REVIEW AND UPDATES IN PROPERTY

REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

(LAND TITLES AND DEEDS)
2017

PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD NO. 1529)

(Based on Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws

(Land Titles and Deeds)” and “Reviewer in Property Registration
(With Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers)”1

JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI2

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. 3
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.4 Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.5

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.6

1
Published by Rex Book Store. See also: Agcaoili, “Law on Natural Resources and Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases,” a Foreword by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
2
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in
Management at the Asian Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and Research Section,
Bureau of Lands, he was appointed Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and Assistant
Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was
Chairman of the 13th Division upon his retirement from the court. Justice Agcaoili is a Professor of the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). He is a Professorial Lecturer of the UP Institute for the
Administration of Justice (UP-IAJ). He teaches law at UST, UP and PLM. He is an Appellate Court
Mediator and Maritime Voluntary Arbitrator. A delegate/participant in several international conferences, he
wrote a paper entitled “Environmental Protection: The Convergence of Law and Policy” which he read
during the 20th Biennial Conference on the Law of the World held in Dublin, Ireland in October 2001.
Described by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as “isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa lupa (one of our
experts on land rights),” Justice Agcaoili is the author of three books: “Property Registration Decree and
Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds),” “Law on Natural Resources and Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases,” and “Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Proceedings.” (Tel.: 922-
0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail: [email protected])
3
Republic v. Sin, GR No. 157485, March 26, 2014; Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310,
Feb. 19, 2014; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Secretary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No.
172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v. Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept. 17, 2008; Alcantara v. DENR, GR No.
161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy
Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21,
2002.
4
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102.
5
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.
6
Valiao v. Republic, supra.
 2

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, 7 embodies the
principle of State ownership of lands and all other natural resources as provided in Sec. 2,
Art. XII, to wit:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND

ANCESTRAL LANDS

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,8  petitioners

challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural
resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural
Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the basis of native title. After due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme
Court voted as follows: seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7)
others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56
of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed
upheld.

Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian theory
does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,
adverting to the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government,9  where the United
States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in two modes: (a) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and
Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

BACKGROUND

The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land
was made by Mr. (afterwards, Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman in South Australia in 1857.
In the Torrens system, title by registration takes the place of “title by deeds” of the
system under the “general” law.

The Property Registration Decree (PRD) (PD No. 1529) which is a codification of
the various laws relative to registration of property mainly governs the registration of
lands and places them under the Torrens system. It does not, by itself, create title nor vest
one. It simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it forever
indefeasible.

7
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006.
8
G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000.
9
212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.
 3

In a side by side comparison, the Public Land Act (PLA) (CA No. 141) is the
substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the
public domain. On the other hand, the PRD refers to the manner of bringing registrable
title to lands, among them, alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens
system; in terms of substantive content, the PLA must prevail. On this consideration, only
land of the public domain that has passed into private ownership under the terms of the
PLA can be registered under the PRD.10

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

The government has adopted the Torrens system as the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.11 The government is required to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner
of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon
noted or what the law warrants or reserves.12 The objective is to obviate possible conflicts
of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to
dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the
registered owner complete peace of mind and security in his ownership.13

PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION

The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land
and stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Indeed, titles over lands
under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the stability
of the country's economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.14 The Torrens system
aims to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable, 15  and to relieve
the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims. 16 However, the Torrens
system does not furnish a shield for fraud, 17 nor permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others,18 otherwise, its acceptability is impaired.19

REGISTRATION NOT A MODE

OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of

confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title
are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
10
Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), 2015 ed.
11
Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011; Tenio-Obsequio v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550.
12
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424..
13
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874.
14
Republic v. Agunoy, GR No. 155394, Feb. 17, 2005; see also Legarda v. Saleeby, GR No. 8936, Oct. 2,
1915, 31 Phil. 590, 31 Phil. 590; Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731, Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9;
National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68741, Jan. 28, 1988, 157 SCRA
388.
15
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No. 14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996.
16
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra.
17
Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 125585, June 8, 2005.
18
Ibid.
19
Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291.
 4

transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration.20

Registration does not vest title. It is merely a procedure to confirm and secure
evidence of his ownership over a particular property. Our land registration laws do not
give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 21 A certificate of title merely
confirms or records title already existing and vested.22 The purpose of land registration
under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of land but only the registration of title
which applicant already possesses over the land.23

REGISTRATION OF LANDS,
A PROCEEDING IN REM

Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands shall be in rem and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.24 Being in rem,
such proceedings require constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including
the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. 25 Constructive seizure of the land
is made through publication, posting and service of notice.26 The purpose of publication is
to (a) confer jurisdiction upon the court over the res, and (b) apprise the whole world of
the pending registration case so that they may assert their rights or interests in the land
applied for.

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
UPON REGISTRATION

Sec. 52 of PD No. 1529 provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. — Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.

Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 27 A deed or other
voluntary instrument involving registered land shall not take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority of the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned.28
In case of conflict between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor
who registers the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest

20
Ventura v. Abuda, GR No. 202932, Oct. 23,2013, citing Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb.
24, 2009, 580 SCRA 175.
21
Solid Estate Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196
SCRA630.
22
Tiro v. Phil. Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008, 563 SCA 309; Duque-Rosario v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
23
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del rio, GR No. l-43105, Aug. 31,1984.
24
Sec. 2, BP Blg. 129; Esconde v. Barlongay, GR No. 67583, July 31,1987.
25
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, GR No. 102858, July 28, 1997.
26
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258
SCRA 223.
27
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, GR No. 171531, Jan. 30, 2009; MWSS v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
126000, Oct. 7, 1998.
28
Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-69303, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 253; Campillo v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. L-56483, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 512.
 5

bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a vendee who had previously
bought the same property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of
sale.29

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TITLE”

AND “CERTIFICATE OF TITLE”

Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is
ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title,
therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on
the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under
the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,
issued subsequent to the original registration.30

THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

AND REGISTRIES OF DEEDS

FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

The Land Registration Authority, under the Department of Justice, 31 is the central
repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens
system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands. 32 It is headed by an
Administrator and two deputies appointed by the President.33

The functions of the Administrator include the issuance of decrees of registration,

resolution of consultas and verification and approval of subdivision, consolidation, and
consolidation-subdivision survey plans.34

OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for each province and one for each
city.35 The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the
province or city wherein such office is situated. It shall be the duty of the Register of
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.36

Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument

or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.37

GOVERNING LAWS ON LAND REGISTRATION

29
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Vilbar v. Opinion, GR No. 176043, Jan. 15, 2014
30
Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258.
31
EO No. 30, March 14, 2011.
32
Sec. 6(2)(c), PD No. 1529.
33
Sec. 5, ibid.
34
Sec. 6(1)(a-f), ibid.
35
Sec. 7, ibid.
36
Sec. 10, ibid.
37
Sec. 52, ibid.
 6

REGISTRATION OF LANDS:
GOVERNING LAWS

PD No. 1529, or the “Property Registration Decree,” issued on June 11, 1978,
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages. 38

CA No. 141, or the “Public Land Act,” approved November 7, 1936, remains as
the law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. 39
Under the Public Land Act, there is a presumption that the land applied for belongs to the
state, and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof for a
period prescribed by law.40

Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral Act, issued on February 11, 1913, is an act
providing for special compulsory proceedings for the settlement and adjudication of titles
to lands.

RA No. 8371, or the “The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act” (IPRA) was enacted on
October 29, 1997. The law allows indigenous peoples to obtain recognition of their right
of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS

Under Sec. 2 of PD No 1529, it is provided that “Courts of First Instance (now

Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.”

Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the aforesaid provision has simplified

registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions, contentious
and non-contentious, arising upon such applications or petitions.41 In Lozada v.
Bracewell,42 (April 2, 2014), the Court stressed:

It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have
the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial
ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and
petitions filed after such registration. (Emphasis supplied)

JURISDICTION OF FIRST LEVEL COURTS

38
Sectary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. Oct. 8, 32008.
39
Ibid.
40
Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 141325, July 31, 2006.
41
Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986..
42
GR No. 179155.
 7

Pursuant to Sec. 34 of BP Blg. 129, 43 Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering:

(a) lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or

(b) contested lots the value of which does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos.

Such value shall be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of

the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property.

Decisions of first level courts shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions
of Regional Trial Courts.

All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.44

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION

Pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution:

Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied)

The classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the

executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification, the
lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over shall
be classified as alienable and disposable.45

Under Section 6 of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), the President, upon the
recommendation of the DENR Secretary may, from time to time, classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these
lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration and disposition.
Under Section 7, the President may, from time to time, and for purposes of the
administration and disposition of alienable and disposable public lands, declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under the Acts' provisions. Section 8
authorizes the President to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously
declared open to disposition, until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation
or by act of Congress.46

The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify

or reclassify land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by
law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and

43
Judiciary Reorganization Act, dated Aug. 14, 1981, as amended by RA No. 7691. See also SC Circular
No. 6-93, dated November 15, 1995.
44
Secs. 2 and 108, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836,
Aug. 2, 1995, 247 SCRA 9.
45
Sec. 15, PD No. 705 (Forestry Code).
46
Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 177168, Aug. 3, 2015.
 8

disposable.47 Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of
lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.48

Alienable and disposable (A and D) lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership
under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.49

The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks as categorized in Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.50

SECONDARY CLASSIFICATION

Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law

according to the uses which they may be devoted.51 This classification is referred to as
secondary classification. Sec. 9 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides:

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the
use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for town-sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

NON-REGISTRABLE LANDS

Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible
of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.52

Specifically, the following are not capable of alienation or disposition for titling
purposes:

Lands intended for public use and for public service

47
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
48
Sec. of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008.
49
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, Sept. 3, 2013 (Res. on motion for reconsideration)
50
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
51
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
52
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.
 9

Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.53  Art. 420 of the

Civil Code provides that the following are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar
character;

(1) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.54 

Rivers, lakes and lagoons

Art. 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their

natural beds and the beds themselves;

(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;

(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds; x x x

All other property of the State, which is not of the character mentioned above, is
patrimonial property.55  Property of public dominion, when no longer needed for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.56

Lands which are intended for public use or public service such as reservations for
public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as
long as they remain reserved.57

If land sought to be registered forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek
or river, the decree or title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any
right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the
Torrens system.58 In Cachopero v. Celestial,59 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is
property of public dominion.60

Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds are likewise
inalienable.61 Under Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, "the natural bed or basin of
lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth."62

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are
subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind.63
53
Art. 419, Civil Code.
54
Art. 420, ibid.
55
Art. 421, ibid.
56
Art. 422, ibid.
57
NOVA v. Republic, supra.
58
Republic v. Sioson, GR No. L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963.
59
GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003).
60
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
61
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio, GR No. L-43105, Aug. 31, 1984.
62
Ibid.
63
Art. 51, ibid.
 10

In the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the
banks of a stream, shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement
under PD No. 1216. Open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational
use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."64

Reservations for public or semi-public purposes

Section 83 of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act) provides as follows:

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural

Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of
the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of
any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas communales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other
improvements for the public benefit.

On the other hand, Section 88 of the same Act provides:

The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-
three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease,
or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or
by proclamation of the President.

In Central Mindanao University v. Republic,65 Proclamation No. 476 reserving

certain portions of the public domain for CMU's school site purposes operated to
withdraw the same from sale and settlement pursuant to Section 83 of CA No. 141. There
being no proclamation again declaring said lands as alienable under Section 88 of the
same Act, the titles issued to CMU were and ordered cancelled, and the lots covered
thereby, ordered reverted to the public domain.

Forest lands

Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property. Courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands
within the forest zone.66 The subsequent release of forest lands as A and D lands does not
validate a previous grant.67 In Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,68 the Court stated:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. ‘Forest lands’ do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as ‘forest’ is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
64
Pilar Development Corporation v. Dumadag, GR No. 194336, March 11, 2013.
65
GR No. 195026, Feb. 22, 2016, citing Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, GR No.
177168, August 3, 2015.
66
Collado v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002; Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
75672, April 19, 1989.
67
Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296.
68
GR No. L-27873, Nov. 29, 1983.
 11

Note, however, that in Malabanan v. Republic,69 the Court, through Justice Tinga,
declared that it is sufficient that the property sought to be registered be already classified
as alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.70

Mineral lands

Mineral land means any area where mineral resources are found.71 Mineral
resources, on the other hand, means any concentration of mineral/rocks with potential
economic value.72 The ownership of mineral resources is provided in RA No. 7942,
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, viz.:

SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. — Mineral resources are owned by the

State and the exploration, development, and processing thereof shall be under its full
control and supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into mineral agreements with contractors.

The State shall recognize and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands as provided for by the Constitution.

Justice Panganiban in La Bugal-B’laan Association v. Ramos73 stressed that:

All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development
and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of
the State.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa,74 the Court, through Justice

Cruz, held that “(t)he Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may
be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be
private.” It added:

The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for)
any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in
which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong. x x x Once minerals are discovered in the land,
whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be
discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be
used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other
purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

Possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not confer possessory
rights.75  Thus, a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain
classified as mineral lands. Any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands of

69
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.
70
Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993.
71
Sec. 3(ac), RANo. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
72
Sec. 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.
73
GR No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
74
GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.
75
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 88883, Jan. 18, 1991. 193 SCRA 71.
 12

alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.76

Foreshore and reclaimed lands

The term “foreshore land” has been invariably defined as “that strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.”77 The Philippine Fisheries Code defines
foreshore land as a string of land margining a body of water; the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.78

Foreshore lands are inalienable unless reclaimed by the government and classified
as agricultural lands of the public domain.79 In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Republic Real Estate Corporation,80 the Court held that foreshore lands – or “that strip of
land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is
alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides” - belong to the public
domain intended for public use. The controversy in this case involved lots which are now
part of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP). On March 5, 1962, the government
through the Solicitor General sought to nullify the reclamation agreement between Pasay
City and Republic Real Estate Corporation on grounds that there were no “foreshore
lands” in Pasay City which could only be the subject of lawful reclamation under the then
prevailing law, RA No. 1899; that the area was already reserved as a national park, hence
beyond the commerce of men; and that the agreement was executed without any public
bidding. The Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Justice Purisima, sustained the
government’s action and nullified the reclamation agreement as being ultra vires and
contrary to law. It held that the reclamation involved “submerged areas” or “all sea” and
not "foreshore lands" as allowed by said law. The land is now occupied by the Cultural
Center of the Philippines.

In a separate opinion, Justice Puno cited the importance of the CCP as the only
venue of arts and culture in the Philippines and, in elegant prose, intoned:

The CCP Complex is the only area in the Philippines that is fully devoted to the
growth and propagation of arts and culture. It is the only venue in the country where
artists, Filipino and foreign alike, may express their art in its various forms, be it in
music, dance, theater, or in the visual arts such as painting, sculpture and installation
art or in literature such as prose, poetry and the indigenous oral and written literary
forms. The theaters and facilities of the Complex have been utilized for the staging of
cultural presentations and for the conduct of lectures and demonstrations by
renowned visiting artists. The wide open spaces of the Complex are the only open
spaces in Metropolitan Manila that have been used to accommodate huge crowds in
cultural, artistic and even religious events. The CCP has indeed emerged as a
dynamic force in the promotion of the country's artistic and cultural heritage and the
development of new and modern art forms. Through the years, it has helped raise the
Filipino consciousness to our nationhood, and in the process, inculcated love for our
country.

Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means are

inalienable. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court held that only when
actually reclaimed from the sea can submerged areas be classified as public agricultural
76
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumyung, GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.
77
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation, GR Nos. 103882 and 105276, Nov.
25, 1998, 299 SCRA 199.
78
Sec. 4(46), RA No. 8550.
79
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003.
80
GR No. 103882, Nov. 25, 1998.
81
GR No. 133250, May 6, 2003.
 13

lands. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government
may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.

Mangroves swamps

Mangrove swamps or manglares are forestal and not alienable agricultural land.82 
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,83  it was held “that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.”
This was reaffirmed in Director of Forestry v. Villareal84  where the Court categorically
declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests and, therefore, not subject
to disposition until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land. The Fisheries Code makes it unlawful for any person to
convert mangroves into fishponds or for any other purposes.

Watersheds

Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds."
Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man.85 The Constitution expressly
mandates the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the
country’s watershed. In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,86
the Court recognized that:

x x x The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the

most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
‘intergenerational’ responsibility that needs to be answered now.

In Tan v. Director of Forestry,87  the Supreme Court reiterated the basic policy of
conserving the national patrimony, as exemplified by the government’s withdrawal from
entry, sale or settlement of forest reserves for watershed, soil protection and timber
production purposes.

Military or naval reservation

Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot be registered.88 To segregate

portions of the public domain as a military reservation, there is need of a presidential
proclamation to that effect. In Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,89 it
was held that a military reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, or any
part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition unless it is first reclassified
and declared as disposable and alienable public land, even if incidentally it is devoted for
a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense.

Protected areas
82
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, GR No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598.
83
GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 151 SCRA 88; see also Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR
No. 74957, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 679.
84
Supra.
85
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001.
86
GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001; see also Collado v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390
SCRA 343.
87
GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302.
88
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006.
89
GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006.
 14

RA No. 7586 provides for the establishment and management of a national

integrated protected areas system referred to as the “National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992). NIPAS is the classification and administration of all designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to
preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The illegal possession or
sale of rights of portions thereof is prohibited under the NIPAS Act.

Pursuant to Section 19 of RA No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1955,

mining operations are not allowed in old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed
forest reserves, wilderness area, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks,
provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as
defined by law in areas expressly prohibited under the NIPAS and other laws.

National park refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness

character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of
exploitation.90 National parks,91 protected areas and nature reserves92 are inalienable.

ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

WHO MAY APPLY

Under Sec. 14, PD No. 1529, the following may apply for registration:

(1) Those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds
by right of accession or acquired under existing laws;

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
for by law.

Under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), it is provided as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto may apply for the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title.

Sec. 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an owner while
Sec. 14 (2) involves prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership.93
There is no substantial difference between Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec.
48(b) of CA No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that (1) the land is alienable and
disposable (A and D) public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in open, continuous
exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.94 Both refer to original registration proceedings, are
against the whole world, and the decree of registration for both is conclusive and final.
90
RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
91
Palomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997.
92
RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
93
Republic v. Joson, GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014.
 15

ACQUISITION OF A & D LAND BY

POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO

Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides that “those who by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier” may apply for registration.

Sec. 14(1) refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to

public land acquired under Sec. 48(b) of CA No.141, as amended by PD No. 1073. Under
Sec. 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that such
possession and occupation is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.”95

Lands that fall under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 are effectively segregated from
the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Judicial confirmation in such
cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into
private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period
of possession became complete.96

Possession should be in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine; continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.97

In the landmark case of Malabanan v. Republic,98 the Court en banc reiterated

that the law does not require that the land subject of registration should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, or since June 12, 1945. It
is sufficient that the land is already declared as alienable and disposable land at the time
the application for registration is filed so as to entitle the possessor to registration.

PROOF THAT LAND IS “A” AND “D”

To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant
may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved
94
Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No. 170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic,
GR No. 141924, Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., GR No. 146527, Jan. 31, 2005, 450
SCRA 247..
95
Republic v Zuburban Realty, GR No, 164408, Marc 24, 2014March 24, 2014; Republic v. Remnan
Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371, March 5, 2014;
Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 186639, Feb. 5, 2014;.Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No.174626, Oct. 23, 2013;
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
96
Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., supra.
97
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing.
Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
98
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, reiterated in the Court’s resolution dated Sept. 3, 2013;
see also Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438; Republic v. Rizalvo,
GR No. 172011, March 7, 2011.
 16

the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant
must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.99

Since the effectivity of PD No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown that
possession and occupation of the land started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. A mere
showing of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer
sufficient.100

Originally, Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for the possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1984. This was superseded by RA No. 1942,
dated June 22, 1957, which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The law,
however, has been amended by PD No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977 but became
effective on May 9, 1977,101 which now requires possession since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto.102
But PD No. 1073 cannot impair vested rights of applicants who had complied
with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942. A vested right is
"some right or interest in the property which has become fixed and established, and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy."103

Thus, in Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc.,104 (Feb. 19, 2014), the Court held
that an applicant who, by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for 30 years prior
to the issuance of PD No. 1073 (issued on January 25, 2977 but effective only on May 9,
1977), or at least since May 8, 1947, may apply for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. The Court however
clarified in La Tondena, Inc. v. Republic105 that only applications for registration filed
prior to 1977 may invoke Republic Act No. 1942.

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

BY PRESCRIPTION

Sec. 14(2) provides that those who “those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws” may apply for
registration. As Sec. 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties may be
acquired thru prescription and under Art. 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private.106

In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,107 it was held that

Sec. 14(2) of public, PD No. 1529 must be considered in relation to the rule on
99
Gaerlan v. Republic, GR No. 192717, March 12, 2014; Republic v. Heirs of Sin, GR No. 157485,
100
Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371, March 5, 2014.
101
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
102
Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797,
Dec. 4, 2008; Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, GR No. 173775,
Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v. Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March 13, 2007; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No.
156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183; Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359. See also RA No. 6940,
dated March 28, 1990.
103
Benguet Consolidated Mining Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 (1956) citing Balboa v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928)
and 16 C.J.S. 214-215.
104
Supra.
105
GR No. 194617, Aug. 5, 2015.
106
Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 186639, Feb. 5, 2014
107
GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.
 17

prescription under the Civil Code as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial

property. Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into
private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express
declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or development of
national wealth.108 Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.109 But the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as
patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive
period.110

Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a

patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.111

Open, continuous and exclusive possession of land classified as A and D land for
at least thirty years segregates the land from the public domain and ipso jure converts the
same to private property.112

(Note: In Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 113 the Court ruled that
a mere notice of adverse claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession.
In Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, 114 which also cited the Rañon.
the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat another's right of
ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription. In the same vein, a protest filed
before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively
toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. Only in cases filed before the
courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession.115)

Distinction between Sec. 14(1) and Sec. 14(2): Under Sec. 14(1), there must be
proof showing that the land had already been classified as alienable and disposable at the
time the application is filed. Under Sec. 14(2), there must be proof that the land had
already been converted to patrimonial property (no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth) at the start of possession.116

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND BY

RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR ACCRETION

Sec. 14(3) of PD No. 1529 states that “those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or acquired under existing
laws” may also apply for registration.

108
Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.
109
Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013. Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18,
2012.
110
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, supra.
111
Id.
112
Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA
56; See Arts. 1127 and 1134, Civil Code.
113
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
114
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012. citing Heirs of
Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 406-407.
115
Virtucio v. Alegarbes, GR No. 187451, Aug. 29, 2012.
116
Republic v. Zuburban Realty, GR No. 164408, March 24, 2014.
 18

Under Art. 420, paragraph 1117 and Art. 502, paragraph 1118 of the Civil Code, rivers
and their natural beds are property of public dominion. River beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. 119 However,
the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by
paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by
the new bed.

By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects of the current of the water — belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the
banks of rivers where it forms. 120 The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. 121 In Cachopero v.
Celestial,122 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.123

Art. 457 of the Civil Code requires that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. 124 However, the accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens title. There must be a separate action for the registration thereof.125

Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and is not open
to acquisition by adverse possession, unless subsequently declared as no longer needed
for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries.126

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND IN

ANY MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW

Sec. 14(4) provides that “those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law” may also apply for registration. This is illustrated where, for
instance, a land grant has been made by a Presidential proclamation or legislative act
pursuant to which the grantee may apply for the registration of the land and bring it under
the operation of the Torrens system.

In Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals,127 the trial
court ordered the registration of Lot No. 1176-B-2 situated in Davao City, which was
reserved by a Presidential proclamation for medical site purposes in 1956, in favor of
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The court held that the proclamation legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Property Registration Decree. Such grant is constitutive of a “fee
simple” title or absolute title in favor of the grantee.

CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT

117
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; . . . .
118
Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:
1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . .
119
Art. 461, Civil Code.
120
Art. 457, id.
121
Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012.
122
GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003).
123
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
124
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
125
Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524.
126
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335.
127
GR No. L-40912, Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146.
 19

ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

On the basis of their capacity “to acquire or hold lands of the public domain,” the
following may acquire private lands:

(1) Filipino citizens;

(2) Filipino corporations and association as defined in Section 2, Article XII of

the Constitution; and, by exception,

(3) Aliens but only be hereditary succession;128 and

(4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands subject to limitations provided by law.129

Area limitations:

 For residence

o 1,000 square meters in the case of urban lands or one hectare in the
case of rural lands.130

 For business (investment) or other purposes:

o 5,000 square meters if urban land, or 3 hectares if rural land.131

But where a Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen in a foreign country has

“reacquired” his Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No. 9225, dated August
29, 2003, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003,” the area limitation under RA No. 7042 may no longer apply since the law
expressly grants him the same right, as any Filipino citizen, to “enjoy full civil and
political rights” upon the re-acquisition of his Filipino citizenship.

Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities “qualified to acquire

or hold lands of the public domain.” Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60%
of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or
holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition
was made by a former natural-born citizen.132 Aliens, however, may lease private lands.133

The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine

land and not to the improvements built thereon. A contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves
the parties where it finds them. The provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the
action is proscribed by the Constitution.134

CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND

128
Sec. 7, Art. XII, Constitution
129
Sec. 8, ibid.
130
BP Blg. 185, dated March 16, 1982.
131
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000 ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA
No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179.
132
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009.
133
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461;
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.
134
Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing cases.
 20

DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF

ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION

The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the
right to own it is acquired. Thus, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina,135 it was
held that a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a natural-born Filipino, acquired
land from a vendor who had already complied with the requirements of registration prior
to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land even if at the time of the filing of
his application he was already an alien. He already had a vested right to the land.136

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED

FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS

A private corporation may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. 137 But the rule does not apply where at the time the
corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was
possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the
latter to registration. If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in
possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully
apply for confirmation of title to the land. That vested right has to be respected. Alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.138

PUBLICATION, OPPOSITION AND DEFAULT

PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING

Within five days from the filing of the application for registration, the court shall
issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
45 days nor later than 90 days from date of the order. 139 The public is given notice of the
initial hearing by (a) publication once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation; (b) mailing of the notice to persons named in the application for
registration and also to relevant government officials, and (c) posting of the notice on a
conspicuous place on the land itself and on the bulletin board of the city or municipality
where the land is situated.140 Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.141 However, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation
remains an indispensable requirement consistent with procedural due process.142

If amendment of the application is made to include additional area, a new

publication of the amended application must be made, but not when the amendment
consists in the exclusion of a portion form the area originally applied for.143

OPPOSITION

Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file and
opposition, based on right of dominion or some other real right, to the application for

135
GR No. 108998, Aug. 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567.
136
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapiña, 235 SCRA 567.
137
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
138
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509.
139
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529.
140
Id.
141
Sec. 24, PD No. 1529.
142
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27
SCRA 276.
143
Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.
 21

registration.144 But the absence of opposition does not justify outright registration. Since
the presumption is that all lands belong to the State, the applicant has the burden of
proving his imperfect right or fee simple title to the land applied for. 145 The failure of the
government to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right
to appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private property.146

DEFAULT ORDER

If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court shall, upon
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be
recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the notice
"To all Whom It May Concern", all the world are made parties defendant and shall be
concluded by the default order. Where an appearance has been entered and an answer
filed, a default order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.147

EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP

IDENTITY OF THE LAND

As required by Sec. 17 of PD No. 1529, the application for registration must be

accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands (now
Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau), together with the applicant’s
muniments of title. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings
until approved by the Director of Lands.

In Director of Lands v. Reyes,148 the Court declared that the submission of the

tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. But in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,149  the Court considered the submission
of a white print copy of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The Court was more
categorical in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Espartinez150  when
it stated that “the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required x x x may now be
dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been
overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.”

CLASSIFICATION OF
LAND AS “A” AND “D”
In Gaerlan v. Republic,151 (March 12, 2014), the Court reiterated that to prove that
the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification
from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the
certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.

144
Sec. 27 PD No. 1529.
145
Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227.
146
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
147
Sec. 26, PD No. 1529.
148
GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
149
GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586.
150
GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98.
151
GR No. 192717.
 22

The Court, citing Republic v. TA.N Properties, Inc.,152 further clarified that an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land is
indeed alienable and disposable. In Gaerlan, the Court held that a CENRO or PENRO
certification cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein since he
is not the officer “having legal custody of the record.”

Note, however, that in DENR Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, the
DENR clarified that the issuance of the certification and the certified copy of the
approved LC Map to prove that the area applied for is indeed classified as A and D is
“within the competence and jurisdiction of the CENRO.” In fact, under DENR Adm.
Order (DAO) No. 20, dated May 30, 1988, as amended by DAO No. 38 (1990), the
PENRO is authorized to issue certificates of land classification for areas over 50 hectares,
and CENROS for areas below 50 hectares.

(Author’s note: But in Llanes v. Republic,153 the Court held: “To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action, investigation reports of
the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. A certification by the
CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within
the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application.” Note that the
corrected certification was admitted although presented only during the appeal, in the
interest of substantial justice

The case of Republic v. Joson,154 stresses that the applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey
by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The mere certification issued by the
CENRO or PENRO does not suffice for the purpose. To the same effect are the recent
cases of Republic v. San Mateo,155 and Republic v. Castuera156)

EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION

Under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529, the reckoning
point of possession is June 12, 1945.157 It is only necessary that the land is already
classified as A and D land at the time of the filing of the application for registration.158

Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 159 Acts of a possessory character by
virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient. 160
Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without
152
G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477
153
GR No. 177947, Nov. 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.
154
GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014.
155
GR No. 203560, Nov. 10, 2014.
156
GR No. 203384, Jan. 14, 2015.
157
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188..
158
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
159
Sec. 14(1), PD No. 1529; Sec. 48(b), CA No. 141, as amended; Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371,
March 5, 201Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26
May 2005, 459 SCRA 183
160
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No. L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32.
 23

substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute exclusive and

notorious possession under claim of ownership161

TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX

RECEIPTS CORROBORATIVE PROOF
OF POSSESSION

Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof of ownership but
have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of actual possession or
supported by other effective proof.162 Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting it
every once in a while do not constitutes acts of possession. 163 Tax declarations are not
evidence of the right of possession unless supported by the other effective proof. But
they constitute proof that the holder has claim of the title over the property.164

Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax

purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner.165 Hence, payment in one a lump sum to cover all past taxes is
“irregular” and affects the validity of the applicant’s claim of ownership. 166 But mere
failure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that there was
abandonment of the property.167

SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER

VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

Spanish titles are no longer admissible as proof of ownership. The so-called

Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is inexistent.168 In a case, TCT No. 451423-A was traced
back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate Estate of the late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already declared null and void,
and from which no rights could therefore be derived.169

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF REGISTRATION

JUDGMENT; ORDER FOR THE

ISSUANCE OF DECREE

Within 15 days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration and certificate of
title.170 There is no period within which to issue the decree.171

Adjudication of ownership includes the delivery of possession if the defeated

party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of her rejected claim of
ownership.172

161
Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734; Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177.
162
Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id.
163
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214.
164
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820; Masagana v. Argamora, 109 SCRA 53; Director
of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
165
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
166
Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140.
167
Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.
168
PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; Quezon
Province v. Marte, GR No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of
Appeals, 265 SCRA 733; Director of Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329.
169
De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011.
170
Sec. 30, PD No. 1529)
171
Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012.
172
Pascual v. Daqioag, GR No. 162063, March 31, 2014.
 24

While the judgment becomes final 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment
(as to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from receipt of the decision by
the Solicitor General who represents the government in all registration proceedings), 173
the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case until after the expiration of one
year from the issuance of the decree of registration; 174 hence, the case may still be
reopened and the decision set aside when granted. 175 As held in Francisco v. Rojas,176 the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final,
in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry
of the final decree of registration. The title is not yet finally adjudicated and the decision
in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court. Until then the court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another person.

Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and

the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. A Torrens title issued on the basis of
a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Property Registration Decree which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the
decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.177

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land

already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void.178

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,179 the Court held that a judicial

declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48180 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable.181

WRIT OF POSSESSION

The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration
case but also against any one adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to
the issuance of the decree.182 The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land
after the issuance of the decree and who was not a party in the case. He can only be

173
Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.
174
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.
175
Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348.
176
GR No. 167120, April 23, 2014.
177
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases.
178
Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada
v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 333, 343-344, citing
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558, November 17,
1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.
179
G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-47847, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.
180
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
181
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011
182
Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491.
 25

proceeded against in a separate action for ejectment or reivindicatory action.183 The writ
is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession 184
and may be issued by a special order of the court. Mandamus is a proper remedy to
compel the issuance of a writ of possession.185

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

CONTENTS

A certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the
Register of Deeds in the registry.186 It accumulates in one document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee simple title which an owner possesses. The
certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner has. 187 What appears
on the face of the title is controlling on questions of ownership since the certificate of title
is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. 188

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, CONCLUSIVE

PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

A certificate of title is conclusive of ownership. It enjoys the presumption of

validity. Registration does not vest title: It is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 189 It
does not give any person any better title than what he lawfully has. 190 Registration is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands. 191 A certificate of title is an indefeasible
title and is conclusive as to the ownership of the registrant, 192 the identity of the land,193
and its location.194As against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed
of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.195

While certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect
a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.196

If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates
of title were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, the
transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any
anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.197

183
Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.
184
Gawaran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 154; Lucero v. Leot, 25 SCRA 687.
185
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
186
Philippine National Bank v. Tan Ong Zse, GR No. 27991, Dec. 24, 1927,
187
Legarda v. Saleeby, GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915.
188
Panganiban v. Dayrit, GR No. 151235, July 28, 2005.
189
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172; Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339; Avila v.
Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148.
190
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590. Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR
No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
191
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366.
192
Tan v. Bantegui, GR No. 154027, Oct. 24, 2005.
193
Demasiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105.
194
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626.
195
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
196
Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig, GR No. 166838, June 15, 2011, citing De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, 492 Phil. 643 (2005).
197
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing Degollacion v.
Register of Deeds of Cavite, G.R. No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 108, 115 and Mathay v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115788, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 556.
 26

An original certificate of title issued by virtue of administrative proceeding is as

indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the
indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.198

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. 199 He is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.200

IMPORTANCE AND PROBATIVE

VALUE OF A TORRENS CERTIFICATE

The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land
and stop forever any question as to its legality. 201 The certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. A title once registered under the Torrens system
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be
defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound
by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 202 But a certificate of title is not
conclusive where it is the product of a faulty or fraudulent registration.203

RULE WHERE TWO OR MORE CERTIFICATES

COVER THE SAME LAND

The general rule is that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as
between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one
certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.204

RULE WHERE TITLE IS IN THE

NAME OF ONLY ONE SPOUSE

Where property is registered in the name of “Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael

Litam,” what is the character of the property, conjugal or paraphernal? The property
belongs to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal property, for if it
were conjugal, the title should have been issued in the names of “Rafael Litan and
Marcosa Rivera,” or “Spouses Rafael Litan and Marcosa Rivera.” The words “married to
Rafael Litam” written after the name of Marcosa Rivera is merely descriptive of the civil
statue of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the property covered by the title.205

STATUTORY LIENS AFFECTING

REGISTERED PROPERTY
198
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.
199
Sec. 44, PD 1529; Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011;
Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-
78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710; Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78178, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 738; Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 487 (1935); Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil.
901 (1924).
200
Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310, Sept. 3,
1992, 213 SCRA 563; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
201
Republic v. Agunoy, GR No. 155394, Feb. 17, 2005
202
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, GR No. 175720, Sept. 11, 2007.
203
Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 91797, Aug. 28, 1991.
204
; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Sta. Maria, GR No. L-45168, Jan. 27, 1981.
205
Litam v. Espiritu, GR No. L-7644, Nov. 27, 1956.
 27

TITLE FREE FROM LIENS EXCEPT

THOSE NOTED THEREON

Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of

registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title
for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely: First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution
of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of
Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately
preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone. Third. Any public highway or private way
established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if
the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation
canal or lateral thereof have been determined. Fourth. Any disposition of the property or
limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or
any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.206

The provision on retention limits under Section 6 of RA No. 6657 constitutes a

statutory lien on the certificate of a titled owner, and any derivative titles, even if no such
annotations were inscribed on all of the said titles.207

The purpose is to give to the person registering, and to his transferee for value, an
absolutely clean title, one not subject to hidden defects, to undeveloped or inchoate
claims, to any sort of restriction, limitation or reduction except those named in the
certificate of registration or described in the law. That being the purpose of the statute,
the exceptions specified in Section 44 will not be enlarged beyond the actual signification
of the words used or extended beyond the limits which the words themselves actually
set.208

JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS

JURISDITION OF COURTS
OVER REAL ACTIONS

Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 confers exclusive jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts

(1) in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; and (2) in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, Section 33 of BP Blg. 29 provides that Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
206
Sec. 44, PD No. 1529.
207
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, GR No. 190482, Dec. 9, 2015.
208
De Jesus v. City of Manila, GR No. 9337, Dec. 24, 1914.
 28

(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation

expenses and costs.

An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, hence, exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action pertains to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in which instance
the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction.
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the
complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby
sought.209

When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year,
one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of
possession. While an accion reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment
case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana.210

REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO FRAUDULENT

OR IRREGULAR REGISTRATION

The aggrieved party has a number of remedies to question the validity of the
decision. These include the remedies of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or appeal to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 33, PD No. 1529.

Under the property Registration Decree, the remedies consequent to fraudulent or

irregular registration are: review of decree under Sec. 32; reconveyance under Secs. 53
and 96; damages under Sec. 32; claim against the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95;
reversion under Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title; quieting of title; annulment
of judgment under Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and
other special laws.

 Petition for review of decree. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,211 the Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili,

“Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds)”, stressed that
courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an
application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of
the decree of registration. However, the basis of the action must be anchored solely on
actual fraud.

The petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court’s decision and
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as
noted in Rivera v. Moran,212  there can be no possible reason for requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of
fraud. A petition taken under Sec. 32 of PD No. 1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for “as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the

209
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico
Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.
210
Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases.
211
GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.
212
GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836.
 29

court rendering it.”213

The adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it
may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside
said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another.214

The rule on the incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one
year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to titles acquired
through homestead or free patents.215 The date of issuance of the patent corresponds to the
date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases.

A Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from the
issuance of the final decree and is generally conclusive evidence of the ownership. 216 The
rule on the inconvertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one year from entry
of the decree of registration is equally applicable to title acquired through homestead or
free patents.217 Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished form intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment.

To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) he must show actual fraud in the
procurement of the decree of registration; (c) the petition must be filed within one (1)
year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and (d) the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.218

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party
in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing

litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.219

 Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No. 1529)

The remedy of one who has established his ownership over a property but which
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered through fraud or mistake in
another's name is, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the questioned
decree, not to set aside the decree, it having become incontrovertible and no longer open
to review, but to institute an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance. Proof of actual fraud is not required as it may be filed even when no fraud

213
Lozada v. Bracewell, GR No. 179155, April 2, 2014.
214
Director of Lands v. Busuego, GR No. L-19090, Dec. 28, 1964, cited in Lozada v. Bracewell, supra.
April 2, 2014.
215
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
216
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992)
217
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
218
Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.
219
Pinusukan Foodhouse v. Far East Bank and Trust Co., GR No. 159926. Jan. 20, 2014.
 30

intervened such as when there is mistake in including the land for registration.220

If the property, however, has already passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the remedy is to file an action for damages from the person who
allegedly registered the property through fraud, or if he had become insolvent or if the
action is barred by prescription, to file an action for recovery against the Assurance Fund
under Sec. 95 of PD No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree) within a period of six
years from the time the right to bring such action accrues. 221 An action for reconveyance
is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.222

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose

property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It is
filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the action in court.223

As held in Medizabel v. Apao,224 the essence of an action for reconveyance is that

the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.225

Reconveyance does not aim to reopen proceedings but only to transfer or

reconvey the land from registered owner to the rightful owner. 226 Reconveyance is
available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a
constructive trust between the parties.227

Requisites of an action for reconveyance

To warrant reconveyance, the following requisites must concur:

(a) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or
dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(b) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured
through fraud or other illegal means;

(c) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and

(d) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud, 228 or
220
Francisco v. Rojas, GR No. 167120, April 23, 2014.
221
Roxas v. Garcia, GR No. 146208, Aug. 12, 2004.
222
Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011.
223
Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing cases.
224
G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608. See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No.
161030, Sept. 14, 2011; Roque v. Aguado, GR No. 193787, April 7, 2013.
225
Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003), citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354
Phil. 556, 561-562 (1998).
226
Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008; Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July
28, 2008; Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356.
227
Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13, 1994.
228
Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, which held that: “An action for
reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which
 31

not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.229

Art. 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.230
A petition for review and action for reconveyance are no longer available if the property
has already been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.231

Note: There are kinds of actions to recover possession of real property: Actions to
recover possession of real property:

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
and unlawful detainer.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title.

Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the

proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.232

Prescription of action

An action for reconveyance may be barred by prescription or laches.

(1) Action based on fraud - four years

(2) Action based on implied trust - ten years

(3) Action based on a void contract – imprescriptible

(4) Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession – imprescriptible

An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in

ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, or the instrument
affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the
land and operates constructive notice to the world. Repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 233
The 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on
fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession
of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does not apply to an action to
nullify a contract which is void ab initio. Art. 1410 of the Civil Code categorically states
that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.234

But prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the
disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or

requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.”
229
New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citing
Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut, GR No. 147379,
Feb. 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206.
230
Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257 (2005).
231
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, GR
No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.
232
Suarez v. Emboy, GR No. 187944, March 12, 2014.
233
Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011; Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641
(2004).
234
Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011.
 32

his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.235

Where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights
of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable
powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. 236  Failure to take
steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of
title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.237

 Cancellation of title

In contrast to an action for reversion which is filed by the government, through

the Solicitor general, an action for cancellation is initiated by a private party usually in a
case where there are two titles issued to different persons for the same lot. When one of
two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and
ordered cancelled. Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons for the
same land, the earlier in date must prevail, and in case of successive registration, the
person holding under prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
relies on the second certificate.

While an action for cancellation of title is usually brought by the aggrieved

private party, the government, although it may have no proprietary interest in the
property, is also vested with personality to bring actions for the cancellation of
erroneously issued titles to protect public interest, preserve the integrity of the Torrens
system, and safeguard the Assurance Fund as well.

Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment

of title, should never be presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which
must be proved.238

 Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

An action for reconveyance is not feasible where the property has already passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. But the interested party can file an
action for damages against the person responsible for depriving him of his right or
interest in the property. This action may be filed against the applicant or person
responsible for the fraud.239 The action should be brought within 10 years from the date
of the issuance of the questioned certificate of title pursuant to Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code.240

 Action for compensation from the Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No.
1529)

The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of
the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. 241 The
requisites for recovery from the Assurance Fund are: (a) a person sustains loss or
damage, or is deprived by any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of the bringing of
land under the Torrens system; (c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in the certificate of entry in the registration book; (d) without negligence

235
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
236
Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277.
237
Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731, Jan. 11, 1990.
238
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011
239
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9)
240
Castillo v. Madrigal, GR No. 62650, June 27, 1991.
241
De Guzman v. National Treasurer, GR No. 143281, Aug. 3, 2000.
 33

on his part, and (e) is barred from bringing an action for recovery of the land. 242 It is a
condition sine qua non that the person who brings the action for damages against the
Assurance Fund be the registered owner and, as the holders of transfer certificates of title,
that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. 243 But as between two
persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law
must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor
bereft of any transmissible rights.244

The action must be brought within 6 years from the time the right to bring the
action first occurred.245

The title issued to an innocent purchaser and for value cannot be revoked on the
basis that the deed of sale was falsified, if he had no knowledge of the fraud committed.
The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who
caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance
Fund.246

But in Treasurer of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,247 respondent spouses

bought a parcel of land from a person identifying himself as Lawaan Lopez. Later, the
real Lawaan Lopez appeared and petitioned the court to declare the sale null and void,
which was granted. Respondents subsequently brought an action for damages against the
Assurance Fund. The Court held that since respondents are neither the registered owners
nor innocent purchasers, they are not entitled to recover from the Assurance Fund.

 Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)

Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to
the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.248 The action is instituted by the government, through the
Solicitor General, in all cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the
Constitution249 or were fraudulently obtained.250 The mistake or error of the officials or
agents of the Lands Management Bureau cannot be invoked against the government with
regard to property of the public domain.251

In Yujuico v. Republic,252 the Court, citing Agcaoili, Property Registration

Decree and Rrelated Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), described reversion as an action
which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. But the Court in related cases
has also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that
were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the
conditions imposed by law,253 and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a

242
Sec. 95, PD No. 1529; Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107967, March 1, 1994; Eduarte v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 105944, Feb. 9, 1996; Veloso v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 102737, Aug. 21,
1996.
243
Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic, GR No. 151424, July 4, 2008.
244
Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78728, Dec. 8, 1988.
245
Sec. 102, PD No. 1529.
246
Tiro v. Phil. Estates Corporaion, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008.
247
GR No. L-42805, Aug.31,1987; see also Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, GR No.78728, Dec. 8, 1988.
248
Reublic v. Mangatora, GR No. 170375, July 7, 2010.
249
Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292.
250
Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007.
251
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 123586, Aug. 12, 2004, 479 Phil. 870 (2004);
252
GR No. 168661, Oct. 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513.
253
Republic v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 79582, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 721.Republic v. Court of
Appeals andAlpuerto, GR No. L-45202, Sept. 11, 1980.
 34

patent covering inalienable forest land254 or portion of a river, even when such grant was
made through mere oversight.255 In Republic v. Guerrero,256 the Court gave a more
general statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of "only in cases of
fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title."257

The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an
annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a land registration court. Actions for
cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that
"involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the
assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.258

PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR

VALUE
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s
claim.259

Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that “in no case shall such (petition for
review) be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.”

A person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to
rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are
annotated on the title, for registration is the operative act that binds the property. 260  It is
enough that he had examined the latest certificate of title or that which was issued in the
name of his immediate transferor. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate
but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the
property.261

In a series of transfers, it is enough that the buyer examines the latest certificate of
title and need not scrutinize each and every title that preceded it. 262 But a purchaser
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
claim that he acted in good faith.263 The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be
aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the
vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.

Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that, as regards immovable property,
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded the sale
in the Registry of Property.

In Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, the adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979,
respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by
respondent only on March 14, 1980. The Court stated that the prior registration of a lien
254
Republic v. De la Cruz, 160-A Phil. 374, 381-382 (1975).
255
Republic v. Roxas, GR No. 157988, Dec. 11, 2013; Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, supra.
256
GR No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424.
257
Lozano v. Tabayag, GR No. 189647, Feb. 6, 2012.
258
Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012.
259
Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264.
260
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710.
261
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, GR No. 171531, Jan. 30, 2009.
262
Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467.
263
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
 35

created a preference. Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will not
diminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens and the adverse claim.

The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is
preferred in right) is followed in land registration. 264 Thus, it has been held in a case that
Mahinay’s notice of lis pendens having been registered ahead of Sorensen's real estate
mortgage, the notice of lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate mortgage. The
claim of Sorensen that the owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverse
annotation at the time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the
nature of involuntary registration, the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the
original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind
third parties. It affects the whole world even if the owner's copy does not contain the
same annotation.265

The phrase “innocent purchaser for value” in Section 32 of the Property

Registration Decree includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.266 But unlike private individuals, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence in their dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract.267

In St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,268 the Court, held

that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings
and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the
subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the
mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith.

A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor of the property offered as security, and in the absence of any sign that
might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake further
investigation. But where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered
owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised
by the mortgagee.269
In Mahinay v. Gako,270 the Court ruled that when a mortgagee relies upon what
appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the basis of the
title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title was
defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the
land mortgaged must be respected and protected.271

In Blanco v. Esquierdo,272 it was held that the right or lien of an innocent

mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if
the mortgagor obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case, upon a complaint filed by
the legal heirs of Maximiano, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-6582
for having been secured through fraud, and also the cancellation of DBP’s mortgage. The
only question is whether the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The Court answered
in the affirmative. The bank was not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title was in the
name of Fructuosa at the time of the mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely on
264
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682 (1942).
265
Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897 (1995).
266
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 91383, May 31, 1991..
267
PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011.
268
GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577.
269
Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank, GR No. 200468, March 19, 2014.
270
Supra.
271
Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands
v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494 (1960).
272
GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.
 36

what appeared in the certificate and was under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate. The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action may
be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.

The issue of the buyer's good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of
the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner
whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of
the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. 273 But a
mortgage executed by an authorized agent who signed in his own name without
indicating that he acted for and on behalf of his principal binds only the agent and not the
principal.274

RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens
system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) then,
the first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.275 Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine
ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the
buyer; specifically, to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of
Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith. 276 As against the registered owners and the
holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess. 277
A person cannot claim good faith if he was aware that there were occupants in the subject
property other than the seller.278

The circumstances which must concur in order to determine the applicability of

Article 1544 are:

(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly
the same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions;

(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and

273
Sabitsana v. Muertegui, GR No. 181359, Aug. 5, 2013.
274
Bucton v. Rural Bank of El Salvador, GR No. 179625, Feb. 24, 2014.
275
Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544.
276
Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011
277
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
278
Alfaro v. Dumalagan, GR No. 186622, Jan 22, 2014.
 37

(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each have bought from the same seller.279

In Remalante v. Tibe,280 the Court ruled that the civil law provision on double sale
is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found
to be fraudulent.

Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v. Valerio,281 where the same parcel of land was
purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed
of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply
where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail.282 The rule that where two certificates purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting
the process of registration.283 On the other hand, while the execution of a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, it only gives
rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the
vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.284

Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not
have — nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. In a number of cases, an action for reconveyance has been treated as an action to
quiet title.285

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE

DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL
PROPERTY

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. It is not necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with
funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the
marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in
which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and
the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of
the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome the same.

Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without his wife's consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. A sale
of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of
his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and
within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.286

In Dewara v. Lamela,287 the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage, before the enactment of the Family Code. The issue is
279
Roque v. Aguado, GR No. 193787, April 7, 2013.
280
GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.
281
GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.
282
Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 350.
283
Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988, 295 SCRA 556.
284
Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.
285
Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases cited therein.
286
Ayuste v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999.
287
GR No. 179010, April 11, 2011.
 38

whether the property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal

property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject to levy
and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal
case for serious physical injuries. The Court held:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,

unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 288
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.289 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.290 Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, it does
not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to
answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before
debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be
shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to
the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be
enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.

Q. Evidence showed that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Socorro, but the certificate of title in the name of "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres," was issued only after the celebration of
the marriage. Is the property conjugal?

A. The property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro

Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned
the property. 291

Q. The subject property was acquired in 1968 during Ros and Aguete's marriage.
Ros mortgaged the property in 1974. Is the debt chargeable to the conjugal partnership?

A. No. As held by the Court: 292

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract
is voidable.293 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros'
encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee
that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we
follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to
Ros' encumbrance of the subject property. Debts contracted by the husband for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of
the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. For this reason,
we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. 294

288
CIVIL CODE, Art. 160; Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 197, 203.
289
Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).
290
CIVIL CODE, Art. 178; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, at 202.
291
Ventura v. Abuda, GR No. 202932, Oct. 23, 2013; Salas v. Aguila, GR No. 202370, Sept. 23, 2013.
292
Ros v. PNB, GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.
293
Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 534 citing Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-
Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, Aug. 28, 2000, 410 SCRA 97.
294
GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.
 39

Art. 88 of the Family Code (EO No. 209, July 6, 1987) provides that absolute
community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the
marriage is celebrated. Article 96 further provides that the administration and enjoyment
of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. Art. 111 of the Family Code, as amended, provides that either
spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Art. 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband
and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's inability, the authority of the court. 295 The
particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without
the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community
of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of
the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the
wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of
the husband to institute the case.296

Q. What is the effect of an agreement to lease a parcel of land entered into by a

Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband?

A. The alien husband has no right to nullify the agreement. Being an alien, he is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. This is
true even if he provided the funds for the acquisition of the land. No reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property
was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.297

Q. Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is
being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
"stranger?"

A. There is no dispute that the contested property is conjugal in nature. Unlike in

the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of
a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-
spouse.298

Q. Is the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with

her husband Norberto Chan answerable for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under a
judgment?
295
Ravina v. Villa Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009.
296
Ibid.
297
Matthews v. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009.
298
Buado v.Court of Appeals, GR No. 145222, April 2, 2009.
 40

A. Since spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or

after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their absolute community
property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse pursuant to
Art. 94 of said Code.299

Q. Is respondent, an alien, entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the

acquisition of the Antipolo property?

A. Pursuant to Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution, aliens, whether

individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. Respondent was aware of
the constitutional prohibition. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of his Filipino wife because of said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.300
A FORGED DEED MAY BE THE
ROOT OF A VALID TITLE

Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. 301 Verily,
when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither
does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.302

But a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if
the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. 303 Even if the procurement of
a certificate of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such defective
title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.304

In Repubic v. Agunoy,305 the Court held:

Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own judicial admission, the lots in
dispute are no longer part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth,
fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the
presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino vs.
Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited: “[E]ven on the supposition that the sale
was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be
valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of
Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged
document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or
the name indicated by the forger.”

CONVEYANCE AND OTHER DEALINGS

BY REGISTERED OWNER

GENERAL RULE
299
Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 164401, June 25, 2008.
300
Muller v.Muller, GR No. 149615, Aug. 29, 2006.
301
Sec. 53, PD No. 1529.
302
Sarili v. Lagrosa, GR No. 193517, Jan. 15, 2014.
303
Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011; Solivel v. Francisco, GR No. 51450, Feb. 10, 1989, 170
SCRA 218; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-64159, Sept. 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489;
Director of Lands v. Addison, GR No. 23148, March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 19.
304
Sarili v. Lagrosa, GR No. 193517, Jan. 15, 2014.
305
GR No. 155394, Feb. 17, 2005, citing cases.
 41

The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth in Sec. 51 of PD No.
1529:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. — An owner of

registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same
in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease,
or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.

No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the

owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in the law (PD 1529) or upon order of the court, for cause shown.306

From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens
system remains, for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is
registered, notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the
corresponding deed is registered. Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only
between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.307

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY

AND INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION

As a rule, the order of entries in the Primary Entry Book determines the priority in
registration.308 Sec. 56 of PD No. 1529 states:

Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. — Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he
shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies of writs
and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary
process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when
made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided,
that the national government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be
exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and
registration.

A voluntary instrument is a willful act of the registered owner of the land to be

affected by registration, while an involuntary instrument is one pertaining to a transaction
affecting lands in which the registered owner’s cooperation is not needed and which
transaction may even be done against his will.309

For the registration of a voluntary instrument, it is necessary not only to register

the deed, instrument or assignment, mortgage, or lease in the entry book of the register of
deeds, but a memorandum thereof must also be made on the owner’s duplicate and on its
original. The mere entry by the register of deeds in the entry or diary book, without the

306
Sec. 53, PD 1529.
307
Bulaong v. Gonzales, GR No. 156318, Sept. 5, 2011.
308
Id.
309
Auto Group v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 157553, Sept. 8, 2004.
 42

presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title for corresponding annotation of

the conveyance, does not have the effect of a conveyance of the property. On the other
hand, for the registration of an involuntary instrument, the law does not require the
presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title and considers the annotation of
such instrument upon the entry book, as sufficient to affect the real estate to which it
relates.310

In Saberon v. Ventanilla,311 (April 21, 2014) the Court gave the distinction
between the registration of a voluntary and involuntary instrument as follows:

In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent purchaser for

value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law
the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized
and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time
he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land
sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within
his power to perform. The Register of Deeds is duty bound to perform it.17 In cases
of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to
all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the
register of deeds. Therefore, in the registration of an attachment, levy upon
execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like, the entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.

To the same effect is Bulaong v. Gonzales312 which held that in voluntary

registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's duplicate
certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made
within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not operate to
convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy
upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient
notice to all persons even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of
titles.313

VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH

REGISTERED LANDS

FORMS OF DEEDS

An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise

deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds,
mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons
are concerned.314 No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds,
unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. The
production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate.315

No new certificate shall be entered or issued pursuant to any instrument which

does not divest the ownership or title from the owner or from the transferee of the
registered owners. All interests in registered land less than ownership shall be registered
by filing with the Register of Deeds the instrument which creates or transfers or claims

310
Ibid.
311
GR No. 192669.
312
Supra.
313
Bulaong v Gonzales, supra.
314
Sec. 51, PD No. 1529.
315
Sec. 53, ibid.
 43

such interests and by a brief memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon
the certificate of title.316

MORTGAGES AND LEASES

The requisites of a mortgage are: (a) it is constituted to secure the fulfillment of a

principal obligation; (b) the mortgagor is the absolute owner of the property, and (c) the
mortgagor has the free disposal thereof.

Under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract
of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void. However, an exception
to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine, even if the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This
principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent
purchasers for value." Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does
not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is,
nonetheless, entitled to protection.317

An absolutely simulated contract of sale is void ab initio and transfers no

ownership right. The purported buyer, not being the owner, cannot validly mortgage the
subject property. Consequently, neither does the buyer at the foreclosure sale acquire any
title thereto.318 Mortgages over non-disposable lands do not acquire protection under the
law. A certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber or mineral land.319

A mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows the property – whoever its owner
may be. If the mortgagor sells the property, the buyer must respect the mortgage, if
registered, or if he knows of its existence. 320 The phrase “innocent purchaser for value”
includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. 321 The
subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s title will not nullify the mortgage. 322 The
remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who
caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.323

HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE

REQUIRED OF BANKING OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to
banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of

316
Sec. 54, ibid.
317
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
318
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, now Union Bank of the Philippines, GR No. 147788, March 19,
2002.
319
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 453; See also De la
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, GR No.120652, Feb. 11, 1998, 349 Phil. 898.
320
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 693.
321
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 710.
322
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587; Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494; Penullar
v. Philippine National Bank, 120 SCRA 171.
323
Blanco v. Esquierdo, GR No. L-15182, Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.
 44

them.324 Imbued with public interest, they "are expected to be more cautious than
ordinary individuals."325

In a case,326 the Court held that unlike private individuals, a bank is expected to
exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered
lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it
as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.327

FORECLOSURE OF MORTAGE

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his
obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the
(mortgaged) property to satisfy his credit.328

The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by

Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. The purchaser at the public auction sale of
an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance
with Section 7 of said Act.329

Unlike in an ordinary sale, inadequacy of the price at a forced sale is immaterial

and does not nullify the sale. It is also not required that the bid should at least be equal to
the market value of the foreclosed property or the outstanding obligation of the mortgage
debtor.330 If "the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from the
debtor.331

Where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the determination of the redemption

price for the foreclosed property is governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act.
There must be an unequivocal tender of payment for the full amount of the repurchase
price.332 The only instance when this rule may be construed liberally, i.e., allow the non-
simultaneous tender of payment, is if a judicial action is instituted by the redemptioner.333

REDEMPTION AND CONSOLIDATION

OF OWNERSHIP

If the foreclosed property is registered, the mortgagor has one year within which
to redeem the property from and after registration of sale with the Register of Deeds.334
After the expiration of the period of redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale or
anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to
324
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 246, 261.
325
Alano v. Planter’s Development Bank, GR No. 171628, June 13, 2011. Philippine National Bank v.
Corpuz, G.R. No. 180945, February 12, 2010, 612 SCRA 493, 496; Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 157 SCRA 187.
326
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225, 239 (2002).
327
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, supra.
328
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Doyon, GR No. 167238, March 25, 2009.
329
China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008.
330
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, GR No. 175816, Dec. 7, 2011.
331
Id.
332
Allied Banking Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 167420, June 5, 2009; Quisumbing v. PNB, GR No.
178242, Jan. 20, 2009.
333
Quisumbing v. PNB, supra.
334
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 837, 847 (1999); BPI Family Savings
Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, GR No. 175816, Dec. 7, 2011.
 45

him. But before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all
legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.335

The rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the
property. The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his
right of redemption. The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court.336

Upon the expiration of the redemption period of one year from the registration of
the sale, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute.337 He is entitled to possession following the consolidation of ownership in his
name.338 The writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.339 The trial court has no
discretion on this matter."340

May persons to whom several mortgaged lands were transferred without the
knowledge and consent of the creditor redeem only several parcels if all the lands were
sold together for a single price at the foreclosure sale? In several early cases decided by
the Court, the right of the mortgagor or redemptioner to redeem one or some of the
foreclosed properties was recognized.341

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF
POSSESSION MINISTERIAL

Under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, a writ of possession may be issued either (a) within
the one-year period, upon the filing of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond.342

The proceeding for the issuance of the writ is ex parte and is ministerial duty of
the court,343 unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor,344 or where the bid price is unjustifiably higher than the real amount of the
obligation.345

The issuance of the writ may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case.346 The order of the RTC granting the petition for
a writ of possession is final which can only be questioned on appeal.347

REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT

TO PRESCRIPTION

335
Sec. 75, PD 1529; Reyes v. Tang Soat Ing, GR No. 185620, Dec. 14, 2011
336
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
337
Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco, GR No. 183211, June 5, 2009.
338
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011; Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Tarampi, GR No. 174988, Dec. 10, 2008.
339
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, supra.
340
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Bance, G.R. No. 167280, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 507, 515-516.
Emphasis supplied.
341
Yap v. Dy, GR No. 171868, July 27, 2011.
342
Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, 465 SCRA 287.
343
Sueno v. Land Bank of the Philippines, GR No. 174711, Sept. 17, 2008.
344
Clapano v. Gapultos, GR No. L-51574, Sept. 30, 1984; China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, supra.
345
Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441; Marquez v. Alindog, GR No. 184045, Jan. 22, 2014.
346
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, GR No. 174988, Dec. 10, 2008.
347
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation, GR No. 168088, April
4, 2007.
 46

No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.348 Thus, the right to recover possession of
registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.349 Prescription is unavailing not only against the titled owner but also against
his heirs.350 But ownership may be lost through laches 351 which is failure or neglect to
assert a right for an unreasonable length of time.352

CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT

TO COLLATERAL ATTACK

A certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,

modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. 353 Thus, in a complaint for recovery
of possession, defendant cannot raise in the action the validity of plaintiff’s title. 354 There
must be a direct attack on the title via a separate action; but a direct attack may be made
in a counterclaim or third-party complaint.355

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
356
itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. 357 The prohibition against collateral
attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy
indefeasibility.358

AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION
OF CERTIFICATES

The proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under
Sec. 108 of PD No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do
not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d)
when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered
owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and
no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation,
which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within
three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.359

348
Sec. 47, PD No. 1529.
349
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011, citing Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 107 (1985).
350
Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251; Guinoo v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235.
351
Fernando v. Acuna, supra, citing cases. See also Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277.
352
Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339.
353
Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Tapuroc v. Loquellano, GR No. 152007, Jan. 22, 2007.
354
Gaiterio v. Almeria, GR No. 181812, June 8, 2011; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA
743.
355
Leyson v. Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005; Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18,
2011.
356
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.
357
Lacbayan v. Samoy, GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011.
358
Oliveros v. San Miguel Corporation, GR No. 173531, Feb. 1, 2012.
359
Paz v. Republic, GR No. 157367, Nov. 23, 2011.
 47

All petitions or motions filed under Sec. 108, PD No. 1529, as well as under any
other provision of the Decree after original registration, shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree or registration was entered. The rule aims to prevent
confusion and to avoid difficulty in tracing the origin of entries in the registry. 360 But the
court has no authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing
shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his
or their written consent.361

Under Sec. 2 of PD No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above provision has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions.362

REPLACEMENT OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

Sec. 109, PD No. 1529, governs the procedure for the replacement of a lost or
destroyed owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Where the owner’s duplicate copy is not
in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is unwarranted as the court has no
jurisdiction over the petition.363

Unlike in a petition for reconstitution, there is no requirement for the publication

of the petition for replacement of lost or destroyed certificate under Sec. 109 of PD No.
1529. A petition for replacement of a lost duplicate certificate of title shall be filed with
the regional trial court of the place where the land lies, and this is true even if the title
was issued pursuant to a public land patent registered in accordance with Section 103 of
the Decree.364

RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form

and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred.365 The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in
the custody of the Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is
replaced with a new one — the reconstituted title — that basically reproduces the
original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted
title.366

360
Life Homes Realty v. Court of Appeas, GR No. 120827, Feb. 15, 2007.
361
Sec. 108, PD No. 1529.
362
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107751, June 1, 1995.
363
Camitan vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128099, Dec. 20, 2006.
364
Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-836. Aug. 2, 1995.
365
Republic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 614.
366
Republic v. Vergel de Dios, GR No. 170459, Feb. 9, 2011.
 48

Reconstitution denotes restoration of the certificate of title allegedly lost or

destroyed in its original form and conditions: it does not pass upon the question of
ownership.367 Thus, if a certificate of title covering land was decreed in the name of
“Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,” the reconstituted certificate of title should likewise
be in the name of the decreed owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.368

For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements must be present:

(1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed;

(2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and

(3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.369

The only persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate
are the registered owner, his assigns or persons in interest in the property.370

Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding, hence,

notice of the proceedings must be done in the manner set forth by the law. The
jurisdictional requirements of (a) publication, (b) posting, and (c) service of notice are
mandatory. Reconstitution is governed by RA No. 26 in relation to Sec. 110 of PD No.
1529. Sec. 12 of RA No. 26 describes the requirements for a petition for reconstitution
while Sec. 13 prescribes the requirements for a notice of hearing of the petition. Non-
compliance with the requirements deprives the court of jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution.371

The requirements of Secs. 2 and 3, RA No. 26 are almost identical. The

enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. The phrase “any other
document” in paragraph (f) of Secs. 2 and 3 refers to documents similar to those
enumerated.372

Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or

destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the
names of their duly registered owners.373

Administrative reconstitution is also governed by RA No, 26, as amended by RA

No. 6732, dated July 17, 1989. Administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificates of title may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land
titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority, and on the further condition that:

(a) the number of certificates of title lost or damaged should be at least ten
percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the office of the Register of Deeds;
but
(b) in no case shall the number of certificates be less than five hundred (500).

The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling

significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
367
Republic v. Santua, GR No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008; Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development
Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008; Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12.
368
Bunagan v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, GR No. L-29073, April 18, 1980, 97 SCRA 72.
369
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008.
370
Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 187892, Jan. 14, 2015.
371
Castillo v. Republic, GR No. 182980, June 22, 2011.
372
Republic v. Lagramada, GR No. 150741, June 12, 2008; Republic v. Santua, supra.;
373
Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.
 49

officials or agents, hence, the Republic is not barred from assailing the decision granting
the petition for reconstitution if the same has no merit.374

It has been held that should a petition for reconstitution be denied for lack of
sufficient basis, the petitioner is not entirely left without a remedy. He may still file an
application for confirmation of his title under relevant laws if he is, in fact, the lawful
owner of land.375

INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS

ADVERSE CLAIM

An adverse claim is registered by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn

petition starting the basis of the right claimed. 376 The duty of the Register of Deeds to
record the same on the title of ministerial. 377 The notice of adverse claim is to apprise
third person that there is controversy over the ownership of the land, such that any
transaction regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.378 The annotation
of an adverse claim over registered land under Sec. 70 of PD No. 1529379 requires a claim
on the title of the disputed land. The existence of an easement of subjacent and lateral
support need not be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.380

An adverse claim is not ipso facto cancelled upon the lapse of the thirty days from
its registration. There must be a petition for the purpose to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard.381 Parties with liens annotated on the certificate of title are
entitled to notice in an action for cancellation of their liens.382

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular

real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
374
Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012.
375
Angat v. Republic, supra.
376
Sec. 70, PD No. 1529.
377
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79.
378
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279; Duque-Rosario v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
379
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides:
Section 70. Adverse claim. — Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation,
no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of
First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may
be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered
was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse
claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
380
Castro v. Monsod, GR No. 183719, Feb. 2, 2011.
381
Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals, supra; see also Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011; Equatorial Realty v. Frogozo, GR No. 128563, March 25, 2004; Tan
v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125038, Nov. 16, 2001.
382
Crisologo v. Omelio, GR No. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, Oct. 3, 2012.
 50

said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over the said property.383 The title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no
special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot
acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest. 384 Thus, one who buys land
where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in
good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in
interest.385

A notice of lis pendens should contain (1) a statement of the institution of the
action or proceeding; (2) the court where the same is pending; (3) the date of its
institution; (4) a reference to the number of the certificate of title; and (5) an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered owner. 386 The notice is not a lien or
encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those
dealing with the property that it is under litigation.387

WHEN NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

MAY BE AVAILED OF

The litigation must involve the title to, or the use or occupation of, a specific
property. It does not apply where the object of the suit is money judgment, or
proceedings for the probate of will or administration of the estate of a deceased person,
levy on execution or preliminary attachments.388 A notice of lis pendens subjects the
interest of the transferee to the results of the pending suit.

GROUNDS FORF CANCELLATION

Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration thereof. At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, upon the registration of a certificate
of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of
disposal thereof.389

DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND

RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS

No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting

land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties
thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner prescribed in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.390

CONSULTAS

383
Dela Merced v. GSIS, GR No. 167140, Nov. 23, 2011.
384
Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-902 (1995).
385
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing
Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-
30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207.
386
Sec. 76, PD No. 1529.
387
Republic v. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, Aug. 6, 2008.
388
MR Holdings, Ltd. v. Bajar, GR No. 153478, Oct. 10, 2012; Biglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Co., GR
No. 158998, March 28, 2008.
389
Sec. 77, PD No. 1529.
390
Sec. 113, PD No. 1529.
 51

PROCEDURE

Sec. 117 of PD No. 1529 provides:

SEC. 117. Procedure. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard
to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference
to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. x x x

The Commissioner of Land Registration, considering the consulta and the

records certified to him after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His resolution or ruling
in consultas shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds, provided,
that the party in interest who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or order of the
Commissioner relative to consultas may appeal to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434.

It is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register documents presented

to him for registration.391 If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the registrability of the
document, the remedy is to elevate the matter to the LRA via en consulta. The same
procedure may be availed of by the interested party. 392 Appeal from the LRA decision
may be taken to the Court of Appeals.393

The case of Alfonso v. Office of the President394 stresses the duty of the Register
of Deeds, when in doubt as to the proper action to be taken on any instrument presented
to him for registration, to elevate the matter to the LRA Administrator for resolution, via
consulta, pursuant to Sec. 117 of PD No.1529, viz:

It may not be amiss to mention that even Justice Agcaoili, in his dissent to the
assailed CA Decision, observed petitioner's failure to take precautionary measures,
thus:

‘Considering the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as the "mother of all land titling
scams," the irregularity attending the issuance of the titles could have been avoided had
petitioner exercised a little more due care and circumspection before she affixed her
signature [on the Rivera titles]. The fact that the Maysilo estate has spawned conflicting
claims of ownership which invariably reached the courts, a fact which petitioner cannot
ignore on account of her long exposure and experience as a register of deeds, should
have impelled petitioner to be more prudent even to the extent of deliberately holding
action on the papers submitted to her relative to the estate until she shall have fully
satisfied herself that everything was above board. x x x If petitioner had made further
investigation (in the light of her previous certifications and the notoriety of the Maysilo
estate as a potential breeding ground of titling irregularities) and, thus, made a timely
discovery of the error in the questioned entry, but still was in doubt on how to
proceed, she could have easily referred the matter to the LRA Administrator en
consulta as authorized by Section 117 of PD No. 1529.’

JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI

Philippine Judicial Academy
391
Sec. 10, PD No. 1529.
392
Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152.
393
Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88.
394
GR No. 150091, April 2, 2007.
 52

Supreme Court
552-9636, 922-0232, 0920-9506384
Email: [email protected]

Reference:

1. AGCAOILI, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and
Deeds),” 2015 ed., (with a Foreword by Philja Chancellor Justice Adolfo S.
Azcuna), cited by the Supreme Court as “one of the recognized textbooks on
property registration” in Eland Philippines Inc. v. Garcia, GR No. 173289,
Feb. 17, 2010.

2. AGCAOILI, “Law on Natural Resources and Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases,” 2016 ed., (with a Foreword by Justice Presbitero
Velasco, Jr.) This includes important substantive laws for the protection and
preservation of the environment, and the new Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases covering, among others, citizen suits, consent decree,
SLAPP, TEPO, writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus, precautionary
principle, etc.

3. AGCAOILI, “Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Laws (With

Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers), 2016 ed.

Published and Distributed by REX Book Store