivan, apart
from Palk and the Barwells, most shareholders backed Boulton; while the
crash of his ally Colebrooke threw his erstwhile supporter Rumbold on to the
side of Clive, Sykes and Government. Fear of probes by the Select
Committee influenced many others; and all was conducted amidst a great
deal of public revulsion at Nabobs. The Proprietors’ list won convincingly.
Boulton was made Chairman, with Edward Wheler his deputy. Lord
Sandwich had astutely handled the Government’s management of those
within the Company holding pro-ministry feelings, and of those fearful of
anyone prying into their personal affairs. Sulivan blamed himself for
Sandwich’s degree of control.
Yet he was still surprised at the result, describing it as ‘a revolution
...extraordinary and unexpected’.16 Most contemporary evidence, on the other
hand, pointed to him being crushed, and his friends had predicted it. What he
referred to was the defection of his long-time friend, the ship’s husband,
Charles Raymond, and others in the shipping interest. This ‘betrayal’, left him
utterly crestfallen. This interest had been his constant support, his great
strength. He was broken at the result. He said to Warren Hastings: ‘Ten days
ago all the world thought my power was riveted.’17
He was really signalling the loss of his core support, his power base. No
wonder he was despondent. From April onwards he had few backers, and
faced the hostility of North’s ministry. He vented his rage, remarking
disparagingly that such an incompetent Direction would scarcely last a year,
especially with Crabb Boulton a dying man. But his own resigned attitude is
indicated by the admission that ‘the power of ministry was not to be

resisted...in future they must govern the Company’.18
The April 1773 election was the last of its kind. It returned a majority of
Directors who would prove amenable to every Government suggestion.
Henceforth, Sulivan would only be able to pressurise the ministry and its
lackeys in the Direction indirectly, from within the General Court. His
departure from Parliament in 1774 did not help either. Far from filling the
Chairman’s post, which ordinarily would have been the step up from Deputy
Chairman, he was not even in the Direction. Yet, although down, he was not
out; and symptomatic of his ever-soaring spirit he still hoped to influence the
final form of North’s Regulating Act
3
The King’s speech of 21 January 1773 asserted the State’s right to intervene;
but that and the April 1773 election, denotes the high point of what was
really a remarkably short term of interest by Administration in the affairs of
the East India Company. What the ministry really had to do, however, was
secure control over Company servants – the same object worked at by
Sulivan throughout that fateful year. To this end, as was related to Hastings,
‘he very early’ conveyed his ideas on reform at home and abroad to Lord
North, ‘the fountainhead’.
Restoration of credit to the Company came in October 1773. A series of
small loans for short periods meant that a repeat of the disaster of October
1772 would be avoided. Eventually, the ministry was armed with the findings
of its own Committee of Secrecy. Here the difficulties faced were all spelled
out: the Company’s ‘debts, credits and effects’; the perennial problems of
military costs, and reform of abuses abroad – the very difficulties that Sulivan
and people like him had fought for years.
Naturally, the greatest opposition to North’s terms came from India
House; yet the ministry needed the help of Directors and Proprietors in
framing the necessary clauses and having them accepted at Leadenhall.
Sulivan and Richmond figured prominently. The Duke represented the
animosity felt by Parliamentary Opposition. Proprietor stubbornness showed,
when a committee of thirteen Proprietors, which included Sulivan, was
appointed: ‘To draw up proposals for the reform of the Company’s
organisation in England.’19
The Government’s own draft ideas were based upon the reports of the
Committee of Secrecy; unofficial knowledge of various Company proposals;
and, Sulivan reported sarcastically, ‘by the advice of many individuals
including even Laurence Sulivan’.20 In dismissive language he referred to the
unfair terms accorded Hastings’ position; while still willing to forge a
constructive policy with Government representatives. Yet so great was his
mistrust, before being ousted in April, he had set up a ‘committee of twenty-
five’ to watch over the interests of the Proprietors. By dint of this committee
the Directors were forbidden to offer terms to North; so the minister

threatened dictated terms.
Reluctantly a general agreement along the lines of the proposals first put
forward by Sulivan in his discussion with North on 14 January was settled
upon. These ‘thirteen points’ were forwarded to Parliament by 2 March. They
were debated in the House at Committee level and the Bill was drafted there
– primarily by Robinson, helped by Jenkinson. It was known later as the
‘Loan Bill’.
After the removal of Sulivan in April, the Direction meekly followed
ministry’s wishes; and by May the minister was ready to state the proposals in
the Commons. In the meantime, the persistent lack of negotiation led to
protests among the Proprietors. North called their bluff by asking if the
Company would rather reject the loan. He had won; but in fact, he could not
hold back anyway, the Regulating Bill was complete and the House awaited it.
4
Such are the paradoxes of life, at the very moment of his greatest worry
Sulivan had taken under his wing the individual who would come to the
rescue of his and the Company’s affairs. He was responsible for Warren
Hastings being allowed to return to India in 1769. After that, he appointed
him to the position of Governor of Bengal; and later, in 1773, ensured he
was made Governor-General. The evidence is quite clear on all this. It is even
more striking because before Sulivan’s advocacy, nothing in the least
remarkable career-wise had happened to this Company official.
There had been some earlier links with Sulivan, of course. For instance,
the loyalty he had shown Henry Vansittart from 1760 to 1763 was not lost on
the Company leader. Even closer ties came about from 1763 onwards
because of Clive’s coldness to the young man. Again this was due to
Hastings’ loyalty to Vansittart. Clive had shown hostility to his erstwhile
colleague in other ways. In 1767 Hastings had applied to the Directors for re-
employment, and was refused. Clive, whose followers dominated the Court,
inspired the rejection. The friendship between Hastings and Vansittart
explains why.
However, despite this antagonism, he acquitted himself well when giving
evidence at the Parliamentary Inquiry, and attracted the attention of North
and Mansfield among the ministers; Colebrooke and Purling in the Company.
This helped, of course, but what really explains the success of his re-
application in April 1768 was that Clive had temporarily dropped his
opposition. Why he should do so is explained by efforts made by Sulivan to
come to an arrangement with him in September 1767 using their mutual
friend Robert Palk as an intermediary. In his letter of 13 September 1767,
Sulivan offered an alliance to Clive. In a footnote to this letter, he added that
he had omitted to state that he wished Warren Hastings ‘to be returned to
India, in his standing.’21 Sulivan got his wish; Hastings was to succeed Josias
Du Pré at Madras. He sailed for India in March 1769.
Hastings then attempted to draw into a closer association the friends he

and Sulivan held in common, such as Palk, Vansittart and Elijah Impey. He
entreated Sulivan to secure Colebrooke’s friendship too. This was all
stimulated by Sulivan’s return to power in 1769. Then from 1771 to 1772,
although in alliance with Colebrooke, he was the one who took charge of
affairs. Sulivan’s aim was to shake up the whole of the Bengal
Administration. He wanted it remodelled and the Clivites out.
His power within the Direction in 1771 was made evident when on 10
April a General Letter to Bengal notified the authorities of Hastings’
appointment as 2nd in Council. The next General Letter to Calcutta of 25
April dismissed Cartier and his Clivite colleagues Becher, Claude Russell and
Charles Floyer. Again this had Sulivan’s unmistakable stamp on it.
Before Hastings had even left Madras, yet another official letter followed
on 8 August, again advanced and authorised by Sulivan, which instructed him
to go on the Lapwing to Bengal and take over as Governor. Sulivan required a
man accomplished and experienced enough to manage major restructuring,
and so turned to the already earmarked Warren Hastings.
It is also true, of course, that others seemed to want Hastings to take
charge – his service and talents would warrant this. For example, Francis
Sykes, an old confidant certainly canvassed on his behalf. Even Clive, it has
been claimed, recommended him; although this softer attitude was short
lived. Moreover, it only happened after Vansittart’s death in 1770, thus
ending Hastings’ connection with someone Clive regarded as an enemy.
In Hastings Sulivan had someone who was perfectly suited for what he
wanted. Through him he meant to channel his plans and ideas. Basic to
everything, however, was the wish to re-impose the authority of the
Direction on Company servants abroad. This was supposed to be done
through his protégé. What developed, of course, was not exactly what Sulivan
had in mind. Hastings seized the opportunities presented to him through
being on the spot in India and made his own mark. He doubled his
endeavours, developed great will-power and demonstrated ability to handle
the complex problems before him. Yet he never ceased to welcome Sulivan’s
views, entered in both public and private correspondence.
At first, after being made Governor of Bengal, Hastings heaped all the
praise for his appointment upon Sykes. It was late January-February 1772
before it dawned upon him that Sulivan had been instrumental in securing his
promotion in 1769 and again in 1771. Only the interest that Sulivan
commanded in the General Court and in a section of the Direction, especially
in alliance with Colebrooke, could have secured these appointments and what
followed; not the wishes of Sykes and Palk, however well intentioned.
Hastings was already impressed by Sulivan’s abilities however: ‘Your
superior knowledge and long practise in the Company’s affairs…give you
that ascendant which you formerly possessed in the administration of
them.’22 Referring to his nomination for Governor of Bengal, he expressed
thanks to Sulivan:
for this fresh instance of your benevolence to me. I am as yet

unacquainted with the means by which this very unexpected change
in my fortune was brought about; but I know that it had all the help
that your influence could give it.23
Sulivan, he declared, had ‘uniformly supported him and had never once lost
sight of his honour, his interest and his reputation’.24 Later in his career he
came to know just how great his obligation to Sulivan really was; and
admitted that he owed more to him than any other man in the world.
The task of governing in Bengal was not an easy one, and from the
beginning Hastings faced immense problems. He was forced to introduce
some energy into the art of government in what was an exceptionally corrupt
and lethargic environment. He also faced the consequences of the 1769-70
famine and the decimation of the Company’s wealth that followed in its
wake.
The Secret Committee at Leadenhall, with Sulivan on board until 1773,
helped him in all this, proving formidable in its attack on the powerful
Mohammed Reza Khan who had controlled affairs as the Indian half of the
dual system. Sulivan had him removed. In Hastings’ first year of office the
foundations of the future British ruling structure were laid down. As Diwan, a
proper system was devised, which meant that after long opposition Sulivan
had bowed to the inevitable. The upshot was that Clive’s system was ended,
Bengal was kept alive financially, and Hastings set a course for the future.
From hindsight it can be seen how crucial this appointment was for future
developments. It was not altogether fortuitous, however. Sulivan had
concentrated on him as the man most needed to take charge. In doing so he
showed great discernment. Noting Hastings’ mastery of Indian culture, he
surmised that he could apply himself in a constructive and reforming way for
the future good of the Company and the subcontinent.
This was the thrust of his argument during Company-Government
negotiations on appointments to the Supreme Board at Calcutta. He pushed
Hastings forward for Governor-General against competition from Rumbold,
Pigot and Du Pré; arguing that he was untainted and had already made
inroads into the problems in Bengal. He pointed to the vast overhaul of the
Company’s governing and judicial framework already achieved; and to his
general experience and continuity of service. He made sure that his letters
recommending Hastings reached the right people – especially Charles
Jenkinson, who was impressed. Ministers settled for Sulivan’s choice. Lord
North praised Hastings in the debates and the post was secured.
Hastings was appointed a reforming Governor-General, and had to divert
subverted energies back to Company work. Besides his civil and judicial
duties, he was responsible for defence of the Company’s possessions and
preservation of its gains. He was entrusted with the direction of military
action against the French and hostile princedoms alike; but had to return
profits sufficient for a dividend.
The exceptional talents he possessed were much appreciated by his

mentor, Sulivan, such as his good knowledge of the Urdu and Persian
languages; and understanding of native law, customs and politics. British
officials had to become judges and ambassadors dealing with local matters. In
fact, Hastings (and Sulivan too) would have liked to leave control of Indian
affairs in their hands as much as possible.
He had a bureaucratic, authoritarian cast of mind, more so when opposed;
but also had vision and statesman-like qualities that placed him beyond the
normal. Sulivan endeavoured to keep the Governor-General tied to him. He
never faltered in his support and advice; and he was to fight Hastings’ corner
in the dirty business of Company politics until his return.
This support was crucial; in particular it upheld Hastings ‘during the
critical first two years of his administration, those years when the foundations
were being laid of a decent government in Bengal’.25 The post of Governor-
General that then followed was certainly ‘an appointment Lord North would
not have made without the sanction of the Company’s Chairmen’.26
Somehow it seems fitting that Sulivan was able to fill this first ever
Governor-General position with his own man.
5
Sulivan’s telling remarks on the Regulating Act, and on its operation,
illustrate a piercing understanding of just what was happening. The main
stages in the passage of the Bill and its terms are well-known. In the
Parliamentary struggle, ministry faced the argument that the Company still
had the right to territorial revenues. Lord Rockingham, with Edmund Burke
at his elbow, led the Opposition on this; and the issue was expanded into a
general attack upon the Government, claiming that such interference
attacked the liberties of the citizen while it increased the power of the Crown.
The Bill was a composite measure, transitory in nature, and was regarded
as a means in itself for future reforms. Its primary function was to bridge the
gap between the years 1773 and 1780, the end of the Company’s current
Charter. Balance was its main feature, since it attempted to satisfy the wishes
of the Company and those of the State in the choice of members for the new
government in Calcutta. Representing the Company’s choice were Warren
Hastings and Richard Barwell. For the Government was ‘The Triumvirate’ of
Philip Francis, Colonel Monson and General Clavering, who was to be
Commander-in-Chief and Hastings’ successor if he resigned.
The Supreme Court set up in Bengal was based on Sulivan’s Judicature Bill
of 1772, but married to the Ministry’s desire that the Crown would appoint
the Judges. Most of the provisions for checking corruption among Company
servants contained in the Bill also owed their existence to Sulivan’s Judicature
Bill, as did the proposed reform of the Company in London.
The measures included Sulivan’s desire to curtail even further the ‘splitting’
of stock, by ensuring that people owned the shares for longer, before they
could count as qualifications at Company elections. The voting requirement
itself was increased: from £500 to £1000; and the cumulative vote for large
holders of stock was reintroduced. A four-year rotation of Directors was to
commence from April 1774; and there were to be no plenipotentiaries in
India.
Even as the Bill was being thrashed out in Parliament, Sulivan and his
fellow Proprietors were presenting a petition against it, signifying the
simmering opposition within Leadenhall. However, the Solicitor-General,
Alexander Wedderburn (and Charles Cornwall) succeeded in having this
rejected. North was then able to reintroduce the Bill, and it became law on 21
June 1773; but only after hot debates in the Lords.
It would be 1774 before all of this legislation created the desired changes
and before the ministry would have direct influence on Company affairs.
Even then, it still had to face the anger and hostility of most Proprietors, and
was going to have difficulty in making them cooperate in the new
arrangements.
From the first, the inefficient operation of the new system reflected it was
a compromise. Indirect Governmental control through its agents in the
Supreme Council in Bengal, and by John Robinson and the Earl of Sandwich
within the Direction, was disastrous. There was no doctrine, and it was
clumsy; with the Government dependent upon Company machinery. More
difficulties were created than it set out to resolve. Hastings could only ever
expect – at the very best – a compromise with North and Robinson. ‘The
Triumvirate’ utterly horrified Sulivan and his friends.
In the end, the Act was to fail in India and was only just kept alive in
Britain. It inaugurated another period of ‘General Courts’, stimulating power
struggles among the body of Proprietors. It was a continual struggle for
Government to maintain some form of control in the Proprietors’ Court as
well as the Direction.
Becoming involved in the Company’s affairs and learning how its labyrinth
machinery worked was now one of the Treasury’s most active pursuits.
Robinson, Jenkinson and Dundas gained much needed expertise; and with
them, although it was negligible at this stage, began the participation of the
British Government in the administration of India. Here again, inadvertently,
Sulivan had helped in a more mundane way. The organisation within India
House (completed earlier by Secretary James and himself) was so sound that
the investigating commission, set up in 1773 in preparation for the
Regulating Act, felt compelled to congratulate the Company upon the
competence of its clerks and the state of its books.
Sulivan’s letters abroad, principally to Hastings and Richard Barwell,
demonstrate how quickly he grasped Government’s real intentions. They
reveal how useful he was as a commentator and critic upon events; and
provided Hastings with vital knowledge, and insights. By May 1773 he had
come to the conclusion that ‘the system now adopted must be productive of
anarchy and confusion...I deem the men bold who have launched upon such
a bottom.’27
He saw the looming struggle for control that would develop, and
commented, ‘Sacred writ says that no man can serve two masters, yet such is
the task.’28 By October he was lamenting that Hastings was ‘not empowered
to act singly’, and that the ‘crown had carefully preserved a majority...in the
new government of Bengal, with the succession well secured’.29 At that point
Sulivan did not know how firmly Government controlled nominations to the
Bengal Council. His own conclusions, however, were that ‘in equity and
sound sense the scale ought to have preponderated with the Company’. He
feared that the prevailing view within the ministry, Parliament and the public
would ruin the organisation.30
Between October and March 1774 he comprehended the overall design
and was horrified. The Act and its consequences would annihilate his
beloved Company. To him it dissolved ‘a solemn compact, dearly purchased
and secured...by so many Acts of Parliament’. Although it restrained the
Company for five years only (from 1773), he commented shrewdly, ‘add the
time before this can reach India and the term extends nearly to the expiration
of the Charter itself’.31
He was deceived over the Supreme Court articles too. They struck against
the Company: ‘The first Magistrate reduced to a common J.P.’ Sulivan was
under the impression that North had agreed with him that there should not
be too much interference with local custom and laws. Yet the Supreme Court
had been given ‘extensive jurisdiction and immense power’. He foresaw that
every native would seek legal decisions in ‘an English Court of Justice’. It was
also wrong, he thought, that the independent powers of the other
Presidencies should pass to Bengal. He said to Hastings, ‘It will require all
your philosophy to bear with temper the Parliamentary system which in a
great degree annihilates the Company’s powers and privileges, disgraces and
degrades the service in India.’32
He did not think that Hastings could accept such an arrangement; and
feared, all too correctly that he would lose real power and be faced with rivals
in the Council. He went on to picture a dismal future in which the power of
Parliament was to be dreaded; where Hastings would find it impossible to
conduct Company affairs; and the Council would belong to the Crown. The
lack of experience and knowledge in the Bengal Council, together with the
rejection of Hastings (which he foresaw), would be ruinous. He now
bemoaned the four-year Direction and the £1000 stock qualification to vote,
which had to be held for a year beforehand. His keen eye saw that the future
independence of the Company was lost.
His letters continued, filled with lamentation. The ministry, he said, would
have the ‘entire management of the Company at home and abroad’; and
added, ‘love of my country and its happy Constitution warrants me to call
this a dreadful hour’.33 His greatest fear was that the end result would be the
surrender of the Company Charter. His only hope lay in, ‘A confidential
union’ between Hastings and Barwell. Above all, he put his hopes in what he
termed Hastings’ own ‘superior abilities’.34
In his correspondence Sulivan belittled what his own role in future events
might be, saying: ‘My affection can suggest no counsel – its beyond the reach
of my abilities.’35 Yet he went on to offer a never-ending stream of plans and
advice on every topic. One of his fervent hopes was that ‘the arrival of my
much loved friend Mr. Impey’ would help him.36 In light of the feud that
developed later between them, it is ironic that Sulivan should give the new
Chief Justice such an outstanding character reference.37
Impey had been Warren Hastings’ ‘old acquaintance…school fellow and
intimate friend’.38 Sulivan had benefited from his friendship. It enabled him
to make connections in the Cabinet, especially with the Attorney-General,
Edward Thurlow, from whom he gained considerable information as well as
a firm alliance. Impey was also the close confidante of his long-time ally,
John Dunning. These joint friendships made the link with Hastings stronger.
He also thought, wrongly it proved, that Monson would be a close
collaborator.39 In this way, friend and foe were identified; although it was
only late in 1773 that he learned Francis was Clive’s friend, through D’Oyly
‘whose interest brought him (Francis) into the commission. D’Oyly and Clive
are inseparable.’40
What is most apparent in these letters of Sulivan’s is that he (and through
him Hastings) realised that by the Regulating Act, Parliament had all but
taken over control of the Company and its possessions. He was to be proved
correct in every prognosis; and knew that all the ‘lucrative and tempting
power’ would eventually be in Government’s hands.41 Hastings’ situation,
with its duties and obligations, he saw would be both delicate and dangerous.
Nevertheless, he maintained that it was the duty of both to keep on course:
‘They stood on a precipice…but the eyes of Parliament, the Company and
the British nation were upon them.’42
Sulivan’s use of terms like ‘Chartered Liberties’; ‘Rights of an
Englishman’; for the ‘public service’ and so on were not employed in the
sense of looking after the general good, for the benefit of trade or perhaps
the alleviation of poverty; nor did they refer to impartiality, parity, justice or
of equal reward for equal work. They can best be described as colloquialisms.
The language appears to betoken a common attitude held by those who were
from his class or strata in society.
The expressions might be taken to represent a Whig view of the times; of a
ruling oligarchy against both monarchy and the non-property owning mob.43
Even as the leader of the East India Company, Sulivan was not required to
undergo public examination – limited as this was in eighteenth century
Britain. He objected in the strongest terms to Parliament’s efforts to enforce
just such an inspection (as opposed to regulation) in what was perhaps an
early movement towards public accountability. He certainly regarded North’s
Regulating Act as breaching the walls of hard won and (to him) justified
privilege.
The loss of Vansittart and the other Supervisors early in 1770 had been a
body blow, although the Supervisory Commission itself had been a good
idea. A Parliamentary route, not a Company one, would have sufficed; and
the Judicature Bill he introduced, or something similar, if given a chance

might have succeeded. His real concern and painstaking work is shown in the
details of this proposed Act, and in the plans and ideas willingly given to the
Secretary of the Treasury, John Robinson. Now that the ministry had overall
control, Sulivan was to express his schemes and proposals privately, to
Warren Hastings and to others among his close friends and family in the east;
until once more he was asked for his ideas by Robinson, Dundas and Pitt the
Younger later in the 1770s.
Through ministerial confidence in himself he had hoped to continue
making a personal contribution to the better regulation of Company affairs.
This hope, fortified by ministerial use of his ‘thirteen points’, only lasted until
the 1773 election, when it was made clear that the last thing the North
Government wanted to face was the continued rivalry between him and the
Clivites.
He had known for some time that he must put the right man in charge in
India. Abroad, this person would have to work alone, yet act in tandem with
him. He must take heed of all that was said, and act on the advice sent by
him from Leadenhall. Hastings was just such a mortal; and he tried to give
him unlimited power.
In the end he could do nothing about ministerial takeover via the
Regulating Act. Nevertheless, in the period 1769 to 1773 (similar to the years
prior to 1765) he probably did more than any other person to set up the
framework required for the future territorial administration of British India.
His work was to be built upon and pursued vigorously by Hastings in his
own individual way.
Sulivan’s own assessment of his contribution at this time is probably
correct. He said that as a member of the April 1769 to April 1770 Direction,
in particular, he helped create substantial groundwork for reform in India. He
wanted to operate a form of benevolent, but firm rule, giving security,
impartial justice and regular administration. In his heart of hearts he would
have already given way to Parliament’s right to superintend eventually, while
still defending the sanctity of chartered rights. The form of government he
desired was one that would operate, as far as it could, within Company
confines, while preserving laws and customs that had become adapted to the
needs of Asians through time.
12
Desperation and Defiance

1774-78
From August 1769 Sulivan had made prodigious attempts to escape from
the financial trap he was in, and in so doing became further involved with
Colebrooke, Vansittart and Macleane. He faced a truly appalling situation; a
state of affairs particularly humiliating to him when he was at the helm of the
Company from 1771 to the end of 1772, and in the right place, it might be
thought, to remedy things. Hastings was told that he and Vansittart were so
much in debt ‘it forced the children (Owen and Sulivan connections) to India
and brought me to the brink of ruin. For though I was independent, not
anxious for more, I never was rich.’1 Vansittart’s death made the situation so
desperate he was forced to mortgage everything with any value.
By 1772 he owed over £10,000 to Palk and more than £7,000 to
Vansittart’s estate. Macleane and others owed him more than £9,000. In
exchange Sulivan received securities on the estates the Ulsterman had
transferred to Vansittart, worth £6,000. These embraced three lots of land on
the island of St. John, Newfoundland (later known as Prince Edward Island).
He also held Macleane’s bond payable to the executors of Henry Vansittart’s
estate, worth £1,593-15/.
Towards the end of May 1772, the ongoing negative conduct of Edmund
Boehm, Vansittart’s executor, forced him to turn again to Palk, a trustee of
Vansittart’s estate. His other hope of succour was through Colebrooke, also
in his debt through a move of Macleane. His optimism terminated with the
collapse of India stock in 1772 and the failure of Colebrooke’s banking firm
in l773.2 That same year, Colebrooke, Sulivan, Macleane, the Barwell family,
the Burkes (William and Edmund) and Lord Verney were participants in a
plan which, although the details are lost, involved the redistribution of India
stock. It came unstuck.
Colebrooke was declared bankrupt in 1773, and an unsuccessful attempt
was made to put his bank in Threadneedle Street into the hands of Sulivan
and John Boyd. Sulivan’s predicament was so bad in 1774, he was forced
once again to seek John Dunning’s help. His pride choked him, however,
when he found people at his friend’s house who smirked at his reduced
circumstances. Unable to face the humiliation he turned away.
Although author of his own predicament, he was certainly dogged by bad
luck. The country and the Company were in the grip of a credit crisis which
he was powerless to do anything about. Nor could he have legislated for the
death of Vansittart. It was the lowest point in his fortunes. In late middle age
his world had literally come apart. He was out of the Direction and only one
step removed from debtors’ prison.
2
Great Ormonde Street and neighbourhood would have been very beautiful
in the spring of 1774, but the sixty-year-old Sulivan might not have
appreciated it too much. He was very much changed from the forty-four-
year-old who came to power in 1757. The never ending work and
responsibility, Clive’s remorseless enmity, and the effort to regain office in
1769 had left their mark. The wreck of his personal finances that followed
was accompanied by the loss of his much-loved Company to the State, and
with it ministerial control of what had been his to rule over.
His character had changed in countless little ways. He was more cynical,
sceptical and suspicious - although still able to enjoy a fight. In 1739 he had
been a mysterious figure but in every other way open and above board. Now,
though still secretive, life at the white-hot centre of so much of consequence
had tempered his views of mankind, and made him play his cards close to his
chest.
He still sought fulfilment, but this search had changed subtly from the
original one. He had luxuriated in authority, and the trappings of success.
This had substantially gone, but he still hungered for the exercise of power.
The pride of his early years had turned to conceit when he took the Deputy
Chair in 1757. It took the debacle of 1769 and the abject defeat of the years
1773 to 1774 to make this tendency disappear forever. Henceforth he was to
be respected (and hated) for his skill, knowledge and ability in relation to
Indian affairs.
Yet, there was still one trait he just could not subjugate, one that lay at the
root of all his troubles: he could not resist a gamble, a joust with lady luck.
This characteristic had been demonstrated time and again. Yet he could never
stop. It was part of his nature, blended into his soul. Nothing else mattered
other than to be ‘in the game’. After 1773, although still possessed of the
same compulsion, he could not indulge it because he did not have the
wherewithal and lacked opportunity. It was as if a rogue gene forced him to
seek authority and use it, and in many respects his conflicts and struggles
within the Company were all to do with this. Unquestionably these battles
reflect a compulsion to be the master. It was the same with the contests in
DESPERATION AND DEFIANCE 1774-78 197
the press, against ministers, and with powerful servants, home and abroad.
He had to be in command.
Sulivan enjoyed the exercise of power; and had aspirations to change so
much of the world. This is reflected in plans and proposals, administrative
reforms, Parliamentary bills and everything else. These embraced territory
and life in the East; and every conceivable sphere of Company business. In
his private and Company correspondence, in Parliamentary speeches, press
statements, books and pamphlets, the same impulses to control, command,
but also to do good, are evident.
He always wanted ‘the confidential powers’, seeking command, fame, and
riches (strictly in that order); and only through and within the East India
Company. He regarded riches as necessary only for pursuing, gaining and
retaining influence, and for a certain standard of life. He enjoyed the
demonstration of power, however, and the accompanying prestige; but his
influence was used to push others towards riches and lucrative appointments,
not himself. Nevertheless, he always sought to earn this authority and not
just be given this because it went with the office. Self-awareness, knowledge
of society and the workings of the world lay behind this attitude. His
excellence and expertise were the outward manifestations of knowing his
inner self.
The wish to exercise power was at the very heart of this intelligent man.
Like Machiavelli’s Prince he too planned with foresight and clarity; executed
ruthlessly; and winning was everything. Fulfilment only came when he alone
governed a successfully-run Company. He used the tactics of a professional
politician: wheeling and dealing; remaining inscrutable; giving nothing away;
and holding his tongue. These ploys become habitual.3 He maintained a
deliberate aura of mystery and ensured that his reputation went before him;
enlisting others, such as Thomas Lane, to do much of the work that had to
be kept secret. The impression he contrived to impose was that without him
there would be chaos.
By the nature of things those superior in social and political standing did
not necessarily love him, usually the opposite; they could resent, fear or
ignore him. Sulivan knew his position and what he could reasonably achieve.
Also, because of his high-powered activities and the dirty politics that
enveloped him he would have to be untruthful at times, though without
sacrificing honour. Many of his tactics ‘like Machiavelli out of Tamany Hall’,
were surely devious. He studied everyone, continually searching for
motivation and traits. There is the impression that apart from his wife, he
never trusted anyone completely.
He had the ability to plot and counter-plot, so necessary to get to the very
top. Perhaps the stimulus for such driving ambition (and use of
Machiavellian tactics) lies too deep to be analysed properly, and is to be
found in psychological and genetic features, or even his ancestral
background. Nevertheless, it was probably the most striking feature of his
personality. There was a down-side to all this, of course. The pursuit and
application of great power surely bled him of some feelings and created
illusion. Without the warmth his wife could provide and a normal home life,
he could have become a hollow shell.
3
In 1774 Sulivan and family moved westwards, only a matter of several
hundred yards, from 46 Great Ormonde Street to a less imposing and not so
costly house on the south side of Queen Square. He would dwell there until
1782. This square was a special place and the house stood in one of the
loveliest backwaters in the heart of London.4 Doctor Burney and his daughter
Fanny (Madame D’Arblay) were his immediate neighbours. Hannah More,
one of Dr. Johnson’s circle, was a resident.
It was a rather fashionable area, favoured by the intelligentsia and by
commercial men. Robert Louis Stevenson later described the Square as,
‘Grave and kindly…set apart from the humanities of life and the alleviations
of all hard destinies.’5 The house had many rooms, all of a handsome size and
providing enviable living conditions.
In the space immediately south of the Square right in front of Sulivan’s
house, stood an iron pump. This provided the best water in the
neighbourhood. ‘It was a sight to see the procession of jug-carrying servants
from the great houses and children from the poorer houses making their way
to the pump each day.’6 It was at this time he became a member of the
church of St. George the Martyr, Queen Square. John Luxmore, Rector from
1782, was to lay to rest both he and his wife in its burial ground.7
Sulivan was engrossed so much in money matters and political skirmishing
that his other qualities tend to be squeezed out. Nevertheless, he did
appreciate many forms of beauty. This is reflected in his love of Persian and
ancient Indian artefacts, and appreciation of portraits. It is also illustrated by
his patronage of the artists Tilly Kettle, Richard Crosse and Sir Thomas
Lawrence, who all finished portraits of him.
He was not spiritual in a religious sense and was really more of a humanist
or atheist. He often described himself as such and said that he abhorred
religion, though using Biblical terminology a lot, and attending ritual for his
wife’s sake. However, he would not offend the protocol of religious life.
Encircled by so many devout people, like his wife and Robert Palk, he could
do little else. Why he was so irreligious is not obvious – although clearly
steeped in scripture. Possibly it was because he had observed so many
different beliefs, especially in the East; and had seen enough intolerance in
the world.
Even before his move to Queen Square itself, Sulivan was known far and
near, as ‘The Old Man of Queen Square’. His association with this part of
London was to remain rooted for a quarter of a century. Many of his friends
and enemies, such as: Clive, Vansittart, and William Barwell had ties with the
area or lived close by. The Square was certainly at the centre of affairs,
judging by the number of East Indians who lived thereabouts. It was a short
carriage ride from India House and the rest of the City, yet near enough, for
a merchant and Company man, to the society of the West End. It was
convenient for Westminster and Whitehall, for the Court, and his country
estate in Hertfordshire – if he should ever repossess it.
4
By acceptance of the new situation created by the Regulating Act, Sulivan
again displayed that he was a realist. In order to ensure some form of
independence the executive had to forge a fresh relationship with
Administration; and although not in the Direction, he worked hard at
establishing the ground rules that would accommodate the Company’s new
masters.
Nor was he was disheartened after defeat in April 1773. Hastings was told,
‘I certainly do not give up the game, and my prospects are rather solid.’8 He
referred to renewed ties with the Johnstone group; and with others among
the Proprietors opposed to ministerial control of the Company. He was
forging links too with members of the Rockingham party, who formed part
of the Parliamentary Opposition. By September, Richmond was asking
Rockingham to forget the aversion they both entertained, and to vote for
him at in April 1774. Richmond wanted Sulivan to be part of the alliance
Sandwich had formed with the Johnstone group.
The real political arena now was the General Court, where the struggle for
domination developed. The groups had to fight along organised lines, in
contrast to earlier times, largely because of the changes introduced by
North’s Act. One quarter of the 24 man executive would be elected annually
for a four-year term. The regulation came into force for the first time in April
1774, giving sharpness to the election. To inaugurate the scheme a quarter of
the Directors were to be elected for the full term, a quarter for one year, the
same for two years, and again for three years.
Sulivan was the only one of the old leaders still skirmishing, and his
adherents started to regroup. He observed that the death of an old enemy,
Crabb Boulton, might be to his benefit. He also revealed that he and Charles
Raymond of the shipping interest were ‘fast friends again’.9 This was
extremely important. It probably came about because he recommended
ample provision should be made for commanders of ships deprived of
employment due to new regulations reducing Company shipping. They
received £200 each. He was troubled, however, by the attitude of Lord
North, who he described as pretending to be sorry for his conduct towards
him, which he did not believe. This and the confusion at India house left him
beginning to feel a little more uncertain of success.
The 1774 election was exceptionally significant, therefore, because the
result would be long lasting. However, by Christmas he knew North had
decided against him, probably influenced by his dallying with the
Rockingham group. He returned this hostility as his own views hardened.
His aims were to support Hastings; restrain or redirect ministerial
pressures bearing upon the Company; and preserve its semi-independence
for as long as possible. To him this was ‘a dreadful era’. He saw the struggle
ahead and described Lord North, with no small measure of sarcasm and
anger as ‘The boldest minister...since the days of Oliver Cromwell.’10 He
thought the forthcoming election would be the last real contest, since he
expected that Government would seize hold of Company management by
having their own nominees returned.
He described the period December 1773 to January 1774 as full of scenes
of confusion. He was also aware that Clive had joined the ministry, but
thought this would make no difference. He was wrong. His Lordship had
realised the importance of this election and brought all his influence to bear.
It was to be his last but effective storm of activity against Sulivan. Walsh and
Strachey, in collaboration with John Robinson (who was acting on behalf of
the ministry) filled the Direction with their men. Thus a coalition of ministry
nominees and Clivites was formed. Sulivan described them as, ‘more
contemptible, if possible, than when Bolton [Crabb Boulton] presided, broke
to pieces among themselves and at this time there are four and twenty
chairmen – a melancholy but true picture.’11
In early January 1774 he consented to form a coalition with Governor
George Johnstone. This was a real turnaround. Apologetically he said to
Hastings: ‘To you and my friend Macleane nothing could perhaps be more
disgusting than such a union and my best friends have a right to an
explanation.’12 It was done because the shipper, Charles Raymond, wanted it.
With the North ministry’s unfriendliness, Sulivan reflected that he would not
‘accept a junction with them but upon very explicit grounds as I have been so
often betrayed’.13 In this way he was sucked further into the Johnstone,
Richmond and Rockingham camp.
All involved in this alliance were urged to buy stock for splitting, and
Sulivan resorted to a series of publicity campaigns. A comparative state of the
Company was published under the name ‘An Old Proprietor’. He also had
another article ready, which he described as ‘A vindication of the Company
and its Directors...it marks the minister (North) as the origin of our present
misfortunes.’14
He harnessed the support of Colebrooke and Sir James Cockburn to that
of the Johnstones, George Dempster, Lushington and Yorke. Robert Palk’s
backing was vouchsafed, together with that of all his connections, and those
of the Vansittarts. The Rockingham Opposition supported him. Yet, even
with this show of support, neither his son nor Palk thought he had much
chance.
Stephen Sulivan was out early in the day ‘to do all in my power by
soliciting at the door of every Proprietor’. He saw the tide swing against his
father in everything, and reckoned he had ‘not even a glimmering of
chance’.15 Palk reported the same bad tidings. He thought his friend would
be ‘entering the lists’ for the last time, ‘for it does not appear to me that he
has the smallest chance of being chosen, but he cannot be prevailed upon to
give up the vain pursuit’.16
However, two letters from Sulivan to Hastings, one on 28 March before

the election, the other on 15 April, just after it, show what his real aims had
been. In the first of these, he predicted that a ministerial government would
be in Leadenhall, but added, indicatively, ‘The 24 (Directors) this year, bad as
they are, may be much worse the next.’17 He too had come to think success
was impossible; but it was so important he was determined to make a hard
struggle of it. He professed to be ‘supporting the interests of the Proprietors
against the Administration who had invaded the Company’s chartered rights’;
and saw himself as having no other choice but to act.18
He attempted the manoeuvre of promoting and publishing a House list
without Government consent. The ministry refused to even contemplate it.
Lord North then published a ‘House List Amended’, with the fourteen they
would support and ten alternatives, who were all Clivites and friends of the
ministry. Sulivan was furious that North and Robinson, who were not part of
the East India Company, had actually made a list of Directors. He raged
about it to Warren Hastings: ‘so daring are men grown in subversion of our
liberty...in this country there is little honour or gratitude’.19
The ‘House List Amended’ duly appeared on 24 March, reflecting the
wishes of Robinson, and Clive’s supporters, Walsh and Strachey. By 3 April
this group had wind that Charles Raymond would back Sulivan in place of
Becher in the category ‘class for four years’. Clive’s supporters then set about
countering Raymond and his friends by ‘building for Becher’. In this way,
Sulivan was even blocked from entering singly, and his defeat was confirmed.
In fact, none of his group survived. Philip Francis sneered, ‘Mr. Sullivan
made but a poor figure.’20
Sulivan disclosed to Hastings that he had gambled everything to create a
favourable situation for the next election: ‘We played a desperate
game...risqued our own prospects for the year to secure a majority of the late
Directors who were pledged to bring me and others in next year.’21 It had
been a valiant attempt: ‘Such an effort was never made in the memory of
man, only 950 votes in the 3 kingdoms, and 890 balloted for.’22 He was now
tired and dejected. North had shown he was resolved that he and his group
would not return to power. Strachey crowed to Clive: ‘Sulivan and George
Johnstone have been thrown out so we may be said to have carried our best
point.’23
The defeat was indeed a shattering blow, every bit as bad as that of 1765;
and again caused by an alliance between Clive and the Government of the
day. Robinson now had the opportunity to maintain ministerial power, with a
perpetually weak and disorganised Direction, devoid of ability and resolve.
He would be able to determine the mould of Company politics for the
foreseeable future.
5
That Sulivan should experience such immense suffering in the very year that
his great rival Clive died by his own hand was ironic. One of the last
confrontations between the two was in Parliament on 3 May 1773 during a

debate on North’s Regulating Act. To the very end Sulivan had remained
Clive’s bête noire, while the Johnstones continued to be his chief persecutors.
Clive believed (incorrectly) that Sulivan provided them with the ammunition
they used in their scathing, venomous attacks. Sulivan did not join with the
Johnstones; he could not forget that they had deserted him at the April
election.
During the debate, Clive’s speech centred upon trying to clear himself of
wrongdoing in India. At one stage a little humour broke out. He shifted the
spotlight upon his rival and had a dig at his near bankruptcy. Sulivan, he said,
had searched the India Office records for charges that might be laid against
him, and that he was ‘so assiduous in my affairs that really, Sir, it appears he
has entirely neglected his own’.24
The humorous interlude continued as his Lordship illustrated just how low
Company officials had sunk in the popular mind. Referring to the fact that
the Jacobite heads on Temple Bar had fallen down, he thought they might be
replaced, with his own in the middle, Sulivan’s on one side and Colebrooke’s
on the other. He could not resist yet one more entertaining swipe at Sulivan
and his fellows. He pictured them gorging on free meals at the Company’s
expense, ‘Devouring the turtle and all kinds of viands out of season and in
season, and swilling themselves with whole hogsheads of claret, champagne
and burgundy.’25
Sulivan would depart Parliament for good in 1774. On the surface this was
due to Palk’s request that he have the seat returned to him. He claimed he
had never gained any satisfaction there and that if he had his fortune back
would never go near the place again. He admitted, however, that he or his
son had to be, ‘in the Senate’; and that he had been ‘building castles…not
unusual with me’ at the possibility of this coming about. In September Palk’s
kind offer to allow him to continue was declined.26 He was in an extremely
serious financial state.
It is incongruous, however, that at a time when he most needed to be in
the Commons, he was forced to retire. What is more, North’s determining
influence at Leadenhall through the terms of his Regulating Act, coming at
the very moment of his exclusion from the House, doubled the effect of his
expulsion from the Direction. In this blackest and most desperate of times,
with no patronage to offer, he consolidated those ties already made and
depended heavily upon the network of friends in every settlement. An
outcast from the Direction, he had no other means of gaining accurate
intelligence and information.
Public life for Sulivan in the mid 1770s can be summed up as a defence of
all that he stood for and defiance of his enemies. He struggled to build the
new relationship between the Company and the State. He was rocklike in his
support of Hastings, and in rallying others to the Governor-General’s cause.
This was his role from 1774 onwards.
There were three phases to the Regulating Act’s operation. First came a
two-year introductory period from 1774 to 1775; followed by two years of
dislocation stemming from events in India. From 1777 to l779 there was a
partial run-down, explained by the Government’s harassment elsewhere, with
war in America, Europe, and then in India too. No business was possible
until the new Court of Directors was constituted in 1774. From then on men
willing to adapt were required by Government inside the organisation. North
worked by using Treasury influence in the Company Courts and committees
– ably directed by Robinson and Sandwich. Voting patterns at Leadenhall
were strictly orientated towards matching Parliamentary ones.
From within the Proprietors’ Court Sulivan had to employ all his
impressive energy and intellect to the defence of Hastings against the attacks
of the North ministry and its allies in the Company. Ammunition was being
supplied to them by Clavering, Francis and Monson. The struggles
developing in Calcutta impacted heavily upon politics in India House and in
Parliament. This clash over Hastings occupying the post of Governor-
General was the major disagreement with ministry; it would run like a thread
throughout the rest of Sulivan’s public career.
However, his defence of Hastings was not just about ministry,
‘Triumvirate’, or the strictures created by the Regulating Act. He was
convinced during his last spell in the Direction that the Company was almost
ungovernable abroad; and servants would not listen to the Board. It was a
development he had fought since 1757. Hastings was to be helped as he
strove for better administration within all the Presidencies, and engaged in
wars to defend the Company’s position. He also wished to serve his superiors
in India House, a desire rendered almost impossible by the ministerial
puppets beside him.
Sulivan had to maintain a constant support in London and sponsor anyone
in India who backed his friend in Calcutta or himself. All aspirations were
pinned upon the success of this one man. If the ministry was successful in
removing Hastings and his ally Richard Barwell, this would really signify an
end to any show of independence, and prove the superiority of ministerial
influence at Leadenhall. It would illustrate Parliament’s ability to get rid of
the Company’s most powerful official in India; and in the process negate the
influence of its most able and knowledgeable enemy, Laurence Sulivan. To all
of this, the Irishman made strenuous objection.
Only remarkable endurance (fortified by his desperate financial straits)
enabled him to remain a force in the Company. At the head of the pro-
Hastings group he fought with almost fanatical zeal to protect his friend
from merciless attacks. Hastings’ friends in the Commons were to be
similarly used in his defence. Although now absent from Parliament, Sulivan
shepherded all these forces.
The correspondence between Sulivan and his protégé was like an umbilical
cord; and indicates a clear and uncluttered exchange of ideas. The Irishman
made a point of transferring his knowledge to his friend. Each came to
understand the other. This reassurance served each man in his own private
hell: Hastings, faced with the ‘Triumvirate’; Sulivan, against a Government-
dominated and hostile Direction. They formed an axis around which rotated
the most important issues involving the Company. While they remained
united it proved impossible to break either man. Lord North and his two
leading agents, John Robinson and Charles Jenkinson, realized this only after
eleven years of effort.
His other major task was to create a role for himself within the new
arrangements brought into play by the Regulating Act; and he was forced to
combine with Government if he was to achieve reforms within the
Company. A whole range of new rules had to be learned; and his future and
that of his dependants rested upon how much he could keep abreast, or
ahead, of developments.
The real problem affecting the Regulating Act was the relationship to be
struck by Government and Company. It was all about management of the
monopoly at Leadenhall. Control was achieved by various alliances, some
quite tortuous, although overt patronage was quite common. Efficient
management was difficult, however, because people had so many different
reasons for being involved in East India affairs.
Any upset in India created havoc in Britain. In Bengal all the faults
inherent in the Regulating Act were revealed, creating policy and leadership
problems, mostly in the Supreme Council; and the bitterness built up festered
and travelled back to London. News of the Pigot scandal (the imprisonment
and death of the Governor of Madras); the Nawab of Arcot’s debts; the
Maratha war; Haider Ali’s ravages in the Carnatic; and the threat of a united
native front in India against the Company all created uproar at home; yet
were overwhelmed in importance by the revolts in the American colonies.
Distinct groups were in competition at Leadenhall: London merchants and
bankers; former Company servants, primarily from the civil service; the
shipping interest; speculators and financial manipulators; and dotted
everywhere, ministerial lackeys. Some factions were a direct result of the
controversies overseas, the Hastings and Pigot ones in particular; and
although Clive was dead by 1774, his followers continued their antagonism,
which now embraced Sulivan’s friends and protégés. Sulivan commented
emotively, ‘The ghost of Clive haunts me.’27
There was also some attempt at reform of the Company from within, and
as usual Sulivan was all for it; but all had now to go through Government
channels. Specialists like Robinson, Jenkinson and Dundas had begun to put
their learning to use. There was no doctrine behind it all – and there was no
machinery put in place to subsume the Company and its Indian
administration. The Regulating Act lurched on, and only the most strenuous
efforts kept it going on a year-to-year basis.
13
Fight for Survival

1774-78
I t might have been felt that after securing Hastings his appointment to the
supreme position in India that he was safe. Yet, Sulivan had no peace of
mind, knowing better than his protégé did that his own constant presence
inside India House was crucial if his friend was to continue in office.
Hastings could be certain of this unswerving backing because apart from
genuine friendship, both their salvations, and Sulivan’s plans for the future of
the Company, dictated it be so. He paraded his friend’s achievements;
bolstering his protégé by telling him of the utter confidence he had in him: ‘I
can add but three to your own name with whom I would have lodged
unlimited authority, and these were Stephen Law, Henry Vansittart and
Robert Palk.’1
This promotion and defence required liaison with a diverse group of
supporters. Forming the nucleus of the faction were friends and allies of
earlier years, such as Shelburne, Thurlow, Impey and Dunning, as well as
Palk and George Vansittart – and their families. Sulivan’s own relatives were
part of it. They combined with his followers in the Company. Sulivan’s home
in Queen Square became a rallying point.
As the Hastings party developed, it came to include ever more supporters
at Westminster as well as others from London business life.2 Although
Edmund Burke’s dislike of the Company was growing, he and the rest of the
Rockingham Opposition still stood behind him, their support based upon
‘chartered rights’.
Regrettably, some of the so-called friends were really adventurers who had
no hesitation in betraying a trust. The worst were Lauchlin Macleane, John
Stewart of Hampstead and John and James Macpherson. They used Sulivan
to get close to Hastings, seeming to promise him deliverance from financial
difficulties; and for Hastings, riddance of political fears. In Macleane and the
Macphersons they were presented with opportunists who acted on a scale of
ruthlessness and cunning that left them largely defenceless.3
The fact that Hastings was backed by Sulivan created him enemies; and
years of political activity and struggle with the Clivites meant that all these
adversaries were hostile too. The only exception was Sykes, Hastings’ old
friend; but even he told him lies about Sulivan. He faced the dislike of the
monarch too, who was committed to General Clavering. Cocking a snoot at
them all, Sulivan told Hastings, ‘no opportunity has been lost to establish you
upon the noblest ground.’4 He made sure that copies of the Governor-
General’s letters portraying the excellent work he was doing went to North
and from thence to the King. Hastings’ exertions were made known to the
leading figures in the Company. He warned his friend of people, home or
abroad, who meant him ill; and protected his reputation.
In the General Court he fought every issue, such as first opposing the
appointment of Clavering as Commander-in-Chief of Company forces in
India, then neutralising it by having Hastings commissioned Commander-in-
Chief of the Fortress and Garrison at Fort William. He carried the fight
onwards, through what remained of the North ministry’s time, and into the
1780s against the Rockingham, Shelburne and Portland administrations.
Even before Hastings became Governor-General Sulivan tried to give him
allies who were supposed to help in his endeavours. With many he made a
mistake or was deceived; as with Monson, John Stewart of Hampstead,
Lauchlin Macleane and John Macpherson. Others turned out well, like
Richard Barwell and Alexander Elliot. Richard Barwell played an important
part in what developed. Early in 1772 he had offered his loyalty in exchange
for a strong footing in Hastings’ entourage. The Irishman realised that
Barwell’s position was as hazardous as the one Hastings filled. He worked
successfully to keep them together, to the extent that Barwell remained the
Governor-General’s sole supporter during his years of severest trial.5
Sulivan’s enduring feud with Clive left a legacy. Before his death, the noble
Lord had proclaimed that he was ‘particularly acquainted with Mr. Francis’.
He referred to his contact with Francis through D’Oyly and the Fowke
group; and all his dislike of Sulivan and Hastings was transferred to him.6
Francis was also close to Edmund Burke, now more antagonistic to
Sulivan. This resentment seemed to stem from the loss of financial
independence by the Burke family, which was blamed on Sulivan; and the
fact that in 1771 Sulivan shifted from (seeming) alliance with Parliamentary
Opposition to a union with Lord North. Writing to Henry Strachey in 1775,
Francis promised that henceforth he would consider Edmund Burke’s
friends as his own.7
Faced with the ‘Triumvirate’s’ hatred, Sulivan shored up his friend’s
confidence. He enthused: ‘The general voice runs so strongly in your favour I
am satisfied all is right.’8 As they began to understand the importance of the
Hastings-Sulivan connection, and the strength the Governor-General gained
from Sulivan, these enemies even objected to their correspondence.
FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 1774-78 207
By January 1775 Sulivan was beginning to sniff greater hostility, and

reported that ‘an ill humour was growing’ in the Company Courts.9 He kept
Hastings informed of the developing struggles; advising him to be careful and
to hold firm. Symptomatic of this need to take care was that Mohammed
Reza Khan, who had been deposed by Hastings, had the effrontery (in
Sulivan’s eyes) to make a personal approach in London, lobbying for
restitution of office. Sulivan also marshalled the defence at home, following
the attack by the ‘Triumvirate’ over the Rohilla war.
For twelve years the struggle was unremitting. The numerous
investigations into Hastings’ conduct made by Clavering and Francis created
corresponding disturbances in London. Resistance, on most occasions, was
organised by Sulivan, who invariably defused the criticisms. The secret to his
success during these tortuous years was his espionage system. It was truly
remarkable. He knew exactly who were the enemy and what they were up to.
Thus he was well aware of Francis’ efforts to drum up a personal support.
Many Proprietors he approached were pro-Sulivan; nevertheless, he persisted
in sending them beguiling letters. They all reported back to the Irishman.
A massive crisis arrived in 1775-1776 over Hastings’ supposed resignation;
this shook Sulivan to the core. It all revolved around Lauchlin Macleane who
had become very important within the sphere of Sulivan-Hastings relations.
At this date it was impossible for Sulivan to know that he only posed as a
friend and cared little for Hastings or himself.10
In 1773 Sulivan had helped get him to India to retrieve his fortune, and
thus repay his debts. A potentially lucrative post as Commissary-General at
Bengal, placing him under the Governor-General’s protection was secured.
The letter of recommendation from Sulivan, which referred to this ‘man of
substance’, was exceptional; Macleane’s charm was all that was needed,
thereafter, to place him securely in Hastings’ confidence. The arrival of the
‘Triumvirate’ ended his money making activities, however; and in December
1774 he resigned before (at Francis’ insistence) he was dismissed. In the
meantime, he had secured for himself one of the two available posts of
personal agent for Hastings that empowered him to act for the Governor-
General in London.
Unknown to Sulivan and Hastings, Macleane also held an Agency from the
Nawab of Arcot. In 1775 he arrived home accompanied by John Graham,
Hastings’ other agent. Both were armed with materials and legal instruments
to defend the Governor-General against further grievous attacks in London.
Included in the armoury at Macleane’s command was the right (or so he
thought) to tender Hastings’ resignation if it was deemed necessary.
By December 1775 the attack on Hastings was at its height within the
Company, spearheaded by the unreliable John Johnstone and Nathaniel
Smith. Organising the defence were Sulivan and Macleane. Because the
Ulsterman had been on the spot in Bengal Sulivan relied upon him. Sulivan
witnessed first-hand how hard he worked, saying he ‘fought on his stumps’.
It was then that Macleane dropped the bombshell news that he had the
authority to hand in the Governor-General’s resignation. An amazed and
disconcerted Sulivan immediately asked to see Hastings’ letter. He also

wanted to know the background to it. What he saw and heard convinced
him; and he shaped his course accordingly. If Hastings must come home,
then he would have the best deal and as many honours conferred as possible.
The whole resignation issue was a shadowy business, however. It seems
that Hastings had already complained to Lord North that ‘the meanest
drudge enjoys a condition of happiness compared to mine’. He had begged
for immediate recall, or power on an honourable footing to deal with the
‘Triumvirate’.11
Negotiations between Robinson, Macleane and Sulivan regarding the
resignation were going on in May, and these continued into September. In
the Commons the issue, stirred up by the Hastings group, attracted much
attention. Opposition figures of the stature of Bute, Shelburne, Rockingham
and Richmond, fired up by North’s relentless drive to oust Hastings, became
involved.12
Late in 1776 it was obvious that North was making a point of forcing the
issue and having the final say. Sulivan and Macleane knew quick action was
needed, and were led to believe that they must accept what the ministry
deemed right before Parliament met, or Hastings would be squashed.
Believing all was lost his supporters agreed that the resignation letter should
be handed in. In September, the ministry’s terms were accepted and an
accord was reached. Macleane then handed in the resignation and this was
announced to the public.
However, in the interim Hastings proclaimed that Macleane had gone
further than he ought, and revoked the resignation note. The invalidity of the
‘Letter of Resignation’ sent in by Macleane was based on the non-specific
nature of the commands given; and that these had relied entirely upon the
discretionary powers given by Hastings to his agents. Although perplexed,
Sulivan accepted this ‘explanation’.
Ministers were not the only ones upset. Within the Company the issue had
created a great furore from the beginning. The hostile Direction had sought
corroboration from George Vansittart and others that the Governor-
General’s intention had been genuine. They had then (by one vote) decided
to recall Hastings. However, at a Proprietors’ meeting held in late 1776
(where Sulivan was prominent) this was reversed by a majority of 107. This
great ‘victory’ convinced Hastings to stay in India. It helped that the
infamous ‘Threesome’ had also been literally killed off. Clavering was dead by
August 1776; Monson died in September. As time went on Hasting
continued to resist any implication that he had resigned, and the crisis fizzled
out.13
The tendering of Hastings’ resignation marked the climax to Macleane’s
employment on Hastings’ behalf. From that point onwards he was in Lord
North’s pocket, and now concentrated upon the Nawab of Arcot’s affairs.
He died in 1777 while on his way out to India again, on board the Swallow,
theoretically still acting for Hastings and the Nawab.
Hastings may have survived, but the attacks on him continued. So low did
his stock fall, at times Sulivan seemed to be defending him single-handed.
However, he had nothing but scorn for the charges that began to appear. A
typical one, by Francis, was that due to Hastings’ poor administration, at one
stage there remained only six lakhs in the Bengal treasury. Sulivan wondered
if it was possible to find anyone who could ‘swallow such insufferable
nonsense’.14 By January 1778 he had ‘grown callous’ of the abuse directed
against his friend. He labelled the language so infamous, ‘Mrs. Rudd would
have been ashamed to use it.’15
Even with all Sulivan was doing for him (that he knew about), the
Governor-General seems to have regarded him as having only a limited use.
Perhaps he believed his power to actually achieve anything was fatally limited
by exclusion from the Direction. With an imperfect grasp of the Irishman’s
power play in the Proprietors’ Court, he would have thought him
comparatively toothless. This interpretation could explain some of the long
silences from India. It might all have been quite innocent, of course; Hastings
had developed the habit of asking that a letter to any one of his friends
should be passed on to the others. He did write directly to Sulivan on several
occasions, although the flow of mail was frequently interrupted or
intercepted.
Given his own predicament at this time, Sulivan’s pursuit of reform and
better government in the settlements, and Bengal in particular, was
remarkable. He spent incalculable hours drafting plans and useful material (all
extant and verifiable). Most of his work was based upon real problems and
practicalities. He relied on his own experiences in Bombay; his expanded
knowledge from years of executive participation; and what he gleaned from
reading interminable letters from Bengal, Madras and elsewhere. He
possessed an amazing store of accumulated knowledge. All of this
information and insight was relayed to Hastings. The Governor-General was
expected to use or discard the material as he saw fit. Hastings needed help as
he faced quite enormous tasks; but without detracting from the great work he
performed, he did owe much to Sulivan.
Yet, Sulivan never sought any plaudits and only ever praised his friend’s
achievements; although in some instances his own advice, promptings and
even draft plans and proposals can be detected in what was accomplished.
He preferred to extol Hastings’ excellence in transforming words and
thoughts into deeds in the midst of the most trying conditions. This attitude
can be seen in his own words: ‘Happy am I to find that my letters have been
of the smallest use.’ There is little doubt that they were.16
As time went on (and despite the silences) there is no mistaking the high
regard in which Hastings held Sulivan, even when quite unaware of how
indebted he was to him. The attention he paid to what his mentor said is
reflected in a letter to Palk. He believed Sulivan would think him ‘wild and
chimerical’ in the way he was cutting military costs.17
It is notable that while a small trickle of advice did reach Hastings from
others in London, it was insignificant when compared to the tidal flow from
the man in Queen Square. In his private letters home, Hastings always sought
after this constant stream of ideas, advice and plans from his friend. A few
excerpts suffice as illustration. As early as October 1773 Sulivan was urging
him to press on quickly with his intended reforms in the military and revenue
branches before the other members of the Council arrived. He urged
consolidation of Clive’s military gains; the formulation and completion of
administrative and justiciary plans; and of any land settlements that were in
hand. All the while, he prepared his man against the imminent attacks of the
‘Triumvirate’. Much of the correspondence dealt with finance matters, and
indicates that the annual Investment would always have first priority in his
eyes. He advised Hastings to place an embargo on any trade that hurt the
Company; to curtail expenses and correct abuses; recover the Company’s
credit and generally restore its battered prestige.
Sulivan had been one of the many who believed Clive when he said that
£2 million per annum was pouring into the Company’s treasury in Bengal.
This sum was subsequently upgraded to £4 million. Sulivan did not quite
believe, then, that Clive would be so casual over such important claims, upon
which so many decisions were to be made. What it led to, unfortunately, was
a mad boom in stock, the Parliamentary intervention of 1766-67 and, to
some extent, the Company’s financial collapse in the 1770-2 period.
In 1775 Sulivan gave Hastings an immensely detailed historical appraisal of
how, in his opinion, the Bengal finances had arrived at the terrible state they
were in. He covered the years from Plassey to 1775, admitting there were so
many areas of mystery he was truly baffled, and urged Hastings to investigate
further. In this exhaustive and complicated letter he displayed all his
computations yet could not discover the true wealth of Bengal. It was his
opinion that nobody could do so: ‘The collective wisdom of Leadenhall
Street can give no lights.’18
He remained perplexed even after using the best and most precise
information then available. As he said, ‘men believe that in Clive’s day there
was great and solid revenue’.19 Since then, he said, they believed the opposite;
and Hastings was expected to put things back in a good way. He added a hint
of what underlay the need to have precise figures: ‘I wish to guard against
such for should I return to the Direction, of which I do not despair, our
expiring Charter will require deep and serious deliberation. The true value of
Bengal will be one of the most important matters for discussion.’20 It is
impossible not to suspect (before he launched into an even more detailed
scrutiny of the figures) that a touch of wry humour caused him to add: ‘Ill as
I have been used by the body of Proprietors, they do give me credit for some
little knowledge of their affairs.’21
Sulivan enclosed two specific calculations, made by Clive at different
times; and he included a particular study of the year 31 January 1766 to 31
January 1767 from figures delivered to him privately by Walsh at Clive’s
express command. The information stood comparison with Verelst’s first
year in office. Clive’s next statement of account, for 1767 to 1769, showed an
expected increase from the revenues of 20 lakhs per annum. Sulivan gave him
full credit for this and had based his own sums upon his figures. Others did
the same.
He then proceeded to give Hastings a comprehensive account (with a
breakdown of cash, charges, and expenses) up to 1775. From these figures he
calculated surpluses for the Investment each year, which by 1775 reached ‘A
balance in our favour in Bengal of £1,716,664.’22 The persons collecting the
figures were ‘Lord Clive and our auditor – the materials in the period of 1769
taken from the Bengal Books – the account I enclose you…were public
papers laid before Parliament by the Company.’23
He urged Hastings to give a speedy and complete refutation of these
calculations if he found them erroneous, which they obviously were he
thought, by the poverty-stricken state of Bengal. The public at home, he
asserted, wanted to know why and where everyone was going wrong. He
ended: ‘Now I no more believe that you have £31,500,000 surplus (in 1775)
than I do that you have £15 millions, yet I cannot make out a corrected
account.’ His last plea to Hastings was that he should be the first to know the
truth of the matter.24
The Governor-General reported back, giving a ‘complete and pleasing
picture of our finances in Bengal.’25 At last Sulivan had a model before him
that approximated to the truth; and knew that a proper monetary structure
was in place. For this he was unstinting in his praise of Hastings, to all and
sundry, in or out of the Company.
Sulivan’s mind was forever fertile in schemes for creating and encouraging
new trade and accumulating money. The commerce in raw silk, which he
initiated, very quickly became a valuable source of income. He first broached
the subject in 1770 when writing to Vansittart; and had pressed him to send
£100,000 from Bengal to China to invest in this trade because of the great
shortage of silk in Britain. In April 1773 Hastings was urged to buy as much
as possible. In 1775, Sulivan followed this up, even pleading with him to do
so. He exclaimed: ‘I KNOW that this is the only article that can restore the
Company’s credit’; and he then proceeded to outline the commercial
approach that Hastings should take.26
The opium trade (which was to provide the essential capital for the trade
in tea) was another activity Sulivan favoured. He suggested this commerce be
stepped up; and in 1775 urged that the Dutch be excluded. The human
tragedy lurking in the background was never addressed. He gave instructions
on how Hastings should handle delicate matters concerning the native
powers; and approved the stoppage of the Nawab of Bengal’s allowance in
1774. He was told to pay special attention to the Company’s interests on the
Coromandel Coast, in particular to Tanjore; and to keep a particular eye on
the marauding Marathas.
On the subject of the Bengal revenues he poured out all his (distilled)
knowledge. He covered page after page with facts and ideas concerning the
regulation of grain; the ‘farming out’ of Company land; and sent a very
detailed land survey of Bengal. This information was tremendously accurate,
up-to-date and meticulously planned.27
Concern for the situation in Bengal and desire to do something about it

was not just directed towards Hastings. In 1772 he and Sir James Stuart had
produced several plans, including reforms in the coinage; and proper
collection and storage of grain purchases. The specific aim was to avoid
repetition of the famine of 1769-70. The criminal neglect by the ministry-
controlled Direction (from 1773 onwards) of these and similar attempts at
reform is captured in his sardonic phrase, ‘All I suppose are grown mouldy at
India House.’28
He clearly intended Hastings to implement the reforms held in mind for
some time; and he was short-circuiting the formal Company machinery,
which in the 1773-8 period was out of his control. Hastings was meant to
translate Sulivan’s words into actions. It will probably never be determined
whether in fact the improvements in Bengal owed something to his advice,
or were wholly due to Hastings’ own genius. However, the impact of his
Governorship, which was felt almost immediately, might serve as a pointer,
suggesting that they did. Cuts in military and civil expenses in that Presidency
alone put the Company back on its feet by 1775.
The Hastings-Sulivan correspondence was vital to both men. It was
voluminous, and was deep in content. Perhaps the super-abundance of
Sulivan material also reflects best its nature and content. Sulivan never
flagged, even though at times Hastings seemed to provide no reply to him
directly over periods of a year or more. In May 1777 he wrote, ‘Not a single
line from you or the dash of a pen from Impey.’29 However, the proof that
Hastings wrote to him at least one long letter per year is seen in the
accumulated correspondence of a later date. The packets would seem to have
been prevented from reaching him at the time.
2
It would not have been Sulivan if an attempt to re-enter the Direction was
not made each year. Yet, he set about preparing for the 1775 election with
reluctance and only because of the shipping magnate Sir Charles Raymond’s
persistence. By February, however, he was making ‘another determined effort
to get on the House List’.30 He tried to mend splits in his party, such as the
growing enmity between Governor Johnstone and John Macpherson.
Through the Vansittart-Palk connection he influenced Charles Boddam
and Captains Richard Hall and Nathaniel Smith, and he hoped to have the
support of John Manship. He also attempted to capture the dead Crabb
Boulton’s lines of interest; and built upon the eleven Directors he reasoned
might still be loyal to him from 1774. He was successful in his approach to a
long-time friend John Graeme and his relations, Sir William and Robert
Mayne.31 Robert Orme was also contacted in order to secure Frederick
Pigou’s vote. Macleane’s influence was used too.
All this effort was in vain. He had expected North’s support, but the Clive
group brought political pressure to bear on the minister. Whereas Sulivan still
believed in North, Orme and others saw all along that his ‘only impediment
was the opposition of the ministry’.32 Later Sulivan said the news that he
would stand caused ‘Mr. Walsh, at the head of 25 Bengal Proprietors, to form
themselves into a canvassing club for opposing me alone. And thus ends this
dull history.’33
It is amazing, nevertheless, how this battle-hardened warrior could bounce
back as optimistic as ever. He considered the prospects for a return to office
in 1776 to be very fair ‘through the line of Government, for there’s an end of
Opposition’. He also counted upon Deputy Chairman John Roberts.34 As
usual he was tireless in drumming up support, such as in his cultivation of Sir
Gilbert Elliot.35 At the beginning of December 1776, he was still hopeful,
and paid a visit to Mr. Harrison, ‘the first I ever made for we were never
upon kind terms’. He found little satisfaction there; and by Christmas was
having serious misgivings, although John Purling, another influential
Proprietor, seemed to be friendly.36
Gloomily he told John Stewart in February 1776 that his own avowed
attachment to the Governor-General would be one reason for his exclusion.
On the eve of the election he had little hope: ‘As the friends of Clavering etc.
make it a particular point to keep me out.’ North remained utterly opposed
and he was barred.37
For the April 1777 election he was once again disappointed in his
expectations of support from North and Robinson, despite a friendlier
attitude towards Hastings, Macleane and himself. Robinson’s main reason for
this relaxation was the aim of reviving ministerial support following a major
defeat in the General Court in May 1776. Sulivan maintained afterwards that
in order to oblige North, and also to placate Macleane, he did not oppose
Purling. He believed he would have won if he had done so.
Following the 1773 Act, it had become customary to re-elect any or all of
the four Directors who had been ‘out by rotation’ for a year, who wished to
stand once more. This convention could also be broken by arrangement. Just
as he had done in 1758, Sulivan defied any such custom, and this helped his
successful comeback in April 1778.
Two versions explaining his triumph were put forward at the time.
Sulivan’s one was that he stormed the Direction and made it impossible for
the Proprietors to deny him. The other was from John Macpherson who
insisted that it came about through North’s intercession on his behalf.
Neither version tells the whole story.38 John Macpherson had already
reflected upon the usefulness of an end to the Sulivan-North stand-off.
Tentative efforts towards this had been made over the intervening years, not
least by Sulivan himself. In spite of everything, he had never given up hope
that North might yet do him justice. It is also possible he had developed
cautious solicitations through Macleane. All would depend, he commented,
upon North’s ‘sense of honour’.39
His plan in 1778 was to stand against John Pardoe, unpopular in the
Company, and being pushed forward by Lord Sandwich. The old maestro’s
entire support in the shipping interest and elsewhere was brought to bear.40
Later he said, rather disingenuously, that he had ‘tired of waiting for
governmental support’; adding that he was ‘no longer, since 1766, an object
of hatred to the Nabobs’.41
However, it is not altogether true, as later claimed, that he carried the day
‘with a very high hand against the united and violent efforts of Government
and Directors’.42 For the ministry’s own reasons he enjoyed the minimum of
opposition, despite complaining to his son before the election that he had
been ‘positively denied’ by Robinson.43 In fact, North and Robinson (in
particular) had been tied by Sandwich’s promise to John Pardoe. Sulivan beat
this unpopular candidate by 148 votes, and thus qualified as a Director for
the next four years. Eighteen of the twenty-four Directors were newcomers,
giving him the opportunity to fashion a new party.
No time was lost in broadcasting the news of his success to family and
friends; and they were informed of the united efforts of Government and the
outgoing Directors to thwart him. He did admit, however, he would be
‘happy to believe there would be an agreement between ministry and him’,
which suggests he knew that the all powerful ministry had been lukewarm in
its opposition.44
The Chairman and Deputy Chairman were Sir George Wombwell and Sir
William James, respectively. His friendship with James dated from Bombay
days and through the storms of the 1760s. Although he was (rather
unwillingly) in North’s pocket, he would eventually swing back to him.
Wombwell, a former supporter of Clive and now firmly attached to
Sandwich, was unpopular because of his ministry leanings. To Sulivan, such
different leanings made it certain he could sit on whichever committee he
should choose. There could be no denial, he was back.
3
Three factors now determined Sulivan’s approach, and these would continue
until 1785. First, his reaction to an incident or circumstance abroad would
depend on how he judged it would involve him at India House; and to what
extent it would influence his relationship with ministers or their agents.
Second, given his impecunious position, he had to read how the situation or
event would concern him financially. The third, although feeble from 1774 to
1778, was how far his acceptance and disbursement of patronage would be
affected.
Hand in hand with these yardsticks were particular objectives that he never
flinched from in the years ahead. He would give unstinting support to
Warren Hastings (and to his son Stephen who would go to India in 1778). He
also took good care of Sulivan, Owen and Irwin relations, as long as they did
not cross his main aims and objectives. To these can be added backing for
the Nawab of Arcot, again only if he continued a friend and if his concerns
did not cut across other priorities.
Essentially, Sulivan and his fellow Directors wanted the Nawab maintained
in his position, with territorial and trading features kept strong and secure.
Assistance to the Governor and Council of Madras depended upon those in
office remaining friends. He was prepared to ditch everyone concerned

should Hastings be crossed; and would confront any faction that was raised
in India House against the Governor-General or himself.
He was very concerned, of course, with restoring his fortune. He wanted
‘lucrative residencies’ and ‘commands strung along the rivers of Hindustan’
for his family; and their riches were to be remitted to England.45 He insisted
that he would be responsible for the preservation of any bonds, jewels or
presents; and that these should be made out to him.
Although out of the Direction until 1778, Sulivan had kept abreast of what
was happening in the Carnatic. His relations were there, and the theatre was a
cause of increasing anxiety. This would not disappear during the remainder
of his life. British disquiet in Southern India was centred on Walajah
Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, Nawab of Arcot. Company money and men had
saved him in the wars of 1757 to 1762; and upon cessation of hostilities he
owed a vast sum. The Company required rapid repayment, which was the
reason for the jagir around Madras being taken. It was rented back to him. He
put up a good show in paying off his debts between 1757 and 1776, but this
strained his finances and he turned to heavy borrowing from Indian bankers
and Madras councillors. The loans carried interest rates of twenty to thirty
per cent.
By the late 1770s he was sadly reduced, almost to the role of a Company
puppet, his main duty now being to maintain Company troops. His expensive
ways had led him to continue indebted; and with the onslaught of new wars
with France these debts were to become heavier. On the other hand, his rule
was underwritten by the Company and by Sulivan’s clause in the final Treaty
of Paris of 1763. The years that followed (up to 1785) were particularly
confused with the further decline of Mughal control (due to the Anglo-
French wars) and the establishment of Company rule. The Nawab’s financial
embarrassments added to this. Loans to him were like gilt-edged bonds. The
‘gentlemen of the coast’, councillors and others, invested like mad. The
Nawab continued to borrow discreetly, but heavily.
In February 1775 a struggle developed at Leadenhall over who would be
the new Governor of Madras. A great deal of malevolence and rancour
attended the whole issue – too much in Sulivan’s opinion, because it was
again giving the Company a bad name. He was sure the office would go to
Thomas Rumbold and not Pigot because he was North’s choice; and was
amazed when Pigot was chosen by ballot at the General Court. In fact, so
certain were the Directors of the result, they had already sworn Rumbold in.
George Pigot returned to Madras as Governor in 1775, with an unpopular
mandate. He was specifically appointed to restore the state of Tanjore to its
rightful Raja. In the early 1770s the Nawab had secured support for an
unprovoked invasion and annexation. Its revenues were then regarded as
security for even more loans. The Nawab was dismayed, therefore, at Pigot’s
policy, but was relatively powerless and in the hands of the various European
factions in Madras; especially the notorious Paul Benfield.
The proposed restoration of the Raja’s territory sparked violent opposition

to the Governor. He was faced with Benfield and other creditors, many of
them from outside the ranks of the service; others like John Macpherson
(then a Factor), he dismissed. Pigot was arrested by a majority of his own
councillors, led by General James Stuart and including Benfield. He died in
captivity. The facts of his death remain obscure, but the Nawab was
implicated. Sulivan noted everything, but said and did nothing. All hinged on
what the Governor-General would do.
Hastings showed no sympathy for Pigot, and readily supported his
opponents. His stand had little to do with the merits or demerits of the crisis
itself and all to do with his own situation. He wanted nothing to disturb the
fragile understanding with neighbouring Indian states. His responsibility was
for the Company’s overall position in the subcontinent; and with a life or
death struggle against the Marathas on his hands thought the restoration of
the Raja would jeopardise everything.
In his eyes it was essential that the Company’s alliance with the Nizam of
Hyderbad be maintained to keep him from going over to Haider Ali of
Mysore, which would create a united front against the English. Madras, it
seemed to him, was going out of its way to antagonise the Nizam; and that
Pigot was interfering with the financial terms of the existing alliance by
restoring Tanjore to its Raja. To Hastings, the Madras Governor had also
sown discord by detaching a chunk of the Northern Circars, which was then
leased as security for loans. If he was to face the unthinkable, a triple alliance
of the Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad and Haider Ali of Mysore, and the
French came in with an armada, the Company was done for. To Hastings,
the Governor of Madras (despite following direct orders from home) had
acted blindly, selfishly and incompetently. He also thought his own
supervisory powers were being flaunted.
When news of Pigot’s deposition and death reached Leadenhall early in
1777, the Proprietors divided. Sulivan, Macleane, Caillaud and Palk (all
friends of Hastings) who were also linked with the ‘Arcot interest’* became
allies of the Madras Councillors who had perpetrated the ‘crime’. Sulivan and
his friends joined with this group because foremost in their minds were
Hastings’ priorities in India. Others, like Macleane, had high expectations
from the Nawab.
The Nawab, meanwhile, stoked up further trouble by informing the
Company he would not pay his debts to anyone.46 In December 1777 a
meeting was held in London to consider arrangements to ensure he would
pay. By then, the whole matter had developed into a Government versus
Opposition fight, but one played out in the Company Courts. Pigot’s
supporters suspected, unfairly, that Hastings had been a party to the
overthrow.47 Ministry, on the other hand, wanted the Company Directors to
now state that Tanjore’s revenues did belong to the Nawab; Sulivan agreed
with this because of Hastings’ needs. The Company resisted the ministry,
with the backing of the Parliamentary Opposition, with Burke to the fore.
In May 1777 Lord Elibank described the scene and the atmosphere
perfectly: ‘The affair of Madras gives occasion to much altercation here. I
consider it like most other India disputes, as a struggle over who should have
the fleecing of the miserable inhabitants.’48 In the end, the North ministry put
an end to it all. Prior to any knowledge of the Madras Governor’s deposition
and death, John Robinson asked for Pigot’s reinstatement, but he was then to
be recalled. Robinson’s argument was that the Nawab’s claims and rights had
to be considered as much as the Raja’s.
Support for this proposal within the Company was given by the Directors
controlled by ministry; by Sulivan’s group; Macleane’s associates; and friends
of the Madras Council majority. As a result, the General Court of 9 May 1777
saw Robinson’s solution virtually imposed on both sides. A sort of grudging
compromise was reached, one that would last until the expiration of the
Company’s Charter, due in 1778. It was proposed that Thomas Rumbold
would be Governor in Pigot’s place, a suggestion that again secured Sulivan’s
backing. Nonetheless, the struggle left a legacy of animosity. Alas, the
situation in the Carnatic became worse with Rumbold’s corrupt
Governorship; and he returned to England in ignominy in January 1781 to
face a storm of criticism. In the end he escaped prosecution, although
Sulivan chased him relentlessly for what he termed his ‘criminal’ actions.
At home the tortuous management system determined by the Regulating
Act was seen to be totally unsatisfactory. A pretty negative impression had
been created by such unseemly activities in the Carnatic and by war there.
Sulivan was alarmed at such public interest, and as a counter, published a
memorial on the Nawab of Arcot’s debts in the summer of 1778. He
continued to stand back from the whole Pigot business, however. The hope
of personal financial help via the Nawab and from members of the Madras
Council, undoubtedly contributed to his thinking. Nevertheless, the need to
support Hastings in everything was the vital factor.
He continued to cling to how things affected Hastings as he viewed
unfolding events. As early as March 1777 he considered the threat from the
French on the coast made the whole business very serious. In the same vein,
he felt Pigot’s orders regarding Tanjore should initially have been made
subject to the control of the Supreme Council in Bengal as well as that of the
Directors. He maintained the view that Hastings, on the spot, with major
problems to overcome, should always be brought into any decisions that had
to be taken in India. In January 1778, and again in April of that year, he
attacked along these lines.49
4
The collapse of his father’s fortune was a disaster for Stephen Sulivan; the
position was made worse by the old warrior’s exclusion from the Direction in
1774 and thus from any share of Company patronage. So acute was the
Sulivan distress, it was originally thought in 1772 that Stephen would have to
accompany the proposed Supervision of that year, acting as Secretary. He
had studied Persian for that purpose and was far advanced in his studies
when the Commission came to an end. At the time Sulivan asked Hastings to
accept a few of ‘The Fables of Gulisdan’ his son had translated. He also let
him know that he was pressing on with his Persian studies, regardless, and
was translating the ‘Life of Nader Shah’. The Governor-General was asked
for more Persian books, ‘as no one is more equal than yourself to make a
choice’.50
Earlier, to keep the family afloat, Stephen had been forced to sell his
appointment ‘To the Primate in Ireland’, for the original purchase money,
7,000 guineas. Then in 1775 he faced a double disappointment with his
failure to obtain the post of Under-Secretary of State in the Southern
Department, and a seat in Parliament. He was also disenchanted when his
application to Sir William Hamilton for the office of Secretary to the Spanish
Embassy came to nought. Hamilton failed to take up the assignment. Alas,
his other hope, of filling the position of First Secretary to the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland, had Shelburne become Viceroy, also came to nothing.
On top of everything else, Stephen had acquired an aversion to practising the
law he had been trained for.
Most of the 1770s were miserable for Laurence Sulivan, and he was
reduced to the most abject pleading for help. With the assistance of Palk,
Dunning, John and Richard Sulivan, who had been despatched to India in
the 1760s, he just survived. In March 1777 he also secured permission for the
eldest of the Sulivan brothers (Sir) Benjamin, to proceed to Bengal where he
would practice as a Barrister-at-Law.
His main hope for financial salvation from 1773 had centred upon
Macleane. This had ended with the arrival of the Triumvirate; and with
removal of the Ulsterman went the rest of Sulivan’s hopes. They perked up
slightly with the news in 1775 that he was the agent for the Nawab of Arcot,
as well as for Hastings. Memories of promises by the Prince came flooding
back. However, the Nawab had changed his mind. He told Richard Sulivan:
‘I know Col. Macleane well, he is a snake that if I take him to my bosom he
will sting me to death.’51
With this warning ringing in his ears, an agitated Sulivan warned his son of
Macleane’s skill in gaining the confidence of people. He begged him to be
wary, ‘because there is no defence against his penetration’. He implored
Stephen ‘to embark with him in no schemes, bonds, bills, engagements or
money transactions for any consideration on earth’.52 He was not wrong to
do so. Unknown to him, and even as he wrote, Macleane was embroiled in
yet another plot to deliver a petition from the Nawab to the King against the
Company.53 He was lost at sea in 1777/78 while rounding the Cape of Good
Hope. He had only negligibly reduced his debt.54
There can be no mistaking the extraordinary degree of intimacy and
intrigue enjoyed by Sulivan and Macleane. That they shared many secrets is
reflected in Sulivan’s anxiety that Hastings should get hold of his papers, held
by the dead man’s attorneys in Bengal. He soon realised, however, that the
adventurer had left him out of his plans almost completely, despite salaries of
£10,000 from Hastings and £4,300, plus jewels, from the Nawab.
To Hastings he wailed, ‘Macleane is a public loss and a mortal stroke to my
shattered fortune.’55 He tried to get his hands on money placed in his account
by the Nawab; to no avail. Macleane had also increased his indebtedness to
him, from £9,000 to £14,000 in the years 1774 to 1777. His despair echoes in
the words, ‘Strange fatality in the only vessels lost in their passage for the last
fifty years should be the Aurora (Vansittart), and the Swallow (Macleane).’56
He described Macleane’s debt as, ‘in honour bound (no legal demand for I
took none)’. It had ‘sprung from generosity, confidence and friendship’. His
demise, however, had ‘unspeakable dimensions…My own loss is of too great
a magnitude and joined to the Aurora’s, marks me singularly unfortunate.’57
By June 1778 he was resigned: ‘at first I lamented his loss as a heavy
misfortune...perhaps his death has saved me an increasing misery’.58 In
December he commented, ‘Happy for me if I had never known him, but
peace to his ashes.’59 A few days later, however, he cried out to his son, ‘This
wicked man has barbarously ruined me and for all that he owes me I am
bound to pay for him.’60
In February 1778 £7,000 was still owed to Vansittart’s estate. However,
through Macleane, provision had been made for the Nawab of Arcot to grant
a reversion (for life) to Vansittart’s widow, of the £1,500 per year originally
allowed General Lawrence. This had fallen to Vansittart and Sulivan equally.
When Stephen set off for India in 1778, his father asked him to realise
several gifts from the Nawab. He believed the donations might total £23,000,
plus interest if allowed. This sum, he said, would clear all debts and allow the
Ponsborne estate to be retained.61 Stephen was to remit the money through
‘Mr. Duval’s friend at Pondicherry by the Jack and Dick Sulivan channel, by
the way of France, by China or by any other safe mode.’62
He was in dire trouble, however, and living from day to day. Some time
between February and June 1778 he almost landed in prison. As he put it, Sir
John Boyd ‘behaved with unparalleled barbarity and made a peremptory
demand of the money owing by Colebrooke’. He was saved by the chance
visit of John Sulivan, newly returned from India, who mortgaged his India
stock for the required sum. Laurence Sulivan’s gratitude was so great, he
implored his son to remember John Sulivan’s generosity ‘to the last hour of
your life’.63 His desperate straits continued, however; and throughout the
autumn of that year he remained in great distress.
14
Restoration
1778-82
Sulivan’s loss of fortune was not reflected in any fall from grace, and he
managed to keep up appearances; he was able to receive friends of the first
rank from the political echelons and from society in general. Luckily, major
costs associated with his son’s education and training in the law were already
completed; as was the instruction of his Owen nieces. The income he did
have was sufficient to maintain an appropriate facade.
John Dunning, a good friend since the early 1760s when Sulivan gave him
a first opportunity to handle Company litigation, remained stalwart in
support, as did Robert Palk. His standing, as a London gentleman, had not
changed, and his importance within the Company was still recognised. His
home continued to be visited by petitioners, because he still had the
‘influence of a Prime Minister’.1
The happiness of his wife and the bliss of domesticity was high on his
agenda. He seldom visited taverns or coffee shops and must have gained all
the news he wanted at India House, because he counted perhaps only ten
occasions when he was to be found in such public places – and then, mainly
when electioneering. Family life, made him ‘cheerful and seemingly happy’;
and he enjoyed ‘domestic felicity’. All this sprang, he said, from leading ‘a
methodical and regular life’.2
All seemed to be well until his wife’s health started to deteriorate around
1778. Mrs. ‘Betsey’ Graeme, a God-daughter, was told that it was ‘at best
very precarious’ and she was not fit to write.3 From about 1770 his son
Stephen was feeling the pinch, and that year begged £500 from Palk, and
another £500 in 1774.4 One of his intimate friends was Sir Horace Mann,
famous for being one of Horace Walpole’s correspondents. Young Sulivan
had borrowed money from him, which displeased his father who had no
great liking for Mann. Most of the debt was quickly repaid.
RESTORATION 1778-82 221
Desperation was reached in 1778 when Stephen was despatched to India.

Sulivan spoke of his imminent departure to ‘Betsey’ Graeme: ‘Stee,
disappointed in several considerable lines and with an aversion to Law
resolves for India. He carries with him a wife, sensible and amiable. The
separation affects his poor mother too much.’5 In February he also wrote to
members of the family of Benjamin Sulivan of Cork, who were also resident
in Madras, informing them that Stephen and his wife would be arriving. He
suggested that they stay with them until settled elsewhere.
This separation was clearly heart-rending. Sulivan’s apprehension
overflowed on the eve of Stephen’s departure, and he held nothing back,
fearing that he would never see him again. He appealed to him to ‘exercise
filial affection and feel for your parents’; to keep good health and make a
speedy return.6
Sulivan was more than just a father figure to those he considered his
responsibility. Apart from flesh and blood, he continued to care for the sons
of Benjamin Sulivan. He only ever termed them ‘kinsmen’, but held them in
the highest regard – especially the second son, John. The Irwins, from the
maternal branch of this same family were also helped. His wife’s family, the
Owens, were cared for too; as were sundry godsons and god-daughters. The
offspring of close friends and business colleagues were favoured, such as Jack
Law, son of Governor Stephen Law. Most depended on him, and owed their
start in life and subsequent success to his care.
Why he seldom mentioned actual Sulivan relationships and gave little away
in the form of family details remains a mystery. In one of the few times he
did so, in February 1778, he said to ‘Dick’ Sulivan: ‘Stee and his mother
present their kind compliments and remember us to every relation.’ In this
particularly rare letter there are one or two other enigmatic remarks and
references to people who were obviously intimate family connections.7
With his son’s transfer abroad, words ordinarily whispered were now put
down on paper. They are quite revealing, a fact Sulivan was very conscious
of. His son was pressed to let nobody see the particular manuscript, which he
described as a ‘Letterbook’; and never to show to others anything similarly
confidential. He continued to take great pride in his own good name; but
depicted his conduct as too unorthodox, embracing ‘a nicety of conduct that
bordered upon Quixotism, with worldly honesty’.8 He truly believed he could
have been ‘as rich and honoured as Clive if not for this, combined with the
wish to save an ungrateful Company’.9
He enjoyed reasonable health, which can best be attributed to his wife
Elizabeth. The change of lifestyle she brought about probably saved him;
before marriage he had been disporting himself in a wild manner. He had
been unwell in 1762, and again in 1766, when he admitted to pain and a long
illness. He followed the fashion and repaired to Bath to take the waters. This
he continued to do over the years, to be both fashionable and for his well-
being. The deterioration in his eyesight is first mentioned in 1777, although
almost certainly troublesome earlier. Things became so bad that he had to
dictate his letters to a scribe. It is tempting to say that he was falling to pieces
both mentally and physically, such was the strain he was under; and these
were the blackest of black times. Yet he possessed amazing resilience. He was
not dead yet.
2
The winter of 1777/78, while it marked the death of Lauchlin Macleane,
denoted the striking entrance of James, and especially of John Macpherson,
into Sulivan’s life. Unfortunately for him, he fell into the clutches of two
scoundrels equally as cunning and charming as Macleane had been in the life
he had just departed. Sulivan had no defence against their combination of
flattery and secret design. Now that he was out of the House, his network of
informers, operating mainly within the Company, would scarcely reach to
backstairs politics at Westminster where they also operated; and this left him
vulnerable and gullible. They stalked him carefully, and would linger like
vultures to the death.
James Macpherson was the ‘author, or translator, or editor, or forger of
Fingal and other poems’.10 He is most remembered for these Ossianic
ballads. Through the ‘Fragments’ he gained entrance to, and instant fame
with, the Edinburgh literati; and just as important, in 1761 he secured the
patronage of Bute.11 His direct importance, with regard to Sulivan, does not
appear until the 1770s; but through Bute and because of friendships with
Company officials, such as Sir Samuel Hannay, ‘Fingal’ figures in Indian
affairs much earlier. He also became a Proprietor.
He resumed an earlier acquaintance with John Macpherson and struck up
an association that had one purpose, to make both their fortunes. His efforts
to link the ministry and the Company together in pursuit of fortune for John
and himself also furthered ministerial control. Ministers were all too eager to
become legitimately involved in Company affairs.
John Macpherson met ‘Fingal’ in 1766; then in 1767, sailed with his uncle,
Captain Alexander Macleod, commander of the Indiaman Lord Mansfield, for
China. At Madras, enroute, he attended the Durbar of the Nawab of Arcot,
where by dint of boldness, charm and trickery (he gave a magic lantern show)
gained the Nawab’s confidence. The Scot had introduced himself as an
‘interpreter and agent’ and the Nawab commissioned him as such, to carry
his grievances to the British monarch.
The credit and authority gained from becoming the Nawab’s agent was to
be immensely important. China was forgotten, and by 1768 he was back in
London and plotting with ‘Fingal’. They set about gaining the Duke of
Grafton’s sympathy for the Nawab, and attacked Bute and Shelburne, their
former benefactors, because of the Duke’s enmity to both. This gained them
Grafton’s influence with the Company Directors under his control. Both
Macphersons tried frightening the Proprietors with the thought of the
Nawab throwing his lot in with the French; and argued that he ought to be
an ally of the Crown rather than the Company. Their threats failed; but
through Grafton’s influence John was appointed a Writer to Fort St. George
in the Carnatic in 1769.
That same year the Macphersons struck up friendships with Sulivan (newly
back in the Direction) and also with Rockingham, Macleane and Andrew
Stuart. Before John sailed in 1770, however, Lord North came to power.
Their letters of recommendation were now useless, and the agency was lost.
As yet, they had no influence with North, but set about switching allegiance
to him and Robinson.
Until 1774, John Macpherson concentrated all his attention upon the
accumulation of money (as Paymaster to the Army of the Carnatic). He also
worked up an understanding with Hastings before the new Governor of
Bengal left Madras for Calcutta. Eventually, he won his friendship, through
the advocacy of Sulivan and others in London, and managed a transfer to
Bengal beside him. This friendship was of the greatest importance later,
though he was largely ignored at first. It was only following the arrival of
Macleane, and his recommendation, again endorsed by Sulivan, that Hastings
took any notice of him.
In 1775 John Macpherson stood in for Macleane at the Nawab’s Durbar in
Madras. As agent for Hastings as well as the Nawab, Macleane had made his
way to London on the Governor-General’s business. Aided by Benfield,
Macpherson again encouraged the Nawab to see the Company as his enemy
and the State as his friend – the opposite to what Sulivan preached.
Meanwhile, in London ‘Fingal’ had become useful to Robinson, which
brought John Macpherson into the circle as well. Robinson did not like them,
but they brought the secrets Sulivan and Hastings had divulged. Everyone in
this group felt safe, because Hastings was never a friend of Robinson and
vice versa.
From late 1772 onwards, therefore, the Macphersons were backed in
Parliament by North and Robinson. In India they had the strongest influence
with the Nawab of Arcot; and in Bengal enjoyed the favour of Hastings. At
India House Sulivan was in their pocket. The plain truth was that Sulivan and
Hastings were duped: first by Macleane; by his friend John Stewart (made
Judge Advocate General and Secretary to the Bengal Council by Hastings);
then by the Macphersons. Sulivan had no idea of the collaboration with
Robinson or that this bureaucrat and Lord North knew all the confidences
shared with the Macphersons.
In a letter from John to James Macpherson on 1 October 1772, the lies
told, the depth of their intrigue and contempt for those tricked is shown.
Moreover, they felt safe, because they usually wrote in Gaelic to each other:
The wretches are as black as I am, Colebrooke and Sulivan are

under my thumb. There is not a year but they receive diamond
stones (I have evidence) from my big friend here, the Nawab.
And there is not a stone (member) in the King’s cabinet who has
clean hands.12
Meanwhile, John Macpherson convinced Hastings that in himself he had a

good ‘Company man’, and a friend to be trusted. He also made sure of siding
with Hastings in his struggles with the ‘Triumvirate’; while behind his back,
still serving the Nawab of Arcot.
What the two schemers really thought of the Governor-General and his
friends is seen in another letter to ‘Fingal’: ‘Impey is in trouble, I know the
wretch. He was the manager for Sulivan and for Henry Vansittart, ten years
ago. Hastings is altogether without influence.’13 In the meantime, the flattery,
half-truths and lies continued. In June 1775 John Macpherson solemnly
informed Hastings, ‘I will support old Sulivan and all my friends at any risk.’14
In 1777 Pigot sent John Macpherson back to London from Madras in
disgrace, because of his part in the revolts centring upon the Nawab’s debts.
Sulivan and Hastings had no knowledge then of Macpherson’s links with
Benfield in all this. Once more fortune smiled upon him, however, because
the link he had opened (in his own person) between Hastings and the Nawab
was useful to both. In helping in Pigot’s downfall he found additional favour
in the Nawab’s eyes; and was now regarded by Hastings and Sulivan as a true
friend. He was also re-instated.
The Macphersons took advantage of their improved influence. From
positions of trust they mercilessly deceived Sulivan and Hastings. With
Macleane’s death his agencies (on behalf of both the Nawab and Hastings)
fell into their joint control. John Macpherson’s wild boasts and half-truths
continued. James, he said, had ‘laboured with every zeal for his friends, and
with an extraordinary effort got Sulivan into the Direction’.15 He bragged of
being the principal instigator of everything done on the Governor-General’s
behalf; and Hastings believed him implicitly. In 1778 he was told:
Then I went to old Sulivan who entirely owes his seat in the
Direction to my exertions. He went and assured Mr. Dunning –
In short, we had our troops in motion over two days. Mr. Sulivan
stood calm and ready in the Court of Directors and in that
quarter was to secure enough.16
This referred to the dispute caused by Hastings’ so-called resignation. The

letter also showed that Sulivan was squarely in Hastings’ corner, fighting for
him.
Macpherson returned to familiar themes, the (supposed) importance and
reliability of himself and ‘Fingal’. He boasted that ‘Fingal’ was ‘Ministry’s
confidential man’ and one of ‘Hastings’ truest friends and has the secret of all
your opponents’.17 Sulivan was hooked just as securely, gushing, ‘our good
friend Fingal and I are upon the most cordial terms.’18 According to him, he
and John Macpherson were now:
in constant habits of intimacy. I have studied his character to

pronounce from experience that he is able, honourable, sincere,
with a temper and disposition for pleasing and conciliating, that
he is hardly an avowed enemy…His attachment to you [Hastings]

brought us first together…He stood forward boldly at the hazard
of his own prospects in defence of your public character in the
hour when those whom he counted upon found it their interest
to vilify you.19
This is a sad letter (as are the others that followed of the same ilk); sad
because of the depth of sorrow and foolishness that would strike when the
deceit was uncovered.
In this particular eulogy Sulivan said, referring to ‘Fingal’: ‘The Minister
and his friends pay attention to him.’20 This was something he could scarcely
credit, being unaware of the North-Robinson-Macpherson ties. It might even
have warned him. Sulivan concluded with: ‘He knows all the secret interior
moves…all have a great affection for him.’21 He was totally taken in.
Having deceived Sulivan and Hastings so comprehensively, the rewards
for the Macphersons began to appear. In January 1781 Sulivan was ecstatic:
‘We have carried John Macpherson into the Supreme Council with a pretty
high hand…he will be to you a second Barwell.’22 In February he wrote:
Dear Mac, the enclosed (a testimonial) is proof of my regard and

a pledge of my unshaken attachment. Peruse, seal and deliver it.
Should you in any instance forfeit the character given by me I
must solemnly declare I will be the first man to turn against my
friend John Macpherson.23
Sulivan and Hastings were cruelly betrayed by the Macphersons. The

deception continued for some years before suspicions were eventually
aroused. Given the cloak of secrecy these impostors worked under, their
victims had little defence.24
3
Most of Sulivan’s time now was consumed with defending Hastings;
bettering the government of India; and improving the relationship between
Company and State. Politically his position remained shaky; and he thought
in December 1778 he would have little chance at the 1779 election.25
Nonetheless, he was going to fight tooth and nail. In the event he was
returned with little real opposition.
From 1778 Britain was again at war with France, and once more he threw
himself wholeheartedly into the war effort. He brought experience, vitality
and insight. His information was drawn from the official (and unofficial)
correspondence of Hastings and the other Governors; and from military
friends serving in India, especially Goddard, Caillaud, Graeme and Coote.
The defeat of the Company’s army by the Maratha confederation was a
serious moment; but by May 1779 Hastings had taken steps that would
reverse this blow. Sulivan warned him, however, of bigger threats to follow;
while securing the sinews of war. In an effort to remedy the shortage of

fighting men, which had some success, he offered cash incentives to anyone
in the Company’s service willing to transfer to the Royal Navy.
Renewal of the Company’s Charter was due, and Robinson was ready to
change the existing system. By February 1779 his list of propositions to serve
as the basis for discussion were with the Directors. However, opposition
from within Parliament and inside the Company was strong enough to have
his proposals (including those for the renewal of the Company’s Charter)
deferred until the 1780 Parliamentary session. The opposition inside India
House was led by General Smith, with backing on the outside from the
Rockinghamites, including Edmund Burke.
Towards the end of 1779 Sulivan referred to Robinson’s further loss of
power within the Company, and of a more conciliatory approach. Evidence
for this change was that Dundas (the Lord Advocate) took a part in the new
Treasury–Sulivan alliance. In return, Sulivan cared for his friend, Mr. Hay. In
effect, the strength of the opposition forces facing Government, within and
without Leadenhall, had led to a revolution in alliances. A new coalition,
connecting North, Robinson and Sulivan took effect from 1779.
Sulivan was delighted, because Hastings was assured of yet another year in
the Indies. By February 1780 he had also prepared a plan, to be placed before
the ministry, incorporating proposals for the better government of India. He
would not produce it, however, until a promise of power and protection had
been secured. That this was indeed the case was shown when at the 1780
election, he was chosen Deputy Chairman. It was a major about-turn.
Later Sulivan put forward reasons for this volte-face by the Ministry. He
supposed it was because there was little or no alternative. Those opposed to
him at India House had also quarrelled so badly they were split asunder. He
believed too that he was backed because a man of business was needed;
which meant Hastings had to be included, because they were
‘considered…inseparable’.26 Sulivan recounted to Hastings that North had
settled his differences ‘upon the most liberal terms, and we are to be
supported so long as our actions meet public approbation, and no longer’.27
Sulivan lost support because of this coalition, because he had ‘betrayed’
some of his allies, or at least this is how it was portrayed. Yet, most were tied
to him only because it suited their own interests. His financial predicament
also dictated that he seize this opportunity. He feigned surprise at the censure
he received; but the manner in which he glossed over details suggests
otherwise. In the eyes of some, a sacrifice of principles was involved, itself a
very strange thing in an era where connection rather than principle counted.
It was only possible for him to return to power by uniting with ministry.
At the same time, he was never North’s yes-man; and he swallowed years of
hostility from the minister to accept his support. Within the Company, dislike
of General Smith, whom he detested, made it easier. However, Smith and his
ally Edmund Burke, together with the rest of the Parliamentary Opposition,
especially the Rockingham group, were furious and never forgot. They were
to make life very difficult.
Sulivan’s resumption of authority was soon evident. Once more he chaired

the Secret Committee, where he unswervingly directed the Company’s
military and naval might towards the defeat of France. He was soon
enmeshed in the dialogue and joint collaboration that had to exist between
the ministry and the Company’s leaders over direction of the war. Copies of
advices from India were presented to North and Robinson.28 Incredibly, he
was heavily censured for this. He in turn was aghast at the abysmal lack of
knowledge among his fellow Directors; a total non-comprehension of what
was happening in India. Referring to this rabid ignorance, he said to
Hastings, ‘I am ashamed to go on.’29 There was also criticism of the so-called
‘shameful and unjust practice’ of making a private mark upon such letters as
he wished should be attended to by the Directors.30
Hastings was made aware of the arduous task ahead: ‘We are at sea, no
renewal of Charters and notice given us by Parliament.’ Yet he felt himself
equal to the task, ‘I feel myself prudently bold.’31 His friend was reprimanded
in the very same letter and told not to break Company orders again: ‘There
must be obedience or all is anarchy.’ On the other hand, he gave his protégé
priority in everything.32
Soon he was involved in the planning and political trafficking that
accompanied the new Charter Bill. Robinson had been actively engaged
throughout 1780 in drawing up a constitution. However, it was January 1781
before Indian affairs gained the attention of Parliament. In February
Jenkinson drew up a plan based on Robinson’s one that had been started in
1778. He did so on the assumption that Parliament must proceed with Indian
business with or without the Company’s consent.
Sulivan knew in advance every move and every regulation proposed, and
was scathing in his comments. The proposals did not give Hastings the near
dictatorial powers he judged were needed. He also wanted an extensive
administrative system created; and had spread these wishes widely in
Parliamentary circles. Few of his ideas were adopted at first, though, as he
commented, ‘not disproved’. For this he blamed North’s easygoing
temperament.33 In an uncharacteristic piece of self-praise he mentioned to
Hastings the credit he deserved, and had received for the views he placed
before the ministry. The Governor-General was also inundated with lists of
regulations for better government. Sulivan considered that these or
something similar would have to be agreed to, sooner or later.
He became Chairman once more in April 1781, as was expected. Sir
William James was his deputy.34 On the face of it (if only ministerial influence
could be made to disappear) he seemed to have the influence and authority
enjoyed throughout the years 1757 to 1764; and his return was without doubt
a stimulus to everyone. His enemies again busied themselves spreading
accusations that malpractices would flourish. None of this happened:
negligence and dishonesty could never be part of Sulivan’s design. Yet, he
was somewhat compromised in that he had to use the power of his office to
help his son. No secret was made of this, it was expected of him.
He had worked tirelessly since re-entering the Direction in 1778.

Nevertheless, as he admitted, he had to whip himself even harder following
accession to the Deputy Chair and then to the Chair itself. Typically, he tried
to create circumstances that would satisfy equally the needs of the Company
and himself; and offered proposals to ministers that would serve as the basis
for a permanent settlement of East Indian affairs.
Coinciding with his return troubles had grown in number. The war in
India increased costs all round; and the general European conflict affected
markets. Reform of administration in India had to be postponed. Things
became so bad the Directors were forced to approach the ministry for
financial help. In view of the twin needs of a new Charter and a loan, Sulivan
had to reconcile differences within the Company, considering unity to be
vital before an approach was made. He was successful to the extent that
North was prevented from gaining ‘advantageous pecuniary terms for the
renewal of the Charter’.35
The main push to settle the form of government for India and the basis of
new relations between the State and the Company, took place in the years
1781-4. The year 1781 marked the beginning of both these movements; and
it is to Sulivan’s credit, and no coincidence, that they were initiated during his
period in the Chair. The legislation was to extend the Company’s Charter to
1794 at the earliest.
He provided Hastings with a list of the matters his ‘poor brain had agitated
within these 18 months’, that is, from mid-1780 to January 1782.36 He told
Stephen, ‘my labours are such and almost without assistance that literally I
have not a moment to spare’.37 His work involved a set of remarkably
detailed propositions for prolonging the Company’s trade, clearly time-
consuming to prepare, which were placed, eventually, before the
Government.
Nevertheless, continuous close liaison with ministers over the war was
maintained; as well as joint scrutiny of reports from Hastings. He and his
Deputy, William James, constituted the Company’s Secret Committee, which
dealt with war raging mainly in the south and west of the sub-continent. The
ongoing conflict with France had pulled in some of the strongest native
states in India; and it was quite obvious that help was needed. Once more
Sulivan managed to make this understood at national level.
As Chairman it was his duty to keep up-to-date with the course of
hostilities, and this he did faithfully. The dire tidings from the East also
helped bring about the formation of Dundas’ Parliamentary Secret
Committee, with Jenkinson and Gregory on board. This was bad news,
because the latter was Sulivan’s long-standing enemy. He had also been the
agent in Britain for Nuncomar (Mahrajah Nanda Kumar). After the
Maharajah’s execution, Gregory became a rabid enemy. This was to become
significant because he became Chairman in April 1782.
4
Protection of Hastings had continued, with more muscle following Sulivan’s
return to the Direction in 1778. The first problem he faced was that
following Clavering’s death there was a hint his friend might be accused of
murder; although in his eyes this would have been just as absurd as the furore
over the death of Pigot. Nevertheless, he warned Hastings to get the proper
papers home to Dunning.38
In 1778 the North ministry was fully preoccupied with the struggles in
America, Europe and elsewhere, and there was no opportunity for resolving
India business. The proposed new India settlement, and Hastings’ situation,
would all have to be attended to later. This, and his fortunate return to the
Direction, gave the opportunity to strengthen the protective sheath around
his colleague. He was helped in that the Company was left to ‘manage’ in its
own way for a while, so great were the troubles elsewhere. The space and
time also allowed enabled him to extend his influence.
With Hastings in mind, he planned to bargain with ministry over
continuation of, or changes to, the Regulating Act. With the Company
Charter due for renewal, his protégé’s future would certainly be the main
negotiating piece. His man in Bengal was also made aware of the mood in
London. News of the fiasco in 1777, when Clavering had tried to take the
chair, had hardened hearts. Hastings was informed that he was to be
‘Impeached in Parliament and vengeance was announced by the leaders of
this poor country.’39 It was a chilling and accurate prophecy.
Although he was grudgingly accepted by the ministry in 1778, no such
impartiality was granted the Governor-General. Sulivan was beside himself
with rage at the vicious campaign waged in the Capital. He termed it
‘diabolical with a vengeance’. This ‘malignant pressure’ as he put it, was
maintained, despite ‘a full Treasury in Bengal and the Investment cared for’.40
It really was an incredible tide of hate, involving despatches that emanated
from the Government-controlled Court of Directors. In Parliament as well,
efforts were redoubled to make things so uncomfortable that Hastings would
resign of his own accord. He appealed to Sulivan for protection against the
slurs on his character infiltrating the General Letters.
The many charges were rebutted; and Hastings was assured that his friends
remained active on his behalf. However, he was warned in 1778 that he
would have only five more years to govern, ‘and no longer’. Under a new
Charter, Sulivan continued, prophetically, the territories in India would be
taken by the State, and a new government there (excluding Hastings and
Barwell) would be appointed.41
He was certain Philip Francis was telling most of the lies about friend;
hence his encouragement to ‘go against this incendiary trying to supplant you
in government’.42 He spoke of William Burke spreading the preposterous
rumour that he (Sulivan) would be replacing Hastings; and referred to
supposed ill-treatment of ‘young Fowke’ by Hastings and Barwell: ‘The flame
this has created is not to be conceived.’43 He finished by saying, ‘Oh my

friend, I am sick of the world when I reflect upon your treatment.’44
In 1779 yet another sustained effort to unseat Hastings was foiled. There
were tales of a Hastings-Impey feud; of further enquiries into the Nawab of
Arcot’s debts; and fall-out from the Pigot scandal. A general impression was
deliberately invoked that India was full of intrigues. It was true that a
disagreement had flared between Hastings and Elijah Impey; one that was
particularly poignant because it was between old friends and schoolmates.
They clashed over the powers of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Bengal,
headed by Impey, and those of the Governor-General, at the head of the
Bengal Supreme Council.
Only personal friendship and long acquaintance with both men enabled
Sulivan to pull them together, though he was always on Hastings’ side in the
argument. Sulivan made a personal appeal to Impey: ‘You may have many
able and powerful friends but none that exceeds me in zeal and affection.’45
It took a long time to heal the rift; so much so that in 1781 he grumbled that
though his support could be depended upon, ‘he grows cool even towards
me.’46
His becoming Deputy Chairman in 1780 proclaimed that Hastings’
position was immensely improved. When in 1781 he occupied the Chair he
was secure for at least another year. Even before taking the lead, Sulivan was
able to exclude paragraphs in the General Letter to Bengal drawn up by the
previous Chairman Devaynes.47 Once more a stream of useful men were
despatched: Lord Macartney to Madras, and John Macpherson to Calcutta
were two that he thought (wrongly it was to prove) would be useful to him.48
Perhaps Hastings did not realise the enormity of what had happened in
1780; that North was now responsible for the Governor-General’s India
policy. He either had little conception of the fraught political situation that
now existed, or chose to say nothing. The switch to North made Sulivan fully
appreciate that everything was now subject to the sway of Parliamentary
fortunes. Authority over the Company having been handed to Parliament
meant that Company-Westminster relations were susceptible to party warfare
at Westminster. The creation of this alliance led to savage assaults on all three
men by the Parliamentary Opposition. The attacks, pursued by Francis,
Burke and General Smith, inside and outside Leadenhall, were levelled at
every aspect of its government at home and abroad.
Sulivan now directed the ministerial faction in the Company, a novel and
(to the uninitiated) an alarming situation, although quite in keeping with his
early career and the smooth Administration-Company relations that had been
the norm. He held the Company firmly to the ministry’s point of view – but
only as long as Government held fast in support of Hastings, and did not
plan to destroy his treasured Company.
He got wind of some deep plotting, which centred in reports emanating
from Francis. Hastings was told, ‘We can and will be prepared to stem this
infamous torrent.’49 He harnessed North’s half-hearted support, and his own
supporters in and out of the Company were rallied. He feared that Hastings’
conduct of the war in India was leading to threats against him in London. In
November 1781 Francis even made repeated efforts to call on him, ‘on
business of great consequence’.50 Sulivan had considerable trouble parrying
his thrusts. Alex Elliot supplied him with a few facts; but he wondered why
his friend did not use the cipher to communicate.
His return to the Direction meant additions to the unfaltering flow of
plans, suggestions and criticism sent to Hastings. He reviewed everything his
friend attempted, no matter what it might be. In return, Sulivan now received
details of nearly every event and decision taken abroad. Typically, these
letters were answered promptly. The correspondence became a vital resource
in itself.
The Governor-General’s political ideas were pored over. He elaborated
upon military plans to combat the Marathas; regulations governing trade; and
evasions in the Company’s Investment. Issues, such as the raw silk trade,
saltpetre returns, and relations between the Nizam, Haider Ali, his son Tipu
Sahib and the Nawab of Arcot were avidly devoured. Nor did he refrain from
passing comment upon the political infighting. Sometimes he exasperated
Hastings, who complained to John Macpherson: ‘I would only wish Sulivan
would drop his plans of making new Establishments when it is as much as
we can do to keep the old.’51
He also had excellent strategic sense, and Government took up his
proposal, made in 1781, of despatching an expedition to take the Cape of
Good Hope. This would have effectively ended French and Dutch interest in
India. The plan failed, and Sulivan lamented: ‘My poor brat is strangled...it
was my favourite child.’52 He also claimed total credit for the seizure and
retention of the Nicobar Islands and Achin.53
Demonstrating how the Company could be changed and reinvented to
meet altered circumstances, he continued to pursue at great length the
manner in which the trade in raw silk could be resurrected. He pleaded with
Hastings saying, ‘It is you that know that with this article and this alone the
Company’s prosperity in England can be established.’54 He also set out the
method by which this could be done, asking Hastings for an ‘option for
myself and friends’.55
15
Transformation
1780-84
In the Carnatic everything was coming to a fine brew and a second war with
Mysore broke out (1780–1784). All problems in India were set against this
backdrop of constant conflict. Some means of paying for it had to be
arranged, and the personnel necessary to ensure survival had to be chosen
and given adequate backup. Sulivan, it might be guessed, was involved up to
his neck. From February 1780 he was voicing deep concern about the
deteriorating situation. As one of the Secret Committee he was ready to pay
troops from an assignment of the Nawab’s land revenues,* whether the
Prince liked it or not.1 In fact he had to stop moves that would have forced
him to turn over all his revenues. Sulivan’s main complaint though, was not
being informed of what was going on.
By April he was Deputy Chairman and anxiety had turned to alarm. The
ministry was unhappy as well because things seemed to be getting so out of
hand. They had grounds for apprehension, the Company was in mortal
danger from these wars, which coincided with the end of the American
struggle. Space and time were needed to counteract the French and Dutch.
In February 1781 he attempted to recruit a regiment for the defence of
Madras. Then, with little hope of success, tried to get around 2,000 troops
from an expedition departing for the Cape of Good Hope. In the spring of
1781 he was Chairman, and on a war footing. Reports were invariably bad;
although in April he was pleased that the Cape had been captured. That same
month he advised Hastings to, ‘take the bull by the horns’, and land Goddard
at Mangalore, from whence he should march to Madras and Seringapatam.2
He informed the ministry in May of the need for ‘at least 10 sail of the line
and 6,000 troops to secure Madras against the French fleet threatening there’.
But apart from one regiment, the Company fought with little help from
Government.3 Goddard, who was a particular friend, had already provided
him with information on Haider Ali, the situation in the Carnatic and in
Bombay.4 By June he was aware the French knew of Company weakness on
TRANSFORMATION 1780-84 233
the Coromandel Coast. He blamed this on Governor Rumbold and his

Council in Madras, while hailing Hastings as a potential saviour.
Although Haider won the opening exchanges, Sulivan thought he would
‘play a shy game’ with Coote. He was convinced about one thing, however,
‘Haider must be destroyed to secure our own power.’5 This must have been
in his mind for some time because he remembered Clive saying: ‘Sooner or
later it will be found that Hyder Ali must be crushed.’6 As well as reducing
Mysore, Sulivan wanted ‘proper bridles on all the native states’ because he
sensed deadly danger.7 He feared Haider and his son Tipu, especially in
alliance with European enemies. A deal had to be struck with the Marathas as
well; and an alliance formed with the Nizam of Hyderabad, regarded as
‘dangerous, cunning and deceitful’.8 Most important of all, the rulers of these
native states had to be kept isolated.
Haider Ali and his son had immense revenues, they were great warriors in
Sulivan’s eyes, and had secret help from France. Nevertheless, he believed
neither put much trust in the French. He maintained that Hastings would be
lauded in Britain if he prevented a French-Dutch-Mysore combination
against the English Company. Even more praise would come if the country
powers were ranged against these enemies on a permanent basis. In the end,
only the cessation of war with France saved the day. In 1784 the Treaty of
Mangalore was signed which Hastings disapproved of because he thought the
terms too conciliatory – and he did not like the Nawab being excluded.
2
Sulivan’s first public fall-out with the Burkes centred on the dispute between
the Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Tanjore. As per instructions, Pigot, then
Governor of Madras, had taken the part of the Raja against the Nawab, over
his lands and revenues. In 1777 he was deposed by a majority of his council,
who were also creditors of the Nawab. He died in custody. Hastings, who
had responsibility for all Company possessions, for strategic reasons had
supported the Nawab (and thus the creditors) against Pigot and the Raja. He
urged the Madras government to force him to pay the Company. As in
everything in these years, Sulivan followed Hastings.
In London, meanwhile, the ‘common purse’ that Edmund, William and
Richard Burke shared was empty. William and Lord Verney (who put up all
the money) had suffered financial failure not just in the ‘Great Scheme’ of
1769, but because of yet another ploy in Amsterdam.9 William Burke left for
Madras in 1777 in search of succour. He returned in 1778 as joint Agent for
the Raja, a post that promised the much needed funds. Unluckily for the
Burkes these plans were foiled, for which event they blamed Sulivan who was
then back in the Direction.
Two of the Burkes became Proprietors: William in July 1778, Edmund in
October 1780. In this way they could keep an eye on Tanjore developments.
With Sulivan’s return to power came the adoption of a number of policies to
which they were opposed. One of these appeared in April 1780, when
Sulivan drew up orders by which the Raja was to assign revenues from his
territory to the Company to pay his (supposed) debts.
Edmund Burke pretended to be scandalised at the Tanjore situation. But
his fury was more for private than public reasons – he planned the
preferment of his cousin in Tanjore. The reality was that the Burkes and
Sulivan were involved in a private war; and the Deputy Chairman was just as
determined that William Burke would not succeed through the Raja, at the
expense of himself and his son.
Nevertheless, Burke presented the whole business as State interests being
placed second to the wishes of individuals. No mention was made of his
cousin William’s post of agent to the Raja. Burke accused Sulivan and
Devaynes of seizing, and delivering over to their servants at Madras, all the
revenues of Tanjore. He claimed this action violated a solemn treaty that no
Company servants would meddle in its internal government; and referred to a
letter of 1775 sent to the Governor and Council of Madras.
The views of Hastings on this subject are interesting. He thought it
scarcely deserved serious discussion. The Raja might have been given the title
of ‘King’, but it was a misnomer. The Nawab was his undoubted sovereign.
As he understood it, the Raja had refused to contribute during this time of
great crisis. Accordingly, he must be compelled to open up his grain store.
Burke’s annoyance intensified. On 2 October he more or less accused
Sulivan and Devaynes of robbing the Raja. He appealed to Jenkinson ‘on
public principles’, saying that the nation was being placed in a scandalous
light. Three days later he encouraged Portland to gather with Proprietors
Adair and Crighton, to try and put a stop to everything. Still making no
mention of his own interest, he told the Duke that Sulivan had personal
designs on the Raja’s revenues. Then he appealed again to Jenkinson to do
something.
To begin with he seemed to be getting results. Jenkinson consulted Lord
Stormont, Secretary of State for the Northern Department; and that same
day Stormont asked Sulivan and Devaynes to postpone sending the orders
until North came to London. Next day he forwarded Burke’s complaint to
Devaynes and Sulivan, asking for an answer in writing.10
Sulivan was furious. His anger was directed as much against Burke’s
manoeuvring of Parliamentary allies for personal ends (posing as public
interest) as much as everything else. In addition, instead of taking place
within the Company, all was being conducted within the Parliamentary arena,
from which he was now excluded. To his fellow Director Henry Fletcher, he
described Burke’s attack as ‘violent, indecent and injurious beyond
example’.11
In the temporary (and suspicious) absence of Fletcher and Gregory,
Sulivan had been left to get on with assigning the revenues from the Raja’s
territory to the Company. He discovered that the Prince had cleared his debt.
All orders were then changed, and the Raja informed that the Directors
would waive the demand if he agreed to pay two months in advance. Sulivan
maintained his colleague Fletcher joined in creating these terms. Crucially, he

was thus seen not to be acting alone.
He and Devaynes refused to meet Edmund Burke over the instructions
intended for India, upon the correct grounds that it had nothing to do with
him. Stormont and Hillsborough also informed Burke that the orders were
not what he had thought. In fact the Raja owed little to the Company. The
servants in Madras were rebuked by Sulivan and Devaynes for failing to
provide information that would have given the correct picture. All was sorted
out by the despatch of 18 October.
Understandably these new commands, presented by Sulivan, were of little
use to William Burke and Captain William Aldergrove, the Raja’s agents. The
torment for the Burkes was that Sulivan’s son Stephen was to become
Resident at Tanjore, with large allowances. He was actually made Judge
Advocate General in Bengal before taking up this appointment. Edmund
Burke was adamant, and without a doubt correct, that all along Sulivan meant
to deliver the Tanjore office to his son; and that the orders were carried
through the Direction with this in mind: ‘Scarcely was Will’s back turned,’ he
said, ‘than Sulivan began his old machinations.’ Put another way, he and
William Burke had been foiled.12
Sulivan then sent ‘a relation’, Eyles Irwin, to his son (accompanied by a
new Writer, Mr. Seton) with an account of the new situation. At exactly the
same time, William Burke was taking back an acknowledgement from the
monarch of receipt of a letter from the Raja. It was alleged that on the
overland route to India, William was deliberately stopped by Benfield and
Sulivan’s protégé Seton, from boarding a ship in Basra. Seton was given
precedence, which meant Stephen Sulivan knew of developments first, and
was prepared.
Sulivan became Chairman in April 1781 and though still subject to
ministerial whims was all powerful in the Company. It is instructive,
therefore, to find that despite Burke’s wrath, he still sought the Chairman’s
help. On 30 August a John Robertson was solicited to approach him on
William’s behalf. The great statesman was surely conscious of the debt owed;
and the request suggests there were still bonds of a sort.
3
While Sulivan vigorously pursued war in the Carnatic theatre, steps were
taken to choose a strong man to take charge in Madras. A second disaster
hard upon the heels of events in America was dreaded by Government and
Company alike. Governor Rumbold’s misdeeds had also created a bad press.
That is why at the end of 1780 Lord George Macartney was appointed
President of Fort St. George, Madras; arriving there in June 1781. He was the
first official chosen outwith the ranks of the East India Company’s servants.
As virtually executive managing director of the Company, Sulivan had
much to do with his selection. Macartney always recognised the fact, stating
time and time again how much he owed to him. Sulivan and most of the
Proprietors thought the situation on the Coromandel Coast required

someone totally unconnected with India affairs. He also thought Macartney
would be quite manageable, and show due deference to the Governor-
General. He was to be proved wrong on both counts.
Hastings also favoured his appointment – at first. This was due to
Sulivan’s influence. He told Hastings that the new Governor was even fit to
follow him as Governor-General He emphasised his fellow-Irishman’s links
with the King and with Bute; and finished by stressing the natural abilities of
someone so warmly attached to them.13
Macartney was proud and honest. Although he went to India to make a
fortune, he would not blacken his character for anyone. Unfortunately he
would not stand in an inferior light to Hastings either, which led to much
trouble; and he easily fell out with anyone and everyone.14 His worst feature
was his temper, which he tried to keep under control; but in his
correspondence he fulminated at length about everything and everybody.
Nobody was ever good enough.
The new Governor was convinced there was widespread corruption in
India. In his constant carping he also insisted that there must be peace with
the Indian states at any price. In this he was going right across all that
Hasting had been striving for over many years. Not for anything would the
Governor-General compromise the Company’s position by a headlong
search for peace.
When Macartney arrived in Madras, Haider Ali was almost at the gates.
Only the exertions of General Coote and Admiral Hughes, given financial,
military and administrative support by Hastings, and backing from Sulivan,
saved the day. The Governor’s first letter to the Chairman described the
wretched condition of the settlement, and he complained of shortages of
every kind. He also believed the common saw that the Governor-General
was responsible for the struggle with the Marathas, and that this had brought
about the Madras tragedy.
He was soon on a collision course with the Supreme Council. By the terms
of the Regulating Act all Presidencies were placed subordinate to Bengal. The
consent of the Governor-General was required for everything – apart from
decisions to be taken during cases of emergency, starting hostilities or
concluding treaties. This, of course, led to difficulties of interpretation, and
the authority of Bengal could never be really absolute. Such an unsatisfactory
arrangement and the disparate characters of the two men led to bitter
hostility. Sulivan’s dilemma was that he was drawn to both, yet in the end
always sided with Hastings – his ‘lode star’.
Macartney was also soon on the way to a complete fall out with his fellow
Irishman, Sir Eyre Coote. The General had been appointed by Sulivan, and
entrusted by Hastings for conduct of the war in the Carnatic – an
arrangement that caused even more friction between Bengal and Madras.
Macartney despised the General. To Sulivan he growled, ‘In God’s name how
could you send such a man as old Coote here…even persons of his own silly
trade have lost faith in him.’15 Sulivan certainly had some sympathy, he had
become quite disenchanted with Coote himself.
The General began taking apoplectic fits in 1782, and died the next year.
His successor was General James Stuart, and soon Macartney was arguing
with him. In 1776 Stuart had helped throw Pigot in gaol, where he died. He
had a long acquaintanceship with Madras, and with most of the corrupt
officials. Macartney regarded his behaviour as one of ‘systematic
disobedience’. He sent him home under arrest. This almost instigated a
mutiny in Madras; caused uproar in Leadenhall and Parliament; and led to a
duel. The Scottish General had many connections, Sulivan was one of them.
Robinson and Andrew Stuart, the General’s brother, also well known to
Sulivan, made approaches to him to do something. It was hoped Stuart
would be cleared at his court martial. It might just be coincidence, or maybe
not, that Sulivan’s ‘kinsman’, Benjamin Sulivan (brother of John, Richard and
Henry Sulivan) was Judge Advocate at the subsequent court martial that
acquitted Stuart.
4
Soon after arriving in Madras, Macartney had gone ahead and assigned the
Nawab’s revenues from lands in the Carnatic to the Company for the
duration of the war. This did not please the Nawab’s creditors, nor did it go
down well with the Nawab. He had continued to borrow at exorbitant rates
from Indians and Europeans alike, but in particular from Council members.
Many were part of or in alliance with the ‘Arcot interest’. Not a lot was
known of the growth within Parliament of this powerful group, numbering
some thirteen MPs, whose attention was firmly fixed upon what was
happening in the south of the subcontinent. This clique also had substantial
support within India House. Sulivan monitored the activities of those he
knew about (in Parliament as well as at Leadenhall).
A commotion was deliberately stimulated in Britain by fellow members of
the so-called ‘Arcot interest’. Sulivan had no direct interest in settling the
claims of these creditors; and it was common knowledge, anyway, that many
were both exaggerated and doubtful. Nevertheless, the claimants appealed to
the Governor-General to cancel the assignment, which he did, to capture
their support. Macartney, however, refused to do as instructed and petitioned
his superiors in India House.
Yet at first, Hastings had espoused the assignment; and Stephen Sulivan
had already given him a copy of his father’s plans for the liquidation of the
Nawab’s debts, based on this tactic; this in turn had been forwarded to
Macartney. Hastings had even commented (before his retraction) that these
were similar to his own in thought and principle.
The Madras Governor had, in the meantime, become wary and suspicious
of John Macpherson and his friends among the ‘Arcot interest’ who had
recommended Paul Benfield, the leading creditor. He knew well that their
sole aim was to acquire money from the Nawab. However the problem (and
his difficulty) was compounded by the fact that the Prince and his second
son had been completely taken in by Macpherson. Every scrap of
information they possessed was forwarded to his fellow conspirators in
England by ‘Johnny McShuffle’.
With Hastings won over to the side of the Nawab and the creditors against
Macartney, and overruling the Madras Governor, Sulivan was in a
predicament. He knew all the reasons for his friend taking this step: the
desire to secure the ‘Arcot Interest’; plus dislike of the new Governor, who
defied his own authority. What aggravated Sulivan more was that in January
1781, earlier than all these developments now staying his hand, he had
proposed that the Nawab’s debts should be consolidated. Nothing at all had
happened; and now he was impelled to support Hastings (as he did on
everything else) upon his change of direction over the assignment.
Throughout the whole affair Sulivan tried to remain cool and uninvolved,
particularly with regard to Benfield and the other creditors. His support of
Hastings in whatever approach he favoured dictated this. His son Stephen,
however, did not like Benfield and could not understand his father’s
neutrality towards him. He described Benfield as unscrupulous, ambitious
and dangerous.16
Sulivan was committed to Hastings, and by the end of November 1782
was expressing astonishment at Macartney’s entrenched opposition. Hastings
was informed that Macartney owed all to him, and that the ‘terms’ had been a
‘confidential union’ with the Governor-General. He hoped for a change of
conduct, ‘if not, we must turn the tables’.17 His son expressed astonishment
at his father’s total espousal of Hastings (who he thought too strong in his
criticisms) at the expense of Macartney. He believed his father should be
promoting liaison and not discord between them; and appreciated
Macartney’s disgust at the corrupt officials in Madras. In his letter he added,
‘I am surprised that you, who are partial to the constitution of the Dutch
Government at Batavia, should not have endeavoured at least to remould the
Government of Madras.’18 Stephen was told to keep quiet.19
Waging the war now raging in the Carnatic was still Sulivan’s first priority.
However, he was no longer in the Chair after April 1782, and out of the
Direction by rotation. It seemed to him that both the war and Madras affairs
were being left untouched. The Chairman would do nothing, and the
Direction was growing uneasy. By March 1783 he was also seriously
concerned at the size of the Nawab’s arrears, now understood to be around
£300,000 – and set off against the Company’s bonded debt.
There was disquiet as well over whether Macartney was justified, through
his interpretation of the orders from the Court of Directors, in refusing to
restore the assigned lands to the Nawab. The Deputy Chairman, Nathaniel
Smith, one of that earlier Direction, wanted to blame everything on
Macartney. Sulivan, probably because of his own involvement at the time,
was inclined to acquit him.
In the end, the Nawab was advised that the government and garrisoning of
Madras would be in the hands of the Directors, and of the Supreme
Government at Bengal; and that Hastings’ projected system of 1783 would

be implemented. By this, both the Prince’s finances and the Company’s
demands would be met; as would, to a limited degree, the claims of the most
‘justly clamorous creditors’.20 A letter from a John Cox-Hippisley to General
John Caillaud, demonstrates how prickly things had become in Madras by
1783, and how dangerous was the bickering and back-biting. Macartney, he
said ‘had sorted out’ nearly everyone, so the Governor-General was no
exception. Hippisley insisted, however, that despite everything, Macartney
was still Sulivan’s friend.21
5
A tremendous flurry of activity had surrounded the despatch of Stephen
Sulivan to India in 1778. He was appointed Persian Translator at Madras,
effective from 28 November 1777; and was to be Secretary there when Mr.
Oakley, retired. Sulivan regarded these offices as of little consequence,
however; they were merely vehicles for his son’s rapid advancement.
All Stephen’s preparation to lead a public life in England was sacrificed in
sending him to India, forced by Macleane’s death. The only avenue left was
succour from friends abroad. Hastings was in the best position to give this
aid, but he was kept in reserve; and hopes were centred at first upon the
supposed gratitude of those placed in responsible positions in Madras, and
upon the Nawab of Arcot.
Sulivan’s efforts to solicit help were prodigious. In 1778 he despatched
letters of expectation to everyone he thought could influence Stephen’s
fortunes. It was a bombardment. In addition he began writing a series of
letters to his son. Of special importance, was the very remarkable and
revealing ‘Letterbook.’ It was begun when Stephen departed, and was
continued while his son was in India. This correspondence and the
Letterbook in particular, reveal much about Sulivan’s subtle, urbane mind; his
knowledge and business acumen. It portrays too what he thought of
contemporaries, friends and enemies.
Depicted are plans for his son while in Madras; the dangers to be faced
there; and the money troubles that had to be overcome. The young man was
to make it his business to enlighten his father of every circumstance: civil,
political, military or whatever. He was to observe, analyse and deduce; and
come to conclusions on all current affairs. Sulivan was very concerned about
the ruthless men his son would meet, far from a father’s guiding hand; and he
was quite correct in being so solicitous. There was little loyalty or
remembrance of past favours, as both discovered. Stephen was sworn to
secrecy regarding the contents of the Letterbook. His father even used coded
words for names, important items and dangerous material. At the same time,
it is evident he intended that this Letterbook should be kept and never
destroyed.22
Two other exceptional letters to his son were written: one on 27 February
1778, the other on 6 April; and the Letterbook continued to be added to. The
first of these, introducing the Letterbook, was important in itself. The first
two lines give its tenor and the significance Sulivan attached in it: ‘This is my
sacred repository which in no events should fall into any hands but yours and
more of this, you will ever remember to be careful.’23
In these revealing letters, Sulivan introduced his son to his own dealings
with individuals from whom he might gain favours and emoluments. A brief
history or cursory character sketch of each was included. The letters dwelt
particularly upon financial considerations; and he mentioned numerous
sources of revenue. All hopes for financial salvation hinged upon Stephen’s
satisfactory launch in India, so his father bared his soul.24 His opinion was
spelled out on issues, home and abroad. His expectations, fears, disgust,
successes, failures and disappointments were all included. The motivation
and character of those he had known and whom Stephen would meet were
spelled out; as were the dangers.
Sulivan was to be bitterly disappointed. Those he had placed in high office
proved to be men of straw. He expected so much from so many, yet in nearly
every instance drew a blank: Rumbold was positively hostile, and when
Chairman in 1781, this was remembered by ‘the old man of Queen Square’.
Oakley, supposed to be a friend and advisor, did nothing; likewise John
Whitehill.25 Fortunately, in October Stephen was appointed Secretary to the
Civil Department at Fort St. George - the result of scheming by father and
son.
It was hoped that salvation would come from the Nawab, and a letter in
December seemed to offer gifts, and the promise of Stephen becoming his
agent, with a £6,000 salary, paid in London. Sulivan became emotional as he
demonstrated on paper all that they could do for the Prince. He produced a
veritable tidal wave of advice and instructions.26 Stephen was to read to him
‘in great confidence, the papers I mean to publish in vindication of his
honour and interest, but not in my name’.27 He was to tell the Nawab he
expected to be an MP soon, where he would represent him when the
Company’s Charter was being considered; and would push for his
independence. As ‘the Under-Secretary in the India Department’, he would
defend his position; similar, ‘to Edmund Burke’s support of the American
colonists’.
Sulivan specified many ways of making money through the Nawab’s good
offices.28 In particular, he expected Stephen to benefit from a £100,000 fund,
believed to be held in England, when confirmed as the Nawab’s agent
alongside Bute’s son, Frederick Stuart.29 In the end, he received nothing; and
the agency fell into the hands of the two Macphersons who regarded it as
their own.30
There was a fund, only it was in the shape of a bond worth 100,000
pagodas in the favour of Macleane, who cashed 73,000 pagodas before his
death. Oakley now held it; and Sulivan only heard of it at all because of
Macleane’s demise. He said, ‘I conceived nothing too great for him.’31 He was
right, his erstwhile friend had proved treacherous even beyond death.
He thought he had a right to much of this money, and Stephen was urged
to obtain it in such a way that, ‘no claim can be made upon us by Macleane’s
bond creditors’.32 He worked out that his own adjusted demand was
£21,180-15/-; nevertheless, only expected £16,000.33 Again, he received
nothing, yet had been certain his son would receive lucrative offices ‘because
his father had served the Nawab more than any other…more than all other
men put together’.34 All he held were Macleane’s Granada estates, and the
reversion to him (in 1775) of a portion of a lot of land measuring 20,000
acres, in Prince Edward Island.
Stephen did not quit his post as Persian Translator until 13 March 1779,
thus picking up two salaries, the other was for Secretary to the Madras
Council. He was not to be the channel for confidential information, however;
and was convinced that neither the Nawab nor John Macpherson was
receptive. All the high hopes for great things in Madras were dead. Sulivan
was also unsure whether Macleane had died having ‘done him well’ or sold
him out.35 Everything now depended upon Hastings.
From the mid 1770s plea after plea to the Governor-General had been
ignored. These entreaties are typified by that of 15 May 1779: ‘Let me conjure
you by the affection you bear me, think of my son.’36 By November, with not
a word of reply, Sulivan’s anger at this disregard had built up:
And now my dear friend Warren Hastings, what can I say, what
must I think, to question your affection for me is impossible. An
only and much beloved son, torn from parents, far advanced, has
been recommended by me to your notice, and his very name has
no place in your letters. I am deeply wounded by this
neglect…Let me again conjure you to promote his prosperity.37
Though polite, there was no mistaking how deadly serious he was; and it is
difficult to think that Hastings was still blind to all Sulivan was doing in
London to promote and safeguard his position.
This letter, expressing deep hurt and anger at being ignored worked; and
Stephen began reaping the benefits. In April 1780 he was given a completely
unjustified commendation for virtually non-existent services as Secretary to
the Madras Council. Then, while accompanying his wife to Bengal in
August, carried despatches to Hastings, who immediately appointed him his
personal assistant and Judge Advocate General.
It was also 1779 before Hastings made his so-called ‘spontaneous effort of
generosity’ and allowed his creator and mentor to call upon him for up to
£10,000. This was shabby treatment, at a time when Sulivan was sick with
worry. Still, it would have made the father cringe to know that it took
Stephen over twenty-two years to pay back the money.38
Remitting these funds proved difficult; and everything had to be kept from
prying eyes. Hastings was to think of him using the entire £10,000 loan for
the purpose of paying interest, and as a reserve against the time when he
might be pressed ‘to a state of disgrace.’39 The help was crucial in maintaining
their close relationship. A split would have had severe consequences. Sulivan
apologised for doubting ‘Hastings’ eternal friendship’; the help given he
termed ‘an affectionate rebuke’; his doubts due to ‘a mind tortured by
pungent affliction’.40 As it was, the total ever received was £7,000; and this
only arrived in 1783. The whole matter was carried through with great
embarrassment on both sides. Stephen reported that Hastings was ‘delicate in
these matters, as delicate as I feel awkward’.41
Now Stephen was in Calcutta he began to benefit from commissions, such
as renewing leases for Company lands. At his request and through his father’s
scheming he was already Resident at Tanjore; and while holding this
Residency post, he was given the honorary rank of Councillor in Bengal.
Even as this was happening, Sulivan was making him a Senior Merchant, and
hoped to place him in the Supreme Council at Calcutta. All this rapid
promotion created a mix-up. It was not clear whether he would return to
Fort St. George, or would remain in Bengal. In the end, Sulivan had the post
in Calcutta confirmed; and secured the Residency of Tanjore for John
Sulivan.
The affection Hastings had for Sulivan bore fruit, and expectations turned
into reality. He and his agent, Johnson, secured well recompensed positions
for Stephen, and so saved the father. However, young Sulivan enjoyed the
post of Judge Advocate only until 1781. A ‘precipitate slip’ was how his
father described its loss; it was regretted because it grew ‘to be worth £3,000
a year, which no power would have taken from you’.42 In 1781 Hastings
granted Stephen an opium contract, which he sold the following year to a
John Burn for over £3,000. Hastings knew nothing of the resale. Apparently,
neither did Stephen’s father, since in February 1784 Sulivan was advising him
to renew it. There was some illegality in the hasty resale; and later Hastings
was condemned for it.43
Evidence of Stephen’s mixed fortunes abound: In 1780 he was money
lending, utilising funds belonging to his father at Madras. By 1781 each had a
share in bonds based upon the ‘New Consolidated Fund of the Nawab of
Arcot’.44 William Burke was to be coerced (or helped) into giving him a bond
for half of his £3,939 arrears, because, as Sulivan said, ‘my misfortunes call
for relief’.45
In Queen Square, Sulivan and his wife continued to live frugally. At first
there was little left to remit home because of high expenses in India, and the
debts there to be erased. He confided that £22,000 was needed to clear
everything. Ponsborne would then belong to his son, with no mortgage,
‘unless I suffer ultimately by Colebrooke’.46 His (unfulfilled) financial
projections continued to fill the letters and the ongoing Letterbook. When all
debts in India were paid, Sulivan stipulated 100,000 pagodas [£30-40,000]
would be needed to come home.47 The minimum he could afford to return
with was £20,000; and initially, at least £10,000.48
He issued a stream of directions on how to remit funds: such as by ‘Star’
Pagodas (made of gold); and how diamonds could be conveyed by the
commanders of East Indiamen. He planned formation in India of a ‘House
for receiving monies in cash or kind’: accepting diamonds, insurances and

remittances of all sorts from Europeans in Madras and in Bengal.49 Hastings
favoured the plan and offered to help in its formation; but it came to
nothing.
On return to England, his financial independence secured, Sulivan
expected Stephen to do well. He was sure Solicitor-General Thurlow would
find him a position; he was to be disappointed. One source of wealth his son
was not equal to, lay in what were described as ‘the new treasures of the
Persian language’. Sulivan referred to Robert Wood, Chatham’s Secretary,
having made his fortune out of this; and Chatham had even advised Stephen
to start a collection.50
He made an interesting observation about Sir William Jones: ‘I hold Mr.
Jones (who is the first in this country of the Persian class) to be a mere
superficial smatterer, with this merit, however, that he knows more of the
language than any other man and perhaps with such lights and materials as
are here within reach he may not be equalled.’51 Stephen was urged to collect
Persian manuscripts and books, ‘good stuff, not trash’; and to seek the advice
of people like Barwell, Col. Dow and the ‘Company’s black Persian
Translator at Madras’.52
16
Personal Loss and Political Revival

1781-83
The first half of the 1780s witnessed striking alterations in how Indian
affairs would be managed from London. These were the culmination of
several developments, all of which involved Sulivan. The most outstanding
adjustment was a Board of Control, set up in 1784 and commanded by
Henry Dundas. Sulivan’s role in all this concerned the evolution of new
procedures, their introduction, and the manner in which fresh regulations
were achieved. His sincere aim was always better government for India; just
as it was that of the ministry and all interested parties. What lay behind this
commendable aim, however, meant something different to the protagonists,
and is best summed up in their attitudes to Warren Hastings.
Successive ministries wanted rid of him; and, as outlined, colossal effort
had already been made to remove him. This persecution was to continue, but
had to get past Sulivan. His vigilant defence, long and constant years of
service meant that clashes with whichever ministry was in power were
unavoidable. The rise and fall of so many Administrations in rapid succession
had prohibited coherent planning. It was a sorry state of affairs paralleled by
the political jostling at each year’s Company election.
From 1778 to 1781 Parliament had tried to make improvements in the
government of India. Reorganisation of control, home and abroad, was one
objective; a better relationship between Company and State was the other.
These goals had come to nothing despite the efforts of Robinson and
Jenkinson. An impasse was reached. The whole was attended by public
controversy; people were deliberately led to believe that Hastings was the
problem, and this criticism included Sulivan and the Hastings party, involved
in championing the Governor-General.
The lack of an effective reform settlement had meant renewal of the
existing legislation; and it was only with conclusion of the crisis in America
that India matters received full attention. Robinson and Jenkinson,
meanwhile, with advice from Sulivan, set out to prepare a plan embracing
PERSONAL LOSS AND POLITICAL REVIVAL 1781-83 245
everything to do with the government of India. The basic outline was

Robinson’s plan of 1778, with additions from Jenkinson’s later one. They
were then to proceed with a settlement; supposed to be completed with or
without the Company’s consent.
Consequently, in April 1781 Robinson (helped by Dundas) presented
another Bill, which became law in July. This Act did not vary much from his
1778 proposals. Sulivan was not impressed, and hoped for supplementary
legislation to rectify things. Yet, this body of work was important. Robinson
and Jenkinson also recognised that they were short-circuiting the alliance of
interests dominating Company affairs since 1773.
Sulivan had long realised he could not combat the ministry; but was
determined to secure the best possible legislation for the organisation he had
served so long. He could best achieve this by working with bureaucrats like
these two, who he realised genuinely sought better government for India.
Long-term control of the Company might be gone forever, but the right to
participate in the present and to help form the future remained.
Yet, while attentive and involved in the transformation of the 1780s,
Sulivan had a long history of attempted improvements to look back on; so
much so that the India Act of 1784 undoubtedly had much of its beginning
with him. Working backwards, Pitt’s Act is seen to be based on Fox’s lost Bill
of 1783, which in turn owed its existence to Dundas’ earlier one. This in turn
had relied almost completely upon the work of Robinson and Jenkinson,
discussed above. But in the beginning, long before these two bureaucrats,
Sulivan formulated plans and made efforts to place men in India to carry
them out: from 1757 to 1763; then 1769 to 1773; and his proposals
thereafter.
At every stage of Government interference, and latterly during its attempts
at reorganisation, Sulivan had been consulted: through the 1766-7 Inquiry;
from 1769 to 1773 and the lead-up to the Regulating Act; and then following
his return to power in 1778. His views were widely accepted, then advanced
and expanded upon by later Parliamentary administrators. Sulivan said in
1778, ‘Necessity dictated that I be consulted by Government upon the new
structure because I was the only fit person and only one prepared for it.’1 He
was used again after 1780. Apart from his invaluable knowledge, Robinson
and Jenkinson knew that if they wished to make progress within the
Company Courts, his political adroitness was just as necessary as his
contribution to and agreement with their plans.
Between 1780 and 1783 the ministries of North, Rockingham, Shelburne
and the Fox-North Coalition, came and departed against a backdrop of the
perennial Indian question. Sulivan found little mutual ground with each new
ministry; and was forced to maintain his defence of Hastings against
permanently unfriendly Parliamentarians intent on ousting him. Burke-
inspired motions polluted the Commons; such as those of May 1782 and
October 1783, where the Governor-General’s conduct was censured and
grounds sought to dismiss him. These were only defeated by the activity of
North in the Commons, and the pro-Hastings group in the General Court.
Upholding Hastings’ integrity impacted harshly on Sulivan’s life. He was also
going into his twilight years and about to suffer the most severe shock to his
system.
2
In January 1782 he was approaching the end of his term as Chairman, and
would exit the Direction in April, by rotation, together with five other
Government supporters. Sustaining any sort of pro-Hastings group would be
a problem; and the new executive was potentially hostile He had warned
Lord North, but the minister did nothing. Sulivan’s wishful thinking was that
‘urged by necessity he will continue me in the Direction’.2 He believed it was
not in Government’s best interest to allow supporters who had already
‘passed the Chairs’, to be excluded by the rotation clause.3
The anguish intensified as his exit drew near, because he could see a clear
majority of ‘malevolent and intriguing enemies in the Direction’. Fletcher he
identified as ‘a complete fiend’; and General Richard Smith ‘a wretch who
would hang you (Hastings) me and Impey upon one Gibbet’.4 He bemoaned
the lack of talented individuals; and raged at North’s indolence: ‘He flies
from trouble and yields to his enemies except where they go beyond what he
can bear, and then no man is more active or courageous.’5
His powers are reflected in the remark that there would be little opposition
if he could remain a Director; but how hard he would have to work is
revealed in the words: ‘the real sentiments of a majority seldom coincide with
mine’.6 The change of ministry to Rockingham in March 1782 sealed his fate.
His opponents, headed by General Smith, Fletcher and Gregory formed a
majority in the Direction. These men would remain in charge within the
Company, despite the fall-out between Rockinghamites and Shelburne’s
followers, and the early death of Rockingham in July 1782.
Many contemporaries commented upon what they thought was Sulivan’s
demise: ‘I think the reign of Sulivan is over, the reign of Hastings is over,’
Burke crowed.7 A neutral observer, Thomas Allan, thought he had ‘been
treated with...an infamous regard. He has felt it very severely and, it is said,
has been obliged to make his peace on very hard terms and it is a doubtful
point if he ever comes into the Direction again.’8
His enemy, Robert Gregory, became Chairman in 1782; but Nathaniel
Smith, one of his followers, filled the Deputy Chair. Sulivan was instrumental
in bringing this about. On 10 April he was thanked by the Court of Directors
for all his work. It meant little. ‘The truth was,’ as Allan reported to
Macartney, ‘he was sadly broke down by the late attack on him.’9 He was only
partially correct. What really lay behind Sulivan’s dejection was his wife’s
death. He was devastated and inconsolable.
Elizabeth Sulivan died on 4 February and was buried on 12 February 1782.
That day,’ he informed Warren Hastings, ‘put an end to my happiness in this
world. And such has been my weakness that it’s wonderful I now exist. I
struggled with misery.’10 It was a massive blow to him. The words he used to
paint her virtues when she was alive measure out exactly what she had meant
to him:
When I lamented the deceptions I had experienced in my

friendships with men I should have marked the peculiar kindness
of Providence in giving me your mother, who with every virtue
of a Primitive Christian, has been my constant adviser and friend
in the solid understanding, unbounded affection, nice and
religious honour, with such a share of prudence and discretion as
never to divulge a single secret. The loss of character in me or
you I know she could not survive. Experience has often
convinced me (I confess it with pleasure) that her judgement
surpasses my own; and this has frequently puzzled me to account
for, because I do not conceive her abilities are superior to mine,
and a greater knowledge of the world must give me an advantage.
Perhaps the mind occupied with fewer objects increases the
strength of conception. Whatever be the cause, all the capital
errors of my life have been committed when I have neglected to
consult her. And this testimony I bear to the merit and goodness
of the best of women.11
His wife was his ‘single friend, in her bosom only was deposited my whole
confidence and inmost secrets’.12
He said to his son, ‘The lease of Queen Square house expires in March but
if it had not, there I should never go’; and he never did.13 It was 1785,
however, before he sold the lease, when it went to a John Alexander. Such
was his loss, Sulivan was wont to proclaim himself helpless. He was no such
thing, but certainly much of the spirit had temporarily gone out of him.
At first he stayed with relations of his niece ‘Betsy’ Wood, at Fordhook
House, Ealing. He and the son of his deceased friend Thomas Lane then
took a house in George Street, Hanover Square; and another ‘in the country,
on a lease’. This house was also at Ealing; and Sulivan provides a domestic
image: ‘Mrs. Hawkins living with us as manager. And to do them both justice
(Lane and Mrs. Hawkins) my ease is their study.’14 At his house in George
Street, he employed a William Morris as butler, and an Indian boy called
‘Sadi’. After his death they conspired to rob his son; both were caught.
He had been in poor health for a number of years. In April 1780 Hastings
was informed: ‘A disorder in my eyes disables me from writing much. Excuse
me, therefore, to Impey, to Barwell and to Coote.’15 There were few letters in
his hand after this. Without doubt, decades of work had placed strain on his
eyes. Yet he was still reading and his sight became worse. In January 1781 he
complained: ‘My eyes are so bad.’16 From then he depended upon an
amanuensis. His physical condition was undoubtedly made worse by loss of
his wife; and he continued in poor health and with troubled eyesight
throughout 1782. In November he feared so much for his life that he stated
baldly to his son that he was born on 24 April 1713. It appears strange that
this had never been mentioned before.
This normally resilient campaigner also began to show signs of hurt and
resentment. Towards sworn enemies he carried ideas of revenge and
retribution. Stephen voiced much of the disgust and dismay the Sulivans had
grown to feel over the years, at what the son termed ‘unwarranted ill-
treatment’:
With the many examples of ingratitude and treachery which your

long and hackneyed experience of the ways of men has afforded
you, I should not have wondered if instead of that credulity which
has accompanied you through youth and manhood, you had chosen
as the companion of age a gloomy and suspicious distrust of
mankind. But I perceive you encourage to the last, and will even
carry to the very grave, those amiable weaknesses of human nature
which, however they may expose us to the artifices of the
designing, grow out of the noblest root in the world, universal
benevolence.17
3
No longer in the Direction from April 1782, Sulivan focussed on his son’s
affairs, those of Hastings and what was happening in the Carnatic, that is
when he was able to concentrate. He also came under quite inordinate
pressure from several quarters throughout the year; fortunately, although
quite rundown his stamina proved sufficient. He fought back against
scurrilous efforts to demean him. His enemies now in control of the
Company searched, but found no evidence of any wrong doing; and were
disgraced when a motion in the General Court, which implied
misdemeanours by him, fell flat on its face.
In Parliament he came under heavy fire. The onslaughts had been building
for some time, launched via the Secret and Select Committees. They had
actually begun in April 1781, and were levelled at every aspect of the
Company’s government at home and abroad. Dundas led the Secret
Committee; Burke, Francis and General Smith fronted the other.
The Secret Committee had launched a major attack in October 1781,
directed primarily at Hastings. Sulivan had been alarmed at the way this
Committee pervaded every department at India House, aiming to achieve ‘a
total revolution in the management of India’.18 Dundas and his cohorts
ranged over problematic events in India, and used them as vehicles for
vicious tirades against the Governor-General.19
Yet, bad as it was, the Secret Committee was not as loathsome as the
Select Committee, chaired and controlled by Burke; much of the information
provided by Francis. In April 1782, coincidental with his wife’s death and his
own exit from the Direction, he was summoned to sit in front of this
Committee, where he was taken to task over alleged inaccuracies, delays and
restricting tactics when Chairman. It was an especially heartless examination.
Given Burke’s displeasure at Sulivan’s political ‘betrayal’ in forming an
alliance with Lord North in 1780, and his anger over Tanjore, he was
relentless. He tried, without success, to pillory his adversary; and also took
the opportunity of censuring Hastings and Elijah Impey. Sulivan deftly
avoided the accusations and later referred to them as minor irritations; but
that was not true.20
He and his fellow Irishman were old antagonists. Burke knew perfectly
well that Sulivan’s great knowledge would always be placed at the service of
‘his’ Company, and against the onslaught of a would-be destroyer like
himself. Earlier, the great orator had said to a friend, Thomas Lewis O’Byrne:
‘Him (Sulivan) I know well.’21 Now, after subjecting his opponent to the
most intense and unpleasant interrogation, he exploded with fury to William
Burke: ‘That infamous wretch (Sulivan) after shuffling and prevaricating has
at length taken refuge, refusing to give answers which may tend to
incriminate himself.’22
Before this particular grilling was finished, the Select Committee (or rather
Burke) had lambasted Sulivan further. He was accused of various ‘crimes’
and ‘neglect of duty’, such as failing to send abroad, promptly enough, the
Judicature Act of 1781, which he had virtually created.23 Sulivan thought this
charge, ‘very feeble’.24 What incensed him most, however, was the nature of
his cross-examination. He detested its viciousness and the sneering, insidious
tone in which it was conducted.
He was so angry he sought immediate revenge and asked Dunning to
provide a seat in Parliament in order to harass Burke. It was risky, but he
wanted to challenge his enemy on his own duelling ground. Not surprisingly,
Dunning did not answer. He had to cool his friend down.
The wily old fox had proved too elusive for Burke, but it took time for his
anger to subside. The initiative remained with these Parliamentary
Committees long after Rockingham’s death, and trailed on even beyond the
crash of Fox’s India Bill in 1783. Yet before that date Sulivan could still
express his contempt. In July 1783 he exclaimed: ‘The labours of a Secret
Committee are done away...and Edmund Burke has become what Richard
Smith ever was, a most contemptible wretch.’ Burke’s 9th Report he
described, with some venom, as ‘a Dwarf and harmless, though a bitter
injustice.’25 In a tract published on 18 December 1783, signed, ‘Detector’ he
answered the charges. Later, he dismissed the efforts of both Committees as
trivial.
4
Until the greatest danger to Hastings was over in December 1783, Sulivan
maintained a ferocious defence. Their mutual enemy, Philip Francis spoke of
the wonderful support marshalled by ‘the Old man of Queen Square’. In June
1781 he had dealt with Rumbold, who had blamed the Maratha war on
Hastings. By November he had faced up to Francis’ venomous allegations,

difficult to deal with because of his detailed knowledge. Nevertheless, as Sir
Charles Lawson put it: ‘Sulivan, with infinite ability defeated him.’26 That he
continued to outfox Francis is suggested by the latter’s comments: ‘The
conversation between him and me at my house…was full as curious…A
third of the kind is not to be met with in history.’27
The Shelburne ministry of July 1782 had shaped an assault because the
minister was convinced that Indian reform would secure him votes. Impey
was recalled; it was threatened to bring back the whole Bengal council; and
the minister toyed with replacing Hastings with Cornwallis. Dundas’
accusation that the Governor-General was a warmonger was typical of the
odious charges flung about in the Commons.
Within the Company, the ministry-controlled majority followed the party
line: Hastings’ recall was demanded, amid a plethora of accusations. Sulivan’s
defence during this Government-inspired onslaught was magnificent;
particularly his resistance to the attacks launched between May and October
1782. His objective was to secure terms that would ensure Hastings had an
honourable homecoming. When this was not forthcoming, and instead an
unconditional return was insisted upon, he fought tooth and nail. The
defences he put up were all based on chartered rights and privileges. He
maintained the Company had the last word on such an important issue.
Realising the Governorship would be lost if he did not remain firm, he
organised a substantial group inside the Company that sided with Hastings.
They worked for rejection of Shelburne’s (Dundas-inspired) call for his
removal. Accordingly, a special meeting of the General Court was held in
October 1782 to vote on the recall. At the head of Hastings’ supporters
Sulivan secured the victory. Despite aches and frailty, ‘my frame is shook and
I write in pain’, he and his group carried all before them by 428 votes to 75.
The sheer size of the rout sparked off great celebrations at the George and
Vulture tavern.28
Signs of the intense pressure he faced at this time and of his deepest
feelings appeared in a letter written in November. It reflected his brooding
frame of mind. He urged Hastings to ‘make a speedy retreat, for I am heartily
sick of men and measures’; that his friend must not have his fame and
honour sullied by staying any longer than he had to.29 In spite of physical
difficulty he was able to add in his own hand:
Your character is now so universally known and generally

admired that we have nothing to fear from the rancour of your
active enemies…and the abandoned witch, General R. Smith is
(thank God) below contempt. Nor is the sublime and beautiful
[Edmund Burke] in much greater estimation.30
Yet, he understood nothing had been settled, that his protégé could be
removed. He also knew others were ferreting for a ‘person of distinguished
rank, tried abilities and unsullied honour’ to succeed him. Sulivan believed
that person would be Lord Cornwallis, with whom Major Scott, Hastings’
appointee, had already opened discussions.31
Major John Scott was a problem on his own. Hastings had appointed him
to care for his interests in Parliament and in the Company. Scott arrived in
late 1781, and immediately joined with Sulivan; and at first he seemed to take
advice. It was soon found out, however, he was rather ‘volatile’, had a
headstrong attitude and poor grasp of essentials. Sulivan’s dilemma was that
because the Governor-General listened to the man, he was constrained to
maintain confidentiality and an understanding, regardless of Scott’s nonsense.
Hastings was incredibly naive to expect such a man, straight from service
in India, to deal successfully on his behalf in England. The Major would have
to work within a milieu of amazing complexity in the Company’s Courts; and
do the same within the equally intricate field of national politics in the 1780s.
Sulivan and the Governor-General’s other friends became convinced of his
mistake in even appointing a representative, regardless of capabilities. As it
was, Scott could be called before the Parliamentary Committees, where he
would be no match for Dundas, Burke and Francis.
When this was pointed out to Hastings, he wrote to the effect that Scott
had been despatched in order to save him some work; that no malice was
intended. This was ironic indeed. To Sulivan it was then almost unbelievable
that Hastings saw fit to be piqued. He sensed it in their correspondence
during 1782 and defended himself vigorously, maintaining his friend was
being poisoned against him. His suspicions were correct; the culprits being
Major Scott, ruffled at his own helplessness and negativity, and the
treacherous John Macpherson, whose cover had not yet been blown. It was
fortunate that no umbrage was taken.
5
Having come to terms, somewhat, with the death of his wife, Sulivan’s
appetite for Company politics returned; and he offered himself for re-
election in April 1783. He saw no real obstacles to gaining a share of power.
A return to the Direction was also imperative. Stephen and kinsmen:
Benjamin, John, and Richard Sulivan, were all in India; as were Eyles Irwin
and others he favoured. All of them relied on the backing he could give; and
of course Warren Hastings was never far from his thoughts.
The fall of North’s ministry in March 1782 was speedily followed by the
demise of Rockingham’s in July of the same year. Sulivan’s expectations rose
with the end of this ministry. Among its ranks, in Parliament and at
Leadenhall, were some of his most vicious opponents. It is not surprising
that their hopes fell in equal amount to the rise in his.
Shelburne, his friend of earlier years, formed a ministry; but Sulivan’s
dreams of a reunion were doomed. Although the minister’s supporters were
inclined towards Hastings and himself almost to a man, the minister’s need
for political support among their enemies in the Commons decided matters.
There was also a coolness between them that can be dated to the 1769 crash
and to the machinations of Macleane. They met, uncomfortably, at a dinner

on 1 November 1782. Shelburne kept ‘a princely distance’, and Sulivan’s
pride would not allow the required courting.32
Despite Shelburne being ‘lost to remembrance’, Sulivan was sure he would
regain office, though he would have to share with people he disliked
intensely.33 His support in the Company came principally from the
Johnstones and Lord North’s connections, who had ties with John
Macpherson and John Stables. It was a bitter reversal of roles for Sulivan
when Shelburne urged Hastings’ recall. In December Francis was confident
that Sulivan would not be a Director; adding that he would be ‘grievously
mistaken if he ever gets in again’.34 Passing judgement on the Irishman, he
supposed that ‘in Europe there is not so wicked and abandoned a villain’.35 It
was a view that more truly reflected his own depraved nature.
The fall of Shelburne in February 1783 and the appearance of the
remarkable, and utterly unstable, Fox-North Coalition, opened the way for
yet another attack on Hastings by the Select Committee. In a series of
reports, Hastings was severely criticised for his handling of problems in
India. These placed Sulivan in deep defensive mode.
With the conclusion of the European war that accompanied and
overlapped the American struggle, there was now time for Company business
to be debated in the House. Through ‘Indian’ friends in the Commons
Sulivan thought he could fight for the monopoly; but they struggled to
maintain its position in the discussions. The problem was these friends
supported different groups. Six were deemed to be followers of Pitt the
Younger; eight others supported Charles Fox; another three, Sir James
Cockburn, Sir Hector Munro and James ‘Fingal’ Macpherson, would switch
to Pitt in 1783.
But even though Sulivan kept up his exertions within Parliament through
these men, it was to be of no avail. In the end his contribution was a legacy
of past efforts at reform and the massive injection he gave to discussions
with ministers and their officials. He also put hard work into getting the
shareholders to accept such defined regulations for the better government of
India.
6
During the lead-up to the 1783 contest, Sulivan and Sir William James were
placed together on the ‘Proprietors’ list. However, at a meeting held near the
end of March, an alternative and rival list of six candidates was proposed and
accepted; this one put these two in opposition to one another. It was an anti-
Sulivan move. Putting in his shilling’s worth, Burke deliberately timed
publication of the 7th Report (so hostile to Sulivan) to coincide with the
election.
This set the scene, but how the election would turn out would depend
upon Lord North. Even though his strange alliance with Charles Fox made
the minister appear untrustworthy to all candidates, both sets of supporters,
Burke’s through Sir William James and Sulivan’s via Woodhouse, beseeched
him for assistance. Fortunately for Sulivan, the combination of North’s
hedging and the appearance of the Select Committee Report, all shortly
before the ballot, suggested that an attempt was being made to exclude him.
It led to a deputation, headed by Governor Johnstone, forcing North to
support him. The minister gave Burke no support for his alternative list and
called upon him to prove Sulivan was the criminal he declared him to be.
The success that followed left Sulivan highly elated. There was even a
possibility he would accept one of the Chairs. Apart from gratitude for
North’s crucial backing, he was overflowing with praise for the Johnstones.
He launched a public attack upon his enemies and, ‘offered a reward in the
public papers of 100 guineas for the discovery of the person that wrote the
ministerial letters circulated to the Proprietors against me.’36
Parliamentary interest in Indian affairs, during and following the Fox-
North Coalition of 1783, was stimulated by the Company’s financial trouble.
It was fed all the way through by the Select Committee Reports stemming
from the vitriolic pen of Burke and by proposals in Dundas’ Bill. Sulivan was
requested to be present at a joint committee of the Company’s Treasury and
Accounts departments to look into what all this might mean. It was part of
Charles Fox’s grand pan. A report of September 1783 was to be examined,
which recommended that the Chairs inform the ministry that the Company
could not pay its bills without Government aid.
Meanwhile, Fox’s plan to transfer all Company patronage to Parliament
was being drafted into his Bill. Further approaches were made to Sulivan to
help smooth their acceptance at Leadenhall. To secure his support and that
of Hastings’ other friends a compromise over the terms for the Governor-
General’s return from Bengal was offered. It was unsuccessful. Sulivan’s
unblinkered understanding of the political reality and his implacable hostility
to all that was implied made such a deceit impossible. Although George III
hated everything about this ministry, it staggered on. Only when Fox’s India
Bill appeared on 18 November did things begin to happen. The Bill
stimulated reaction in the Company and in Parliament. It forced joint action
from disparate groups such as: Hastings’ supporters; the ‘Arcot interest’; and
various factions in the City, and among the shippers.
Sulivan was at the forefront in everything that now happened. After the
failed attempts to entangle him during the introduction of Fox’s India Bill, he
was totally involved with its defeat and the consequences. Only on 18
November were its terms known, but active, organised opposition from
within the Company had already commenced. Sulivan, alongside Edward
Becher and Hastings’ agent, Major Scott, had been collecting materials for
the defence. Only the Company Chairman, Henry Fletcher, together with
Gregory and seven other Directors joined with Fox.
On 22 November a ‘Committee of Nine Proprietors’ was set up, whose
remit was to defend the Company against the attack on chartered rights
inherent in the Bill. Sulivan was its leading light. His presence produced
sufficient agreement at Leadenhall; and he had been working closely with
Atkinson and Robinson. Defeat of the Fox Bill also suggested support for
Hastings might be attracted among those opposed to it.
Parliamentary Opposition seized the opportunity opening up. In
December 1783 Pitt, Thurlow, Dundas, Jenkinson and Robinson pushed the
monarch into expressing his disapproval of the Bill. This was enough to kill
it. Thurlow kept alive the impression that Fox was destroying the
Constitution and reserving all Company’s patronage for himself. Thereafter,
Sulivan (considered a Northite by everyone but himself) said that he was ‘lost
to all remembrance by Lord North and his friends’ because of his
organisation of Company hostility to the Bill.37 He went on to say that the
minister ‘and all his connections abandoned me in this hour as they had
before done in Parliament; and peace be with them all to Eternity’.38
He now controlled the ‘Committee of Nine Proprietors’, appointed in
November 1783 by the General Court to watch over rights and privileges. It
had co-ordinated the combined Parliamentary and Company opposition to
the Bill and was to hold the initiative in Company matters until June 1784.
He made sure the ‘Committee of Nine Proprietors’ now backed Hastings to
the hilt.
Throughout the winter of 1783-4, he was alert, negotiating the best terms
for the Governor-General’s return. A softer attitude towards Hastings had
been presented by the Fox-North Government; a line dictated by the
problems it faced, but nobody was fooled. Eventually, however, a signal did
arrive that confirmed Sulivan’s protection had been successful. At the
General Court of 7 November 1783, called by Sulivan and friends to
congratulate Hastings on the ending of the Maratha war, the Proprietors
thanked the Governor-General for all he had done. Sulivan believed the end
of war had brought this turnabout. He became emotional:
Instead of the Company being, annihilated past redemption, with

my advice to return as soon as possible…Genius (so says Lord
Mansfield) has brought about a wonderful and sudden revolution
and you have the principal merit of saving the Company in
England as you have done in India. Can man rise higher?39
Sulivan was usually self-effacing, never mentioning his own input. He would
endlessly praise Hastings’ achievements. This time, however, he could not
restrain himself: ‘And it is a pleasant reflection to your friend, which he will
enjoy in his latest moments that we have fought back to back in this glorious
conflict.’40 Later he added the significant comment that the removal of the
Fox-North ministry had probably saved the day. He still advised Hastings to
prepare to come home; then, sensing the initiative lay with his friend, urged
him (in the immediate term) to stay a little longer.
17
Closing of an Era
1782-86
I n December 1783 the Fox-North Coalition was replaced by the ministry of

William Pitt the Younger. He was pledged to bring about change in the field
of Indian administration, introduced by the now departed Fox and North.
He was forced, therefore, to deal with Hastings, with Sulivan’s defence of the
Governor-General’s position, and with public concern.
Directors and Proprietors alike were now conscious of the threat to the
organisation’s existence; of the need for reform in its government, home and
abroad. There was some understanding that a better relationship with the
State must be forged. Others were now as determined as Sulivan to protect
privileges and hang on to the last vestiges of independence.
The able Parliamentarian Richard Atkinson served as the main contact
with Sulivan and an aroused, prickly Company. He was particularly friendly
with Francis Baring and his friends in the Direction, who together formed
the ‘City’ interest. This group had joined with Sulivan and the Hastings party
in the struggle against Charles Fox. Progress pivoted around Atkinson
winning support within the Company for the young Pitt. Sulivan worked with
him for the good of the Company, for Hastings, and for himself. Atkinson
laboured for his own (secret) aims, as well as for Pitt. Together, they had
disproved Fox’s allegations of the Company’s financial instability.
Pitt soon displayed his political adroitness. Recognising Sulivan’s strength,
he was secretly adamant from the start that he would not be allowed to
dominate the Company; or bring about the much-needed reforms from
within. Sulivan was completely in the dark to these views at this point. He,
meanwhile, was using the ‘Committee of Nine Proprietors’ to re-establish the
ascendancy of his own, or what was sometimes termed, the ‘Indian’ or ‘Old’
interest.
By January 1784 the Direction and the General Court had been brought
around to accepting a resolution supporting the Pitt-Dundas scheme for
reform. Sulivan, working with Atkinson and James Macpherson, was certainly
the instigator in these moves since the ‘Committee of Nine’, which he led,
pushed this action. He was also asked to occupy the Chair whenever this
Committee was asked to wait upon His Majesty’s ministers. The alliance with
Government was cemented, therefore, just as Pitt desired. The Company
agreed to work with the minister upon whatever terms for reform in India he
should produce.
These were not long in preparation; and although some clauses were
ambiguous, he obtained a general agreement. The minister then listened to
any modifications. Yet even while he was suggesting some of these
adjustments, Sulivan was pushing Pitt’s main proposals through the two
Company Courts. Almost immediately afterwards, on 12 January, the Bill was
introduced into the Commons. It failed on the 23rd, and Indian reform was
delayed.
Thus, prior to the April 1784 national election (where he was certainly
helped by Sulivan) Pitt had tried to act decisively. The time had also been
appropriate because the Company was more relaxed after the defeat of Fox’s
Bill and pre-occupied with its financial worries. The Court of Directors too
was disorganised following the forced resignation of Chairman Fletcher.
Now, following the failure to push the India Bill through the House, Pitt was
faced with the problem of how to manage the Company while the Act was in
abeyance.
He was thrown back upon the system of patronage used so successfully by
North. The agents were to be Atkinson and Baring. Their proposals boiled
down to the minister nominating the Chairmen annually, thus effectually
managing the course of business. Pitt refused to do this; so Atkinson and
Baring then suggested he should make Sulivan all-powerful. Pitt turned this
down too.
Sulivan was well aware that he was being backed by Atkinson and Baring.
He also knew about their partnership ‘in contracts’; of Atkinson’s links with
North, Robinson and James Macpherson; and of Baring’s ties with
Shelburne. The worst part was that he also believed (until shortly before his
election to the Direction in April 1784) that they were friends of his and of
Hastings, as well as now being true to Pitt.
It was during the lead-up and course of this 1784 election that the full
extent of the duplicity emanating from Westminster, from within the
Company, and from so-called friends was laid bare. Sulivan’s hesitation as
events unfolded reflects the difficulty he had in accepting these deceptions.
Within the Company it was now obvious that he was the real power. He
was helped in that from December 1783 to January 1784 there was
unexpected harmony among the Directors. However, the uncertain political
climate at Westminster meant, as he knew all too well, there could be no
permanent alignments at Leadenhall. When he was offered the post of
Deputy Chair, his reasons for turning it down were vague: that ‘he had secret
notice of the impending storm that was to annihilate the Company’; that his
CLOSING OF AN ERA 1782-86 257
‘mind and body required some tranquillity’.1 These excuses reflect the
disturbing information he was receiving.
Until March he held firm: ‘I will take a respectable line on the new
Direction but I will fill no Chair.’2 Then he relented and admitted to Hastings
that ‘the pressing wish of my friends may possibly force me back if (as is
suggested) Mr. Pitt should make the request’.3 It was then that he found out
how base his supposed friends were. Not only would there be great
opposition from his enemies Burke and Fox, his ‘friends’ Atkinson, Baring,
Robinson and James Macpherson would challenge him as well.
Pitt also played him false; while secretly instructing Atkinson and Baring
that he did not want Sulivan in either Chair, he received the old Company
man most handsomely. At this private meeting Pitt said (deceitfully) how
much he wished to see him occupy the premier executive position. He also
spoke of how he expected Sulivan to hold his own against the imminent
attack by Fox and Burke.
Sulivan accepted Pitt’s observations with good grace, saying that he was
more concerned that his honour had not been sullied than anything else. The
fact was he already knew the truth. It came from many mouths: from John
Robinson, who had added that the minister would not protect him from an
attack; and from ‘Fingal’ Macpherson.4
The Scot’s treachery now showed, when he advised Sulivan that he should
‘submit to place Messrs. Baring and Atkinson in the Chairs for this year only,
but reserving real power to himself’.5 Sulivan deduced by ‘Fingal’s’ pleading
for men he now knew to be enemies and in the Pitt camp, that he was being
duped. He made it public knowledge that though he would not solicit a
Chair, neither would he now decline one.
The further activities of James Macpherson and John Robinson in pushing
every interest in favour of Baring and Atkinson galvanised him into action;
and before the election seventeen Directors had pledged him the Chair, with
the nomination of his Deputy.6 He knew he and Hastings were secure, which
suggested the best approach was to take the position. This roused Pitt to
interfere once more, and he was just able to convince Sulivan that ‘an inferior
situation this year would best answer every purpose’.7
In that all future dealings would be with the Pitt ministry, Sulivan probably
thought he had little choice. Yet, even as late as 18 April, it was proposed by
others that he should occupy the top post. This might indicate he was still
mulling things over. It is a view substantiated by Richard Sulivan; and
Atkinson seemed to suggest the same thing: ‘He could not be prevailed upon
to wait a year out of the Chair.’8 What probably sealed things was Dundas’
decided negative; which was enough to destroy any grand plan of his to take
control regardless.
He then firmly brought forward Devaynes and Smith. The former was
generally in support of Hastings, thus had credit. Nathaniel Smith was one of
his own followers.9 Through the ‘Committee of Nine Proprietors’ he also
carried the selection of Governor Johnstone, Richard Atkinson (for private
reasons) and Woodhouse. Fox’s six nominees were defeated. Sulivan’s
comment to his son summed up his mastery: ‘Thus Messrs. Robinson,

Macpherson, Atkinson and Baring have been smothered in their own Pit –
and instead of sharing power with me, which they might have, they are now
of no consequence whatever.’10
When all was done and dusted, although Pitt could do nothing about
Sulivan’s entrenched position within the Company, he had managed, by
negotiation, flattery and pure artifice to clear the way inside the organisation
for his Bill. Only Sulivan’s genuine wish to see the reform proposals inherent
in the proposed Act implemented explains his complacency; especially in the
face of Pitt’s double-dealing. The first minister then gained a majority in
Parliament following the national election success of April 1784, again with
help from the Company. The new India Bill was finally enacted in July of that
year.
Sulivan was involved to the very end: smoothing the way within India
House; ensuring acceptance of the Pitt ministry there; pushing for the
Dundas-Pitt proposals; and afterwards, working tirelessly for acceptance of
the Act within the Company. He could also maintain he had some share in its
original conception; could lay particular claim to the clauses that
strengthened the powers of the Governor-General in Bengal; and to ensuring
that everyone in charge abroad was answerable to the Government in
London.
2
During Hastings’ final years in India, Sulivan knew there were traitors
working against both their interests. He had spoken of his suspicions as early
as June 1781. But it took a long time to discover that John Macpherson and
John Stables, both in Bengal, and James Macpherson in London were their
worst enemies. They had relied upon these men and their associate, John
Stewart.
The old Irishman had even chosen John Macpherson to be Richard
Barwell’s replacement in the Supreme Council; and had then forwarded a
glowing character reference. Hastings too was totally deceived. In the case of
‘Fingal’, Sulivan had always been impressed by his confidential relationship
with North and Robinson. That this connection did not waken danger signals
was probably because of the subsequent support given by both Macphersons
to the Hastings cause. In 1781, he had chosen Stables to fill Francis’ vacancy
in the Supreme Council, thinking he would consolidate the Governor-
General’s position. Unknown to Hastings and himself, he was Robinson’s
man and in league with John Macpherson.
From 1778 the two Scotsmen had played their double-cross with finesse,
maintaining a close relationship with the ministry, pursuing their own ends;
and all the while keeping the face of friendship turned towards Sulivan and
Hastings. It was unknown at first, that Atkinson, ‘Fingal’ and John
Macpherson were all members of the ‘Arcot interest’ and discreetly tied to
Benfield and others at Madras.
Since it was the aim of the ‘Arcot interest’ to line their own pockets, they
wanted cancellation of the assignment of the Carnatic revenues. Atkinson
and the Macphersons were after full settlement of the Nawab’s private debts,
by which they would benefit. What is more, they wanted it done without
investigation into the validity of the amounts. Sulivan shared these
sentiments, not because of the aims of the ‘Arcot interest’ or because of his
own pecuniary difficulties, but rather to buttress Hastings. The Governor-
General had annulled Macartney’s Carnatic assignment in order to have his
authority over Madras recognised; and to fit with his view of affairs from his
seat in Calcutta. Sulivan always backed Hastings.
Doubts about the trustworthiness of ‘Fingal’ began to trouble Sulivan
from October 1781; but he had no proof and could only advise Hastings to
be cautious. Then he more or less negated this advice by expressing his belief
that ‘Fingal’s’ friend John Macpherson was spotless. In 1782 he wallowed in
the thought of how firmly Hastings was being supported by Stables and John
Macpherson, saying things like, ‘Stables has been always yours.’11 Only in
March 1783 did Hastings discover the duplicity of both. Sulivan did not
know until April 1784. In fact, in December 1783 he was still writing ‘My
dear Mac’, quite freely, and was appalled when all was made clear:
Oh my friend, what has availed my labours, my influence? I have

sent snakes to your bosom and have been the dupe of Macpherson
and Stables, they acting under their General here…but you and I
very lately have blown up a deep plan that would have thrown the
patronage of Asia into the hands of 3 persons, couple this with the
history of the Chairs that Scot[t] gives you, and I will be
understood.12
By November 1784, having had time to reflect upon things and gain more
facts, he was able to state (to his son) what he thought had been finally
exposed. Presumably, the plot would have placed ‘the patronage of Asia’ into
the hands of Robinson (the General), Atkinson and John Macpherson. He
was ‘happy for this country that their power was at an end’.13
3
Because of Sulivan’s support for him, in or out of the Direction, Macartney
kept in touch. When, in September 1782 he heard of the ministerial changes
in London, he paid Sulivan a handsome compliment. He was not sure how
the revolutions at national level would affect India affairs, but was sure of
one thing:
whoever took the lead in Leadenhall…will find the task very

difficult and laborious…and will soon greatly regret the want of our
good friend from Queen Square. In truth, I consider him from his
experience and assiduous attention to our affairs, as absolutely

necessary to carry them on.14
At the end of March 1783 his affection was just as strong; and John Sulivan
had informed him: ‘Our old friend in Queen Square would certainly be in the
Chair next April (1783). I fear much that he will not accept it.15 Macartney
hoped Sulivan would continue ‘to lend (his) able hand to calm and
compose…the troubled sea of Indian Affairs.’16
Although at this stage Sulivan was still seen as fair and fresh, Macartney
continued his litany of criticism and condemnation of what was around him.
Hastings was severely censured, repetitively blamed for the Maratha war and
the collapse of Madras. He also maintained, ‘The whole system on the Coast
is wrong. It was well suited to a commercial factory, but now totally
inadequate to the management of your present possessions.’17 He went on to
say that he did not possess sufficient powers to maintain discipline: that he
needed full military authority and the sole power of appointment. No
councillor should have any other employment. There should be only one
army, the King’s or the Company’s, and they must obey the Governor. These
were views strikingly similar to Sulivan’s own.
Macartney continued to counter Hastings by believing that nothing but
immediate peace would save the day. Only this and the policies he suggested
would do. If not, ‘they (the territories) will assuredly slip away from you in a
few years, and your Asiatic Empire will be lost like your American.’18 He
repeated his conviction that the whole future of the Carnatic was based on
the assignment; that all would be anarchy and distress if this was changed.
This Irish Lord then complained once more of Hastings’ antagonism and
spoke of leaving, finishing with the words that he had ‘acted upon great
public principles, as an honest man and a good Englishman’.19
Sulivan was on the receiving end from both Hastings and Macartney. In
the Supreme Council, Macartney’s suspension was called for over alleged ill-
treatment of the Nawab. Hastings was fed up with his sarcasm; opposition to
the policy of keeping the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Marathas apart; and
hostility to the cancellation of the assignment. Macartney would not change
anything, and a stalemate was reached. When in 1784 the Supreme Council
would not oblige the Governor-General, all the issues went to India House
to be resolved; and, as far as Macartney was concerned, to seek redress.
Although he was largely responsible for Macartney becoming Governor of
Madras, Sulivan never deviated in his support for Hastings. The upshot was
that when Macartney realised he would always take Hastings’ side, all
correspondence ceased. Stephen Sulivan received a vivid account of what
then happened in London:
At an interview with his lady, which she earnestly solicited, the

decency and good sense she possesses forsook her. The
expressions she used against Mr. Hastings and me were too
strong for your father to bear and I parted with observing that
when her Ladyship became cool and temperate I might renew my

visit; which is, however, what I never mean. Neither Lord nor
Lady Macartney gave just cause for their behaviour. But I am
warranted in charging him with ingratitude, for he alone knows
what he owes to me.20
He finished by expressing his exasperation, ‘after this detail be you not

surprised that I am still an infidel’.21
4
In 1784 Richard Atkinson wished to cancel the assignment of the Carnatic
Revenues* and liquidate the creditors’ claims. Self-interest lay behind this
proposal. He was the agent for Paul Benfield, the most notorious creditor,
and both were part of the ‘Arcot interest’.* Despite his suspicions, Sulivan
was ready to support Atkinson, on condition that he would publicly join
forces; and that the cancellation of the assignment would be to the benefit of
the Company. This, however, was not in the ‘Arcot Interest’ plans. The
Macphersons, also members of this group, were working hand in glove with
Atkinson. Consequently, John Macpherson, the Nawab’s influential agent, in
collusion with his other creditors, stirred the Prince to deliberately play off
their claims against those of the Company.
Atkinson and Macpherson had already swung over to Pitt the Younger in
national politics; a move at least partly influenced by their interest in ensuring
the assignment was cancelled and the creditors paid. However, for many
reasons Sulivan did not want the creditors claims investigated and paid:
foremost was his suspicion that the Company was to be left out; bad
publicity; and enhanced suspicions that the Board was dancing to the wishes
of Atkinson and others in the ‘Arcot Interest’.
This drove him to influence fellow Directors to object on the grounds
that: ‘whilst the Nawab continues to declare that all his debts are just…to
enquire into the grounds of his debts appears therefore wholly useless.’22 He
wanted the clause cancelling the assignment and liquidating the creditors’
claims excluded from Pitt’s Bill. Nevertheless, the paragraph remained, due
to Pitt’s fear of a Burke and Fox attack.
John Call, of the ‘Arcot interest’, put new pressure on Pitt and Dundas to
validate the creditors’ claims, and pushed for cancellation of the assignment.
However, Nathaniel Smith, the Company Chairman, was now as resolutely
opposed as Sulivan; he disliked the ‘Arcot interest’ and he too wanted
Company claims to come first. He proposed an annulment of the assignment
(that is, declaring it invalid). This secured Sulivan’s support and that of others
uneasy with the ‘Arcot interest’. The Chairman next queried the activities of
Benfield and John Macpherson; and the Madras Government was ordered to
pay only those claims that were obviously legal. Sulivan and all his interest
again supported Chairman Smith’s proposals, and Atkinson was abandoned.
By late October 1784 control of the Direction had fallen into Sulivan’s
hands; Dundas, reported that ‘a determined faction in the India House’ was
operating against the ministry.23 As far as Sulivan was concerned, since an
annulment of the assignment satisfied the Governor-General’s requirements,
then that was enough for him. He felt no qualms about discarding Atkinson,
now known to have been intriguing against him at the April 1784 election. By
then the opposition of the ‘Arcot interest’ to himself and Hastings was also
known; and the deceit of the Macphersons uncovered.
Following the passage of the India Bill, the India Board began studying the
debts.24 Political weight was brought to bear on Dundas and the Board of
Control to settle the creditors’ demands; and Dundas hoped the Directors
would yield to its suggestions. Sulivan, however, seized upon what he saw as
an opportunity (perhaps even contrived at by him) of putting Dundas and
Atkinson in a predicament. He made certain the majority of the Directors
stood firm on a particular point: that the origin of the Consolidated Loan of
1777 was obscure. Dundas had to agree, but skated around everything by
saying the Nawab had recognised all his debts.
The Directors did not reply. There was no need to; Sulivan’s aim had been
achieved, he had brought the matter to the public’s notice. On 28 February
1785 Fox and Burke moved for papers on the Arcot debts; and they
subsequently charged Dundas with malpractice in conducting negotiations
through the ‘Arcot interest’, by using Atkinson.25 By bringing the whole issue
of the Nawab’s debts into the open, the creditors’ wish to secure the money
with no questions asked was foiled; and there was better chance of the
Company being paid, which was Sulivan’s main wish.
5
Macartney’s original action of procuring the assignment of the Carnatic
revenues was annulled in June 1785. He then resigned. At Leadenhall Sulivan
had already taken steps in case the Governor stood down. In December 1784
he had moved for Mr. Hollond to succeed as Governor. Undoubtedly this
was because the choice of Macartney as Hastings’ successor would have
placed him in an impossible situation.
The enmity of the two Governors loomed large. Nor had he forgotten his
own distasteful scene with Macartney’s wife. Yet what bothered him most
was that the contest was to be between Macartney and George Vansittart,
brother of his deceased friend, Henry Vansittart. Sulivan did not vote; the
Directors split, 10:10, and the issue was decided by drawing a ball. Macartney
was the lucky one. He, meanwhile, had gone to Calcutta, and it was there that
he was offered the post of Governor-General. Hastings had already left for
home.
In a letter of explanation to Macartney in March 1785, Sulivan tried,
ineffectually, to justify why he did not vote for him. He maintained that he
had been given the impression that all intercourse was at an end. He added
that since his own ‘conduct…has been seemingly hostile’, he would explain
things and also put a stop to the lies of his enemies. He then accused
Macartney, among other things of reducing the Nawab to a mere cipher; and
not taking care of captives left in Tipu’s hands. He listed the prejudices and
opposition he had stirred in India.26
Despite these criticisms, he concluded, if Macartney should accept the
position of Governor-General, he could expect his full support. But this
would be done only ‘in all instances where your conduct shall (in my own
judgement) coincide with the Company’s and the National interest.’27 But
Macartney declined to become the next Governor-General of India, because
he wanted and was refused, absolute control over the army.28
6
In 1782, through his father’s exertions, and aided and abetted by Hastings,
Stephen was nominated for one of two vacancies in the Supreme Council at
Calcutta. The choice of Charles Stuart and Sulivan’s son caused ripples in the
Company.29 George Cuming, of the shipping interest, charged that Sulivan
had gone too far; and that he was turning senile. Stephen had maintained that
by getting him a seat in the Supreme Council his father would unite ‘Power
with Profit’. If not, he would have the ‘mortification to find that the
Chairman of the East India Company has not carried the seat…for his only
son’. He warned also that ‘if a Minister should prevent it’ he would return to
England.30
In a postscript to this letter, he scribbled that he had just learned of his
appointment, and gushed: ‘I scruple not therefore, to thank you a thousand
and a thousand times.’ He was also placed upon the ‘supernumerary service’
list, which pleased Sulivan because he could be accumulating money without
the ties of office. It was a letter that carried even greater news, his wife
expected their child to be born around the middle of December 1782.31
A hint that Stephen might become Hastings’ agent did not materialize.
Nevertheless, the emoluments already granted considerably fattened his
official annual salary of 2,000 rupees (approximately £200). Stephen was also
given the agency for supplying the Royal fleet in India, then under command
of Admiral Sir Edward Hughes. The Admiral helped because of friendship
with Robert Palk. By 1784, however, Sulivan senior was concerned, because
by virtue of this contract, Admiral Hughes was cut off from his own
emoluments; and in order to gain the agency for himself had landed Stephen
in trouble with naval superiors. Sulivan pleaded with Hastings to shield his
son.
It was not until 1782 that Stephen was in a position to remit money home.
Some funds arrived via a scaled down version of Sulivan’s consortium idea.
Friends like Pechell, Caillaud and Motteux used this conglomerate to receive
remittances. Stephen, John Sulivan and his brother Henry Boyle Sulivan,
together with John Cox-Hippisley used this channel. In India everything was
controlled by John Sulivan. In London, Sulivan was then able to free his son
from ‘every other person to whom you stand indebted.’32
Stephen had disappointments to face as well as successes. He was

prevented from gaining two posts in Oudh: that of Paymaster, the other a
‘Commissarship’. His letters began to reflect weariness with India, and a
longing to resume the life his father had prepared him for. Remitting money
proved difficult, despite his father’s alternate channels; but it was absolutely
vital that he persevere. Sulivan wanted his son home, but not until he had put
together a moderate fortune.
Early in 1784 Sulivan was ‘still distressed for shirts’, that is, short of cash.
He could not even use two Lottery tickets that had brought a prize of £20
each. Stephen’s Bengal bills, worth £16,900, were unobtainable, because the
Company was paying them out only optionally over three years. By 1784 the
situation had turned even worse, if that was possible. It was doubly
frustrating because he could not touch a fund now standing at £26,000.
However, by December 1784 ‘young Thomas Lane’ had been repaid; and
Stephen had remitted sufficient funds to satisfy Mr. Jeckyll and some others.
Some outstanding debts due to his son were difficult to recover, such as the
one owed by a Mr. Livins.33
Until 1784 the Sulivan family had lived in a state very close to penury.
Disaster was averted, but only because of the kindness of friends. From the
moment Stephen arrived upon Indian soil, he was urged to remit money
home. Sulivan called upon all his own channels for this, as well as those
provided by others. John Sulivan in particular, made strenuous efforts on his
namesake’s behalf.
Sulivan came up with the novel idea of having funds remitted through the
‘new’ trade in raw silk that he had been encouraging. Yet another route was
via Navy and Victualling bills from one or all of the Presidencies. A word of
warning was added: ‘you should find out some (certainly safe)
channel…because the Company will hardly be able, for some years to come,
to pay their Bills but at long credit’.34
If the note of June 1786 entitled: ‘Debts of Laurence Sulivan undischarged
at the time of his death’ is used as a yardstick, then he failed to remedy the
disaster that began in 1769. He still owed £23,000: £6,000 to Vansittart’s
estate; £4,000 to Palk; £7,000 to Hastings; and £6,000 to John Sulivan.
Stephen later added a few lines to this note: ‘John Sulivan made it easier to
pay by accepting what he was due from the paper...in India.’ Vansittart’s
estate was repaid in £1,000 instalments.35
However, this gives a wrong image; it does not tell what Sulivan had really
done. The father had not left his son hopelessly encumbered. He had
procured offices for Stephen by which the Sulivan fortunes were revived
before his death. As early as 1784 enough to clear all debts were en route
from India. He had located channels for remittance of these funds; and it was
only a matter of time before the transfers were completed. In many respects
too, it suited the Sulivans to owe this money in England while their security
for it remained in India.
The complications involved in securing a great deal of Sulivan’s own
money in India is exemplified by a bond for 37,000 pagodas (worth about
£15,000) which the Nawab of Arcot granted in February 1785 to John

Stewart, in trust for him. The whole issue cropped up in Parliament in May
1806.36
In his address to the Commons John Sulivan said: ‘The bond to Mr. Stuart
(John Stewart) in trust for Mr. Sulivan…is dated 5 February 1785. Mr.
Sulivan was informed of this transaction in the summer of 1785.’ Sulivan
asked to have the bond cancelled because, although honourable and above
board, he was a public figure, which made it open to misconstruction.
Following Sulivan’s death in February 1786 Stephen (who inherited the
bond) found that his father’s assets did not equal his liabilities and was
obliged to use it to settle with his creditors. It was eventually examined in
1788 at Madras, admitted to be just, and was to be paid with interest accruing
from February 1785.37
Before he died, Sulivan had secured everything of importance to himself
and his son; meaning that Ponsborne estate and the house in Hanover
Square, were safe. In February 1785 he held sufficient India stock to retain
qualification as a Director. £4,000 cash became Stephen’s on 2 May 1786, by
virtue of his father’s Administration. Stephen also inherited potentially
lucrative land holdings in Prince Edward Island. There were five lots, each lot
amounting to 20,000 acres; all were in part payment of the debts owed him
by Lauchlin Macleane.38 Sulivan had won back for himself and his family the
independence and self-respect they craved.
18
Endings
1784-86
I n June 1784 Atkinson supposed Sulivan would never again be allowed to

take the lead in the Company. He gauged that his attitude towards Pitt, to
Dundas and to himself would remain forever hostile and this would exclude
him. Sulivan had a somewhat different view, he saw no great obstacles in his
way to the Chair in April 1785 and if his health held good, meant to take it.
He was helped by the Commutation Act of August 1784, which brought
down the duty on tea, made an impact upon tea smuggling and established a
monopoly of its importation by the Company. This increased sales and thus
the demand for tonnage. The ‘Old’ shippers, many of them already his
friends, who knew of his involvement were very pleased and assured him of
their support. They could quickly produce the necessary ships, unlike the
‘New’ shippers.
By January 1785 Atkinson had changed his views. In a remarkable
assessment, expressed in two letters to Dundas, he concluded that there was
little hope of reducing Sulivan’s power in the Direction. He even suggested
that his Chairmanship might be the best choice open to Government in
order to proceed with further reforms. He knew that Sulivan shared this
desire. Ministerial support, he argued, would be a means of keeping some
control over him. Before the April 1785 election, however, the ministry had
managed to woo Devaynes with the promise of backing for his re-election to
the Chair.
As late as March 1785, Sulivan toyed with the idea of taking the post
himself. The need to support his son and kinsmen drove him on; and
Hastings’ return from India was imminent. He wanted the best deal for his
friend so shrugged off his own advanced years and Pitt’s constant veto. He
was still a force to be reckoned with.
ENDINGS 1784-86 267
He was up against stiff ministerial opposition, however. Dundas had

worked to deprive the Company of its remaining powers and to establish
himself as the supreme authority. Atkinson, on the other hand, was
concerned with reform and with his ‘Arcot interest’. He was convinced
restructuring could only be achieved with Sulivan’s help. To succeed, he saw
that either Parliament appointed the monopoly’s leaders, in so doing taking
power from Sulivan, or Pitt, Dundas and Sulivan would have to come to
terms.
Pitt refused point-blank to entertain the latter course of action and
prevented Atkinson from making a bargain with Sulivan. Dundas preferred
to think he could gain control at the 1785 election. Not to be deterred,
Atkinson pressed ahead and he and Sulivan struck a private deal. Sulivan
promised to join with ministerial intentions if his friends Darell, Townson
and Major John Scott were supported. Pitt and Dundas refused to
contemplate this. Accordingly, although at the election Sulivan was not
selected for the Deputy Chair, and Dundas gained control over the new
Chairman Devaynes and his Deputy, Smith, Sulivan and his interest
commanded the Direction.
Atkinson had correctly foreseen there would be total frustration of
ministerial desires, no matter how it acted. Gone now were sarcastic terms
like ‘dotage’, ‘veteran’ and ‘senility’ to describe this able man. In his second
(extraordinarily objective) scrutiny, shortly before his own unexpected death
in May 1785, he measured the other members of the Direction against him,
testing ability and skill in building relationships against the old Irishman. He
was filled with reluctant admiration as his analyses revealed the quicksilver
mind and political adroitness of his adversary.
Since the Pitt ministry’s inception in December 1783, while still
maintaining a defensive shield, Sulivan had sought the best terms for
Hastings should he be forced to return. Everything was so unresolved and
uncertain throughout January and February 1784 he could not say whether
the Company would continue or not. To Hastings he said ruefully, it all
depended upon, ‘A Pitt or a Fox...Poor old England.’1
By March 1784, however, he was fairly certain his friend was safe; and in
April urged him to stay another year, because Pitt’s Act would only be
effective after supplementary legislation in 1786. Then, sometime before July
1784, after the Act was passed, he changed his views again. He sensed further
danger stemming from the Pitt ministry. In September he nominated Edward
Wheler to succeed Hastings; but this was not acceptable to others in the
Company or to the Board of Control where Dundas favoured Macartney.
After he refused the post, Pitt, not the Company, then appealed successfully
to Cornwallis.
Sulivan had to be satisfied with securing a sound financial settlement for
the outgoing Governor-General, and proposed that he should have ‘10 lakhs
quartered upon Clive’s jaghire’.2 At first there was little objection to this,
although no honours would be entertained. By October, however, he was
aware of new hostility; and within the Direction he had a struggle to even get
a vote of thanks for Hastings.
He continued his opposition to the Board of Control’s plans for the
Nawab of Arcot’s debts; but in November, while these were being discussed,
the ministry’s coolness to him and the askance view it took of Hastings were
made public.3 The unfriendliness stemmed from Dundas in particular. He
began to criticise the power of the Directors over appointments to the
various governments in India; and manoeuvred to place this solely with the
Board. He also continued to work for Hastings’ speedy removal. Sulivan
replied in kind, such as by proposing John Hollond as successor to
Macartney, in opposition to Dundas’ favourite, General Sir Archibald
Campbell. He also called for Hastings to be continued for a year after his
successor had been appointed. Dundas, of course, objected to both
suggestions.
Alas, despite all Sulivan’s manoeuvres, the critical moment had arrived,
marking the end of the Company executive’s prerogative of making
appointments. Transfer of power was taking place, despite his best efforts to
the contrary, and the Board of Control had in effect become the supreme
decision-making authority. Sulivan’s guardianship of the Company’s
chartered rights was nearly at an end. After a long rearguard defence, power
had finally slipped away to Westminster.
His protection of Hastings was very nearly ended too. He urged his
friend’s speedy return; his wife Marion was already home. Hastings resigned
and left Calcutta in February, arriving in June 1785, never ever having
contemplated (as has been suggested) an American style ‘Declaration of
Independence’ from the Company or from the British Government. In
London he was feted and thanked by the Directors for his work in India. It is
not difficult to see Sulivan’s hand here as well.
After his return Hastings understood better all that Sulivan had done for
him, and never forgot his benefactor. Sulivan’s portrait was to hang in a place
of honour in Daylesford House. The ties remained strong: in 1795, nine years
after his father had passed away, Stephen Sulivan was at Hastings’ post-
impeachment victory dinner.
The Governor-General’s return also marked the end of a decade and a half
of Sulivan-Hastings correspondence. It is an extraordinary testimony to their
coalition; and forms one of the clearest and most continuous discussions
upon Indian affairs and associated topics from 1770 to 1786. Sulivan’s
observations show understanding and acute analysis of ongoing changes in
his own environment. He had unique insight, perceiving the real springs of
action when hidden from most. This reached as far as India. These private
letters dealt with much of public life. Sulivan toyed with the idea of turning
his own epistles into a diary; then changed his mind, believing that this would
try his time and Hastings’ patience.
He was probably right, but posterity owes a large debt to both. Probably
inescapably, it has been the Hastings end of the correspondence that has
been dwelt upon by writers without number. It seems incredible that
ENDINGS 1784-86 269
Sulivan’s contribution has been so overlooked. Surely it must have struck

someone that he had been writing to a useful and probably extraordinary
man if he continued such a long conversation with him.
Without this alliance the Governor-General could not have remained in
office. In every sense he owed his public career and its continuance to his
friend in India House. Sulivan’s support was sustained for a variety of
reasons, some altruistic, some not. Partly it was because Hastings was so able,
thus about natural justice. At the same time his protégé served as a channel
for his own ideas, even if only indirectly applied. He also hoped the powerful
Governor-General would be stimulated by his faithful support, to help him
and his son. Last but not least, Hastings was his personal choice, and that
was always important to Laurence Sulivan.
2
Sulivan took things a bit easier following the April 1785 election. He still had
a year to run in the Direction; and the firm support he enjoyed among his
fellow Directors was vouchsafed far beyond his exit by rotation the next
April. There was also renewed respect for him as a politician and fighter.
Throughout 1785 he remained in command of his ‘troops’, but made little
effort to lay the foundations for future political management. This is readily
explained by the return of Hastings, by his age and the fact that the future
welfare of Stephen, his wife and the precious baby grandson, Laurence, was
assured.
He divined the direction of Dundas’ further expansionist ideas at the
Board of Control; and his ready presence was a deterrent to any over-zealous
activity. He remained a barrier, an object of dislike and irritation to both the
Pitt Government and to its opponents in Parliament, like Edmund Burke.
This formidable foe said: ‘I know hardly any of the Directors except enemies,
by sight, the enemy (he referred to Sulivan of course) I know very well.’4
Not unnaturally, chartered rights, defence of Hastings, retrieval of his
financial independence through Stephen, and furtherance of the careers of
his immediate kinsmen had occupied most of Sulivan’s thoughts. However,
he had spent time and effort in bringing his plans to fruition, many of which
had been germinating for a long time
He also perceived that it could only be through ideas apparently
formulated within, and emanating from the Company (and not seen as his
alone) that any of the reforms he held precious had a hope of being realised.
They would then have to be channelled upwards into ministerial hands. It
was fortunate that Dundas directed a favourable eye on most suggestions,
though not on Sulivan himself. It was doubly fortunate that Sulivan was able
to ensure that Atkinson (before his death) and Dundas understood his
proposals. The shrewd campaigner knew the future lay with the Board of
Control but hoped to influence the shape of things to come.
His blueprints dealt with the future nature and purpose of the Company’s
Committees; and the way patronage was to be organised at home and abroad.
His ideas were laid before the Directors in March 1785. A letter from
Atkinson to Dundas on 31 January makes it evident that Sulivan had
previously aired them with that writer, and he in turn with Dundas. Before
his own death in May, Atkinson had gained Dundas’ support for these
reforms.
Sulivan recommended that the system be simplified by regrouping the
existing twelve committees into three divisions: political, military and
commercial. Corresponding groups of committees were to come into
existence at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. He also pointed out there had
been no change in the Company's rules since 1707, which had led to a lack of
accurate accounting and only a ‘conjectural estimate’. Although brilliantly
conceived, his scheme was doomed to failure because of the patronage
factors involved.
He made yet a further attempt to achieve the improvements sought. This
was based on a scheme brought forward by the Chairman, Nathaniel Smith,
though clearly owing its existence to Sulivan’s prototype. In this, the twelve
Committees were to be grouped into three classes. Sulivan proposed that the
Committees of Correspondence and Warehouses should be the most
important. The first of these was to confine itself to political matters and
have nothing to do with commerce; that would be handled by the Committee
of Warehouses.5 Eventually, the Direction (with Dundas’ blessing) allowed
the plans to be promoted in India, as Sulivan had suggested; and division into
Boards went ahead there.
These plans, dealing with the Company's organisation, began to be
overlapped by his earlier ones. Meanwhile, the Directors faced the problem
of Company debts abroad now amounting to £8 million, which had to be
funded. Sulivan’s proposal was one among many put forward for establishing
credit in India.6 In June 1785 Dundas accepted Sulivan’s figures; and agreed
with his argument that the charges in India should be transferred to London
and formed into a permanent debt at a fixed interest.
Dundas’ plan followed in September 1785, based on those of Sulivan and
his fellow Directors; and in turn was accepted by the Company’s Secret
Committee (which included Sulivan). Sulivan replied to heated opposition
within the Company by affirming that his own ideas, and those of the Secret
Committee, were almost exactly the ones being promulgated by Dundas. In
his rebuttal, he fumed that the very poverty of understanding shown, in itself
emphasised what was needed; and that their feeble views only strengthened
his views.
In October 1785 he opposed Dundas’ proposal to allow the French East
India Company to trade once more in India. In this he was ably helped by
Hastings. Both feared French political and military encroachment. Hastings
continued to oppose Dundas on this issue after Sulivan was gone; but the
minister became too powerful and a commercial treaty with France was
eventually established.
ENDINGS 1784-86 271
3
The last duty Sulivan embarked upon was Hastings’ defence against possible
Impeachment. Sulivan’s words to his friend in 1778 had been prophetic:
‘Pray bring home every material that may be of future use to justify your
public conduct (for that day must certainly come) in support of your own
honour and condemnation of your enemies.’7
He worked alongside Hastings, after his arrival, creating a shield against
the looming attack by Francis and Burke. If he had lived, Sulivan’s defence
would have stated the charges were motivated by rank hatred, not principle.
The arraignment gives all the appearance of a deliberate act of savagery. This
is how a great number of contemporaries saw it. Half the kingdom, as
Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor put it, considered Burke little better than ‘an
ingenious madman’. In an epigram the poet Robert Burns exhibited how far
and wide such revulsion had spread: ‘Oft I have wonder’d that on Irish
ground/No poisonous Reptile ever has been found:/Revealed the secret
stands of great Nature’s work:/She preserved her poison to create a Burke!’8
The great orator’s earlier attack on Sulivan through the Select Committee
was only the precursor. That interrogation too was personal and vindictive;
but Sulivan only played a John the Baptist to the role Hastings was to fill. He
was to be struck down. Frustration and pent-up malice, made worse by
Sulivan’s scorn, seem to have unbalanced him. Hastings was to be the
ultimate victim and the sublime gratification.
Glorification of it all in the spectacle at Westminster Hall spells this out. It
was never about ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, other than that perpetrated by
Edmund Burke from the safety of the Commons. The Impeachment of
Hastings was a premeditated act of revenge. The Clive-Sulivan struggles of
1758 to 1774; the Hastings-Francis feud in Calcutta of 1773 to 1780; and the
Burke family’s frustration and rage at Sulivan were transferred to Burke and
Francis to prosecute. The Governor-General was viewed as incorporating all
the ‘sins’ of his mentor Sulivan.
In his attack on Hastings, Burke was assailing the man who symbolised all
he detested about the Company, which in turn was the symbol of all the
injustices he saw in so many spheres of life, but couldn’t touch. It is summed
up in his wonderful, though cruel imagery. Hastings was: ‘An Indian Rajah
with a white face – the most terrible animal in God’s creation’, representing
avarice and untrammelled power.9
Burke began his attack in the Commons on 17 February 1786, launched
with appalling viciousness, excess of language and invective. Its enormity at
once thrusts the reader’s sympathies towards Hastings. Two days later, on 19
February, and just two days before his death, Sulivan called at Hastings’
home to discuss the issues involved. It was a duty that he was more than
willing to perform; and followed on from those he had cheerfully shouldered
for the previous twelve years.
After the Governor-General was found not guilty, Burke reflected that the
trial and its result had been the ‘glory and the shame’ of his public life. Rather
than Burke’s meaning that it was appalling Hastings had been acquitted,
generations have dwelt more on the shame that attaches to the whole
Impeachment; one that might be seen to have besmirched Burke’s own
glorious career.
4
There seemed nothing unusual about Sulivan’s physical condition during
what proved to be his final months. The general pattern had remained the
same for some time. It merely suggested that old age was encroaching with
its customary aches and pains.10 The fact that before the end of 1783 he and
Hastings had finally beaten the opposition, both in India and in London, had
cheered him. This is reflected in his tribute that year: ‘my feeble abilities have
been constantly, and ever shall be, exerted with unremitting zeal in support
of the highest character that ever shewed in India. You must bear this from
me because I am too honest and too old to commence a flatterer.’11
His health had fluctuated from that point: he was much better from
August 1783 to February 1784, then the cold weather took its toll; however,
by November he was in fine spirits again and strong enough to produce ‘a
veritable book’ for his son.12 He let him know that ‘with a wonderful share of
health (for which I cannot be sufficiently thankful) I have been very active in
this Direction’.13 Yet, he did admit, ‘the winters begin to shake me and I must
study warmth. In my former letters, I desired you would send me some shawl
wastecoats…and pray add a shawl night-gown if procurable.’14 While the
birth of his grandson had cheered him enormously, the actual sight of the
child in the summer of 1785, not to mention the safe arrival of Stephen and
his wife, was an occasion of great joy. He was surrounded by those closest to
him.
When death came, it was quick and without prior indication that
something was seriously wrong. In his diary Hastings provides probably the
most appropriate record of his passing. They were in constant contact, either
at his home or at Sulivan’s, where they attended each other on alternate days.
They supped together, and scrutinized whatever intelligence was to hand.
Tactics and strategy were organised, opinions exchanged and letters studied.
On 11 December 1785 he wrote to Sulivan from Bath; and soon after
arriving back in town they were again deep in discussion. On 19 February
1786, a Sunday, he called at Sulivan’s house ‘by appointment’ to ‘talk on the
first enquiry’ into his affairs.15 At midnight on Monday he scribbled in his
diary, ‘Mr. Sulivan seized with a disorder in his bowels’. On Tuesday 21
February he ‘Called at Mrs. H. and Mr. Sulivan’s. Not admitted – Evening at
the opera. The Sulivans called there to give me the afflicting news of Mr.
Sulivan’s death. It happened at 4, suddenly and without pain.’16
On the day Sulivan died, out of respect, the Directors postponed the
appointment of a Governor-General to fill Hastings' place. The papers
carried the news all week.17 His passing had significant political repercussions.
A man of first class abilities and drive, active until the last, was now gone.
ENDINGS 1784-86 273
His party disintegrated because it had no bond or union after his passing.
Over the years he had provided leadership and backbone.
In the Morning Chronicle and Advertiser for Friday 24 February there was a
letter from a John Travers who intended to fill the vacancy in the Direction.
He was unsuccessful and Sulivan’s place was taken by Abraham Roberts.
Major John Scott broadcast that but for the forthcoming impeachment, he
would have asked Sulivan’s friends to vote for him. It would have been a
poor substitution.
The burial was on Monday 27 February at the church of St. George the
Martyr, Queen Square, where he was interred beside his wife. Hastings
commented, ‘Continued heavy snow. Called on Sir Robert Palk at 1 and went
with him to Mr. Sulivan’s funeral. Returned after 3.’18 John Caillaud penned a
fine tribute, addressed to Stephen Sulivan:
Were I to give way to all my heart dictates, I could dwell long on

the great abilities and many virtues which composed the
character of your much respected father. To these the voice of
the public, which he so long, eminently and faithfully served, will
do justice. And the pen of some more able friend record, and
transmit them to posterity. But of those among the many he left
behind, none was more warmly attached to him, more grateful
for his kindness. Nor any who honoured and loved him more
while living. Nor can more bewail his loss, or feel for yours
than...John Caillaud.19
5
Laurence Sulivan was consumed with a never-ending desire to be known and
accepted as the undisputed leader of the East India Company. He was ever
ready to protect this goal. Along with this, he always wanted to be one of that
powerful coterie found in the innermost sanctums, making major decisions
affecting public life. His career, the power-play, everything was geared to
these objectives.
This led to a form of obsession with authority and command. For a time,
when in full control, debasing symptoms accompanied this, and an
overweening vanity. However, the terrible financial losses he suffered can be
said to have returned him to a degree of humility; and there was always some
restraint. He was conscious too of a ‘general good’ that had to be supported.
This said, he never trusted anyone with authority over him.
His special abilities were perfectly suited to an organisation like the East
India Company, because the mixture of commerce, money and politics at its
core were the fields in which he excelled. It became imperative to him that he
operate there, after having learned the ropes in Bombay. He was a living,
talking authority on the Company. In this he found contentment.
The fights and feuds arose when these ambitions were tampered with;
when attempts were made to oust him, or even just denigrate his managerial
abilities and exploits. It marked the quarrel with Clive; and underlay the long
losing struggle against ministerial interference and Parliamentary
encroachment. It was to the fore in later years and especially in the clashes
with Edmund Burke.
He had the amazing ability to handle a multiplicity of interactions
simultaneously, and deal competently with all of them: home life; private
business; affairs at India House and abroad; and Parliamentary relations. He
was a truly clever man and invariably managed to uncover what lay behind
the manoeuvres of others. His son Stephen referred to his great persistence.
He marvelled at his ‘indefatigable perusal of the records’, and ability to scour
through endless material in order to ‘sift things through to the bottom’.20
He would never face losing the respect of family and friends; and he
seldom gave the game away. Playing card imagery was constantly used in his
correspondence, and perhaps this echoed his nature. He had good manners
and even in the worst situation never lost his comportment. This politeness
endorsed a genuinely benevolent but determined temperament. His
disposition was tempered by the needs of someone who led such a public life
to always appear gracious and courteous.
His public reputation was very important, which his opponents
understood and did their best to destroy by slander and belittling him. It was
part and parcel of the political ‘game’. They wanted him out and so he was
described in as many demeaning terms as could be conjured up. Friends said
he was quicksilver in thought and speedy of action; prompt with a response;
and capable of rapid summaries and assessments. He was also described
candidly by them as emotional, a gambler, and someone who made a virtue
out of honesty.
Although opinionated, often biased and able to nurse a grudge for a long
time, he seldom displayed real ferocity towards adversaries. This absence of
viciousness was most obvious in his struggle with Clive. Sulivan’s general
absence of gut-hatred appears the more striking when he did express severe
dislike, such as for Edmund Burke. His friends pointed to his positive
qualities: proud, courageous and defiant; an astute, unflagging realist; the sort
of man who, in private or in public, searched, probed and thoroughly tested
all alternatives before making a decision. They applauded him as a wonderful
raconteur; someone with a warm human nature, who was vigorous and alive.
The utmost personal satisfaction, even exultation, came with command.
Only in exercising himself in this manner did life become full. He wanted to
be considered indispensable. From 1757 to 1786 he was ever-present,
whether a Proprietor, occupying a Chair, or sitting as a Director; and it was
seldom he was not on the main committees. He was almost never off the
Committee of Secrecy. It must have seemed to contemporaries that he was
always there, at the very centre of all that was going on.
What emerges is that for some thirty years he was the Company’s brain
and the driving force within the executive; operating at a time when (despite
itself) the Company was forming the nucleus of an empire. The times
demanded a greater degree of managerial dexterity than was ever needed
ENDINGS 1784-86 275
before; and Sulivan fitted the bill. He provided the dynamic energy required
during these momentous years. The roots of this dynamism can be traced to
the years spent in Bombay; or perhaps to dark events in his native Ireland.
However, Sulivan remains a man of mystery in this respect.
Throughout the whole era of his pre-eminence in the Company, he was
more occupied with the task of preserving its credibility than he was with any
other issue. Determined efforts to balance the books were major features of
his career. In his efforts to reform the organisation, he was faced with
ignorance among colleagues and national figures alike. Nevertheless, he never
gave up. It was part and parcel of saving his precious Company.
The evidence is overwhelming that most of his plans, reviews and
abstracts can be accepted as sound, some were exceptional. Many of his ideas
were turned down, sometimes justifiably because they were unworkable.
Others were implemented successfully by himself when he had the power, or
by his protégés. Latterly they were used by Jenkinson, Robinson, Atkinson,
Dundas and Pitt the Younger. His account of things can be accepted too.21
Throughout his career his soul belonged to nobody; and he was certainly
never controlled by any minister or Parliamentarian. It was his independence
that Chatham, Shelburne, North, Burke and others did not like. What also
made him so unusual and effective was his ability to persuade and mollify
many different interest groups and yet maintain clear profit goals and pro-
business objectives. He succeeded in grafting together politics and
commerce.
He fought for the Company’s existence, and nullified the efforts of any
European power to get rid of it. He thwarted the endeavours of Indian
Princes to scupper the organisation and expel the British from the
subcontinent. Strict control through a strong official, following policies,
objectives and methods initiated at India House was his favoured approach.
He tried to impose his will upon those he picked to govern. This was quite
legitimate in his eyes, and he relied on them to mark the boundaries if they
felt he was interloping.
Sulivan was a leader, an astute and persuasive man; throughout his career
he personified ability, hard work and drive. Yet despite all this, his position
was founded upon the patronage he controlled. It was this that produced the
authority that was recognised and understood all over the globe. Great
influence and pre-eminence went together; and the process was self-
perpetuating because his favours were the means by which he ensured his
continued support.
Thus he found positions for friends, fellow Directors, Proprietors,
ministers in office and various MPs, even some landed gentry. Important
figures who could respond in kind were provided for; or anyone who could
help (or hurt) him. Nepotism was rampant, and he was no different from
others. He was forever being harassed to give lines of introduction, and
always the degree of favour depended upon intimacy and importance, as
measured by him. In 1773 he summed it up in a letter to Hastings:
Many are the recommendations I am obliged to trouble you with.

India voters expect it of me or they are affronted. Therefore,
these must be understood to extend to common civilities only, by
no means to burden you. And when I wish to solicit particular
favours, such will always be mentioned in my private letters.22
From a notional list of Sulivan’s patronage recommendations from 1757 to

1786, culled from numerous sources, the following emerges: At the very
least, he patronised around 200 people, though there might have been double
that number. Of these, five were women. Between 1757 and 1765 some 40
odd were provided with posts; from 1769 to 1777 the figure was between 80
and 90. In the years 1778 to 1786 this fell to around 50.
120 of those identified were civil servants; 23 were military; 12 nautical. Six
favoured were judges or lawyers. The numbers also included an artist, an
engineer, a surgeon and a labourer. 54, but almost certainly more, were
suggested to Hastings as worthy of help. A minimum of 18 Scots asked for
special treatment for friends and relations; 37 were endorsed, and probably
more. The Irish enjoyed patronage from their fellow-countryman as well – at
least 12 were helped to posts. Some individuals were approved for office
several times. Yet despite being the possessor of such enormous largesse,
Sulivan always claimed that his hands were clean:
Such has been my conduct…without fee or reward, resisting all

temptation and some very extraordinary, one in particular of a
lady offering me her person, a seat in Parliament and £10,000 for
a capital Government for her son. Many other bribes of equal
magnitude, but in no instance of my life can a single blot stain
my character.23
Defence of the Company’s chartered rights was never far from his thoughts;
he was dedicated to preserving its independence and monopoly. That is why
he baulked at the thought of such a commerce-based institution being
transmuted into a territorial and imperial power – he foresaw danger. After
Plassey he could not put the clock back, yet until 1765 at least, was able to
keep the Company from becoming totally burdened by territorial
responsibilities and the costs entailed.
The new aspirations led, as he saw clearly, to complicated questions. Could
the Company manage the territorial, financial, judicial and political
responsibilities that accompanied such a role? Would recognition and
toleration of cultural and other differences be maintained? He did not think
so. Most crucial of all, in the blink of an eye, Parliament was questioning the
Company’s right to its subordinate powers; and in 1766-67, then later,
Government intervention could not be countered by argument based on
chartered right. There was none, as Sulivan knew.
After the Regulating Act of 1773 he envisaged the Company’s continued
existence as utterly reliant upon the power of the Governors in each
ENDINGS 1784-86 277
Presidency and upon the Governor-General in particular. By that date he had

also accepted that commercial priorities had to give way to territorial ones;
and recognised the suzerainty of the state. The new breed of administrators
working for ministers also ensured that the awkward features of the
Company’s hierarchical system were avoided as much as possible.
By the third quarter of the century, a general feeling had spread in Britain
that it was not proper that a private concern should monopolise all that India
had now come to represent; it was much more than a trading matter.
Alterations to the Company’s set-up were required to deal with a changed
situation; and such reform could only be imposed from outwith its confines.
The loss of the American colonies deepened the general anxiety, with fears
of similar losses in the east; thus the Company’s affairs and the
administration of its settlements were no longer viewed as being its own
business. Nor was the old mercantilist system, followed so faithfully by
Sulivan, regarded as sustainable. Surely, it was argued, the spiralling,
seemingly uncontrollable chain of events in India was proof of this.
A mark of his contribution, however, was that long after his death the
Company survived with many of its commercial features intact. To some
extent the flag continued to follow the dictates of commerce.24 The
organisation still exhibited many of the original trading characteristics,
especially those of barter with other peoples on a fair and level surface. What
he had done was to combine and enshrine a ‘rigorous tradition of
administrative accountancy’ and ‘an ideology of transcendent law and
sovereignty’.25
However, continual and increasing military expense called for fresh
demands that could not be paid out of strictly commercial profit. He
recognised this in 1761 with regard to the Carnatic. The double-edged nature
of Hastings’ military campaign did not help either; but on the whole, the
acquisition of more territory was largely resisted until the 1780s. Repeated
demands thereafter, backed by force, destroyed the balance in India. What
followed his demise was the principle of 'trusteeship' for Indians and their
lands. It was to replace the limited sovereignty and strict trading principles so
sacred to him; and seemed to accompany the shift from trade to tax
collection.
Through no fault of their own, indigenous peoples were adjudged to have
become increasingly dependent upon the British. It was a development with
an inbuilt disposition towards racial superiority that Sulivan would have
recoiled from. He never would impose British manners upon the Indian
peoples. He had a great and lasting interest in the culture of the subcontinent;
and was not responsible for the racial discrimination that developed with the
later British Empire.
He partly determined the nature and course of the British domain in India
for something like half a century; and it remained largely non-racist for many
years after his death. This more harmonious form of co-existence, and the
‘benevolent despotism’ form of rule using Governor-Generals was favoured
by the British Government until 1815. Both threads can be traced back to
Sulivan.26
It might be argued that in his attitude, as in nearly all else, it was his wife’s
moral rectitude that directed Sulivan. After all, it was she who pushed him
initially towards what was a careful, domesticated and sober life. Perhaps
much of the caution he exhibited in Company business was deliberately
fostered and encouraged by her. All indications are that his personal
inclinations were towards a more riotous form of existence.
The course of his life reflected a belief in material progress; and he worked
for this in the world he knew. The pursuit of happiness was for him
encapsulated in the East India Company, but he was intrigued with the
condition of his fellows, and with their hopes and aspirations. But as he came
more and more into contact with greed, envy and deceit, he was increasingly
sickened. The irony was that he could not live without human contact.
In some ways he possessed a different kind of honesty or set of values
from most contemporaries, in or out of service. His integrity was portrayed
through a sort of fearlessness and astuteness. While most thought that
Company and native alike were fair game, he would have none of it. Some
forms of commercial advantage he agreed with – but not at the expense of
decency. He would admit to no stain on his record.
When, as here, focus is placed upon the endeavours of the merchant
executives to make the Honourable Company work, Sulivan stands out. He
was the central figure in all that happened during what were probably the
most eventful and dangerous years in its history. Without his contribution at
critical junctures, it might possibly have fractured and fallen apart, or been
vanquished at home and in the east. With no Indian settlements it is doubtful
if there would have been a second British Empire; one expanded by
preservation of the routes there, and the accumulation of territories on the
way.
There is no doubt either that Sulivan was aware of his astonishing role;
indeed at first he seemed content to luxuriate in the knowledge; but after
having suffered the ‘slings and arrows’ of life he portrayed things differently.
He depicted himself having traversed the classic route from saviour to
sacrifice and latterly martyrdom – all for his treasured Company. Before his
death, however, he seems to have reached a plateau of contentment;
probably because the future of his family was secured, his service to Hastings
and the Company ended.
Two mysteries still cling to Sulivan. One is that apart from some
connection with Benjamin Sulivan of Cork and the Irwin family, his origins
remain unknown. He never made any reference to either his father or
mother. Even the names of his children broke with tradition. Nothing in
writing was allowed to come down through the ages.
The final intriguing question is whether before his death he realised some
form of personal fulfilment, his own epiphany. In a life that was so full and
varied, beset by conflicts and vengeful interludes, it is very possible that
satisfaction eluded him. On the other hand, perhaps he did experience
ENDINGS 1784-86 279
contentment, despite the financial wreckage of his later life. One of his
rewards was certainly a lengthy, happy marriage.
Yet it remains uncertain whether he ever did quench the desire for those
‘lights’ that would give him understanding; or an end to the constant curiosity
and activity that was the outward manifestation of his restless spirit. To be
involved was everything to Laurence Sulivan. It must have pleased him,
therefore, that to the very last breath of his long life he was still thoroughly
embroiled in matters of consequence.
Short Titles and Abbreviations
Add.MSS. – Additional manuscripts kept in the Department

of Manuscripts in the British Library, London.
Bodl. - Manuscripts kept in the Bodleian Library, Oxford
B.L. British Library, London
Bute MSS. - The papers of John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute,
kept at Mountstuart, Isle of Bute.
Cal.H.O.Papers - Calendar of Home Office Papers in the Reign of
George 111 (1760-5), J. Redington & R. Roberts
(eds.), London 1878.
De Bertodano Papers belonging to Mr. Martin De Bertodano
Papers
E.P.L. - Edinburgh Public Libraries.
George 1V Bridge, Edinburgh
E.U.L. - Edinburgh University Library.
G.M. - Gentleman's Magazine.
Hansard - The Parliamentary History of England from the
Earliest Period to the year 1803, T. C.
Hansard, W. Cobbett (Eds.), (London, 1813/4).
H.M.S.C. - Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports.
I.O.L. MSS. - Manuscripts in the Asia, Pacific & Africa
Collections in the British Library, London.
I.O.R. - Records of the East India Company kept in the
Asia, Pacific & Africa Collections in the British
Library, London.
N.L.S. - National Library of Scotland, George 1V Bridge,
Edinburgh.
N.L.W. - National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.
n.p. – No pagination.
P.A. - Public Advertiser.
P.R.O. (Ireland) - Public Record Office, Four Courts, Dublin.
P.R.O. (London) - Public Record Office, London.
P.R.O. ((N. Ireland) Belfast, Northern Ireland.
S.R.O. - Scottish Record Office, Register House,
Edinburgh.
280
Chapter Notes and References
Preface
1. McGilvary [1].
2. See Sutherland [1]; Feiling; Philips, C.H. [4]; Davies, A.M. [1].
1. Bombay and Origins 1713–52

1. I.O.R. Range 341, Bombay Public Consultations, vol. 10, p.357, J. Horne to S. Law,
30 August 1739.
2. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, L. Sulivan’s Letterbook to Stephen Sulivan,
April 1778. [Note: De Bertodano Papers, Laurence Sulivan’s ‘Letterbook to his son’,
April 1778, is an exact copy].
3. Quoted in, Dodwell [3], p.4.
4. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, L. Sulivan’s Letterbook to Stephen Sulivan,
April 1778.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Commander John O’Sullivan, of Cork City; son of Philip O’Sullivan and his wife
Elizabeth Irwin; brother of Benjamin Sulivan. Born 1716, died 1780; buried at St.
Mary’s Shandon, Cork. Married Susannah O’Sullivan, City of Cork, born 1726, died
1792. He had one son, Captain Philip O’Sullivan.
9. Commander James Irwin was from Roscommon and Cork City.
10. He was a free merchant and inhabitant of Calcutta by 1730; also appearing in
Madras in February 1730 and May 1732.
11. S.R.O. GD/Sect.1/464/(c), ff. 25-27. In the 1720s, a Philip Roche from Cork,
named the ship he stole, Mary. See also Hayward, pp.95, 337; Analecta Hibernica,
vol.20, p.64, Doneraile Papers; vol.23, p.250; P.R.O. (Ireland) m.6282.
12. Born at Calcutta in 1728, died at St. Helena in 1792. She was the daughter of Mary
Beale of St. Helena.
13. Eyles Irwin was born in 1751. Through Sulivan he was chosen to be a Writer at
Madras in 1767.
14. Possibly also a connection with an Andrew Galwey (alias Andrew Gardiner).
15. Laurence might have been an illegitimate older brother. Benjamin Sulivan was
born in the Parish of St. Paul, Cork City, in 1720, died 1767. In 1733 admitted to
Kings Inns: ‘Mother (Elizabeth Irwin) a Presbyterian.’ In 1740 appointed Attorney.
[Kings Inns Admissions Papers, pp.458-69, 468-69]. From 1752: Barrister at Law and
Clerk of the Crown and Clerk of the Peace, by letters patent, for Counties Cork and
Waterford; renewed in 1758 and 1761. He married in 1742, Bridget, daughter of Rev.
Paul Limerick, D.D. from Scull, County Cork.
16. See Exeter Record Office, Palk MSS. no. 169, L. Sulivan to R. Palk, 27 May 1772;
Grants of Arms, vol.22, pp.212-213; and McGilvary [1], pp.1-2.
17. Add. MSS. 29143, f.334, Francis Sykes to W. Hastings, 16 May 1779. He referred
to the youngest son as, ‘Mr. Sullivan’s nephew’.
18. John and Richard Joseph Sulivan paid for research by G. Beltz in 1801. Laurence
Sulivan is not mentioned. Nor did Beltz seem to know that his son Stephen was alive.
281
282 CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES
19. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c. 472, f.2, L. Sulivan to John Sulivan, 6 February
1775. Col. Wood and Mr. Darvall were married, respectively, to Laurence Sulivan’s
nieces, ‘Betsy’ and ‘Nancy’ Owen.
20. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook to his son, April, 1778.
He died in Madras, unmarried and with no issue, on 9 October 1793.
21. His first name is clearly from the Irish Labhras. ‘Sulivane’ was the form then in use
among maritime members of the O’Suileabhan Beara Sept.
22. A Laurence Sulivan was convicted of high treason in February 1680 for being part
of the Earl of Tyrone’s ‘Popish’ uprising. [See H.M.S.C. Ormonde MSS., vol.36,
p.510; and p.580, 12 February 1681].
23. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Laurence Sulivan’s ‘Letterbook to his son’, April 1778.
24. I.O.R. Bombay Public Consultations, vol. 2, n.p. 17 March 1740.
25. See Sutherland [1], p.53, and Dodwell [3], p.31, for a description of what would
have been his daily work.
27. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. E. 302/2, ‘Letterbook of Mrs. Adriana Spencer’, passim.
28. Later, he became Superintendent of the Bombay marine. In 1749 he was Mayor of
Bombay. [Low, vol.1, p.120].
29. He was a Senior Merchant in Bombay in 1747, Marine Paymaster in 1748 and
third in Council by 1749.
30. At least twenty-five trusted close friends can be picked out.
31. I.O.L. ORB 50/15, 12 December 1752.
32. I.O.R., Bombay Public Consultations, vol. 16, p. 162.
33. Ibid. p. 347. This was payment for ‘passing notes and seeing it be exported in no
undue manner but in the proportions which the Honourable Company usually
allowed’.
34. I.O.R. Bombay Public Consultations, vol. 18, f.435.
35. I.O.R., Surat Factory Records, vol.37, f.1; ff. 16-18, The Committee to the Board,
8 January 1752.
36. Ibid. ff. 18-19.
37. Ibid. ff.25-27.
38. Ibid. ff.39-46.
39. Ibid.
40. In January 1750 he used the accounts and the estates of Nathaniel Whitwelf,
Henry Talbot, William Binnel and Anthony Upton for bills totalling £230.13.9.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES 283
2. London and India House 1753–63

1. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.472, f.40, et seq. [See also Sutherland [1], p.62].
Edward Owen’s widow Ann, was paid an annual allowance of £40; a house was
rented for her in Great Russell Street. Nothing more is then heard of her.
2. Ibid. Purchased in 1741 by the Chandlers from Edward Randolph. In 1763 sold to a
distiller, Isaac Lefevre. Formerly owned by Sir John Gayer, ex-Governor of Bombay.
[Morris [1], p.10; and pp.45-47. My thanks to Derek Morris for his information].
3. See Morris [1], pp.45-47 et passim; and Jucker, pp.25-2].
4. For additional material on Captain Thomas Lane see: Morris [2], pp.20-27. See also
Morris [1], pp.46-47, 70, et passim.. Note: In 1711 a Mr. Lane was present at India
House. [Jucker, p.25].
5. Morris [2], pp.23 and 26 et passim.
6. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.472, f.40, et seq. He laid out £200 for repairs;
stumped up law fees; paid his ‘share of the dinner to the steward and jury’ of the
Court granting possession; paid a ‘fine’ at a special ‘Court Baron’ held at the Angel and
Crown, Whitechapel. [See Morris [1], p.10; pp.45-47].
7. Ibid. Everything on the outside was painted twice. The house, in magnificent
condition, survives to this day as 37, Stepney Green.
8. Ibid. The estimate for painting the staircase was £49.8.7; the total bill: £193.11.4.
9. Ibid. The cost of wine was also itemised.
10. Ibid. [Additional information, courtesy of Derek Morris].
11. Ibid. The obligations shouldered were many. Mrs. Lane’s nurse was paid for. Gifts
were made.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. He itemised: suits, coats, waistcoats, breeches, garters, wadding, lining, lacing,
stockings, buttons, buckles, wigs, hats and shoes – in every conceivable material:
Velvets, satins, silks, cotton, worsteds, in a dazzling riot of colours: black, brown,
blue, orange, scarlet, crimson – and, above all, gold.
14. Ibid. Strict book-keeping allowed little room for manoeuvre; six footmen and eight
coachmen came and went before November l763. Everything was modelled on the
Stephen Law household.
15. Ibid.
16. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to his son Stephen, 24 February 1784; et passim.
See also Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, f.7. Laurence Sulivan’s ‘Letterbook to
his son’, April 1778; and c.472, f.40, et seq.
17. Sutherland [3] p.47 et. passim; and Dickson, passim.
18. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. L. Sulivan to his son, April 1778.
19. Ibid.
20. See N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, Letterbook No, 10, f.92, Clive to Orme, 1
August 1758; and ‘Journal’ for December 1757 to December 1758.
21. My thanks to Derek Morris for information on Clive’s visit to Sulivan.
22. Bodl. L. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.472, f. 40 et seq. ‘Accounts.’ These shares
amounted to 27,399 rupees in l76l, that is, approximately £3,500 (at two shilling to the
rupee). The 8 ships noted were: Hardwicke, Lively, Prince Edward, Neptune, Doddington,
Cauder, Pastorinho and Fatty Salem.
23. I.O.L. MSS. Eur.E. 302/1, ‘Letterbook of John Spencer’, f.79.
In 1757 Thomas Lane subscribed £5000 to the £3 million loan raised by the City.
This, or part, was probably Sulivan’s money. [See Sutherland [7], p.110. See also
Morris, [1], p.50].
25. The Royal Exchange Company had Captain James Saunders, James Tierney and
James Savage (all ex-Company servants) among its directors. The Amicable Society for
Perpetual Assurance had Elijah Impey, a Jeremiah Bentham and Thomas Manningham.
27. Ibid.
28. See Sutherland [3], p.14.
29. P.R.O. London, Will of Samuel Hough, 15 July 1762. Sulivan also received a
diamond ring.
30. The Petition and Appeal of Rawson Hart Boddam and Nathaniel Stackhouse Esquires,
Executors in India of John Spencer, Esquire, deceased, complaining of certain parts of a decree or
decretal order of the Court of Chancery, of 31st October 1785, and praying that the same may be
reversed or varied. Also: ‘Journal of the House of Lords’, 7 February 1786. [Judicial
Records of the House of Lords, House of Lords Record Office, London.]
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. See I.O.R. Correspondence Memoranda, vol.15 (1756), n.p. Item dated 12
November 1756. ‘A list of interest notes claimed at Bengal and tendered to be
registered and attested copies given.’
34. East Suffolk Record Office, Martin family of Hemingstone Papers, HA 13/A/
1-15.
35. Bodl. L. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.472, f. 40 et seq. ‘Accounts.’
36. See Joslin, p.342.
37. For definitions of the shipping interest, see Philips, C.H. [2], p.462; also Glossary.
38. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letterbook dated May 1764 to September
1766’, ff.43-40, John Walsh to Clive, 22 November 1764.
39. Ibid. Later in life Captain Thomas Lane was listed as owner or ‘husband’ of the
Ponsborne. Captain Samuel Hough (son of Sulivan’s late friend) was in charge
40. Namier & Brooke [1], vol.11, p.267.
41. Perhaps it is only coincidence, but a Peter Godfrey bought land in County Kerry
between 1754-8, from a Cornelius Sullivan, an uncle of Benjamin Sulivan. [See
Register of Deeds, Henrietta Street, Dublin, Memorial 189, et passim.]
42. Chaudhuri, K.N [1], pp.82-83.
43. There were at least sixteen in the group.
44. Sutherland [3], p.88.
45. Holwell, pp.62.
46. See Chaudhuri, K. N. [1], p.86.
47. See also Sutherland [1], p.51.
3. The Court of Directors 1755-58

1. The Society included public figures, like Chatham, Cavendish, and Grafton.
Prominent individuals like Wilkes; and bankers, such as George Colebrooke.
2. Clive to Sulivan, 30 December 1758. See also Forrest [2], vol.2, p.65.
3. Quoted in Furber [2], p.483, R. Atkinson to H. Dundas, 22 July 1784.
4. Davies, A.M. [2], p.52.
6. S.R.O. Buccleuch MSS. GD/ 224/45/38. Item 75.
7. See I.O.L. Orme MSS. O.V. 147. 8, ff. 35-36; O.V. 158.2, ff. 4-5; O.V. 32.1; and
McGilvary [1], pp.45, 50, 74.
8. They were: Godfrey, Plant, Dudley, Savage, Tullie, Gough, Phipps and Rous. [For
Peter Godfrey and Charles Gough, See Parker, pp. 118-122].
9. For example he dealt with the buying in one committee; in another decided upon
issues involving farms, duties, Zamindari powers and disputes between castes.
10. See I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.16 (1757), n.p.

11. Sinha p.xxx.
12 Ibid., pp.xxxviii and xxxix.
13. Dodwell [2], p.16.
14. Ibid.
15. I.O.R. Correspondence Memoranda, vol.16 l757, (in Sulivan’s handwriting). See
also I.O.L. Orme MSS. O.V., 32.1.
16. See I.O.L. Orme MSS. O.V. 147. 8, ff. 35-36; O.V. 158.2, ff. 4-5; O.V. 32.1; and
McGilvary [1], pp.45, 50, 74.
19. Sutherland [1], p.71. See pp.66-73 passim, for this first contested election; and
McGilvary [1], pp. 54-61.
20. See also McGilvary [2], pp.217-222 et seq. This patronage found other uses.
21. Sutherland [l] p.66. See also Holwell, pp.155-6.
22. He had fourteen supporters.
23. Holwell, p.156.
24. Ibid. See p.157.
25. Ibid.
26. P.A. for 13 March 1758.
27 Holwell, p.165.
28. N.L.W., Powis MSS., Clive Papers. ‘Letterbook’, January 1764 to September l765,
f.53, John Walsh to Clive, 5 February 1765.
29. Chaudhuri, K.N. [1], p.82.
4. Priorities 1757-65
1. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
2. Davies, A.M. [1], p.52.
3. I.O.R., Court Book 70, pp. 34, 107-8.
4. Davies, A.M. [1], p.52.
5. Forrest [1], vol.2, p.180, citing a letter from Clive to Henry Vansittart, 3 February
1762. Volume 32 of Robert Orme’s ‘History’ is based on papers given to him by
Sulivan, on war theatres, 1756-62; naval intelligence, battle lines, treaty proposals, and
articles; maps and plans on all theatres. [See I.O.L., Orme MSS .O.V., 32.l, n.p. See
also Orme MSS. O.V., 147.8, ff.35-36].
6. N.L.S. MSS. E.F.P. 41. 10/3. Item entitled ‘Account of the Numbers in the
Establishment of the Company’s European Officers and Soldiers in the East Indies,
from 1747 to 1770.’
7. P.R.O., Chatham MSS. 30/8/60. Sulivan to Pitt, 5 February 1761.
8. Quoted in Dodwell [2], p.194.
9. De Bertodano MSS., n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
10. Peters, p.102.
11. Williams, vol.1, p.27
12. Ibid., vol.1, p.28.
13. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February
1778.
14. I.O.R., Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.186, Sulivan to Pitt, 27 July 1761.
15. P.R.O. (London), Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, ff.169. From internal evidence c.1760.
16. I.O.L., Orme MSS. O.V. 63.26,217.
17. Dodwell [2], pp.287-8. Also I.O.L., Orme MSS. O.V. 63.26,217.
18. See I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.18, n.p.
19. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.96, ff.427-433, November 1761, Bute to
the Directors.
20. Ibid.
21. Entitled: A Defence of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East
Indies and their Servants (particularly those of Bengal) against the Complaints of the Dutch East
India Company, being a Memorial from the English East India Company to his Majesty on that
subject. Published in April 1762.
22. I.O.R. Correspondence Reports, vol.6, See Letters from Jenkinson to Sulivan of
10, 11, 19 March 1762.
23. Malcolm, vol.2, p.128.
24. Cushner, p.11. et passim (Quotes Court Minutes for 30 December 1761 on p.251).
25. P.R.O. 30/47/20/3, ff. 1-3.
26. Quoted in Cushner, p.201
27. One of his final measures was to plan the downfall of Yusuf Khan’s rebellion at
Madura, which lay to the south of the Carnatic.
28. S.R.O., Buccleuch MSS. GD 24/Box 45/Bundle 38, Item 53. ‘Extract from Mr.
Scrafton’s Book of Transactions in the East Indies.’ See also Hotblack, pp.56-96.
29. Lenman & Lawson, p.807.
30. Philips, C.H. [2], p.461.
31. Already Clive had despatched bills totalling £39,000. Sulivan, in partnership with
Thomas Manningham, Richard Baker and Dr. John Munro had remitted bills worth
£31,602.
32. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.18, Sulivan’s reply to the
Bengal General Letter, dated 5 March 1759.
33. Edwardes, p.178.
35. Ibid., p.187.
36. Sutherland[1] p.75.
37. In their own words, the Directors were: ‘Seldom in a position to meet large drafts
at a short date.’ [Quoted in Dodwell [2], p.188].
38. De Bertodano Papers, Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
39. Ibid.
40. I.O.R., General Ledgers, July 1756-June 1763. L/AG/14/5/3-12 et passim;
L/AG/14/7/l.
41. Sulivan to Chatham, 27 July 1761. Quoted in Williams [1], vol.1, pp.28-9.
42. I.O.R., Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.18, n.p. Sulivan’s reply to
the Bengal General Letter of 29 December 1759.
43. S.R.O. Buccleuch MSS. GD 224/45/38/Items 40-114, passim. [See also Sutherland
[l], pp. 26, 138-9].
44. Dodwell [2], pp.118, 324, 415. See also I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence
Memoranda, vol.17, n.p. Sulivan’s reply to the Bengal General Letter of 31 December
1758.
45. S.R.O. Buccleuch MSS. GD 224/45/38/Items 4O-114, passim.
46. Ibid.
47. I.O.R., Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 808, f.141, Sulivan to Coote, 16 March
1761.
48. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol. 18, Sulivan’s reply to the
Bengal General Letter of 26 August 1758.
49. Sinha, p.51. The 4th head.
50. Ibid., p. 187 (1759).
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Dodwell [2], p.185. Company to Pigot, 1 November 1758.
55. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.17. n.p. Sulivan’s answer
to clause 143 of the ‘infamous’ General Letter from Bengal.
57. Add MSS. 29136, ff.104–108, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, no date, but circa 1
March 1775.
58. Ibid.
59. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.189, L. Sulivan to Clive, 29
September 1761.
5. India: Developments and Plans 1757-65

1. See Keay, pp. 319-27, 369-371.
2. Marshall [2], pp.40-1.
3. Ibid., pp.39-40.
4. See I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.809, f.364 et seq. Clive to Sulivan, 30
December 1758.
5. Mir Jafar (privately) promised the army and navy £400,000; the Select Committee
of the Bengal Council £120,000, and later £150,000; Clive £160,000.
6. Marshall [2], p.38.
7. Malcolm, vol.2, p.142.
8. Edwardes [1], p.175.
9. Ibid., p.176.
10. See Malcolm, vol.2, p.192.
11. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous vol.96, f.179, Sulivan to Robert Wood, 17 June 1761.
See also Malcolm, vol.1, p.255.
12. See Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.71. Vansittart to Sulivan, 17 April 1762.
13. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, ff.189-90, Sulivan to Clive, 29
September 1761.
14. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.99, H. Vansittart to L. Sulivan, 22
September 1762.
15. Ibid., ff.107-114, Palk to Sulivan, Madras 5 November 1762.
16. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, ff.181-187, Vansittart to Sulivan, 24
December 1763. Gave details of the slaughter.
17. See Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.209. Vansittart to Palk, 25 June 1764.
18. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. 302/1 ‘Letterbook of John Spencer’, f.28. Spencer to Sulivan,
Calcutta 27 September 1764.
19. Quoted by Namier and Brooke [1], vol.1, p.156.
20. See I.O.L. MSS. Eur. 302/1 'Letterbook of John Spencer', f.44. Spencer to
Sulivan, 21 December 1765.
21. See Marshall [3], pp.234-242; et passim
23. Dodwell [2], p.335.
24. Ibid. p.217.
25. Ibid. p.193 et passim.
26. Ibid. p.217.
27. B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20. It was claimed that only Pigot’s fine character had
stemmed the just resentment.
28. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, n.p. Sulivan to Chatham, 27 July 1761.
29. Ibid.
30. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.25, Palk to Sulivan, 9 January 1761.
31. The Governor also cared for Sulivan’s two nieces now in India, Nancy and Betsy
Owen; and also young Eyles Irwin (a kinsman). See also B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20.
32. Dodwell [2], p.288.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. p.301.
35. I.O.L. Eur. MSS. 302/1. ‘Letterbook of John Spencer’, f.4, Spencer to Sulivan, 24
January 1764; and f.15 Spencer to Sulivan, 2 February 1764.
36. See B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20.
37. Dodwell [2], p.301, 8 April 1762.
38. Ibid., p.415. Company to Palk, 21 November 1764.
39. I.O.R. Court Book 69, p.43.
40. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda vol.18, n.p. Sulivan’s clauses
for Fort Marlborough, 30 October 1760.
41. S.R.O. Douglas MSS. vol. 2, pp.499-501, entry 499/22. Letter from Alex. Hall to
his brother, Sir John Hall of Dunglass (near Berwick), 4 December 1762.
42. P.R.O. (London), Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, ff.109-10. Sulivan to Robert Wood
(Secretary to Pitt), 5 February 176]. Chatham’s order to use the Royal Navy was not
heeded.
43. Due to shortage of pepper the best commercial use was made of the treaty and a
Resident (Dalrymple) was installed.
44. Sir John Murray’s MSS. Cabinet Minute No.30 (s.p. 84/504), quoted in Spencer, F
(ed.), pp. 133-4.
45. See I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.16 (1757), n.p.
Sulivan’s ‘Observations on the Bengal Establishment with such Alterations and
Amendments as Appear absolutely Necessary.’ dated 1757.
46. Quoted Davies, A.M. [1], p.344.
47. See also Marshall [1], pp. 24-27.
48. P.R.O. (London) Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, Sulivan to Pitt, 27 July 1761.
49. Ibid.
50. See I.O.R. ‘Abstracts Coast & Bay’, vol. l, p.237, Despatch from the Calcutta
Board to the Court of Directors, 9 October 1759.
51. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.18 n.p. Sulivan’s reply to
the Bengal General Letter of 5 July 1759.
52. P.R.O. (London) Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, Sulivan to Pitt, 27 July 1761.
53. Foster, pp.303-4; see also Barun Dé, passim.
54. Barun Dé, passim.
55. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. 302/1 ‘Letterbook of John Spencer’, f.28. Spencer to Sulivan,
Calcutta 27 September 1764.
56. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vols.1 and 18 (1757-1760),
n.d. (All in Sulivan’s writing).
57. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letterbook No.10’. Letters from Col. Clive,
from 8 January 1757 to 11 October l759. ff.160-1, Clive to Vansittart, Calcutta 25
December 1758.
58. Sulivan to Sir Eyre Coote, 16 Mar. l76l. Quoted in Forrest [1], vol.2, p. 112.
59. Quoted in Sutherland [1], p.74.
60. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.191, Vansittart to Sulivan, 3 March 1764.
61. Davies, A.M. [1], p.314.
6. Feuds and Peace Treaties 1757-63

1. Davies, A.M. [1], p.286.
2. Ibid. Quoted on p.175.
3. This idea of a Secret Committee caught the eye of Government, and in particular,
that of John Robinson. They were also set up in the Presidencies.
4. B.L. Pamphlet, 100.n.20.
5. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 808, f. 118, Sulivan to Clive, 20 February
1758.
6. On 29 December 1758 he wrote to his father, and to Messrs. Law, Belchier, Smyth
King and Mabbot. Clive had nothing to do with Sulivan’s success in 1758.
7. See N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ff.172-78.
8. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 809, f.364, Clive to Sulivan, 30 December
1758.
9. Quoted in Malcolm, vol.2, pp.141-42.
10. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 809, f.364, Clive to Sulivan, 30 December
1758.
11. Clive to Stephen Law, 29 December 1758. [Quoted in Malcolm, vol.3, pp.140-3].
12. See Davies, A.M. [1], p.313.
13. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. D.546/iii-vii, ff. 99-100, Clive to Walsh, 14 October 1764.
14. I.O.R. Bengal Despatches, vol.1, p.898. General Letter to Bengal of 23 March
1759.
15. Quoted in Gleig [1], p.123.
16. See Forrest [1], vol.2, p.181.
17. B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20. ‘No man of merit escaped – (not) even Lord Clive.’
18. The signatories were Clive, Holwell, Playdell, Sumner and McGuire. [Quoted in
Gleig [1], p.127].
19. Quoted in Malcolm, vol.2, p.133.
20. Ibid., vol.2, p.197. Letter dated 22 November l762
21. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.141, Sulivan to Sir Eyre Coote, 16
March 1761. 1761.
22. I.O.R. Court Book, vol.69, ff.106-107; also General Court Minutes, vol.2, f.266.
23. Ibid. pp.362-3, 18 March 1761.
24. Ibid.
25. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.191, Sulivan to Clive, 18 November
1761.
26. Malcolm, vol.2, p.195. Quotes Clive to Pybus, Madras on 27 February 1762.
27. Ibid.
28. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.192, ff.280-28l, Sulivan to Thomas Nuttal
(Company solicitor), 29 July 1762.
29. Forde demanded £5,000 as compensation for losing his commission and rank in
the King’s service. [Dodwell [2], p.188, Company to Pigot, 1 November 1758].
30. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 808, f.189, Sulivan to Clive, 29 September
1761.
31. Ibid.
32. Quoted in Forrest [1], vol.2, p.191.
33. P.R.O. (London), 30/8/60, Sulivan to Robert Wood (Chatham’s secretary) on 5
February 1761.
34. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, Letterbook, no.10, ff.192-5, Clive to Forde, 24
August 1759.
35. See De Bertodano, n.p., Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
[See also Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, f.22, Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook to
his son, April 1778].
36. P.R.O. (London), Chatham MSS.30/8/60, ff.116-9, n.d. By Sulivan, though no
author or addressee. It is included among a bundle of letters.
37. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, ff.186-8, Sulivan to Pitt, 27 July 1761.
38. Ibid. Sulivan thought this approach was only in line with ‘honour, justice and good
policy’.
39. Cal. H.O. Papers, p.150, no.473, Charles Jenkinson to Mr. Sulivan, 25 January
1762.
41. The terms the Secret Committee recommended were noticeably similar to those
placed before Pitt by Sulivan on 27 January 1761.
42. Bute MSS. ff.522-4. Sulivan to Shelburne, 12 October 1762.
43. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.471, f.5, Shelburne to Sulivan, 13 October 1762.
45. Ibid. This effectively excluded Dupleix’s gains in the Coromandel during that year.
46. Ibid. Referred to on p.96.
47. Add. MSS. 32944, f.30v, 3 October 1762.
48. Davies, A.M. [1], p.338.
49. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February
1778.
50. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist .c.269, f.22, Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook to his
son, April 1778.
51. De Bertodano Papers, n.p., Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February
1778.
52. See Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, f.22, Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook to his
son, April 1778.
53. N.L.S. Pamphlets, Entitled, ‘East India Company 1764-1771.’ No. 3/637, ‘A
Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock.’ Lord Clive 1764. [See also Malcolm,
pp.205-9].
54. See Gleig [1], pp.135-6; Malcolm, vol.2, pp.205-9; and Forrest [1], pp.192-4.
55. See Malcolm, vol.2, p.205-9. Also Forrest [1], pp.192-4. Bute would never be
influenced to do this by Wood, Sulivan’s great friend.
56. I.O.L. Orme MSS. J, f.248. See also B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20, passim..
57. P.A. for 28 March 1763.
58. See also Dodwell [2], pp.333-4, Company to Pigot, 9 March 1763.
61. See Malcolm, vol.2, pp.190-191.
62. Ibid., p.195-196.
63. P.A. for 3 April 1765. See also I.O.R.. Committee of Correspondence Reports of
3 and 8 December 1767.
64. B.L.Pamph. 100.n.20.
65. I.O.L. Orme MSS. vol.124, pp.247-50; and also B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20. passim.
66. N.L.S. Pamphlet no, 3/637, East India Company 1762-1771. A Letter to the
Proprietors of India Stock, from Lord Clive. Lord Clive (1764).
67. Ibid.
68. Bute MSS. ff.186-8, Sulivan to Shelburne, 24 February 1763.
7. Activities: Public and Private 1757-63

2. Bramwell, 176l, 1st George 111, 64. Strode, William.
3. Sulivan might have been reliving a landed position once held by his own family in
Ireland.
4. The Cosmopolitan Magazine, vol.3, [1889] pp.28-32.
5. See De Bertodano Papers, n. p. ‘Particulars of Ponsborne Park, from Laurence

Sulivan's A/C Book.’ Also Noble, p.189, et passim.
6. Hertford County Records, Session Books, 1752-1799 in ‘Presentation Book’, vol. l,
p. 216.
7. Sutherland [1], pp.51-52.
8. P.R.O. (London), Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, Part l. Sulivan to Chatham, 22 October
1761; f.120, Sulivan to Lady Hester Chatham, 29 October 1761.
9. Ibid., Sulivan to Chatham, 6 June 1762.
10. See Anson, p.36.
11. At that time these included: Sergeant Glyn, Alderman Townshend, Pratt, Francis,
Calcraft, Nugent and George Dempster, as well as Dunning and Barré.
12. Bute MSS. f.175. Sulivan to the Earl of Bute, 7 July 1762.
13. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. MSS. entitled ‘Ashburton Election’. See also Hanham,
passim.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. See also Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.471, f.1, Jas. Eyre to Sulivan, June
1761.
16. P.R.O. (London), Chatham MSS. 30/8/60, f.111, Sulivan to Chatham, Ashburton
5 April 1761.
17. De Bertodano Papers, MSS. on the ‘Ashburton Election’.
18. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.189-90, Sulivan to Col. Clive, 29
September 176l.
19. De Bertodano Papers, ‘Ashburton Election’.
20. Ibid. See also Jucker, pp.25-27.
21. Ibid.
22. See Devon and County Records, D. of Bedford’s MSS. ‘Mr. Sulivan’s Case’. Also
Devon Record Office, ‘Brief for the Honourable John Harris Esqr. and the
Honourable Thomas Walpole Esq.’
23. De Bertodano, Papers, ‘Ashburton Election’. Also, B.L. Add. MSS. 38337, ff.271-
24, Quoted in Jucker, pp.25-27.
24. Ibid.
25. Lewis, vol.23, p.288.
26. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letterbook.’.
27. I.O.R. Court Book no. 69, pp.362-3. Sulivan was in the Chair.
28. I.O.R. Court Book 69, p.362, for 18 March 1761.
29. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.13, H. Vansittart to Sulivan, 2 July 1760.
30. Ibid. f.206, Henry Vansittart to Sulivan, 24 March 1764.
31. See Dodwell [2], p.337, Company to Governor Pigot, 6 April, 1763.
32. The Rev. Neville Maskelyne, Mr. Robert Waddington and a Charles Mason were
to proceed to Bencoolen to observe the transit of Venus over the sun on 6 June 1761.
33. Dodwell [2], p.239, Governor Pigot to the Company, 8 March 1761.
35. Quoted in Forrest [1], p.196.
36. See N.L.S. Pamphlet No, 3/637. The East India Company 1764-1771, A Letter to the
Proprietors of India Stock, by Lord Clive.
37. Macaulay, p.61.
38. Browne was an ex-Bombay Free Merchant. Tullie had been in Madras. William
Barwell was a Director between 1753 and 1759; and then from 1761 to 1764.
39. See McGilvary [2], passim.
41. Ibid.
42. Bowen [1], pp.39-53, quoting William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbour,
Michigan, Lansdowne MSS. 90, f.84, ‘Views incorporated in a plan submitted to Lord
Shelburne in January 1767.’
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Newcastle, Rockingham, Grenville, Portland and Middleton were all involved,
although Grenville did not really want any part of Clive’s feud with Sulivan.
48. Ibid.
49. Stuart was rewarded in return with posts for his friends. The group also included
George Dempster, Sir Adam Fergusson and Alex Wedderburn
50. I.O.L. Eur. MSS. 63. ‘Letters of George and John Johnstone, 1757- 1773.’ Taken
from the Pultney Papers in the Henry E. Huntingdon Library, California), f.468,
George to William Johnstone, 3 February 1763.
51. J. West to Newcastle, 14 April 1763. Cited in Namier & Brooke [1], vol.2, p.356.
52. P.A. for 21 April 1763.
53. J. West to Newcastle, 14 April 1763. Cited in Namier & Brooke [1], vol.2, p.356.
The splitting machinery created about 380 votes: 220 for Clive and about 160 for
Sulivan.
54. Cited in Namier & Brooke [1], vol.2, p.356.
55. Built about 1707 by a Mr. Chapman; sold to a George Watson; then in 1751 to a
John Mason; to a Richard Bootle; to Sulivan. It is now part of the Great Ormonde
Street Hospital for Sick Children.
56. See P.R.O. Chatham Papers. 30/8/60, f.124, Sulivan to W. Pitt, Mile End Green,
22 October 1761.
57. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f. 141. H. Vansittart to Sulivan, 27 February
1763; and f.200, H. Vansittart to Sulivan, 24 March 1764.
58. Ibid., ff.25, 59, R. Palk to L. Sulivan on 26 January 1761; and 26 February 1762.
59. He was in remittance-type partnerships with Peter Godfrey, Thomas
Manningham, Richard Baker and Dr. John Munro.
60. Bodl. L. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f. 140, Vansittart to Sulivan, 24 March
1763.
61. Ibid. f.199. Vansittart to Sulivan, 24 March 1764.
62. See I.O.R. L/AG/14/5/3-12 general Stock Ledgers for 1763 to 1766. passim.
63. Bodl. L. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.191, f.170, Palk to Sulivan, 5 September 1763.
This referred to land in St. Johns, Newfoundland.
64. Ibid. f.217, Palk to Sulivan, 24 August 1765. This might refer to Sulivan (secretly)
being involved in buying back estates in Counties Cork and Kerry, once belonging to
his family.
8. Challenge: Defeat: and Reflection 1757-65

1. De Bertodano, n.p. Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
2. I.O.L. Orme MSS. vol. J, ff.247-250; and B. L. Pamphlet 100.n.20, passim. From
internal evidence this was dated March/April 1764.
3. B.L. Pamphlet. 100.n.20.
4. I.O.L. Orme MSS. vol. J, ff.247-250. Signed ‘A Proprietor’.
5. B.L. Pamphlet 100.n.20. passim; also I.O.L., Orme MSS. vol. J, ff.247-50.
6. Ibid.
7. Quoted in Malcolm, vol.2, p.225.
8. Ibid. p.228. The opinion of Clive’s counsel, the Attorney-General, Charles Yorke,
and the Solicitor-General, Sir Fletcher Norton, was that the Directors had no case.
9. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, ff.219-223, 30 December 1763.

10. Ibid.
11. See Malcolm, vol.2, p.220.
12. E.P.L. A Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock on the subject of Lord Clive’s Jaghire,
occasioned by His Lordship’s Letter on that Subject. By John Dunning, Baron Ashburton, 28
April 1764.
13. Tomlinson, p.72, Letter no.65, Grenville to Clive, December 1763.
14. I.O.L. Ormathwaite MSS, D.546, Clive to Walsh, 12 December 1763.
15. I.O.R. Bengal Despatches, vol.2, 9 February 1764.
16. See Add. MSS. 29135, f.401, Sulivan to Hastings, 20 December 1774.
17. N.L.S. MSS. 1006. ‘Small Collection’, f. 11, Alexander Johnstone [brother of
George, John, James, Gideon and William (Pultney) Johnstone], to an unknown
recipient, 11 February 1764.
18. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.190, Sulivan to Palk, 22 May 1764. He added,
enigmatically, that for £360,000 he could have ‘bought over’ Clive and won
handsomely.
19. Ibid.
20. G.M. vol.34 (1764), p.192.
21. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. E.302/1, ‘John Spencer’s Letterbook’, f.43 Spencer to Sulivan 6
February 1765. See also Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. b.190, f.1, Sulivan to Palk, 22
May 1764.
22. Quoted in Jucker, p.286.
23. I.O.R. Court Books, vol.73, p.88, 1 June 1764. He was supported in this by
George Dempster and Governor George Johnstone.
24. Quoted in Forrest [1], p.203.
25. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letters from England to Lord Clive’, ff.42-6,
Walsh to Clive, 22 November 1764.
26. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, f.53, Walsh to Clive, 5 February 1765.
27. Ibid. ff.148-49, Scrafton to Clive, 20 January 1765. He might have referred to Mary
Barwell, a very persuasive lady.
28. I.O.L. Orme MSS. O.V. 222, f.111, Orme to Clive, 19 November 1764.
29. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letters from May 1764 – September 1766’,
f.41, Walsh to Clive, 3 July 1764.
30. Ibid. f.42, Walsh to Clive, 22 November 1764.
31. I.O.R. Homes Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, ff.225-27, Walsh to Clive, 20
November 1764.
32. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letters from May 1764 - September 1766’, f.96,
Walsh to Clive, 17 May 1766. Vansittart’s attack on Scrafton and Clive really brought
this change.
33. Ibid. ff.13-14, Henry Clive to Robert Clive, 13 February 1765.
34. Ibid. ‘Letters from England to Ld. Clive’, 14 May 1764 to 30 December 1766, f.53,
Walsh to Clive, 5 February 1765
35. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, ff.231-5, Walsh to Clive, 5 April 1765. Walsh
said: ‘Sulivan conceived it to be a piece of extraordinary jockeyship on our side.’
36. N.L.W. Powis MSS. Clive Papers, ‘Letters from England to Ld. Clive’, 14 May
1764 to 30 December 1766, ff.231-35, Walsh to Clive, 5 April 1765.
37. Ibid. ff. 148-149, Scrafton to Clive, 21 January 1765.
38. G.M. vol.35 (1765), p.108.
1764 to 30 December 1766, f.135, Scrafton to Clive, 8 April 1765.
40. See also I.O.L. Orme MSS. 22, f.118, Orme to Clive, 27 April 1765.
41. N.L.W. ‘Letterbook’, c.11 (Letters to England from Clive), n. p., Clive to Fowke,
25 September 1765.
42. The Bill was finally passed in 1767, and stipulated that the stock was not only to
be owned by the Proprietor, but that he had held it for at least half a year.
1764 to 30 Dec.1766, f.150, Scrafton to Clive, 12 February 1766.
44. Quoted in Davies, A.M. [1], p.317.
45. I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.18, n.p.
46. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. 302/1, ‘Letterbook of John Spencer’, Spencer to Sulivan, 24
January 1764, quoting Sulivan.
47. Quoted in Davies, A.M. [1], p.317.
48. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 5 May 1778.
49. Grierson, p.77. et passim.
50. See Davies, A.M. [1], p.344
51. See P.A. for 8 April 1768.
52. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.225, Walsh to Clive, 20 November
1765.
53. See G. M. vol.34 (1764) p.288.
54. Spencer had already recognized the Vizier in exchange for £200,000 and
confirmation of duty-free trading rights.
55. See Edwardes, passim; and Davies A.M., [1], passim.
56. I.O.L. Eur. MSS. 302/1, ‘Letterbook of John Spencer,’ f.70, Spencer to Sulivan, 25
September 1765.
9. Fresh Start and New Game 1765-67

1. See I.O.R. Court Book 74, p.52, 31 May 1765
2. The structure was organised along the lines laid out in his ‘Observations on the Bengal
Establishment....’ [See I.O.R. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vol.16 (1757),
n.p].
4. See Sutherland, L.S. & Woods, J. passim
5. Clive to Walsh, February 1766. Cited in Davies, A.M. [1], p.466.
7 . S.R.O. GD224/Box 46/Bundle 46.
8. Ibid.
9. See Sutherland [1], pp.159-60.
10. Taylor and Pringle [eds.], vol.3, pp.189-90, Chatham to Shelburne, 3 February
1767.
11. P.R.O. Chatham MSS.30/8/56, ff.76-83. Included in a paper from Shelburne to
Chatham, n.d. (from internal evidence can be firmly dated as 14 March 1767).
12. P.R.O. Chatham MSS.30/8/56, ff.76-83. ‘Mr. Sullivan’s Propositions to serve as
the Basis of a negotiation with the Government’, 16 March 1767.
13. Add. MSS. 32980, f.296, Rockingham to Newcastle, 15 March 1767
14. I.O.R. General Court Minutes, vol.3, f.53, 2 April 1767
15. It was noted then (as well as now) that the sum of £400,000 was almost the same
as the loss to Government created by reduction of the land tax.
16. Spear [1], pp.178.
10. Great Designs and Personal Struggles 1768-72

1. See I.O.R. General Stock Ledgers L/AG/14/5/3-12.
2. Exeter Record Office, Kennoway Documents, 58/9, Box 104, Item 6. Sulivan to R.
Palk, 13 September 1767.
3. Ibid.
4. Kaye & Johnstone, Section 16, p.62, ff.97-100, Lord Clive’s letter to Harry Verelst,
9 March 1768.
5. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.91, Letter 62, Palk to William Goodlad, 1 November 1768.
6. Ibid.
7. I.O.L. Eur, Photo. MSS. 63, ‘George and John Johnstone Letters’, passim.
8. Sulivan and Duncan Clerk stood security for this sum.
9. This settlement was eventually contracted in January 1769, and in fact was to last
five years.
10. P.A. of 4 April 1769.
11. G.M. vol.39 (1769), p.211.
12. Royal Society of Arts, Subscription Book, 1754-63, passim.
13. It was not for nothing that the Company was known as ‘The biggest multinational
Corporation of all time.’
14. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 6 April 1778.
15. Ibid.
17. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to Vansittart, 28 May 1770.
18. Add. MSS. 29194, f.97, Sulivan to Warren Hastings, n.d. (from internal evidence
c. April 1773).
19. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. pp.126-8, Letter 97, L. Sulivan to R. Palk, c. May-September
1770.
20. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to Vansittart, 24 January 1770. This surprised
him because Scrafton, Clive’s friend, was badly affected.
21. Ibid., n.p. Sulivan to Vansittart, 28 May 1770.
22. Ibid.
23. Add. MSS. 29194, Sulivan to Hastings, (from internal evidence, April 1774).
24. De Bertodano Papers, Laurence Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, c. 6 April 1778.
25. Ibid.
26. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to Vansittart, 28 May 1770. He described
himself as the ‘victim’ of ‘dreadful treachery’ and ‘base behaviour’ at the hands of the
Johnstones.
27. Ibid.
28. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.148, Letter 119, R. Palk to W. M. Goodlad, 7 December
1770.
30. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.157, Letter no.134, R. Palk to W. M. Goodlad, 2 April 1771.
31. Add. MSS. 29132, f.465v, R. Leycester to Hastings, 1 December 1771. By
February 1772 Colebrooke was traversing the same downhill road taken by many of
his fellow jobbers.
32. I.O.L. MSS. Eur. D.535, R. Barwell’s Letterbook, f.53, Richard Barwell to Roger
Barwell, n.d. (but c.1772).
33. Add. MSS. 29133, ff.533-6, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April 1773.
34. Davies, A.M. [1], p.472.
35. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.123, Letter No.93, Palk to Wm. Goodlad, 15 March 1770.
11. Defences Breached 1769-73

1. See Shearer, pp. 210-222
2. A deal done in 1767 resulted in the Indemnity Act (7 Geo III, c.56) lasting for five
years and ending in July 1772. See also Bowen [3], passim.
3. The £400,000 annual payment continued, but if the dividend went to six per cent it
would not be paid. It would then be allowed to increase at one per cent per annum.
4. Add. MSS. 29133, f.535, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April 1773.

5. Colebrooke, vol.1, p.219. He said that Sulivan and ‘Tookey’ (the Company
Accountant) went over the figures ‘minutely’ and thought them correct.
6. Add. MSS. 29133, f.533-6, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April 1773.
7. Hansard, vol.17, pp. 361-377.
8. Ibid., vol. 17, pp.469-70.
9. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.189, letter no. 170, Sulivan to R. Palk, no date (but early July
1772).
10. Add.MSS. 29133, ff.533-6, Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April 1773.
11. Copeland, vol.2, p.321, George Dempster to Edmund Burke, 4 August 1772.
Some of those asked were: Cornwall, Amherst, Burke, Col. Barré, Sir Richard Sutton
and Andrew Stuart.
12. Nor had he ever insinuated any such policy to anyone else.
13. I.O.R. General Court Minutes, vol.4, 3 December 1772.
14. Add. MSS. 29133, ff.533-8, Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April. 1773.
15. N.L.S. Minto MSS. E.F.P. 41/41/3c. Laurence Sulivan’s printed election
manifesto, Queen Square, 3 April 1773.
17. Ibid. 29194, f.96, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, n.d. (but April 1773 from internal
evidence).
18. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. L. Sulivan to Col. Wood, n.d. (but April 1773 from
internal evidence).
19. Add. MSS. 29133, f.389, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 12 February 1773.
20. Ibid., f.69, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 13 October 1773.
21. Exeter Record Office, Kennoway Documents, 58/9, Box. 104, Item 6, L. Sulivan
to R. Palk, 13 September 1767.
22. Quoted in Feiling, p.185.
23. Add. MSS. 29126, f.94, W. Hastings to L. Sulivan, 30 January 1772.
24. Ibid.
25. Davies, A.M. [1], pp.472-3.
26. Feiling, p.106.
27. Add. MSS. 29133, f.97, Sulivan to W. Hastings, n.d. (but from internal evidence,
April 1773).
28. Ibid. f.561, Sulivan to R. Barwell, 20 May 1773.
29. Ibid. 29134, ff.69-70, L. Sulivan to Hastings, 13 October 1773.
30. Ibid., ff.84–91; (and see also ff.96-9) n.d., L. Sulivan to Hastings.
31. Ibid, from ff.69 onwards; the start date is 13 October 1773. These papers
constitute a ‘history’ of the Regulating Act, going on to 28 March 1774.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Add. MSS. 29133, ff.84-98, L. Sulivan to Hastings, commencing in October 1773,
ending on 28 March 1774.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 24 April 1774.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. The attack on ‘rights’ illuminates changes taking place in society. Laissez faire ideas
were penetrating old business cultures.
12. Desperation and Defiance 1774-78

1. Add. MSS. 29194, ff.97-8. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, n.d. From internal evidence,
April 1773.
2. See Feiling, p.89.
3. Greene, passim.
4. It is possible he already owned or rented this property, it was occupied by a Mary
Irwin, a name that suggests she was one of his relations.
5. Quoted in Hamilton, p.77.
6. Ibid., p.33.
7. The cemetery was part of ‘Lamb’s Conduit Fields’. Jacobites who died on
Kennington Common in 1746 were buried in there with heads exposed.
8. Add. MSS. 29133, ff.533-6, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 April l773.
9. Ibid. 29194, f.84-91, Sulivan to Hastings, 13 October 1773.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. ff.84-89, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 7 January 1774.
12. Ibid., ff.96-98, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 March 1774.
13. Ibid., ff. 251-2, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 7 January 1774.
14. Ibid. ff.84-91, 96-8, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 March 1774.
15. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. pp.240-1, Letters, 238, 240, Stephen Sulivan to R. Palk, both
on 3 April 1774.
16. Add. MSS. 29134, f.335v, R. Palk to W. Hastings, 22 March 1774.
17. Ibid. 29194, ff.84-91, 96-8, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 March 1774.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. See E.U.L. Strachey MSS. Strachey to Clive, April 1774.
22. Ibid.
23. E.U.L. Strachey MSS., Strachey to Clive, April 1774.
24. Quoted in Bence-Jones, p.281.
25. Ibid.
26. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. pp.242, 246, Sulivan to Palk, 23 August and 30 September
1774.
27. Add. MSS. 29131, f.171, Sulivan to Hastings, 14 April l775.
13. Fight for Survival 1774-78

1. Add. MSS. 29135, f.401, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 December 1774. [Much of
Sulivan's correspondence with Warren Hastings from 1766 to 1785 can be traced in
the Hastings Papers, Add. MSS. 29132-29194; and in Gleig [2], vols. 1-3.]
2. Some identified were: Macleane, the Macphersons, the Johnstones, Caillaud, Sykes,
Pechell, Du Pré, Graham, the Barwells, Gilbert Elliot, Colebrooke, James Cockburn,
Major Scott.
3. See Maclean [2], for James and John Macpherson.
4. Add. MSS. 29194, ff.186-7, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 3 October 1773.
5. Sulivan was an old friend of the Barwells. To him Mary Barwell was ‘philosophy in
petticoats’.
6. N.L.W. Powis MSS. ‘Clive Letterbook 1767-74,’ n.p. Clive to Hastings, 14 October
1773.
7. E.U.L. Strachey MSS., n. p. P. Francis to H. Strachey, 13 September 1775.
8. Add MSS. 29136, ff. 19-20, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 January 1775.
9. Ibid.
10. See Sutherland [6], passim.
11. Quoted in Feiling, pp.145-46.

12. See E.U.L. Strachey MSS. n. p. P. Francis to H. Strachey, 16 September 1776.
13. Hastings believed his friends betrayed him over the resignation affair. To Sulivan
it was one of the most difficult decisions of his life.
14. Add. MSS. 29138, f.54, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 23 December 1776.
15. Ibid. 29140, ff.23-4, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 January 1778.
16. Ibid. 29194, ff.86, L. Sulivan to Hastings, 3 October 1773.
17. Exeter Record Office, Kennoway Documents, Palk MSS. (Haldon Trust), f.3, W.
Hastings to R. Palk, 5 October 1771.
18. Add. MSS. 29136, ff.104-107, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 27 February 1775.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. 29138, f.409, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 14 May 1777.
26. Add. MSS. 29136, ff.19-20, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 January 1775. John
Delamar, a silk merchant, backed-up Sulivan’s claims for making Bengal silk after the
Italian method.
27. Ibid. He suggested an organised structure: Districts, a District Collector of
Revenues, the office of Collector-General at Calcutta; and a Board of Revenues to
supervise.
28. Ibid., ff.59-61, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 February 1775.
29. Add. MSS. 29138, f.235, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 12 May 1777.
30. Add. MSS. 29131, f.171, Sulivan to Hastings, 14 April l775.
31. S.R.O. GD 29/2122/4, Robert Mayne to his nephew John Graham, 11 January
1775.
32. I.O.L. Orme MSS, O.V. 202, f.43, R. Orme to L. Macleane, 28 March 1775.
34. Ibid.
35. N.L.S. Minto MSS. E.F.P. 10, n.p. L. Sulivan to Sir Gilbert Elliot, 15 July 1775;
also Alex. Elliot to Sir Gilbert Elliot, 30 November 1774.
36. Add. MSS. 29136, f.381, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings 7 December 1775; also ff.44-5,
L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 23 December 1775.
37. Ibid. 29137, f.58, L. Sulivan to John Stuart, 1 February 1776; also f.137, L. Sulivan
to W. Hastings, 1 April 1776.
38. Later Macpherson put forward an unverifiable claim that he had been responsible
for Sulivan’s come-back.
39. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 6 April 1778.
40. Ibid. The Bishop of Carlisle helped: ‘He even carried a Book of Proprietors
(unasked) to canvass for me.’ He was the son off Edmund Law.
41. Ibid
43. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 6 April 1778.
45. Feiling, p.173.
46. Exeter Record Office, Palk MSS. Box 104, Item 15, 17 December 1777.
47. They included the Rockingham Opposition (notably Edmund Burke).
48. S.R.O. GD 32/24/34-57, William Young Correspondence, 1767-1814, Elibank to
his son, William Young, 3 May 1777.
49. Add. MSS. 29140, f.24, Sulivan to Hastings, 15 January 1778.
50. Ibid. 29136, ff.171-72, Sulivan to Hastings, 14 April 1775.

51. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS. p.241, L. Sulivan to Palk, 23 August 1774. Enough had been
sent back to repay Dunning for India stock mortgaged to him.
55. Add. MSS. 29140, f.287, L. Sulivan to Hastings, 20 April 1778.
56. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 5 May 1778.
57. Ibid.
58. De Bertodano Papers n. p. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 10 June 1778.
59. Add. MSS. 29142, f.29, L. Sulivan to Hastings, 21 December 1778.
60. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 28 December 1778.
61. Ibid. 27 February 1778. Before his death Macleane had arranged a tribute for
Sulivan from the Nawab.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 12 June 1778.
14. Restoration 1778-82

1. Colebrooke, vol.1 p.196.
2. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook, April 1778. He still
gave to charity. Ten guineas went to Fielding’s plan for the support of distressed boys.
3. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to Mrs. Graeme, 15 January 1778.
4. H.M.S.C. Palk MSS., no. 189, Stephen Sulivan to Robert Palk, n.d., but 1774.
5. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to Mrs. Graeme, 15 January 1778.
6. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, on 6 April and 13 April 1778.
7. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to R.J. Sulivan, circa. February 1778.
8. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 January 1778.
9. Ibid.
10. Trevor-Roper, passim.
11. Maclean [2], passim.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., quoting Macpherson MSS. 4/28, James to John Macpherson 5 April 1776.
14. Ibid. passim.
15. Add. MSS. 29140, ff.279-80, John Macpherson to Hastings, 17 April 1778.
16. Maclean [2], passim.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. Quotes Macpherson MSS. 41/10.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. See also I.O.L. MSS. Eur. 64. Loose Papers 61, No.1, John Bristow to P. Francis,
29 February 1788 for a pen-portrait of John Macpherson.
25. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 28 December 1778.
27. Ibid.
28. In 1780 he proposed to Hillsborough (Secretary of State for the Southern
Department) that islands in the Celebes and Mindanao chain should have Company
settlements.
29. Add. MSS. 29147, ff.12-15, L. Sulivan to W, Hastings, 6 February 1781.
30. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. 29149, ff.98-101, Sulivan to Hastings, 2 June 1781.
34. Ibid. 29146, ff.175-7, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 23 October 1980.
35. I.O.R. General Court Minutes, vol. 6, p.124, 17 June 1781.
36. Add. MSS. 29152, ff.429-41, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 January 1782.
37. De Bertodano Papers, n.p., L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 20 January 1782.
38. A ‘bargain’ was concluded with the Clavering family. If they kept quiet, the
Hastings group would not oppose any settlement made. It was accepted.
39. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 10 June 1778.
40. Ibid.
41. Add. MSS. 29143, ff.245-6, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 May 1779.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Sulivan to Sir Elijah Impey, 15 January 1778.
46. Add. MSS. 29147, f.300. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 6 February 1781.
47. Ibid. He gave Hastings free reign ‘to win against the Poona Marathas’.
48. Ibid. 29149, ff.242-9, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 8 June 1781.
49. Ibid. 29150, ff.100-101, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 August 1781.
50. Ibid. 29151, f.424. Copy of P. Francis to L. Sulivan, 12 November 1781.
51. Dodwell [5], p.143, 9 July 1782.
52. B.L. Add. MSS. 29149, f.176-7, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 2 June 1781.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid. ff.242-9, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 8 June 1781.
55. Ibid. John Motteux was his middleman. The scheme proved successful.
15. Transformation 1780-84

1. Add. MSS. 29144, ff.33-4, Sulivan to Hastings, 5 February 1780.
2. Ibid. 29147, f.246. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 11 April 1781.
3. I.O.R. General Court Minutes, vol. 6, ff.56-71, 15 May 1781. Army suspicions
forced old recruitment methods; only 1,000 men were allowed on standby; double
when at war.
4. E.U.L. Laing MSS, La 11, 624, Col. Goddard to Sulivan, Bombay, 20 November
1781. He said Sulivan was ‘a person whose whole life has been devoted to promote
the interests of the public, and who has himself rendered such eminent services to the
Company and his country’.
5. Add. MSS. 29149, ff.175-6, Sulivan to Hastings, 2 June 1781.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. N.L.S. Minto MSS. Hippisley Papers. I.E. 93 n. p. J. Coxe-Hippisley to Caillaud, 1
September 1782.
9. See Sutherland, L.S. & Woods, J. passim. In 1769 William Burke and Verney faced a
loss of £53,000 (£23,000 each on this deal alone) which ruined them.
10. Nottingham University, Portland MSS. L. Sulivan to Fletcher 9 October 1780;
enclosed in Fletcher's letter to Portland, 14 October 1780. Portland made a revealing
comment: ‘The original author of this illuminating report [Laurence Sulivan]
possesses great talents, but he presumes too much.’
11. Ibid.
12. Copeland, vol.4, p.316, Edmund Burke to Hillsborough and Stormont, l9 October
l780.
13. See Sutherland [5], passim.
14. Ibid.; and Fraser, pp.154-215 passim.

15. Quoted in Feiling, p.297.
16. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. Stephen Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
17. Add. MSS. 29156, ff.449-453, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 November 1782.
18. De Bertodano Papers, Stephen Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
19. Sulivan was also being misled and corrupted by the Macphersons, whose deceit
had not yet been uncovered.
20. Add. MSS. 29162, ff.291-5, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 1 March 1784.
21. N.L.S. Minto MSS. Hippisley Papers. I.E. 93, n.p. J. Coxe-Hippisley to J. Caillaud,
1 September 1782.
22. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, L. Sulivan’s ‘Letterbook’ to S. Sulivan, April
1778.
23 De Bertodano Papers, n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
24 Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778 and 6 April 1778.
25. Ibid.
1778.
27. Ibid. The Nawab was to understand that this publication really would be his
father’s own work.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. Stephen was to ensure his position ‘should at least equal that of (the
untrustworthy) Mr. Frederick Stuart’.
30. Agents from 1771 to 1793 were: Lindsay, Harland, Macleane & Johnson,
Frederick Stuart, Jas. & John Macpherson, Jas. Macpherson & Nathaniel Wraxall, Jas.
& John Macpherson.
31. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 28 December 1778.
1778.
33. Ibid
34. Ibid.
35. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 12 June 1778.
36. Add. MSS. 29143, f. 246, Sulivan to Hastings, 15 May 1779.
37. Ibid. 29144, f.152, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 6 November 1779.
38. The long delay in repayment might be tied to the split between Mrs. Hastings and
Mrs. Stephen Sulivan late in 1781.
39. Ibid. 29194, ff.98-100, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, June 1781.
40. Ibid.
41. De Bertodano MSS. n.p. S. Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
42. Bodl. Eng. Hist. Sulivan MSS, c.471, L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 28 February 1784.
Copy of Stephen Sulivan’s appointment as Judge Advocate, 30 October 1780. [See
also B.L. Add. MSS. 29149, ff.244-49, Sulivan to Hastings, 8 June 1781].
43. Hastings suffered a reprimand in 1782; and it was also brought up at his
Impeachment (charges 9 and 10).
44. Even after Sulivan’s death in 1786 the money from these bonds had not been
realised.
45. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778. Stephen
was to demand immediate payment, but to give him time to pay if needed.
46. Ibid.
47. £10,000 of this would go towards paying Stephen’s debts in Britain.
48. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 27 February 1778.
49. Ibid.
50. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, f.29, L. Sulivan’s ‘Letterbook’ to Stephen
Sulivan, April 1778.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
16. Personal Loss and Political Revival 1781-83
1. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, ff.39-42, L. Sulivan’s Letterbook to his son,
April 1778.
2. Add. MSS. 29152, f.456. Excerpt from a letter of L. Sulivan, 5 June 1781, contained
in a letter from Richard Joseph Sulivan to W. Hastings, 22 January 1782.
3. Ibid. 29149, ff.174-8, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 2 June 1781.
4. Ibid. 29152, ff.429-41, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 January 1782.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Magnus, p.126.
8. P.R.O. (N. Ireland), D.O.D. 572/19/84, Thos. Allan to Ld. Macartney, 8 June
1782.
9. Ibid.
10. Add. MSS. 29156, ff.449-53, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 28 November 1782. A
portrait was painted by Tilly Kettle in 1767, a miniature by Richard Crosse in 1778.
She left an Owen family bible, which went to Stephen’s wife.
11. Bodl. Sulivan MSS. Eng. Hist. c.269, f.30, Laurence Sulivan’s Letterbook to
Stephen Sulivan, April 1778.
12. Ibid.
13. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan 10 November 1784. He
allowed Major Scott to live there, though nothing was to be moved.
14. Ibid.
16. Ibid. 29147, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 5 January 1781.
17. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. S. Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
18. Add. MSS. 29147, ff. 143-4, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 21 August 1781.
19. Ibid.
20. Accusations made were of: restoring John Macpherson; screening Impey; delaying
a despatch (affecting Patna prisoners); maltreatment of Maratha agents in London.
21. Copeland, vol.5, p.334, E. Burke to T. L. O'Byrne, 30 January 1781.
22. Ibid., vol.5, p.447, E. Burke to W. Burke, 25 April 1782.
23. See also Cone, pp.111-118.
24. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 July 1783.
25. Ibid.
26. Lawson, Sir C, p.80.
27. Parkes & Merivale, vol.2, p.216.
28. Add. MSS. 29156, ff.449-453, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 12 to 28 November
1782.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. I.O.L. Eur. MSS. E.19, Francis MSS. 54, ‘Letters from Francis 1781-2’, f.42,
Francis to Ducarel, 7 December 1782.
35. Ibid.
36. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 July 1783.
37. Ibid., n. p. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 26 December 1783.
38. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to John Macpherson, 26 December 1783.

39. Ibid., n. p. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 26 December 1783.
40. Ibid.
17. Closing of an Era 1782-86
1. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to Wheler, 26 December 1783.
2. Ibid., n. p., L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 10 November 1784.
3. Add. MSS. 29162, f.294, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 1 March 1784.
4. De Bertodano Papers, n.p., L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 11 October 1784.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Furber [2], p.483, Atkinson to Dundas, 22 July 1784.
9. Add. MSS. 29163, John Scott to Hastings, 24 April 1784.
10. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 11 October 1784.
12. Ibid. 29163, f.230, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 27 April 1784.
13. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. L. Sulivan to Stephen Sulivan, 10 November 1784.
14. Bodl. MSS. Eng. Hist. C.111, f.43, Lord Macartney to L. Sulivan, 27 September
1782.
15. Ibid., ff.60-3, Lord Macartney to John Sulivan, 30 March 1783.
16. Ibid.
17. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. Lord Macartney to L. Sulivan, 10 August 1783.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., n.p. Lord Macartney to L. Sulivan, 14 October 1783. .
20. De Bertodano Papers, n. p., L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 10 November 1784.
21. Ibid.
22. P.R.O. (London), Chatham Papers, vol.356. Quoted in Philips, C.H. [4], sub-
section, ‘The Opposition of the Indian Interest, 1784-88’, p.37.
23. Ibid.
24. See Philips, C.H. [4], pp. 38-41. Three categories were formed: the Consolidated
Loan of 1767; the Cavalry Loan of 1777; and the Consolidated Loan of 1777.
25. Ibid. pp. 40-41. See especially p.40, footnote 1: that Sulivan secretly gave the
papers to Debrett, who published them.
26. P.R.O. (N. Ireland), DS 572/10, Sulivan to Macartney, Hanover Square, 16 March
1785.
27. Ibid.
28. Add. MSS. 29168, ff.223-4, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 16 March 1785.
29. Stuart, Bute’s protégé, filled the first vacancy. Also, Dundas’ dependant Edward
Hay and Stephen being friendly resulted in Hay being made Secretary at Bengal, via
Sulivan.
30. De Bertodano Papers, S. Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
31. Ibid. This grandson, named Laurence, was to marry Elizabeth Temple,
Palmerston’s sister. He was to become the Prime Minister’s great friend and an Under
Secretary of War.
32. Ibid., n.p., L. Sulivan to S. Stephen Sulivan, 20 January 1782. Stephen owed
money: to Sir Horace Mann (£1, 800 was already paid); Thomas Lane (Younger); Mr.
Jekyll; & Mary Barwell.
33. Ibid., n.p., L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 28 February 1784.
34. Ibid., n.p., L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 10 November 1784.
35. Add. MSS. 29170, ff.121-2, John Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 9 July 1786.
36. Hansard, vol.7, pp.366-414, 30 May 1806. Speech by John Sulivan.
37. Ibid.
38. In 1772 he received £1,375, based on this land; in 1775 he received portion of
another (shared) lot. Title to the remainder came in 1783. 66,000 acres were
expropriated (with compensation) by the Prince Edward Island legislature in the mid-
1870s. The money was paid to his Great grand-daughter, Charlotte Antonia Sulivan.
18. Endings 1784-86

1. Add. MSS. 29162, f.131, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 12 February 1784.
2. Ibid. 29166, f.123, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 15 September 1784.
3. See also Philips, C.H. [4], pp. 41-44.
4. Copeland, vol.5, p.208. Edmund Burke to G. L. Staunton, 7 April 1785. See also
Philips, C.H. [4], p.49.
5. See also Philips, C.H. [4], pp. 44-45.
6. Among various others were: the ‘Bombay Plan’; ‘B’s’ plan; ‘Townson’s’; and ‘Call’s’.
[See also Philips [4], pp. 46-47].
7. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 10 January 1778.
8. Mackay, p.534.
9. Quoted in Lawson & Philips, p.239.
10. De Bertodano Papers, n.p., L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, 20 July 1783. ‘Rooted
affliction and the weakness of my eyes has for some time rendered me tardy’.
11. Ibid.
12. De Bertodano Papers, n.p. Lord Macartney to Stephen Sulivan, 3 August 1783. In
August 1783 a Mr. Toone informed Macartney that he was recovering.
13. Ibid., n.p. L. Sulivan to S. Sulivan, 10 November 1784
14. Ibid.
15. Add. MSS. 39880, vol.x, (8 September 1785–31 December 1787), W. Hastings’
Diary, ff.6–18.
16. Ibid.
17. The London Chronicle, vol.33, Tuesday, 21 February 1786; the Public Advertiser, Wed.
22 February 1786; The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser for Friday 24 February
1786.
18. Add. MSS. 39880, vol.x, (8 Sept. 1785 – 31 Dec.1787), W. Hastings’ Diary, f.19.
19. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. John Caillaud to Stephen Sulivan, 26 February 1786.
[See also John Sulivan’s tribute made in the Commons in 1806].
20. De Bertodano Papers, n. p. S. Sulivan to L. Sulivan, 1 December 1782.
21. The ‘Letterbook’ to his son is true in what it says; as were his published pamphlets
dealing with the public domain, such as his: History of the Administration of the Leader.
22. Add.MSS. 29194, f.89, L. Sulivan to W. Hastings, no date, but 1773.
23. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.808, f.141, Sulivan to Eyre Coote, 16
March 1761.
24. Philips, C.H. [2], p.462. ‘He (Sulivan) emerges with credit, standing firm in
defence of the Company as an independent trading concern against the incursions…
of the state.’
25. Bayley, p.198 and 199-234 passim.
26. See James, p.219. He makes almost the same point – without reference to Sulivan.
Bibliography
Primary Manuscript Sources

Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
Papers of Laurence Sulivan: Eng. Hist. b.190; b.191; c.237; c.269; c.270; c.271; c.471;
c.472. Macartney MSS. Eng. Hist. c.82; c.111. Vansittart MSS. f.78.
British Library London.
Add. MSS: 5143, 5147, 16260, 18409, 18464, 24611, 28211, 29126, 29128, 29131 to
29156, 29159 to 29163, 29165 to 29168, 29170, 29172, 29173, 29175, 29178, 29193,
29194, 32892, 32896, 32929, 32934, 32935, 32944, 32948, 32980, 34686, 35636,
38198, 38201, 38309, 38337, 38458. Warren Hastings: Diary: 39879 to 39891, 39903.
Clive Papers – 44061. Papers of Henry Fox, Lord Holland (Holland House): 51378,
51379, 51388, 51398, 51431 to 51434. Pamphlets: 100.n.20; 101.n.25.
Bury St. Edmunds & West Suffolk Record Office.
Folios 423, and 446 to 448.
Bute Manuscripts Mountstuart Isle of Bute.
Correspondence of John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute: folios 139-40, 175, 186-8, 205, 276-
7, 522-524, 633-634, 642, 643.
De Bertodano (Private Collection).
Papers belonging to Mr. Martin De Bertodano (These are authentic transcripts of the
correspondence of Laurence Sulivan. The original manuscripts of most are now held
in the Bodleian Library, Oxford and the British Library, London; but for many the
originals have disappeared).
Devon County Record Office.
Bedford MSS.; Burgage Records of Ashburton; ‘Brief for the Honourable John Harris
Esqr. and the Honourable Thomas Walpole Esq.’
Devon and Exeter Institutions Library, Exeter.
Petition of the Freeholders of Ashburton, 1761.
Dublin Castle Record Office.
Betham Will Abstracts - MSS. G.O. 278(Ball); Professor Wardell’s Correspondence
with the Chief Herald, Dublin Castle.
Dublin City Library.
Gilbert Collection - Beltz MSS. Manuscript collection of evidence relating to the
family of O'Sullivan More, the result of an expedition to Ireland by the genealogist G.
Beltz in 1802.
East Suffolk Record Office.
Martin family of Hemingstone Papers, HA 13/A/1-15.
Edinburgh University Library.
Laing MSS. La. 11,73,77, 77 Div.2, 105,111,364,477; Strachey MSS. (Copies from the
Principal of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford): letters to Clive 1765 - l775; letters to H.
Strachey 1764 – 1770.
Exeter Record Office.
Manuscripts of Mark Kennaway (solicitor), Kennaway Documents, 58/9, Box 104,
Item 6; Haldon Trust: Palk MSS. boxes 2, 104, 159, 169, 239, 242, 246.
Greater London Record Office, Westminster.
Records of St. Mary, Whitechapel.
305
306 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guildhall Library.
‘The St. James’ Register’.
Hertford (County) Record Office.
Carlisle MSS. - D/Ex 2-7. Session Books, 1752-1799 ['Presentation Book,’ Vol. l].
Historical Manuscripts Commission
Abergavenny MSS. ; Charlemont MSS. ; Laing MSS. ; Ormonde MSS. ; Palk MSS. ;
Portland MSS.
Holborn Public Library, London.
Original Rate Books for St. Andrew Holborn and St. George the Martyr; Rates
(Holborn); ‘Highway Rate’.
House of Lords Record Office, London.
Journals of the House of Lords. ‘The Petition and Appeal of Rawson Hart Boddam
and Stackhouse’, dated 7 February 1786. Judicial Records of the House of Lords.
India Office Library, London.
Manuscripts:
Eur. 6.4. Loose Papers 61, No.1; Eur. Eng MSS. Photographs: 63, 162, 638 et passim -
Johnstone letters. (From Pultney Papers in the Henry L. Huntingdon Library,
California); Eur. 302/1 - Letterbook of John Spencer; Eur. 302/2 - Letterbook of
Mrs. Adriana Spencer; Eur. D.535 - Letterbook of Robert Barwell; Eur. D/546.
Ormathwaite Collection; MSS. Eur. E.13A, Philip Francis Papers: MSS. Eur. E.15,
MSS. Eur. E.16, Eur. MSS. E.19, ‘Letters from Francis 1781-2’; Eur. E.23, No.66, P.
Francis’ Journal; Eur. MSS. 54 Francis MSS, Eur.E.379/4, Eur.E.379/8.
Microfilm, reel 1542 - Macartney Papers; (Microfilm) Eur. MSS. reel 625.
O.V. – (Orme Various) vols. 1.7, 21, 22, 28, 32.1, 37, 40.l, 63.26, 124, 147.8, 158.2,
159, 202, 214, 217, 222, 271.1, 293; vols. J, J.28, X. 202-64.
Powis MSS. Box 3.
Records:
Abstracts Coast & Bay, vol. l. Bengal Abstracts, vols. l & 2. Bengal Baptisms 1713 -
1800. Bengal Births, Marriages, Burials 1713-54. Bengal Civilians - 0/6/21 to 0/6/29.
Bengal Despatches, passim. Bombay Abstract Letters Received 1723-32, and 1751-62.
Bombay Baptisms 1709-1800. Bombay Burials 1709-1800. Bombay Civil Servants
1712-52. Bombay Civilians - 0/6/32 to 0/6/35. Bombay, Copies of Wills registered in
the Mayor’s Court 1738-45. Bombay Despatches, vols.1 to 6; Bombay Diary. Bombay
Ecclesiastical Returns 1709-57. Bombay European Inhabitants 1719-22. Bombay
Journal 1739-41. Bombay Letters Received 1709-25, 1735-58. Bombay Marriages
1709-1800. Bombay Proceedings 1729-32. Bombay Public Consultations 1730-52.
Bombay, Register of Proceedings of the Mayor’s Court. Bond Book of Company
Servants Abroad. Committee of Correspondence Memoranda, vols. 15 to 23.
Committee of Correspondence Reports, vols. 6 to 8. Court Books, vols.45 to 78, 80,
81, 86, 89 to 94. Despatches from England. European Inhabitants Bombay, 1719-92.
European Inhabitants Madras, 1702-1780. General Court Minutes, vols. 2 to 7.
General Court Minutes - Elections of Directors 1702-1846. Haileybury Records -
Writer's Petitions 1763-4. Home Miscellaneous Series, vols: 82, 96, 118, 153, 154, 191,
192, 208, 214, 322, 369A, 462, 614, 764, 788, 808, 809. Madras Civil Servants, 1702-
75. Madras Civilians. Madras Despatches, passim. Madras Register of Baptisms and
Burials, vol. l. Madras Marriages 1698-1800. Marine Records-L/Mar/B;
L/Mar./C/605H; L/Mar./C/644; L/Mar./C/651. Register of Commands 1737-1832.
Miscellaneous Letters Received, vol. 29. ORB 50/15, dated 12 December 1752.
Personal Records, passim. Petitions, passim. Press List of the Ancient Records of the
Government of India, ‘Fort William Minutes of Consultations’, vol.4. Records of the
Accountant General’s Department. Stock holders and Stock purchased 1718 to 1761.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 307
Records of Fort St. George, Madras; Diary and Consultation Books. Stock and
Bonds, Stock Transfer Books (1753-1786), General Stock Ledgers L/AG/14/5/3-12
et passim; L/AG/14/7/l. Sumatra Records, vol. 8. Surat Factory Records, vols.
23,33,34,37,38. Tracts (Bound), no.487. Writers Petitions. J/1/1-15. Microfilms:
George and John Johnstone Letters, MSS. Eur. Photo. 63. Verelst's Europe Letter
Books, MSS. Eur. Photo.606.
National Library of Ireland
Doneraile Papers; vol.23; Kings Inns Admissions Papers, pp.458-69, 468-69
National Library of Scotland.
Minto Papers: MSS. EFP 3, 10, 15-17, 41 et passim; MSS. 11001 to 11005, 11018,
11027, 11041 et passi; Minto MSS. Hippisley Papers. I.E. 93. Small Collections - MSS.
1006, 1026; Andrew Stuart Papers–Stuart Stevenson Papers: Castlemilk and Torrance
Muniments: MSS. 5330, 5381 to 5386, 5346, 5388, 5391, 5400, 8250, 8251, 8256,
8278, 8280, 8326, 8327, 8352, 8404, 9246; C/959, Tracts on India Affairs; Pamphlets:
no.2/133; no.3/637; MSS. 1694.
National Library of Wales Aberystwyth.
Powis MSS. (Papers deposited by the late George Charles 4th Earl of Powis); Clive
Papers.
National Register of Archives.
The Bute Papers, Nos. 29, 64, 65; The Shelburne/Henry Fox Correspondence, Nos.
56, 57, held in West Register House, Edinburgh.
North Riding Record Office.
Affidavit by Robert and Duncan Clerk, London 10 May 1769.
Nottingham University
Portland MSS: P.W.F. MSS. PWF l0359; 10360; 10364.
Public Record Office (Ireland), Dublin.
Betham Genealogical Abstracts, Prerogative Admonitions, Marriages, Wills; Calendar
of Converts; Diocese Bonds and Wills for Cork; Groves Abstracts; Indexes to Cork
and Ross Wills, Prerogative Grants, Diocese Bonds; Philips MSS, vols.46,62,63.
m.6282.
Public Record Office, London.
Chatham MSS. – 30/8/56; 30/8/60. Egremont MSS–30/47/20/2-3; 30/47/29.
Treasury Papers - T.49, documents 1-9. Ewan Law Papers - 30/12/17. Herbert MSS.
30/53. DS 572/10. Original Wills proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury: -
John Home, Captain Samuel Hough, Stephen Law, John Spencer, Benjamin Sullivan;
Administrations of Laurence Sulivan and Stephen Sulivan.
Public Record Office (Northern Ireland) Belfast.
Macartney Papers – D.O.D. D572/10; D.O.D. 572/19/21; D.O.D. 572/19/84.
Registry of Deeds, Dublin.
Memorials in vols. 167, 170, 175,189,201,211,242,248,301.
Royal Irish Academy Dublin.
O'Gorman MSS ‘A History of Kerry’; MSS ‘Distribution of Forfeited Land in the
Counties of Cork and Kerry’ - Returned by the Downe Survey.
Royal Society of Arts, London.
Minutes of the Society, vol.1; vol.15. Transactions by Dr. Temp1eman, vol.l. Guard
Books, vol. l, f.17, nos.124, 127. Subscription Book, 1754-63, passim.
John Rylands Library, Manchester.
Eng. MSS. 152,153,162.
Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.
Buccleuch MSS GD224; Clerk of Penicuik Muniments: GD18; Douglas MSS. vol. 2,
Entry 499/22; Elibank Papers: ‘William Young Correspondence, 1767-1814’ GD32;
308 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Graham Papers (Kinross House MSS) GD29; Melville Castle Muniments: GD32;
Macpherson of Cluny Papers: GD80; Also: GD 110; GD156; GD 240
Sheffield City Library.
FitzWilliam MSS. Correspondence of the 2nd Marquess of Rockingham and
Correspondence of Edmund Burke deposited by the Trustees of the Wentworth-
Woodhouse Estates: R.1-1443. [Especially R. 66, R.67, R.81, R. 86, R. 207, R.208].
Shropshire County Record Office
Powis MSS. 552/l/c.6.
Select List of Laurence Sulivan Publications

Address to the East India Proprietors respecting questions for ballot. (no date)
A Defence of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies and their
servants, against the Complaints of the Dutch East India Company. (1762)
A Defence of the Leader. (1765)
A Defence of Mr. Sulivan's Propositions with an answer to the objections against them, in a letter to
the Proprietors of East India Stock. (1767)
Plan for Augmenting the capital and extinguishing the debts of the East India Company. (1772)
Letters to the Proprietors. (1773)
An Analysis of the Political History of India. (1779)
On Martial Law. (1779)
A Letter to the Directors of the East India Company. (1784)
Laurence Sulivan was also responsible for a great deal of The East India Examiner.
Selected Printed Works

[All books below are cited by author’s surname. If an author has more than one work
quoted, then the surname is followed by a number [in sequence] distinguishing each
particular work. Authors with the same surname are differentiated by their initials.]
Allan, D.C.C., ‘The Contest for the Secretaryship 1769-70’, (Studies in the Society’s
Archives XXXVI-XXXVIX). In Journal of the Royal Society of Arts. vols. 112-113.
(August-December 1964).
Analecta Hibernica, Irish Manuscripts Commission. (1930)
Anson, Sir W. R., The Autobiography and Political Correspondence of Augustus Henry, 3rd
Duke of Grafton, K.G. (1898)
Arrowsmith, R. L., Charterhouse Register 1769–1872. (1974)
Bayley, C.A., ‘The British Military-Fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance: India 1750-
1820’, in Patrick Tuck, The East India Company 1600-1858. vol.5. (1998)
Bedford, E. C., St. George the Martyr, Queen Square. (1910)
Bence-Jones, M., Clive of India. (1974)
Bengal Past and Present, Journal of the Calcutta Historical Society. vol. 2, part 2; vol. 10;
vol.11.
Bolts, W., ‘Considerations on Indian Affairs’, in Patrick Tuck, The East India Company
1600-1858. vol.3. (1998)
Bowen, H.W. [1], ‘ “Dipped in the Traffic.” East India Stockholders in the House of
Commons 1768-1774’, in, Parliamentary History, vol.5. (1986)
___________ [2], Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757-1773.
(1991)
___________ [3], ‘Teas, Tribute and the East India Company c.1750-1775’, in S.
Taylor, R. Connors, C. Jones, Hanoverian Britain and Empire. (1998)
Bramwell, G., Table of Private Statutes, 1727-1812. (1813)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309
Brooke, J., The Chatham Administration. (1956)

Bryant G.J. [1], ‘The East India Company and its Army 1600–1778.’ (Ph.D. thesis,
London 1975)
_________ [2], ‘Officers of the East India Company’s Army in the Days of Clive and
Hastings’, in Patrick Tuck, The East India Company 1600-1858. vol.5.
(1998)
Buist, N.G., At Spes Non Fracta: Hope & Co. 1770-1815. (1974)
Cannon, J., The Whig Ascendancy. (1981)
Chandra, P., ‘The Relations Between the Court of Directors and the Board of
Commissioners for the Affairs of India 1784-1816.’ (Thesis submitted for the degree
of Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science. London 1932)
Chaudhuri, K.N. [1], ‘The English East India Company in the 17th and 18th
Centuries: A Pre-Modern Multinational Organisation’, in
Patrick Tuck, The East India Company 1600-1858. vol.4. (1998)
______________[2], ‘The English East India Company and its Decision Making’, in
Ballhatchet, K. & Harrison, J. [eds.], East India Company Studies.
Papers presented to Professor Sir Cyril Philips. (1986)
Chaudhuri, N. C., Clive of India: A Political and Psychological Essay.(1975)
Cheung, H. & Mu, L.H., ‘William Pitt and the Enforcement of the Commutation Act
1784-1788’, in English Historical Review, vol. lxxvi. (1961)
Christie, I.R., The Fall of North’s Ministry 1780-1782. (1958)
Clark, F.P., Edmund Burke. vol.1 1730-1784. (1998)
Colebrooke, Sir G., ‘Retrospection' or Reminiscences Addressed to my son Henry Thomas
Colebrooke Esquire, 2 vols. (1898)
Colley, L., Britons, Forging the Nation 1707-1837. (1992)
Cone, C.B., Burke and the Nature of Politics: The Age of the American Revolution. (1957)
Copeland, T.W. (ed.), The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. vols.1, 4, 5. (1958)
Cork Historical and Archaeological Society, Journal. (1898)
(The) Cosmopolitan Magazine, vol.3. (1889)
Cranmer-Byng, J.L., An Embassy to China. (1962)
Crowe, C.E., ‘Sir Philip Francis 1740 1818 - A Biography.’ (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Georgia, 1971)
Cushner, N.P. (ed.), Documents Illustrating the British Conquest of Manila, 1762-1763.
Camden Fourth Series, vol.8. (1971)
Cussans, J.E., History of Hertfordshire, Broadwater volume. (1878)
Dagliesh, W.H., The Company of the Indies in the Days of Dupleix. (1933)
Dasgupta, A., ‘Trade and Politics in 18th Century India’, in Patrick Tuck, The East India
Company 1600-1858. vol.4. (1998)
Datta, K.K., Fort William-India House Correspondence. vol. l (1748- 1756). (1958)
Davies, A.M., [1], Clive of Plassey. (1939)
___________[2], Warren Hastings. (1935)
Davies, C.C., [1], “The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney, Governor of
Madras (1781-85)”, Royal Historical Society, Camden, Third Series.
(lxxiii)
___________ [2], ‘Warren Hastings and Pitt the Younger’, in English Historical Review,
vol.70. (1955)
Dé, B., ‘Henry Dundas and the Government of India (1773-1801). A Study in
Constitutional Ideas’. (Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1961)
Dickson, P.G.M., The Financial Revolution in England. (1967)
(The Oxford) Dictionary of National Biography, vol.53. (2004)
Dodwell, H. [1], The Cambridge History of India. vol. 5. (1929)
310 BIBLIOGRAPHY
__________[2], Calendar of the Madras Despatches, 1754-1765. (1930)

__________[3], The Nabobs of Madras. (1926)
__________[4], Dupleix and Clive. (1949)
__________[5], Warren Hastings' Letters to Sir John Macpherson. (mcmxxii)
__________[6], ‘Warren Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic’, in English
Historical Review. vol. xl. (1975)
Douglas, J., Bombay and Western India, 2 vols. (1893)
Drew, B., The London Assurance. (1949)
Edwardes, M., Plassey, The Founding of an Empire. (1969)
Farrington, A., A Catalogue of the East India Ships’ Journals and Logs, 1600-1834. (2000)
Fawcett, Sir C. (ed.), East Indiamen: The East India Company's Maritime Service, by Sir Evan
Cotton. (1949)
Feiling, K., Warren Hastings. (1954)
Fitmaurice, Lord E., Life of William Earl of Shelburne, afterwards Marquess of Lansdowne,
with Extracts from his Papers and Correspondence. 3 vols. (1875)
Fitzroy-jones, I., ‘The Sulivans of India.’ In, The Genealogists Magazine, vol.6, no.11.
September 1934.
Forrest, Sir G.W. [1], Life of Lord Clive. 2 vols. (1918)
______________[2], Selections from the Letters Despatches and other State Papers preserved in
the Bombay Secretariat, Home Series. 2 vols. (1887)
______________[3], The Administration of Warren Hastings 1772-1785. (1892)
Foster, W., The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India 1615-19. (1926)
Fraser, T.G., ‘India 1780-86’, in P. Roebuck [ed.], Macartney of Lisanoure 1737-1806.
(1983)
Furber, H. [1], Bombay Presidency in the Mid-Eighteenth Century. (1965)
________ [2], ‘The East India Directors in 1784’, in, Journal of Modern History. vol.5.
1933)
_______ _[3], John Company at Work. (1948)
______ __[4], ‘The United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies, 1783-
96,’ in English Historical Review, vol.10.
_______ _[5], ‘Edmund Burke and India’, in Bengal Past and Present, vol.lxxxvl. (1757)
Gentlemans Magazine (New Series)
Gleig. G.R. [1], The Life of Robert 1st Lord Clive. (1848)
________ _[2], Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, 3 vols. (1841)
Greene, R., The Forty Eight Laws of Power. (2000)
Grier, S.C., The Letters of Warren Hastings to his Wife. (1905)
Grierson, E., The Imperial Dream. British Commonwealth & Empire: 1775-1969. (1972)
Gurney, J.D. [1], The Debts of the Nawab of Arcot, 1763-1776. (Oxford University
D.Phil. thesis 1968)
__________ [2], ‘Fresh Light on the Character of the Nawab of Arcot’, in,
Whiteman, A., Bromley, J.S. & Dickson, P.G.M. (eds.), Statesmen,
Scholars and Merchants. Essays in Eighteenth Century History. Presented to
Dame Lucy Sutherland. (1973)
Hamilton, G. H., Queen Square, its Neighbourhood and Its Institutions. (1926)
Hanham, H.J., ‘Ashburton as a Parliamentary Borough.’ The Devonshire Association.
Report on Transactions. vol. xcviii.
Hansard, T.C., & Cobbett, W. (eds.) The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest
Period to the year 1803. vols.14-17. (1813/4)
Hardy, C., Register of the East India Company's Shipping. (1799)
Hayward, A. L. (ed.), A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the most notorious
Pirates, by Capt. Charles Johnson. (1955)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 311
Hill, A.H., ‘Three Centuries of the Island’, a Historical Geography of Settlement and Agriculture
in Prince Edward Island, Canada. Appendix B. (1959)
Hill, S. C, Catalogue of Manuscripts in European Languages in the India Office Library, vol.11,
part 1, the Orme Collection. (1916)
Hodson, Major V.C.P., List of the Officers of the Bengal Army, 1758-1834. ( 1927)
Holwell, J. Z., Important Facts Regarding the East India Company's Affairs in Bengal. (1764)
Holzman, J. M., The Nabobs in England: A Study of the Returned Anglo-Indian l760-85.
(1926)
Hotblack, K., Chatham’s Colonial Policy: A study in the Fiscal and Economic Implications of the
Colonial Policy of the Elder Pitt. (1917)
James, L., The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. (1998)
John, A. H., ‘Insurance Investment and the London Money Market of the Eighteenth
Century.’ In Economica, new series, xx. (1953)
Johnstone, C.L., History of the Johnstones, 1191-1909. (1909)
Joslin, D.M., ‘London Private Bankers: 1720-1785,’ in Essays in Economic History,
vol.2, edited by E. M. Carus-Wilson. (1966).
Journals of the House of Commons. vol. xxix.
Jucker, N. S. (ed.), The Jenkinson Papers, 1760-1766. (1949)
Judd, G.P., Members of Parliament 1734-1832. (1955)
Kaye & Johnstone, European MSS. in the India Office Library. vol.2, part 2, Minor
Collections and Miscellaneous MSS. (1937)
Keay, J., The Honourable Company, A History of the English East India Company. ( 1991)
Khan, A. M., ‘Muhammed Reza Khan, Naib Nazim and Naib Diwan of Bengal, 1756-
1775’. (London University Ph.D. thesis 1966)
Laprade, W.T. (ed.), Parliamentary Papers of John Robinson 1774-1784. Camden 3rd Series,
vol.xxxliii. (1922)
Lawson, Sir C., The Private Life of Warren Hastings. (1905)
Lawson, P. [1], The East India Company: A History. (1993)
________ [2], ‘Parliament and the First East India Inquiry 1767’, in Parliamentary
History, vol.1 (1982)
Lawson, P. & Philips, J., ‘Our Execrable Banditti’, in Albion, vol.16, no.3.
Lenman, B. & Lawson, P., ‘Robert Clive, the “Black Jagir” and British Politics’, in The
Historical Journal, vol. 26, no. 4. (1983)
Lewis, W. (ed.), The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence. (1961)
(The) London Assurance, Minutes of the Court of Directors; Minute Books; Copy of Letters
1751-1805.
Love, H. D., Vestiges of Old Madras 1640-1800. 4 vols. (1913)
Low, C. R., History of the Indian Navy. 2 vols. (1877)
Macaulay, T. B., Lord Clive. (1898)
McGilvary, G.K. [1], ‘The Early Life and Career of Laurence Sulivan, 1713-1765’. (M.
Litt. thesis, Edinburgh University, 1978)
___________ _ [2], ‘East India Patronage and the Political Management of
Scotland, 1720-1774’. (Ph.D. thesis, Open University (1989)
Mackay, J.A. (ed.), The Complete Works of Robert Burns. (1988)
Maclean, J.N.M. [1], Reward is Secondary: The Life of a Political Adventurer and an Inquiry
into the Mystery of “Junius”. (1963)
____________ [2], ‘The Early Political Careers of James ‘Fingal’ Macpherson
(1736-1796) and Sir John Macpherson, Bart. (1744-1821)’.
(Edinburgh University Ph.D. thesis, 1967)
Magnus, Sir P., Edmund Burke, A Life. (1939)
Malcolm, Sir J., The Life of Robert Lord Clive. 3 vols. (1836)
312 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marshall, P.J. [1], Problems of Empire: Britain and India, l757-l813. (1968)
________ [2], ‘British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century;’ A Historical
Revision, in, History, vol.60. (1975)
__________ [3], East Indian Fortunes, The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century.
(1976)
__________ [4], The Impeachment of Warren Hastings. (1965)
___________[5], [ed.], ‘The Eighteenth Century’, in The Oxford History of the British
Empire, vol.2. (1998)
___________[6], ‘Burke and India’, in Crowe, I, [ed.], Edmund Burke, His Life and
Legacy. (1997)
Miller, J. L., The History of the Rise and Progress of the Church and Parish of St. George the
Martyr, Holborn. (1881)
Monckton-Jones, M. E., Warren Hastings in Bengal 1772-4. (1918)
Morris, D.B. [1], Mile End Old Town 1740-1780. (2002)
__________ [2], ‘Mile End Old Town and the East India Company’, in East London
Record, no.9. (1986)
Namier, Sir L. [1], The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III. 2nd edition.
(1965)
___________ [2], England in the Age of the American Revolution. (1966)
Namier, Sir L. & Brooke, J., The History of Parliament. 1754-1790. 3 vols. (1964)
Nightingale, P., Trade and Empire in Western India 1784-1806. (1970)
Noble, W.F., History of the Manors of Ponsbourne and Newgate Street alias Tolmers Bedwell -
alias Bedwell Louth - in the Parishes of Hertford and Essendon Hertfordshire. (1879)
Norris, J., Shelburne and Reform. (1963)
O’Brien, C.C., The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of
Edmund Burke. (1994)
O'Hart, J., Irish Pedigrees. vol. l. (1915)
Page, W. (ed.), Victoria History of England. (1907)
Pandy, B. N., ‘Sir Elijah Impey in India 1774-1783’. (Thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London. S.O.A.S. 1958)
Parker, J.G., ‘The Directors of the East India Company, 1754-1790’. (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Edinburgh, 1977)
Parkes, J. & Merivale, H., Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis with Correspondence and Journals. 2
vols. (1867)
Paurvels, L. & Bergier, J., The Dawn of Magic. (1963)
Peters, M, The Elder Pitt. (1998)
Philips, C.H. [1], Handbook of Oriental History. (1963)
__________ [2], Review of L. S. Sutherland, ‘East India Company in Eighteenth
Century Politics,’ in English Historical Review, no.70. (July, 1955)
__________ [3], ‘The Secret Committee of the East India Company,’ in Bulletin of
the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol.l0, part 2. (1940)
__________ [4], The East India Company 1784-1834. (1961)
__________ [5], ‘The East India Company Interest and the English Government
1783-4,’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, vol.XX.
(1937)
Philips, J., ‘A Successor to the Moguls: The Nawab of the Carnatic and the East India
Company, 1763-1785’, in Patrick Tuck, The East India Company 1600-1858. vol.4.
(1998)
Prendergast, J., ‘History of the O'Sullivans’, in Cork Historical and Archaeological Society
Journal, vols. 4 (1898); 5 (1899); 6. (1900)
Prinivasachari, C.S. (ed.), Fort William–India House Correspondence. vol.4. (1764-66)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 313
Prinsep, C.C., Record of the Services of the Honourable East India Company's Civil Servants
1741-1858. (1885)
Records of Fort St.George, Madras, ‘Diary and Consultation Books’. (1932)
Register of Admissions to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple’, vol.1.
(1501-1781)
Register of Burials, Cemetery of St. George the Martyr, Queen Square.
Reports from Committees of the House of Commons. vols.5 and 6. (1782-83)
Riddy, J., ‘Warren Hastings: Scotland’s Benefactor’, in G. Carnall & C. Nicholson
(eds.), The Impeachment of Warren Hastings. (1989)
Saunders, T.B., The Life and Letters of James MacPherson. (1895)
Sethi, R.R., Fort William–India House Correspondence. vol.3. (1760-63)
Shearer, T., ‘Crisis and Change in the Development of the East India Company’s
Affairs, l760-1773’. (Ph.D. thesis. University of Oxford, 1976).
Sinha, H.N., Fort William-India House Correspondence. vol.2 (1757-1759). (1957)
Spear, P. [1], Master of Bengal: Clive and his India. (1975)
_______ [2], The Nabobs. (1932)
Spencer, A., (ed.), Memoirs of William Hickey. 4 vols. (1913)
Spencer, F., (ed.), The Fourth Earl of Sandwich: Diplomatic Correspondence 1763-1765.
(1961)
Supple, B., The Royal Exchange Insurance: a History of British Insurance 1720–1970. (1970)
Sutherland, L.S, [1], The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics. 2nd edition.
(1962)
_____________[2], ‘The East India Company and the Peace of Paris’, in English
Historical Review, vol.62. (1947)
_____________[3], A London Merchant 1695-1774. (1933)
_____________[4], ‘Lord Shelburne and East India Company Politics’, 1766-69, in
English Historical Review, vol.49. (1934)
_____________[5], ‘Lord Macartney’s Appointment as Governor of Madras, 1780:
The Treasury in East India Company Elections’, in English
Historical Review, vol. xc. (July 1975)
_____________[6], ‘The Resignation on Behalf of Warren Hastings, 1776: George
Vansittart’s Evidence’, in A. Newman (ed.), Politics and Finance in
the Eighteenth Century. (1984)
_____________[7], ‘The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration,
1756-7’, in A. Newman (ed.), Politics and Finance in the Eighteenth
Century. (1984)
Sutherland, L.S. & Woods, J., ‘The East India Speculations of William Burke’, in A.
Newman (ed.), Politics and Finance in the Eighteenth Century. (1984)
Sutton, J, Lords of the East: The East India Company and its ships (1600-1874). (2000)
Srinivasachari, K.D., Fort William–India House Correspondence, vols. 1-6.
(1957 to 1960)
Taylor, W.S. & Pringle, J.H. (eds.), Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. 4 vol.
(mdcccxl)
Tomlinson, J. (ed.), Additional Grenville Papers, l763-1765. (1962)
Trevor-Roper, H., ‘The Ossian Forgeries’, in The Spectator. (16 March 1985)
Weitzman, S., Warren Hastings and Philip Francis. (1929)
Williams, B., Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. 2 vols. (1913)
Wylly, Col. H.C., A Life of Lt. Gen. Sir Eyre Coote K. B. (1922)
Yapp, M.E., ‘The Brightest Jewel’, in Ballhatchet, K. & Harrison, J.[eds.], East India
Company Studies. Papers presented to Professor Sir Cyril Philips. (1986)
Glossary
[Signified in the text by * asterix]
‘Arcot Interest’: Madras Councillors and their associates in Parliament and in the
Company benefiting from involvement in the Nawab of Arcot’s debts.
Assignment of the Carnatic Revenues: This was the annual sum due from four of the
Nawab of Arcot’s districts, assigned to the debt-ridden Madras government in
October 1781.
Batta was an allowance given to officers in the field, but was generally applied to all
ranks. The officers obtained the revenues from the cultivation of land reserved for
that use.
A begah approximated to one third of an acre.
Bills of exchange: Rupees were paid into a settlement’s treasury in India; the
equivalent sum, in sterling, was recovered by an agent in London after the sales.
Charter parties were the signatories (ship’s owners as well as master) who agreed with
the Company to the terms of the hire of a ship.
Comptoirs: This alluded to factories or trading settlements during the peace
negotiations with France between 1761 and 1763.
Country trade (Coastal trade): The term used to signify European commerce with
Indian peoples and merchants throughout the East Indies. The normal commerce was
in peppers and spices, silks and betel nut, indigo, cotton and saltpetre. This exchange
was distinct from the traffic of goods to and from India and Europe carried by
EastIndiamen.
Dastak: The passport or permit granted to the Company to trade.
Directors: Proprietors who owned £2,000 of Company stock chosen by ballot at
Company election in April each year (until 1774).
Diwani: The right to receive the revenue-collections of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.
Durbar: The term used to describe a Nawab’s court.
EastIndiamen: Company registered ships that had the monopoly of sailing from
London to the East Indies and return.
Factor: The second appointment in the Company’s civil service in the settlements
abroad.
Firman: The imperial grant confirming the right to trade.
Free Merchant (Free trader): European (usually British) merchants involved in the
country (or coastal) trade along the coasts of India and in the Indies in general. No
commerce was allowed with Europe.
General Letters: Official communications from the Directors in London to the
Presidencies; and the same from the Governor and Council of each Presidency to
India House.
Investment: Funds required that were gathered by each settlement in order to
purchase goods that were later sold in London.
315
316 GLOSSARY
Jagir: This was a quit-rent paid for territory. It was ‘A tenure common under Mughal
rule, in which the revenues of a given tract of land along with the power of
government were made over to a servant of the state. The assignment was either
conditional or unconditional, usually for life, lapsing, on the holder’s death, to the
state.’
Lakh: A sum of rupees worth approximately £12,500.
Leadenhall (Street): Location of India House, Company headquarters.
Mayor’s Courts were established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta in 1726. Each
Court consisted of a Mayor and nine Aldermen, seven of whom were to be natural
born British subjects.
Pagoda: The gold coin formerly minted at Madras, named thus because of the temple
device on its face.
Pargana: Sub-division of a district, including many villages.
Permanent Bottoms: came to mean a vested right by owners and/or commanders to
have a ship in the Company’s service.
Perpetuity of Command: came to mean a vested right by a commander to a right of
command. It became a ‘property’ to sell, with control over appointments, a
monopoly.
Phirmaund: letters patent. Mughal authorisation.
Proprietors: Owners of East India stock.
Rupees: In the mid-eighteenth century a rupee was worth between two and three
shillings sterling.
Sepoys: The name given to Indian troops.
Ship’s Husband: For purposes of organisation one of the owners chosen as
managing-owner, agent, or, as he was usually called, ‘ship’s husband’. He was
responsible for supervising the building, fitting and sailing of the ship and had to keep
complete accounts. These were incorporated into those kept by the master and purser
during the voyage and presented by the ship’s husband at a meeting of the owners
when the ship returned.
Shipping interest: A body whose main concern was to perpetuate the Company as a
trading monopoly; and also held strong views on state intervention. It took a decisive
part, especially under the ship’s husband in the election of directors.
Subadari: Military government of a Province. This meant ownership and
administration of the area as well as military overlordship.
Supercargo: He looked after the ship’s manifest, handling freight charges and the
purchasing and sale of goods on board. Although not one of the crew, he would have
appeared on the ship’s muster.
Writer: This was the lowest rank in the Company’s civil service in the Presidencies
abroad.
Zamindari: Revenue collecting powers.
Index
Achin, 231 Barwell, Richard, 172, 190-192, 203,

Adair, Mr., 234 206, 225, 229, 243, 247, 258
Adams, Major Thomas, 75 Barwell, Roger, 172
Adams, Robert, 36 Barwell, William, 123, 139, 151, 172,
Aldergrove, Captain William, 235 198
Alexander, John, 247 Batson, Mr., 85
Allan, Thomas, 246 Beale, Sarah (wife of Captain James
America, 184, 203, 229, 235, 244 Irwin), 4
American Colonies, 184, 204, 209, Becher, Edward, 253
232, 240, 252, 260, 268, 277 Becher, Richard, 188, 201
Amyand bank, 29-30 Beckford, Alderman William, 152,
Amyand, George, 80, 112, 123, 136 155
Amyatt, Peter, 75, 105, 128, 132 Bedford, Duke of, 100
Angria, Kohanji, Maratha Admiral, 7, Bencoolen, 79, 80, 121
17 Benfield, Paul, 215-216, 224, 235,
Anson, Lord, First Lord of the 237-238, 258, 261
Admiralty, 61, 117 Bengal Club, 96
‘Arcot interest’, 216, 237-238, 253, Bengal: events 1757-65, 72-76, 79,
258-259, 261-262, 267 133-134; autonomy and loss of
Ashburton, 25, 78, 111, 113-119 control, 81-86, 180; famine of 1769:
Assignment of Nawab of Arcot land 169, 173, 175, 189, 212
revenues, 78, 232, 237-238, 259-262 ‘Bengal Squad’, 89, 95-97, 103, 106-
Atchund, 16-17 108, 123-124, 135, 139
Atkinson, Richard, 41, 254-259, 261- Bentham, Jeremy, 40
262, 266-267, 269-270, 275 'Black Hole', 43
Aungier, Gerald, 83 Board of Control, 244, 262, 267-269
Aurora, 170, 219 Boddam, Charles, 139, 212
Boehm, Amyand and Goslings, 30
Backhouse, Captain Thomas, 61 Boehm, Edmund (the elder), 165
Baksar, Battle of, 76, 141, 145, 148 Boehm, Edmund (younger), 166, 195
Balambangan, Sumatra, 173 Bolts, William, 175
Bank of England, 26-27, 30-31, 65- Bombay: 6-7, 9-12; events 1757-65:
67, 124, 176, 179 78-79, 82, 84
Barclay, Amyand and Staples, 29 Bombay Grab, 17
Baring brothers, 30 Bombay Merchant, 2
Baring, Francis, 255-258 ‘Bombay Squad’, 35, 43, 48, 89,
Barker, Major Sir Robert, 57 Boone, Charles, 119
Barraclough, John, 111 Borneo, 80
Barré, Colonel Isaac, 114, 119, 136, Boscawen, 15
139, 147, 153 'Boston Tea Party', 184
Barton, Captain James, 11, 28, 33 Boswell, James, 23
Barton, Louisa, 32 Boulton, Henry, Crabb, 28, 33, 112,
Barwell, family of, 136, 185, 195 136-137, 139-140, 161, 179, 185,
Barwell, Mary, 172 199-200, 212
317
318 INDEX
Bourchier, Governor Richard, 15-17, Cartier, Mr., 188

19, 143 Cave, Mr., 140
Boyd, John, 136, 162, 165-166, 196, Chambers, Charles, 139
219 Chancery, Court of, 32, 132, 139
Braund, Samuel, 33 Chandler family, 23
Braund, William, 29-31, 33 Chapman, Rev. James, 1
British Museum, 121 Chartered Rights, 40, 93, 143, 147,
Brown, Captain Thomas, 11 153, 156, 157, 182-184, 194, 201,
Browne, John, 123 205, 250, 253, 268-269, 276
Broxbourne Manor, 110 Child, Sir Josiah, 130
bullion, 26-27, 40, 42, 46, 55, 66-71, Child’s bank, 30
77, 149, 175 China, 20, 45, 54, 61, 69, 76, 77, 79-
Burdett, John, 148 80, 83-84, 169, 211, 219, 222
Burgoyne, General John, 182, 184 Chinese: massacre of, 7-8
Burke, Edmund, 91, 119, 149, 151- Choissieul, Duke de, French Minister,
153, 163, 170-171, 180, 182, 190, 103
195, 205-206, 216, 226, 229-230, Clapham, James, of Bayford, 111
233-235, 240, 245-246, 248-253, Clapham, Joseph, 111
257, 261-262, 269, 271-272, 274- Clavering, General Sir John, 190, 203,
275 206-208, 213, 229
Burke, family of, 161, 165, 171, 206, Clerk, Duncan, of Arniston, 165
233-234, 271 Cliffe, Walpole and Clarke, 125, 126
Burke, Richard, 151, 233 Clive, Judge, 98
Burke, Richard, (senior), 163 Clive, Lord Robert: pre-1757, 28-29,
Burke, Theobald, 163 33, 39; 1757-60, 43-44, 47-49, 56-
Burke, William, 151-152, 156-157, 57, 60, 63-75, 77, 82-84, 86, 141; a
167, 195, 229, 233-235, 242, 249 ‘Nabob’, 109; 1757-65, Bengal
Burn, John, 242 finances, 70-71; Feud 87-88, 90-99,
Burney, Dr., 198 102, 104-106; 108, 131, 142-143,
Burney, Fanny, (Madam d'Arblay), 147, 167, 175, 178, 196, 271, 274;
198 Peace Treaties 1762-63, 102-104;
Burns, Robert, 271 Parliament, 112, 117-119; The jagir,
Busk, William, 110 73, 96, 105-106, 131-134, 137-138,
Byfield, Thomas, 12, 14-15 151; Contested 1763 election, 107,
108, 121-127; Contested 1764
Caernarvon, 121 election, 130-131, 133-137;
Caillaud, John, 57, 98, 216, 225, 239, Contested 1765 election, 139, 141,
263, 273 Grenville, 135; Terms before return
Calcraft, John, 125, 136, 139 to Bengal, 137; 1765-74, Bengal
Call, John, 261 138, 146, 148-149, 173-174; and
Camden, Lord Chancellor, 60 Bengal Finances 149, 157-159, 177,
Campbell, General Sir Archibald, 268 210-211; and Sulivan, 144-146, 160-
Canton, 69, 79 161, 166, 171, 180-183, 201-202,
Cape of Good Hope, 170, 218, 231- 204, 206; and Vansittart, 147, 160,
232 169-170, 188; and Hastings, 187-
Carnac, Major John, 76, 85, 98, 132, 189; 1767-74, 180, 185, 193, 198,
138 200-201; suicide 201;
Carnatic, 42, 76-77, 82, 99, 102-103, Clive-Sulivan rapprochement 1767,
121, 173, 215, 223, 248, 260, 277; 160, 187-188
war in, 44, 54-55, 57, 61, 169, 174, Clive-Colebrooke-Sulivan coalition of
204, 217, 232, 235-238, 1769, 169-171
INDEX 319
Clive-Francis-D’Oyly connection, Dorrill, Mr., 14

193, 206 Douglas, Alexander, 16
Clivites, 134, 138-140 148, 150, 168- Douglas, Andrew, 162
169, 171, 188, 194, 200-201, 204, Dow, Colonel Alexander, 175, 243
206, 212, 213 Drake, Roger, Deputy Chair in 1758,
Cockburn, Sir James, 139, 200, 252 48
Colebrooke, Sir George, 112, 151, Drake, Roger, Governor of Bengal,
161, 165, 168, 170-172, 174, 176- 47
179, 182, 184-185, 187-188, 195, Draper, General, 58, 61
200, 202, 219, 223, 242 Draper, Lt. Daniel, 17
Commutation Act of 1784, 266 Drummond's bank, 125, 176
Coneybear, Bishop, 24 Drummond, Mrs. 136
Confucius, 34 Dryden, John, 23
Conway, Henry, 151, 153-154, 157 Du Pré, Josias, 187, 189
Coote, Sir Eyre, 55-60, 68, 74, 95, 97- Dudley, George, 131, 140, 151
99, 123, 225, 233, 236-237, 247 Duke, John, 116
Cornish, Admiral, 57, 60-61 Dundas, Henry, 191, 194, 204, 226,
Cornwall, Charles, 170-172, 191 228, 244-245, 248, 250-251, 253-
Cornwallis, Charles, 250-251, 267 254, 255, 257-258, 261-262, 266-
Coutts bank, 125, 151, 162 270, 275; his India Bill, 253
Cox-Hippisley, John, 239, 263 Dundas, Sir Lawrence, 162, 165
Crighton, Mr., 234 Dunning, John, Lord Ashburton, 60,
Crommelin, Governor Charles, 11, 77, 114, 116, 119, 132-133, 139,
18, 78, 84, 128, 141 147, 153, 167, 193, 196, 205, 218,
Cromwell, Oliver, 200 220, 224, 229, 249
Crosse, Richard, 198 Dupleix, French General, 104;
Cuming, George, 181, 263 doctrine of, 77, 83, 91, 102
Cust, Peregrine, 112 Durand, John, 33
Dutch: investors, 161, 165, 176;
D’Ache, French Admiral, 55 government of Batavia, 7-8, 238;
D'Arblay, Fanny, 198 threat: in Ceylon, 77; in China, 79;
D’Oyly, Christopher, 193, 206 in Sumatra, 80, 83; in Surat, 16-18;
D’Souza, Joseph, 16 war with, 6, 38, 45, 54-55, 57, 60,
da Costa, Solomon, 154 143, 211, 231-233
Dalrymple, Alexander, 80 Duval, Roger, 219,
Damaji, Maratha General, 19
Darell, Sir Lionel, 267 East India Company: army, 72;
Darvall, Roger, 6, 128 Chairman, 53; Charter, 82, 112-113,
Daylesford House, 268 142, 152, 154, 184, 192-193, 212,
Defence, 18 225, 227-229, 240; and
Delawar, 121 Government, 40; Committees: 50,
Dempster, George, 76, 112, 139, 142, 269; of Accounts, 38, 162, 253; of
146, 150, 152, 156-157, 182, 200 Buying, 162; of Correspondence,
Devaynes, William, 181, 230, 234- 43, 89, 173, 270; 'of Nine
235, 257, 266-267 Proprietors', 253-257; of Private
Devon & Child, 30, 139 trade, 38, 41; of Secrecy, 43-44, 58,
Devonshire, Duke of, 117, 133 61, 80, 90, 100-103, 105, 107, 162,
Dharmseth, Servaji, 11 172, 181, 189, 227-228, 232, 270,
'Dividend' Bill, 157 274; of Shipping, 27, 33, 38-89,
Dorrien, John, 30, 60, 80, 100-102, 162; of Treasury, 27, 43, 89, 176-
133 177, 253, 274;
320 INDEX
East India Company, Committees Forrest, Mrs., 167

(continued) of 'Thirteen Forsyth's bank, 176
Proprietors', 186; of 'Twenty-five Ft. St. David, 56, 59
Proprietors', 187; of Warehouses, Ft. St. George, 55, 79, 223, 235, 240,
27, 270; Contested elections: of 1758, 242
46-48; of 1763, 107, 121-127; of Ft. Marlborough, 79-80
1764, 131-137; of 1765, 137-141; Ft. William, 39, 45, 64, 82, 132, 137,
finance, 62-71; debts, 270; financial 180, 206
crisis of October 1772, 174-176; Foulis, Captain Charles, 11, 162
patronage, 36, 41, 45, 46-49, 51-53, Fowke, Joseph, 141, 206
87, 89-90, 97-99, 108, 112, 114-116, Fowke, Joseph, Younger, 229
124, 137, 162, 168, 181, 184, 202, Fox, 128
214, 217, 253-254, 259, 269-270, Fox, Charles James, 245, 249, 252-
275-276; General Courts: 1757-65, 41, 257, 261, 262, 267; his India Bill,
43, 47-48, 89, 95-97, 104, 107, 123, 249, 253-254, 256
126, 134, 137-138; 1765-74, 146- Fox, Henry (Lord Holland), 102, 114,
147, 152, 154-158, 160, 169, 177, 116-117, 124, 125, 151
183, 186; 1774-86, 191, 199, 203, Fox-North Coalition, 245, 252-255
208-209, 213. 215. 217, 246, 248, France, war with, 38, 40, 42, 46, 54-
254-255; The Direction: 1756-65, 41, 55, 59, 63, 113, 118, 215, 225, 227,
51, 66, 85, 88-89, 96-97, 107; 1765- 228, 232-233; commercial treaty
69, 148; 1769-73, 183; after 1774, with in 1786, 270
199, 201, 203, 229, 255-256 Francis, Philip, 190, 193, 201, 203,
East India Examiner, 150 206-209, 229-231, 248-252, 258,
East India Observer, 150 271
East Street, Red Lyon Square, 23 Francis-Burke connection, 206
Eglinton, Lord, 125 Franks, Aaron, 125, 139
Egremont, 121 Freeman, William George, 162
Egremont, Lord, 100-101, 103, 114, French, threat from, 76-77, 79, 143,
118 164, 174, 216-217, 232-233; in
Elibank, Lord, 150, 217 China, 79; in Sumatra, 80
Elliot, Alexander, 162, 206, 231
Elliot, Sir Gilbert, 160, 162, 213 Gazetteer, 126
Ellis, Brabazon, 12 Geekie, John, 9
Ellis, James, 111 Gentleman’s Magazine, 136, 140, 163
Europe, 49, 69, 77, 203, 229, 252 George 111, 53, 59-60, 113, 117, 121,
Expeditions: against the Dutch, 60; 123, 206, 218, 236, 253-254
against Manila, 61; against George Street, Hanover Square, 247,
Mauritius, 60-61 265
Germain, Lady Betty, 125
'Fables of Gulisdan', 218 Goddard, General Thomas, 225, 232
Featherstonehaugh, Sir Mathew, 125 Godfrey, Edmund, 34
Fletcher, Henry, 150, 234-235, 246, Godfrey family, 33, 36, 123, 148
253, 256 Godfrey, Joseph, 30, 33, 34
Floyer, Charles, 188 Godfrey, Peter, 30, 33-34, 43
Fogue, Alexander, 11 Godfrey, Thomas, 34, 129
Fontaine, Elias de la, 162, 166 Golcanda, 77
Forde, Colonel Francis, 55, 57, 98-99, Goldsmith, Oliver, 23
106, 169 Gombroon, 79
Fordhook House, Ealing, 247 Goslings bank, 30, 125, 151
Fordyce Bank, 125, 151 Gosling, Francis, 125
INDEX 321
Gosling, Robert, 125 263-264, 269; and 'Committee of

Gough, Charles, 43, 123 Nine Proprietors', 254; victim of
Graeme, Elizabeth (Betsy), 220, 221 treachery, 258; his return, 262, 268-
Graeme, John, 212, 225 269; censured by Burke's Select
Grafton, Duke of, 153, 155, 168, 170- Committee, 249; Impeachment, 87,
172, 222-223 229, 271-272; post-Impeachment
Graham, John, 207 dinner, 268;
Grant’s Bank, 125, 151 Hastings party, 205, 208, 229, 246
Granada estates, 241 Hatfield church, 109-111
Gray, George, 148 Havannah, 29
Great Ormonde Street, 127-129, 167, Hawkins, Mrs., 247
196, 198 Hay, Mr., 226
'Great Scheme', 161, 164-165, 167, Hay, William, 75, 85
233 Hector, 18
Gregory, Robert, 162, 173, 228, 234, Hertford, Lord, 117
246, 253 Hickey, Joseph, 163
Grenville ministry, 80, 134-135, 145 Hillsborough, Lord, 235
Grenville, George, 97, 133, 135, 138- Hodges, Sir James, 141
140, 152, 155 Holderness, Earl of, Southern
Secretary, 58
Haider Ali, 164, 169-170, 174, 204, Hollond, John, 262, 268
216, 231-233, 236 Holwell, John Zacchary, 36, 47-48,
Hall, Alexander, 80 65, 74-75, 94, 127
Hall, Captain Richard, 212 Hooke, Christopher, 110
Hamilton, Sir William, 218 Hope, Dutch bankers, 125, 151, 161,
Hannay, Sir Samuel, 222 164-166, 178
Hardwicke, Lord, 132, 133 Hope, John, 17
Harrington, 8 Horne, Governor John, 1, 8, 10-11,
Harris, John, 115-117 28, 31, 143
Harrison, John, 136, 213 Hough, Captain Samuel, 11, 21, 28-
Hastings, Mrs. Marion, 268 33, 42, 78, 109, 123, 128, 139
Hastings, Warren, pre-1769, 60, 75, Hough, Martha, (wife of Capt.
83, 146, 187; as Governor of Bengal, Samuel Hough), 31
180, 182, 186-189; as Governor- House of Commons, 91, 116, 181-
General, 142, 187-194, 203-207, 209, 182, 187, 202, 250-252, 256, 265,
214-217, 219, 226-227, 230-231, 271;
233-234, 236-237, 239, 244-256, House of Lords, 31, 111, 123, 191
258-259, 262, 267-268, 270, 272, Howe, Lord, 140
275, 277; as correspondent, 165, 172, Hsan-fu (Chinese overlord), 79
179, 184-186, 191, 194-195, 199- Hughes, Admiral Sir Edward, 236,
201, 206-207, 219, 226-227, 229- 263
230, 247, 267; The 'resignation' and Hunt, Robert, 17-18
Macleane, 207-208; and Bengal Hyde, Governor John, 30, 115, 129
finances, 209-211; and Pigot affair,
216-217; and regard for Sulivan, Imhoff, Baron Wilhelm Von, 7-8
209, 268; feud with Impey, 193, Imperialism, 144, 274-275, 276-278
230; and Macphersons, 223, 224; Impey, Elijah, 188, 193, 205, 212,
and Tanjore, 234; attacks upon 224, 230, 246-247, 249-250
1778 to 1786, 229, 244, 250, 252; India: plans and policies, 80;
and Macartney, 236, 238, 260; help 1757-65, 72, 141-142; 1765-86 and
to Sulivan and son, 239, 241-242, afterwards, 203, 270, 277
322 INDEX
India Act 1784, 245, 258, 267 Lally, French General, 55

India Bill 1784, 256, 258, 262 Lambe, James, 17-18
Indian artefacts, 198 Lambton, John, 11
‘Infamous’ General Letter from Lane, Captain Thomas, 11, 23, 26-31,
Bengal, 29 December 1759, 65, 94- 33, 123, 125, 129, 136, 162, 197
96 Lane, Thomas (Younger), 247, 264
Irwin: family of, 4, 6, 127, 214, 221, Lapwing, 188
278 Lascelles, Peter, 181
Irwin, Captain James, 4-6 Law, Governor Stephen, 1-2, 7-10,
Irwin, Elizabeth, (wife of Philip 23, 26-28, 33, 35-39, 43, 110-111,
O'Sullivan), 5-6 123, 134, 143, 205, 221
Irwin, Eyles, 4, 6, 235, 251 Law, Jack, 221
Irwin, Robert, 4 Law, Mrs. Martha, 1
Lawrence, Colonel (later General)
James, Captain Sir William, 11, 136, Stringer, 57, 95, 98, 134, 219
214, 227-228, 252 Lawrence, Sir Thomas, 198
James, Robert, Company Secretary, Leake, Stephen Martin, 23
120-121, 191 Leycester, Ralph, 148, 151, 172
Jamieson, Captain, 127 Lindsay, Sir John, 169
Jeckyll, Mr., 264 Livins, Mr., 264
Jenkinson, Charles, 60, 100, 115, 134- 'Loan Bill' of 1773, 187
136, 138, 168, 170, 183, 187, 189, London, 48, 121
191, 204, 227-228, 234, 244-245, London Assurance (Insurance) Company,
254, 275 26, 30, 115, 129
Jinji, 55 London money market, 27, 34, 65,
‘Johnny McShuffle’. 238. See 87, 149
Macpherson, John Lord Mansfield, 222
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 23, 198 Lowe, Benjamin, 11
Johnson, Mr., 242 Lushington. Sir Stephen, 163, 200
Johnstone, family of, 126, 136, 139, Luxmore, Reverend John, 198
146-147, 150-151, 162-163, 165,
171, 180, 199-202, 213, 252-253 Macartney, Lady, 260-261, 262
Johnstone, George, 112, 126, 142, Macartney, Lord George, 230, 235-
200-201, 212, 252-253, 257 238-239, 246, 259-263, 267-268
Johnstone, Sir James, 126 Macaulay, Lord, 123
Johnstone, John, 85, 95, 126, 136, Machiavelli, 197
139, 147, 207 Mackenzie, Major, 16-17
Johnstone, William (Pultney), 126, Macleane, Henry, 163
163, 165 Macleane, Lauchlin, 150-152, 161-
Jones, Robert, 112, 148, 161, 168, 171 163, 165, 167, 170, 182, 195, 200,
Jones, Sir William, 243 205-208, 212-213, 216-219, 222-
Judicature Act 1781, 249 224, 239-241, 252, 265; debts owed
Judicature Bill 1772, 180-182, 184, to Sulivan, 167, 195, 218-219
190, 194 Macleod, Captain Alexander, 222
Macpherson, James, 'Fingal', 205-206,
Kandy (Ceylon), 77 222-225, 240, 252, 256-259, 261-
Kettle, Tilly, 39, 198 262
Kiangsi, 79 Macpherson, John, 205-206, 212-213,
Knox, Major, 98 216, 222-225, 230-231, 237-238,
Kwantung, 79 240-241, 251-252, 258-259, 261-262
Madge, Captain, 29
INDEX 323
Madras: 1757-65, 44-45, 76-77, 82 Najim-ud-Daula, 145

Madura, 77 Nanda Kumar, Maharajah. 228 (See
Maguire, Mr., 84 Nuncomar)
Mahé, surrender of, 55, 59 Nawab of Arcot, 42, 55, 57, 78, 100,
Mahim, 12, 15-16, 19 103, 121, 170, 174, 207, 208, 214-
Mahfuz Khan, 58 215, 218-219, 222-224, 231, 233,
Mangalore, Treaty of, 232-233 239-241, 262, 264; his debts, 70, 78,
Manila, 61-62, 128 169, 174, 204, 215, 217, 219, 224,
Mann, Sir Horace, 220 230-231, 233, 237-238, 242, 259,
Manningham, Charles, 39, 47-48 261-262, 268
Manningham, Dr., 39 Nawab of Bengal, 42-43, 47, 60, 69-
Manningham, Messrs., 39 70, 72, 121, 211
Manningham, Sir Richard, 39 Nawab of the Carnatic, (See Nawab
Mansfield, Earl of, 169, 187, 254 of Arcot)
Manship, John, 160-161, 177, 212 Neptune, 121
Marathas, 6-7, 16-18, 42, 57-58, 76, Newcastle, Duke of, 102, 106, 113,
78, 204, 211, 212, 216, 225, 231, 115, 117-118, 125-127, 133, 156
233, 236, 249, 254, 260 Newnham, Nathaniel, 115
Martin & Co. bankers, 166 Nicobar Islands, 231
Mary, 4-6 Nizam Ali Khan, of Hyderabad, 58,
Mason, Captain Charles, 21 77, 216, 231, 233, 260
Mauritius, 57, 60-61 North, Lord, 88, 160, 168, 171-172,
Mayne, Robert, 213 174, 177-178, 180, 182-187, 189-
Mayne, Sir William, 212 194, 199-204, 206, 208, 212-215,
Mile End Green, 23-24, 29, 127, 128 217, 223, 225-230, 234, 245-246,
Mindano, 61 249, 251-252, 253-256, 258, 275
Mir Jafar, 44, 60, 73-6, 84-85, 105, Northumberland, Duke of, 139
132, 145 Norton, Rev. Edward, 31
Mir Qasim, 67, 74-76, 85, 148 Nuncomar, 228
Moffat, Andrew, 29, 33 Nuttall, Mr., Company solicitor, 180
Moffat, James, 29-33
Moffat, Robert, 29 Oakley, Charles, 239-240
Mogul Emperor, 73, 105, 145 O’Byrne, Thomas Lewis, 249
Mohammed Reza Khan, 189, 207 Onslow, George, Speaker of the
Monckton, General Robert, 181-182 House of Commons, 120
Monson, Colonel George, 55-56, 190, Opium, 69, 76, 79, 211, 242
193, 203, 206, 208 Orford, Lady, 115, 119
More, Hannah, 198 Orme, Robert, 28, 33, 45, 77, 139,
Morning Chronicle and Advertiser, 273 212
Morris, William (Sulivan's butler), 247 Ossianic ballads, 222
Morton, Charles, 121 O’Sullivan, Captain John. (See
Motteux, John, 150, 165-166, 263 Sullivan, Captain John)
Mughal: dynasty, 16; Empire, 6, 72, O’Sullivan, Philip (Elder), 5
215 O'Sullivan, Philip (Younger), 5-6
Muhammad Ali Khan. 78, 100-101, Owen, Anne (Nancy), 10, 128
(See Nawab of Arcot) Owen, Captain Richard, 2
Munro, Major Hector, 76, 252 Owen, Edward, (Elder), 2
Mysore, 57, 76, 169, 216, 232-233 Owen, Edward, (Younger), 2, 10, 11,
27
'Nader Shah, life of', 218 Owen, Elizabeth. (See Sulivan, Mrs.
Naik `Allam Khan, 16 Elizabeth);
324 INDEX
Owen, Elizabeth (Betsy), wife of Pitt, William, the Younger, 194, 245,
Colonel John Wood, 10, 25, 128, 252, 254-258, 261, 266-267, 269,
247 275
Owen, family of, 3, 10, 27, 127, 195, Plassey, Battle of, 44, 48-49, 63-64,
214, 220-221 69, 72-76, 80, 89-90, 210, 276
Pocock, Admiral, 55, 95
Page, Sir Gregory, 139 Polier, Major, 57
Palk, Mrs., 128 Pondicherry, 55, 59-60, 74, 77, 219
Palk, Sir Robert, 29, 32, 57, 68, 75, Ponsborne, 144
77-78, 80, 82-84, 112, 114-116, 119- Ponsborne Manor, 109-111, 118,
121, 123, 128-129, 136, 141, 160- 128-129, 167, 219, 242, 265
162, 165-166, 171-173, 179, 185, Pope, Alexander, 23, 88
187-188, 195, 198, 200, 202, 205, Portland, Duke of, 206, 234
209, 212, 216, 218, 220, 263, 264, Powell, John, 151
273 Powis, Earl of, 133
Panchaud, Isaac, 166 Pratt, Jonas, 111
Pardoe, John, 213-214 Price, Andrew, 17
Parliament, 97, 101, 106, 108, 112, Price, William, 11, 19
115, 118-120, 134, 139, 149, 179, Prince Edward Island, 195, 241, 265
182, 186, 201, 226-227, 230, 237, Public Advertiser, 48, 107, 130, 162,
244, 251, 258, 265; Committee of 177
Secrecy 1773, 186; Inquiry of 1766- Purling, Captain John, 34, 123, 177-
67, 150-159, 162, 245; Inquiry and 178, 185, 187, 213
Burgoyne's Select/Secret Pybus, John, 97, 106
Committee of 1772, 174, 182, 184- Pym, Francis, 12, 17-18
187; Secret Committee of 1781,
228, 248; Select Committee of Queen Square, 10, 23, 110, 127, 167,
1781, 248-249, 252-253, 271 198, 205, 210, 240, 242, 247, 249,
Payne, John, 36, 43, 45, 47-48, 54, 259-260, 273
113, 135
Peace Treaties 1762-63, 59, 78, 87, Ram Narrain, Governor of Bihar, 74
90, 99-101, 107, 124, 126, 215 Rammet, Thomas, 32
Pechell, Samuel, 263 Ramseth, 19
Persian: artefacts, language and Raymond, Charles, 30, 33-34, 166,
translation, 190, 198, 218, 239, 241, 170, 185, 199-201, 212
243 Raymond, family of, 162
Philippines, 60, 80 Regulating Act of 1773, 88, 168, 174,
Pigot, Governor George, 44, 60-61, 186, 190-191, 193-194, 199, 202-
77, 83-84, 112, 121, 141, 189, 204, 204, 217, 229, 236, 245, 276
215-217, 224, 229-230, 233, 237 Reynolds, Mary, 32
Pigou, Crommelin, 129 Richardson, Captain, 127
Pigou, Frederick, 34, 123, 129, 139, Richmond, Duke of, 186, 199-200,
212 208
Piracy, 7 Roberts, Abraham, 273
Pitt, 45 Roberts, John, 213
Pitt, Lady Hester, 113 Robertson, John, 235
Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 56, Robinson, John, 168, 183, 187, 191,
58-60, 62, 66, 74, 77, 81, 93-94, 98, 194, 200-201, 203-204, 208, 213-
100-102, 104-106, 113, 114-118, 214, 217, 223, 225-227, 237, 244-
133, 135, 144, 150, 152-155, 168, 245, 254, 256-259, 275
243, 275 Rockingham, Marquess of, 145, 150-
INDEX 325
Rockingham, Marquess of Shahzada, 73

(continued) 152, 155-156, 162, 168, Shelburne, Earl of, 80, 101, 108, 114-
170, 179, 190, 199-200, 205-206, 119, 122, 124-126, 133, 135-136,
208, 223, 245-246, 249, 251 139, 147, 150-157, 160-163, 165,
Rockinghamites, 171, 226, 246 167, 170, 205-206, 208, 218, 222,
Roe, Sir Thomas, 91 245-246, 250-252, 256, 275
Rohilla war, 207 Ship insurance, 29
Rous, Thomas, 60, 97, 100, 103-104, Shipping interest, 4, 28-29, 32-33, 35-
107-108, 122, 126, 131, 135, 137, 36, 50, 123, 148, 162, 168, 172, 185,
139-140, 157 199, 204, 213, 253, 263, 266
Royal Assurance Company, 65 Shuja-ud-Daula, Vizier of Oudh, 145
Royal family, 121 Sidi Ma’sud, 16-18
Royal George, 79 silk trade, 166, 169, 211, 231, 264
Royal Historical Society, 61 Siraj-ud-daula, 43, 45, 68, 73
Royal Society, 121 Skottowe, Captain Nicholas, 79
Royal Society of Arts, 39, 163 slavery, 7, 79
Rudd, Mrs., 209 Smith, Adam, 40
Rumbold, Thomas, 185, 189, 215, Smith, Carling, 84
217, 233, 235, 240, 249 Smith, Captain Nathaniel, 207, 212,
Russell, Claude, 188 238, 246, 257, 261, 267, 270
Russian officers, 121 Smith, General Richard, 226, 230,
246, 248-250
Safdar Khan, 16 Smuggling, 27, 78, 121, 175, 266
‘Sadi’, 247 South Sea Company, 32
Salabat Jang, Nizam of Hyderabad Spencer, John, 10-11, 29, 31-32, 42,
(Subahdar of the Carnatic), 55, 58, 76-78, 83-84, 86, 109, 120, 128,
77, 100-101, 103, 136-137, 141, 145-147,
Salisbury, 11, 15 Spencer, Mrs. Adriana, 10, 145
Salvador, Joseph, 124, 136, 138, 154 St. Dunstan’s Radcliff, 24
Sandwich, Lord, 133, 148, 161, 168, St. George the Martyr, 198, 273
171, 185, 191, 199, 203, 213-214 St. John, Newfoundland, 195
Savage, Henry, 11, 16-18, 21, 65, 136, Stables, John, 252, 258-259
151 Stephens, John, 112
Savajee, Wilfran Set, 12 Stevens, Admiral, 80
Sayer, Mr., 180 Stevens, George, 123
Scindy (Ceylon), 84 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 198
Scott, Colonel, 125 Stewart, John, 139
Scott, George, 12, 15-17 Stewart, John, of Buckingham Street,
Scott, Major John, 251, 253, 259, 267, 139, 154, 213
273 Stewart, John, of Hampstead, 163,
Scrafton, Luke, 62, 70, 139-141, 145, 205-206, 223, 258, 265
169 Stock splitting and anti-splitting Bill,
Sedgwicke, William, 12, 15 89, 123, 140-141, 148, 157, 160, 191
Senior, Ascanius, 148 Stormont, Lord, 234-235
Seth bankers, 75 Strachey, Henry, 143, 200-201, 206
Seton, Mr., 235 Streatham, 21
Seven Years War, 42, 44, 54-55, 69, Strode, William, 109
87, 90 Stuart, Andrew, 182, 223,
Sewell, John, 12 Stuart, Andrew, of Craigthorn and
Shah Alam, Mughal Emperor, 74, 93, Torrance, 126, 237
145 Stuart, Charles, 263
326 INDEX
Stuart, Frederick, 240 Sumatra, 79-80; Plans, policies,

Stuart, General James, 216, 237 personnel, methods, 80-86; 1757-
Stuart, Sir James, 212 63 Feud with Clive and Peace Treaties:
Stuart, John, Earl of Bute, 30, 58, 60, History of the quarrel, 87-99, 104-
80, 97, 100-104, 106, 108, 113-118, 108; Peace Treaties 1762-63, 99-
123-126, 133, 135, 139, 208, 222, 104; 1757-63 Activities: Public and
236, 240 Private: Ponsborne, 109-111;
Subahdar, of the Carnatic (See also Parliament, 111-120, 201-202;
Salabat Jang), 42, 100 India House duties and overhaul,
Sulivan, 76, 144 120-121; Contested 1763 election,
Sulivan, Benjamin, (Elder), of Cork, 121-127; Family health and
5-6, 128, 278 household, 127-129; 1764-65: A
Sulivan, family of Benjamin, (Elder) bad press, 130-131; Contested
of Cork, 5, 127, 195, 214, 221 1764 election, 131-137; Contested
Sulivan, (Sir) Benjamin, 5, 218, 237, 1765 election, 137-141; 1757-65:
251 Appraisal, 141-142, 143-145;
Sulivan, Mrs. Elizabeth, 1, 3, 167, Comparison and contrast with
197-198, 220-221, 242, 246-248, Clive, 142-143; Postscript, 145-
251, 278 146; 1765-67: Speculators, parties
Sulivan, Henry Boyle, 5, 237, 263 and politics, 147-151;
Sulivan, John, 5-6, 127, 219, 221, 237, Parliamentary Inquiry of 1766-67,
242, 251, 260, 263-265 151-159; 1768-73: 1768 election,
Sulivan, Laurence, Birth: 2, 248; 160-161; 1769 election and the
Origins: 3-6, 278; Personal features, ‘Great Scheme’, 161-167; Reform
character and skills: 2-3, 7, 20-25, 28, campaigns through Company and
34-35, 40, 46, 49, 52, 84, 127, 140, Parliament, 167-173; The Crisis of
142, 144-145, 194, 196-199, 209, 1772, 174-179; Attempted reform
220-221, 248, 250, 261, 267-268, of abuses, 179-186; Introduction
273-274, 276, 278-279; 1713-52 of Regulating Act, 186-187;
Bombay: Marriage, 1-3; Passage out, Hastings, appointment and
3-8; Assistant to Governor, 8-9; defence of, 187-190; Hastings:
Mayors Court and private life, 9-12; protection, advice, support, 203,
Collector and civil duties, 12-16, 205-212; Regulating Act 1773, 190-
18-19; Surat mission, 16-18; 194; 1774-78: Collapse of personal
Remittances, record books, habits, finances, 195-196; Changes in
19-21; Return voyage, taking stock, attitude, 196-198; Domestic
21-22; 1753-55 London pre-Company: adjustments, 198-199; Regulating
Home and private life, 23-25; Act and 1774 election, 199-201;
Business, 25-34; Prelude to the Leaves Parliament, 202;
Direction and ‘Bombay Squad’, 34- Desperation and defiance, 201-204;
37; 1755-58 India House: Court of Plans, reforms, review of Bengal
Directors, 38-42; Deputy Chair, 42- finances, 209-212; Storming the
46; Contest for the Chair, 46-49; Direction, 212-214; Carnatic affairs,
Desire to be Leader, 49-50; 1757- 214-217; Search for financial
65: Wields absolute power, 51-54; salvation through son in India, 218-
Seven Years War, 54-62; Problems 219; 1778-83: Private life, 220-222;
and financial crises, 62-66; James and John Macpherson, 222-
Revolution in commercial 225; Company business and
operations, 66-71; 1757-65 India: politics, 225-228; Defence of
72-73; Bengal, 73-76; Madras, 76- Hastings maintained, 229-231;
78; Bombay, 78-79; China, 79; Hastings, honour and
INDEX 327
Sulivan, Laurence (continued) 217-219; 1778-85: in India: 214,

reputation saved, 249-251; 218-221, 237, 239-240, 242, 251,
War in the Carnatic, 232-233; 260; and the Persian language: 217-
Raja of Tanjore and the 218, 239, 241, 243; Resident at
Burkes, 233-235; Lord George Tanjore: 235, 242; Assignment of
Macartney, 235-237; Macartney revenues, 237; and Benfield, 238;
- criticism and friendship, 259- and Macartney, 238; Letterbook,
261; Macartney Resignation, 239-240; Judge Advocate at Bengal,
262-263; Assignment of 235, 241, 242; Secretary at Fort St.
Revenues and the Nawab’s George: 240-241; Councillor at
Debts, 237-239; The ‘Arcot Supreme Court Bengal: 242;
Interest’ and Cancellation promoted Senior Merchant: 242;
of the Assignment, 261-262; and opium contract: 242; and
Stephen Sulivan and personal Supreme Council Bengal: 263;
finances, 239-243; Repair of Agency for Royal fleet in India 263;
private finances, 263-265; and remittance of funds: 263; 1785:
Reform, 244-246; April 1782 return from India: 269, 272;
election, 246; Death of receives Caillaud's tribute to his
Elizabeth Sulivan 1782, 246- father: 273; post-Impeachment
247; Health problems 1782, dinner, 268
247-248; Dundas and Sulivan, Mrs. Stephen, 241, 263, 269,
Parliamentary Secret 272
Committee, 248; Burke and Sulivan’s Gardens, Madras, 144
Parliamentary Select Sulivan-Hastings correspondence,
Committee, 248-249; The 193, 203-204, 209-212, 231, 268-
Company and changing 269
ministries 1783, 251-252; The Sulivan party (or Sulivanites), 89, 168,
April 1783 election and Fox-North 171
Bill, 252-254; 1784-86: Pitt and the Sullivan, Captain John, 4-5
India Act 1784, 255-258; Stables Sulu, Sultan, and expedition to, 80
and Macphersons, 258-259; Pitt, Sumatra, 69, 76, 79-80, 83, 173
Hastings and end of powers, 266- Sumner, William, 84, 138
269; Work and planning in Sun Fire Insurance Company, 24, 30
progress, 269-270; Burke and the Superintending Commission of 1772,
Impeachment of Hastings, 271-272; 176, 181-182, 217
State of health: death: funeral: Supervisory Commission of 1769,
tribute, 272-273; Final assessment, 169-170, 172, 193
273-275, 277-279; His patronage, Supreme Council Bengal, 189-192,
275-276; Legacy, 276-277 204, 217, 225, 230, 236, 239, 242,
Sulivan, Laurence (child, deceased), 258, 260, 263
10 Supreme Court Bengal, 190, 192, 230
Sulivan, Laurence, (Grandson), 263, Surat, 2, 16-18
269, 272 Swallow, 208, 219
Sulivan, Martha (infant, deceased), 10 Swift, Jonathan, 23
Sulivan, Richard Joseph, 5, 218-219, Swiss mercenaries, 57
221, 237, 251, 257 Sykes, Francis, 60, 138, 185, 188, 206
Sulivan, Stephen, 1742-69: birth: 10;
and Ponsborne Manor: 109-110; Talbot, Mr., 125
and Middle Temple: 127; and 1769 Tanjore, 57, 77, 211, 215, 217, 242,
stock crash: 167, 217-218; and 1774 249; Raja of, 216-217, 233-235
Company election: 200; 1769-78, Taunton, 25, 118-119
328 INDEX
Tea trade, 169, 171, 175, 178, 184, Verney, Lord, 151-152, 157, 161, 165,
211, 266 167, 195, 233
Temple, Henry, Earl of Buckingham, Wake, Governor William, 9-11, 14-
113 16, 19, 143
'The Marine Society', 11, 109, 128 Walajah Muhammad Ali Khan, 58,
'The Old Man of Queen Square' (See 215 (See Nawab of Arcot)
also Sulivan, Laurence), 198, 240, Walpole, Horace, 220
249, 260
'Thirteen points' of 1773, 183-184, Walpole, Thomas, 115-117, 126-127
187, 194 Walsh, John, 29, 32-33, 70, 94, 122,
Thornton, William, 136 138-140, 143, 145, 200-201, 210,
Thurlow, Edward, 193, 205, 243, 254, 213
271 Wandewash, Battle of, 55
Tinker, Captain, 128 Warren, 48
Tipu Sahib, 231, 233, 263 Waters, Charles, 28
Tulja-ji, 77 Waters, Thomas, 8
Tolson, Ann, (wife of Edward Irwin), Watson, Admiral Charles, 44
2 Watson, Mrs. (wife of Admiral
Townshend, Charles, 66, 114, 151- Charles Watson), 120
155, 157, 180 Watts, William, 33, 85
Townson, John, 267 Webber, William, 150
Travers, John, 273 Wedderburn, Alexander, Lord, 151,
Trinity College Dublin, 151 181, 191
Tsen tou (Viceroy of Canton), 79 Wentworth, Mr., 178
Tullie, Timothy, 34, 123 West, James, 126-127
Tuinally jagir, 78 Wheler, Edward, 181, 184-185, 267
Whitehall, 117, 199
Upton, Anthony, 4-5, 9 Whitehill, John, 240
Urdu, 190 Wier, Daniel, 181
Winchelsea, 128
Vansittart, family of, 147, 200, 212 Wombwell, Sir George, 148, 214
Vansittart, George, 205, 208, 262 Wood, Colonel John, 6, 98, 128
Vansittart, Henry, 28, 32, 68, 73-77, Wood, Mrs, Elizabeth, wife of
82-85, 95, 97-98, 105-106, 120, 122, Colonel John Wood, 128 (See
127-128, 132-133, 135-138, 140- Owen, Elizabeth 'Betsy')
142, 146-147, 150-151, 160-167, Wood, Robert, 61, 74, 100, 103, 113-
169-172, 179, 187-188, 193, 195- 115, 140, 243
196, 198, 200, 205, 211-212, 219, Woodhouse, John, 156, 253, 257
224, 262, 264
Vansittart, Mrs. Henry, 219 York, 121
Venus: observations of transit, 121 Yorke, Philip, 200
Verelst, Henry, 138, 160, 171, 210 Yusuf Khan, 58

GUARDIAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY The L PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

GUARDIAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY The L PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

GUARDIAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY The L PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the book about?

What is the book about?

Who is Laurence Sulivan?

Who is Laurence Sulivan?

GUARDIAN OF THE

EAST INDIA COMPANY

Tauris Academic Studies

In the United States of America and in Canada distributed by

Copyright © George K. McGilvary, 2006

The right of George K. McGilvary to be identified as the author of this work

International Library of Historical Studies (Vol. 34)

Library of Congress catalog card available

Printed and bound in Great Britain by T. J. International Ltd., Padstow,

1 Bombay and Origins 1713-52 1

A great many people, knowingly or otherwise, have contributed towards

Bombay and Origins

Portraits of Laurence Sulivan in mid-life suggest that when Elizabeth Owen

The notification in the Bombay records of his wedding to Elizabeth Owen

by his intimate knowledge and understanding of the problems faced by the

was reliance on his relations that determined Sulivan would go to there;

I borrowed my ideas not only from reading but an instance which

Governorship changed hands, until January 1740, Sulivan worked in the

procedures, of the intricacies of the coastal trade and of local commerce.

references to deals with ships’ commanders. He dealt with sets of certificates,

with Thomas Byfield, he and Sewell represented Savajee against a similar

a monopoly situation that could not be broken. As a result, the Company

bad light to the Directors. He wrote, therefore, of Byfield and Dorrill as

method is by diamonds…always advise me in time that I may

The variety and number of these channels discloses his ingenuity. He

Enter into no schemes before you have perfectly digested them,

London and India House

those connections in the metropolis necessary for his advancement. He must

Executed a bond to Thomas Rammet Esqr. and Mary Reynolds

another instance, a warrant dated 14 September 1757 said that Sulivan,

The Court of Directors

What demands explanation is why, after only entering the Direction in

quickly and thankfully received. His name immediately appeared on several

The Directors were men of substance and great self-

No financial necessity propelled him into the Direction; he wanted to be

people in Government. It was a skill that was to prove vital to himself, to

allegedly perpetrated the atrocity of the ‘Black Hole’. However, by January

vital information was severely criticised. Again ‘astonishment, regret and

The English did not commence war against Surraja Dowla. He

Intelligence of the successful turn of events in Bengal during 1757 relieved

At this General Court, on 15 March 1758, he appealed against the

Even before he became Chairman, Sulivan might have shuddered at the

authoritarian language, began to appear. He became ‘a powerful

Company would succumb in the face of never-ending warfare and the

Directors. He directed, planned and assumed responsibility for everything –

He demanded to know the details surrounding every event, such as those

General Draper and Admiral Cornish clashed with Governor Pigot at

the immediate, urgent situation arose from ‘unexpectedly large demands in

In this dreadful hour my fame and fortune (perhaps my personal

applauded. He had justification, therefore, in feeling aggrieved beyond words

to fulfil his financial agreements, the Government still expected the

I grounded my opinion upon the veracity of his [Clive’s]

with an empty treasury; and there was fear in Calcutta of a period of

Company. Unfortunately, once more Company servants alone were exempt

The reduction of Pondicherry has given us entire Possession of