PSC 026 Procedure For Conducting Operational Fire, Abandon Ship and Damage Control Drills During A Port State Control Inspection
PSC 026 Procedure For Conducting Operational Fire, Abandon Ship and Damage Control Drills During A Port State Control Inspection
PSC 026 Procedure For Conducting Operational Fire, Abandon Ship and Damage Control Drills During A Port State Control Inspection
The attached FSI 17/7/8 dated 8th December 2008 – HARMONIZATION OF PORT
STATE CONTROL ACTIVITIES – details the procedure for conducting operational
fire, abandon ship and damage control drills during a port State control inspection.
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
E
IMO
Procedures for conducting operational fire, abandon ship and damage control
drills during a port State control inspection
SUMMARY
Executive summary: Annexed to this document are the procedures for conducting
operational fire, abandon ship and damage control drills during a port
State control inspection
Strategic direction: 1
High-level action: 1.1.2
Planned output: 1.1.2.3
Action to be taken: Paragraph 3
Related documents: None
Introduction
1 A Paris MoU Task Force was tasked by the Paris MoU Port State Control Committee
(PSCC) to develop procedures for conducting operational fire, abandon ship and damage control
drills during a port State control inspection
2 The attached procedures for conducting operational fire, abandon ship and damage
control drills during a port State control inspection were adopted by PSCC 41, at its last meeting
in Greece, with the ability to revisit them at a later date.
***
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
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1. Introduction
1.1 It is essential that seafarers are familiar with the life-saving and fire-fighting equipment
on board their ships, and that they have confidence that the systems provided for their
safety will work efficiently and effectively in an emergency.
1.2 Experience has shown that holding frequent drills improves the familiarity of the crew
with life-saving and fire-fighting equipment on board their ships. Drills give ships crew
the opportunity to gain experience and confidence in the use of safety equipment and
work in co-operation with each other. The PSCO should request to see records of drills
carried out as per the requirement of the on board safety Management System.
1.3 During a port State control inspection the attending Port State Control Officer (PSCO)
may establish “clear grounds” for doubting the ability of the crew to carry out their
emergency duties (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3) or receive information from legitimate
interested parties regarding the crews’ ability. In such cases an operational drill should be
conducted.
1.4 It is essential that PSCOs witness operational drills that are conducted in a consistent
manner, that achieve the minimum required standard (see Section 3) and that is
understood by all relevant bodies that may be involved with the vessel such as flag States,
Recognized Organizations, owner/operators and port States.
1.5 PSCOs should bear in mind the security level of the ship. For example, a ship at security
level 2 may have additional doors locked which may impede access to the scene of the
incident. The PSCO should monitor this during the drill.
1.6 The main purpose of these instructions is to provide guidance to PSCOs in setting a drill
scenario, witnessing the drill and finally assessing the standard of the drill. It is important
to emphasize that the PSCO is not looking for an exceptional drill, particularly on cargo
ships. The main points to be satisfied are:
1.6.1 In the event of a shipboard emergency can the crew organize themselves into an
effective team to tackle the emergency?
1.6.2 Can they communicate effectively?
1.6.3 Is the master in control and is information flowing to/from the command centre?
1.6.4 In the event of the situation getting out of hand can the crew safely abandon the
ship?
It is important that when setting the scenario the PSCO clearly explains to the master
exactly what is required and expected during the drill, bearing in mind there may be
language difficulties. PSCOs should not be intimidating, not interfere during the drill nor
offer advice, which on occasions is tempting, they should stand back and observe only,
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making appropriate notes. It is important to emphasize that the PSCO’s role is not to
teach or train but to witness.
2. Background information
2.1 The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) gives
two conditions where operational drills could be witnessed:
a. Paris MoU Annex 1 Section 5 − Whenever there are clear grounds for believing,
that the condition of a ship or its equipment or crew does not substantially meet
the relevant requirements of a Convention, a more detailed inspection shall be
carried out, including further checking of compliance with on board operational
requirements.
2.2 Examples of “clear grounds” are given in Section 4 of Annex 1 of the Paris MoU.
(See annex 1)
2.3 In addition to the examples of “clear grounds” given in Section 4 of Annex 1 of the
Paris MoU (see annex 1). Clear grounds found during an initial inspection which may
warrant an operational drill could be but are not limited to the following:
a. Muster List does not conform to SOLAS regulation III/8 (see annex 2).
b. Random questioning of the crew going about their normal duties reveals:
c. Inspection of logbooks/records reveals that drills have not been carried out as
required by SOLAS regulation III/19 (see annex 3) or as required by the Safety
Management System.
d. There is evidence that the crew have not been trained in accordance with SOLAS
regulation III/19 (see annex 3).
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3.1 When assessing whether operational requirements are complied with, PSCOs should
exercise their professional judgement to determine whether the operational proficiency of
the crew as a whole is of sufficient level to allow the ship to sail without danger to the
ship or persons on board, or presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine
environment.
3.2 When assessing the crew’s ability to conduct an operational drill, the mandatory
minimum requirements for familiarization and basic safety training for seafarers, as stated
in STCW 78/95, shall be used as a benchmark.
3.3 See annexes 5 to 8 for a summary of minimum requirements for familiarization and basic
safety training in accordance with STCW 78/95.
4.1 Operational drills should be planned, organized and performed in accordance with
relevant shipboard requirements so that the recognized risks are minimized. The onboard
SMS should detail this.
4.2 The PSCO must not request any operational tests or impose physical demands which, in
the judgement of the master, could jeopardize the safety of the ship, crew, passengers,
or cargo.
4.3 When requesting operational drills, the PSCO should ensure, as far as possible, no
interference with normal shipboard operations, such as loading and unloading of cargo or
ballast, which is being carried out under the responsibility of the master, nor should the
PSCO require the demonstration of any operational aspect which could unnecessarily
delay the ship.
4.4 Drills should be carried out at a safe speed. PSCOs should not expect to see operational
drills conducted in real time. During drills, care should be taken to ensure that everybody
familiarizes themselves with their duties and with the equipment. If necessary, drills
should be stopped if the PSCO considers that the crew are carrying out unsafe practices or
if there is a real emergency.
4.5 The PSCO should devise the emergency scenario on which the drill will be based in
conjunction with the master. The onboard SMS could be consulted. Experience has
shown that the best assessment is achieved when the PSCO devises and controls the
scenario (in collaboration with the master), since there is then an element of uncertainty
on the part of the ship’s officers as to how a drill will progress and is more realistic to the
actual onboard situation facing crew members in a critical situation.
4.6 Depending on the extent of the operational exercise it should be decided whether one or
more PSCOs should attend the vessel. With a large cargo ship or with a ship carrying
large numbers of crew and passengers it is not reasonable to expect one person to
adequately comment upon all areas of an emergency exercise. A more practical solution
would be to employ a team of two or three observers, each monitoring certain aspects of
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the drill. Objectives will need to be agreed before hand, and a collective opinion formed
through discussion at the end of the exercise. Use of several people rather than one
overcomes much of the difficulty associated with the subjective assessment. It is
appreciated that more than one PSCO is not always available and consideration could be
given to using other, suitably briefed, personnel such as experienced administrative staff,
members of the emergency services such as the Fire Brigade or Maritime Rescue
Coordination Centre (MRCC) staff.
4.7 It is essential that meetings are held between the PSCOs and key members of the ship’s
personnel before and after the exercise. An initial briefing should be used to explain in
general terms how the drill will be conducted and should also enable the ship’s staff to
recognize the PSCOs who are witnessing the drill, it is recommended that all PSCOs
witnessing the drill wear high visibility waistcoats to distinguish them from
crew members.
4.8 Effective communications amongst the PSCOs themselves and between the PSCOs and
crew is essential to enable the drill to be effectively divided into stages, e.g., Stage I
Incident, Stage II Fire Drill, Stage III Abandon Ship Drill.
4.9 Language difficulty between the PSCO and non-English speaking crews can make it
difficult to put across the intentions for the conduct of the exercise. Care needs to be
exercised when an unsatisfactory drill takes place, this is to ensure differentiation
between the crew possibly failing to understand the attending PSCO’s intention and
failure through lack of crew competence.
4.10 A final de-brief meeting should identify any shortcomings and if appropriate where the
drill did not meet the required standard.
5. Standard scenario
5.1 A suggested standard scenario, which could be adapted to various types of vessel,
consists of four phases:
a. Incident Stage − A fire report or alarm received on the bridge and acted upon by
an incident party.
b. Fire Alarm − The incident progresses to a major fire which requires the ship to
deploy fire, boundary cooling, evacuation and closing down parties.
d. Abandon Ship – The fire fighters should withdraw and the crew abandon ship.
Lifeboats/rafts should be lowered and sent away.
5.2 The starting point of the scenario needs to be first established. High risk locations include
main and ancillary engine machinery, galley spaces. Alternatively, electrical sources such
as switchboard rooms or cabling runs in deckheads could be considered. If the ship
carries Dangerous Goods a simulated fire involving these would test knowledge of
recommended emergency procedures.
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6. Muster list
6.1 The PSCO may determine if the crew members are aware of their duties indicated in the
muster list, that they are familiar with the duties assigned to them and are aware of the
locations where they should perform their duties, this is done by asking the crew relevant
questions. This could be done prior to the drill or during the drill, for instance questioning
of stairway guides on a passenger ship.
6.2 To determine whether the muster list is up to date, the PSCO may require an up-to-date
crew list.
6.3 The PSCO should ensure that muster lists (SOLAS regulation III/37) are exhibited in
conspicuous places throughout the ship, including the navigational bridge, the
engine-room and the crew accommodation spaces. When determining if the muster list is
in accordance with the regulations, the PSCO may verify whether:
a. the muster list shows the duties assigned to the different members of the crew;
b. the muster list specifies which officers are assigned to ensure that life-saving and
fire-fighting equipment is maintained in good condition and ready for
immediate use;
c. the muster list specifies the substitutes for key persons who may become disabled,
taking into account that different emergencies may call for different actions;
d. the muster list shows the duties assigned to the crew members in relation to
passengers in the case of emergency;
6.4 The PSCO may determine that the duties of assigned crew members manning the survival
craft are in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS and should verify that a deck
officer or certificated person is placed in charge of each survival craft to be used.
A second-in-command should also be nominated in the case of lifeboats.
Note, however, that the flag State, having due regard to the nature of voyage, the number
of persons on board and the characteristics of the ship, may permit a person practised in
the handling and operation of liferafts to be placed in charge of liferafts in lieu of persons
qualified above.
7.1 The PSCO may determine if the key crew members are able to communicate with each
other, and with passengers as appropriate, in such a way that the safe operation of the ship
is not impaired, especially in emergency situations.
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7.2 Key crew members could be but are not limited to:
a. Bridge Team including GMDSS operators who must also be able to communicate
with the shore and other vessels
b. Fire Parties
c. Damage Control Parties
d. Boat Preparation Parties
e. Passenger Muster Personnel on passenger ships.
7.3 The PSCO should verify the working language(s) of the vessel.
7.4 The PSCO should also verify that the key crew members are able to understand each
other during the port State control inspection or drills.
7.5 The crew members assigned to assist passengers should be able to give the necessary
information to the passengers in case of an emergency.
7.6 The PSCO may determine if UHF or VHF hand held radios are being used and that the
crew are familiar with their use and that they are aware of reception dead zones and areas
and what alternative communication methods are available. (Sound powered
phones, etc.).
8. Command
8.1 PSCOs should establish that there are sufficient personnel on the bridge to make
decisions, navigate the ship as necessary and deal with the considerable amount of
communication that is likely.
8.2 A frequently neglected aspect of emergency drills is communication with the shore.
When a ship is in difficulty it is likely that shore-based organizations will be involved and
it follows that these should be alerted as soon as possible. The crew’s lack of familiarity
with shore-based organizations and the shore-based organizations’ lack of familiarity with
the shipboard organization means that difficulties can occur in mounting a coherent
response to an emergency. For large cargo ships and passenger ships it is recommended
that PSCOs make use of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) facilities during
operational drills. The ability of the local Search and Rescue (SAR) centre to participate
and a working channel over which communication for the purpose of the exercise can be
passed should be agreed beforehand (by reference to the SAR plan). Experience has
shown that this is of benefit to both parties in promoting familiarity with the procedures.
9. Fire drills
9.1 The PSCO may witness a fire drill carried out by the crew assigned to the duties specified
on the muster list and in the ship’s own procedures. After consultation with the master of
the vessel, one or more specific locations of the ship may be selected for a simulated fire.
A crew member may be sent to the location(s) to activate a fire alarm system or use other
means to give the alarm. The crew may also make use of Fire Safety Operational Booklet
and ship’s own procedures under ISM.
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9.2 Whichever location is selected it would be expected that the ship’s fire plan is examined
to find a suitable location from which the fire may spread in as many directions as
possible, having regard to the structural fire protection and ventilation arrangements.
9.3 Consideration needs to be given to testing the ship’s response for control of smoke, this is
potentially as important as the ability to fight the fire given that the smoke will penetrate
far more areas than the fire and will result in greater casualties. Realism is of vital
importance to the exercise and the use of a smoke generator is a useful aid. It is not
advocated that Administrations purchase their own smoke generators but most passenger
ships will have a smoke generator on board for training purposes. Cards identifying “hot
spots”, heavy/light smoke are of some benefit if a smoke generator is not available.
Another method is to simulate the effects of smoke is by masking part or all of the
BA masks. This should be done with care and in slow time. The PSCO at the scene needs
to make clear the exact situation regarding the smoke penetration.
9.4 If agreed with the master, casualties should also be simulated both in the immediate area
of the fire and in cabins, the latter will test the cabin search organization of the ship.
Great care must be taken if crew members are used as stretcher cases. The use of
weighted dummies is just as realistic without the risk of injury.
9.5 At the location of the fire the PSCO should describe the fire indication to the crew
member and observe how the report of fire is relayed to the bridge or damage control
centre. At this point most passenger ships will sound the crew alarm to summon the
fire-fighting parties to their stations.
9.6 The PSCO may observe how the fire-fighting team leader, fire-fighting team members
and fire-fighting team assistants are performing the actual fire-fighting operation.
The PSCO should observe the fire-fighting party arriving on the scene, breaking out their
equipment and fighting the simulated fire. Team leaders should be giving orders as
appropriate to their crews and passing the word back to the bridge or damage control
centre on the conditions. The fire-fighting crews should be observed for proper donning
and use of their equipment. The PSCO should make sure that all the gear is complete.
Merely mustering the crew with their gear is not acceptable.
9.7 If a scenario is developed where by the emergency generator is put on load and will be
used to supply power to the fire pumps, consideration needs to be given as to whether the
crew are over optimistic in the number of hoses deployed. Checks should also be made
that the crew are familiar with the location and operation of isolation valves, sprinkler
control stations, remote closing devices including watertight doors and establishing
emergency lighting.
9.8 Crew response to personnel injuries can be checked by selecting a crew member as a
simulated casualty. Where possible a PSCO should be in the same area as the casualty,
in order to observe how the search team is performing its task of search and rescue.
The PSCO should observe how the word is passed and the response of stretcher and
medical teams. Handling a stretcher properly through narrow passageways, doors and
stairways is difficult and takes practice.
9.9 The drill should, as far as practicable, be made as realistic as possible to simulate an
actual emergency.
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9.10 Those crew members assigned to other duties related to a fire drill, such as the manning
of the emergency generators, the CO2 room, the sprinkler and emergency fire pumps,
should also be involved in the drill. The PSCO may ask these crew members to explain
their duties and, if possible, to demonstrate their familiarity.
9.11 Where possible, one PSCO should be on the bridge to observe how the master is
controlling the drill.
9.12 Crew members on cargo ships should be familiar with the location of fire-fighting and
safety equipment and all means of escape.
9.13 On passenger ships, special attention should be paid to the duties of those crew members
assigned to the closing of manually operated doors and fire dampers. These closing
devices should be operated by the responsible persons in the areas of the simulated fire(s)
during the drill. Crew members not assigned to the fire-fighting teams are generally
assigned to locations throughout the passenger accommodation to assist in passenger
evacuation. These crew members should be asked to explain their duties and the meaning
of the various emergency signals and asked to point out the two means of escape from the
area, and where the passengers are to report. Crew members assigned to assist passengers
should be able to communicate at least enough information to direct a passenger to the
proper muster and embarkation stations. It is important to ascertain the procedure for
evacuating disabled passengers.
10.1 Fire fighting is not the only area which should be examined. Damage control is equally
important. Damage Control Plans should be available on all passenger ships irrespective
of year of build and cargo ships built after 1 February 1992.
10.2 The crew’s knowledge of the Damage Control Plan, including their knowledge of
cross-flooding arrangements, convention valve location, local/remote operation of the
watertight doors, etc., should be tested. Their assessment of the effect on stability of large
quantities of water in a damaged compartment should be assessed along with the
countermeasures taken to minimize the effects.
10.3 The PSCO may determine if the officers of the ship are aware of the contents of the
damage control booklet which should be available to them, or of the damage control plan.
The officers may be asked to explain the action to be taken in various damage conditions.
10.4 For vessels carrying liquid or noxious cargoes, methods to minimize the effects of
pollution following collision damage could be assessed including the resultant effects on
trim and stability.
10.5 The relevant officers may also be asked to explain about the boundaries of the watertight
compartments, the openings therein with the means of closure and position of any
controls thereof and the arrangements for the correction of any list due to flooding.
10.6 The relevant officers should have a sound knowledge of the effect of trim and stability of
their ship in the event of damage to and consequent flooding of a compartment and
counter-measures to be taken.
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10.7 On passenger ships the PSCO should determine if a damage control plan is provided and
whether the crew members are familiar with their duties and the proper use of the ship’s
installations and equipment for damage control purposes.
11.1 In order for the PSCO to satisfy themselves that the lifeboat, its launching arrangements
and competence of the crew the crew should demonstrate the following as part of an
abandon ship drill:
a. Lower the boat to the water (Note the lowering of the boat must be at the master’s
discretion depending on weather and tidal conditions, etc.)
11.2 Care needs to be taken when requiring a ship to lower lifeboats. The number of persons
inside the lifeboats during launching for the purpose of a drill shall be at the master’s
discretion. It is now acceptable to allow lifeboats to be lowered without an operating crew
being inside. However, the attending PSCO must satisfy themselves that the hooks can be
released and the boat taken away. If a lifeboat is lowered without any operating crew
inside then it is acceptable to do a dynamic test of the davit brakes whilst the lifeboat is
being lowered. A dynamic brake test comprises letting the lifeboat descend at constant
speed then dropping the brake arm to impose a sudden load, this should be repeated
three times. A dynamic brake test of the brake must not be carried out when operational
crew are in the lifeboat whilst it is being lowered. The PSCO should also ask to see the
five-yearly load test certificate.
11.3 If it is intended for the crew to embark the lifeboat using the embarkation ladder the
attending PSCO should be satisfied that the ladder is in a suitable condition and aware of
the difficulties that can be encountered when using ladders such as trim and list of ship.
If there is any doubt the ladders should be deployed to check for length and condition.
11.4 If the embarkation ladders are not in a satisfactory condition or the master does not wish
to use them, it will be necessary to initially launch the lifeboat with no operating crew
inside, if this is done satisfactorily the lifeboat should be recovered and the launched for a
second time with the operating crew who can demonstrate the use of the hooks and take
the lifeboat away. Prior to recovering lifeboats to the davit it is recommended that, after
securing the hooks, the lifeboat is raised one metre and left in this position for a short
period of time, e.g., five minutes prior to recovering the vessel to the davits to ensure that
the hook release mechanism has reset.
11.5 If boats are fitted with “on load” release hooks prior to releasing the hooks the lifeboat
should be fully waterborne; the hydrostatic interlock system, where fitted, should be
triggered prior to releasing the hooks manually.
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11.6 The effectiveness of the bowsing and tricing-in arrangements needs to be confirmed.
When assessing whether the bowsing-in arrangements are suitable the PSCO should bear
in mind that the bowsing equipment should be suitable for use with a fully loaded lifeboat
with the vessel having an adverse list of 15°.
11.7 For vessel built after 1986, SOLAS regulation III/31.1 (see annex 11) requires that all
lifeboats on cargo ships shall be so designed that they can be boarded and launched
directly from the stowed position and that davit-launched liferafts can be boarded and
launched from a position immediately adjacent to the stowed position. In light of the
recent IMO Guidelines on Safety During Abandon Ship Drills using Lifeboats whilst
undertaking abandon ship drills as part of a port State control inspection, the emphasis
shall be put on the words “shall be so designed” and as such the attending PSCO should
satisfy themselves that the remote wires for the launching required in regulation 33.1 are
in good condition and the crew are able to operate them, however it is not necessary to
launch the boat fully loaded from the stowed position using the remote wires.
11.8 Free-fall lifeboats should not be free-fall launched as part of an operational drill.
Simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats in accordance with Part 3 of MSC.1/Circ.1206
on Measures to Prevent Accidents with Lifeboats may be an alternative to full launching
(see annex 9).
11.9 SOLAS regulation III/7.2.4 says “Lifejackets selected for free-fall lifeboats, and the
manner in which they are carried or worn, shall not interfere with entry into the lifeboat,
occupant safety or operation of the lifeboat.” This should be checked as there is a risk of
neck injuries when free-fall boats are launched. Space may be an issue if lifejackets are
carried, rather than worn. Some administrations require inflatable lifejackets for use with
free-fall boats on ships built since 1998.
11.10 On cargo ships, it is required that lifeboats and davit-launched liferafts are capable of
being launched within a period of 10 minutes. For the purpose of an inspection it is not
necessary for the crew to launch the lifeboats within 10 minutes, the preparation of the
lifeboats and the launching process should be a controlled and safe procedure whereby
the attending PSCO should be able to assess the proficiency of the crew and the
likelihood that they are capable of launching the davit-launched lifeboats and liferafts
within 10 minutes.
12.2 After consultation with the master, the PSCO may require an abandon ship drill for one or
more survival craft. The essence of this drill is that the survival craft are manned and
operated by the crew members assigned to them on the muster list. If possible the PSCO
should include the rescue boat(s) in the abandon ship drill. SOLAS chapter III gives
specific requirements on abandon ship training and drills.
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12.3 The drill should, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency.
At the same time, it should be ensured that the drill can be carried out in such a way that
it is safe in every respect, and elements of the drill that may involve unnecessary risk will
need special attention or may be excluded from the drill. For example, lowering a boat
with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of a drill that may,
depending on the circumstances, involve unnecessary risk. Such drills should only be
carried out if special precautions are observed.
a. summoning of crew (and passengers) to the muster station(s) with the required
alarm and ensuring that they are aware of the order to abandon ship as specified in
the muster list;
b. reporting to the stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list;
e. lowering of at least one lifeboat after the necessary preparation for launching;
12.5 Care needs to be taken when requiring a ship to lower lifeboats. The number of persons
inside the lifeboats during launching for the purpose of a drill should be at the master’s
discretion. It is now acceptable to allow lifeboats to be lowered without an operating crew
being inside. The purpose of this is to reduce the risk of accidents during launching and
recovery, however this must be balanced out with the risk of embarking/disembarking the
boat whilst it is in the water, if the boat is to be taken away and run. If the lifeboat
lowered during the drill is not the rescue boat, the rescue boat should be lowered as well,
taking into account that it is boarded and launched in the shortest possible time.
The PSCO should ensure that crew members are familiar with the duties assigned to them
during abandon ship operations and that the crew member in charge of the survival craft
has complete knowledge of the operation and equipment of the survival craft.
12.6 Each survival craft should be stowed in a state of continuous readiness so that two crew
members can carry out preparations for embarking.
12.7 On passenger ships, it is required that lifeboats and davit-launched liferafts are capable of
being launched within a period of 30 minutes. For the purpose of an inspection it is not
necessary for the crew to launch the lifeboats within 30 minutes, the preparation of the
lifeboats and the launching process should be a controlled and safe procedure whereby
the attending PSCO should be able to assess the proficiency of the crew and the
likelihood that they are capable of launching the davit-launched lifeboats and liferafts
within 30 minutes.
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12.8 If a sequential lowering of lifeboats is specified on the muster list this should be known
by all and should be capable of being demonstrated.
12.9 SOLAS regulation III/10 (see annex 10) requires that a deck officer or certified person
shall be in charge of each survival craft, a second in command shall also be nominated.
At each liferaft davit or liferaft launching position one person has to be similarly
qualified. The PSCO should check these qualifications and confirm the ability of each
person to perform their role, including the starting and operating of the lifeboat engine,
and the operation of davits. It should be noted that the flag State, having due regard to the
nature of voyage, the number of persons on board and the characteristics of the ship, may
permit person practised in the handling and operation of liferafts to be placed in charge of
liferafts in lieu of persons qualified above.
12.10 For passenger vessels with Marine Evacuation System (MES) these obviously cannot be
deployed, thus only a simulation can be undertaken to ensure the crew are familiar with
the operation.
13.1 Gauging that the drill is of the required standard is highly subjective. Deficiencies in
hardware are generally easy to identify and report on but identifying and reporting
significant procedural deficiencies is far more difficult. If a drill is very good or very bad,
these tend to be self-evident and more readily lend themselves to reporting. It is the drills
which lie on the borderline between acceptable or unacceptable which provide the
greatest difficulty.
13.2 To resolve this problem a PSCO needs to have clearly in his own mind a list of
assessment objectives based on the three principles of command, control and
communication.
13.3 As the drill progresses, areas of concern or of failure are noted against each of these
objectives. At the end of the exercise a judgment as to whether or not the drill is
acceptable should be based on these observations. It is of considerable importance to
make notes to support and justify the PSCO’s actions.
13.4 Having assessed the extent to which operational requirements are complied with, the
PSCO should then exercise their professional judgement to determine whether the
operational proficiency of the crew as a whole is of sufficient level to allow the ship to
sail without danger to the ship or persons on board, or presenting an unreasonable threat
of harm to the marine environment.
a. Confirmation that the crew follow what is required of them by the muster list.
b. Confirmation that there are sufficient personnel assigned to the various parties to
cope with the duties given to them.
e. Confirmation that key members of the crew are able to understand each other.
g. Confirmation that the response time was considered fast enough, considering the
size of the ship and the locations of fire, personnel and fire-fighting equipment.
a. Confirmation that the escape arrangements for passengers/crew from lower decks
are adequate, that the assembly or muster stations are clearly indicated, that the
crew are familiar with the layout of the ship and are able to respond to changes in
circumstances, for example, directing passengers so as to avoid a smoke-filled
area.
b. Confirmation that the boat lowering party is proficient and that boats are lowered
and ready for embarkation with ancillary equipment deployed.
c. Confirmation that the evacuation was carried out in a reasonable time, but without
unnecessary risk to drill participants. Benchmark times from SOLAS should be:
14.1 Two Aide-Memoires have been provided for use by the PSCOs to assist with the planning
and organization of operational drills.
14.2 If in the professional judgement of the PSCO(s) the operational drill witnessed does not
meet with the required minimum level then the corrective action must be taken.
See annex 15 for a summary of deficiency codes relating to Operational Drills.
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14.3 Deficiency relating to operational drills are raised against the Series 2000 Codes –
SOLAS-related operational drills. In addition, a deficiency should also be raised against
Section 8 of the ISM Code – Emergency Preparedness (Code 2540), using an action taken
Code 18 – within three months when the Series 2000 deficiency is non-detainable
deficiency and Code 19 – Major Non Conformity when the Series 2000 deficiency is
detainable.
14.4 If the conduct of the drill is in the professional judgment of the PSCO(s) is so poor that it
warrants detention it is recommended that in addition to completing the relevant Report
of Inspection and Detention Notice the PSCO should complete a Drill Report for an
Unsatisfactory Drill (see annex 14). This report should be completed using the assessment
and status definitions described in the report. In turn the report should be left on board
with the master and a copy faxed with the Notice of Detention and Report of Inspection to
the relevant interested parties. The purpose of the report is to give a clear indication of the
problem areas identified during the operational drill to those parties involved with
rectifying the deficiencies.
15.1 Port State Control Officers should not recommend training providers to masters,
Owner/operators or Agents.
If it appears that the drill is totally unsatisfactory and additional training may be required
it should be left to the decision/discretion of the vessel’s master or Company DPA or
Company Superintendent.
16. References
***
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ANNEX 1
In applying 3.1 (ships of non-parties) of the Memorandum, “clear grounds” which warrant a
more detailed inspection include the following:
.1 the ship has been identified as a priority case for inspection, under section 1.1 and
sections 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5b, 1.2.5.c, and 1.2.8 of this Annex (see Annex 1a);
.5 failure of the master of an oil tanker to produce the record of the oil discharge
monitoring and control system for the last ballast voyage;
.6 absence of an up-to-date muster list, or crew members not aware of their duties in
the event of fire or an order to abandon the ship;
.9 evidence from the port State control officer's general impressions and observations
that serious hull or structural deterioration or deficiencies exist that may place at
risk the structural, watertight or weather tight integrity of the ship;
.11 information or evidence that the master or crew is not familiar with essential
shipboard operations relating to the safety of ships or the prevention of pollution,
or that such operations have not been carried out;
***
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ANNEX 2
2 Clear instructions to be followed in the event of an emergency shall be provided for every
person on board. In the case of passenger ships these instructions shall be drawn up in the
language or languages required by the ship’s flag State and in the English language.
3 Muster lists and emergency instructions complying with the requirements of regulation 37
shall be exhibited in conspicuous places throughout the ship including the navigation bridge,
engine-room and crew accommodation spaces.
***
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ANNEX 3
2.1 Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties
before the voyage begins.
2.2 On a ship engaged on a voyage where passengers are scheduled to be on board for more
than 24 h, musters of the passengers shall take place within 24 h after their embarkation.
Passengers shall be instructed in the use of the lifejackets and the action to take in an emergency.
2.3 Whenever new passengers embark, a passenger safety briefing shall be given immediately
before sailing, or immediately after sailing. The briefing shall include the instructions required by
regulations 8.2 and 8.4, and shall be made by means of an announcement, in one or more
languages likely to be understood by the passengers. The announcement shall be made on the
ship’s public address system, or by other equivalent means likely to be heard at least by the
passengers who have not yet heard it during the voyage. The briefing may be included in the
muster required by paragraph 2.2 if the muster is held immediately upon departure. Information
cards or posters or video programmes displayed on ships video displays may be used to
supplement the briefing, but may not be used to replace the announcement.
3 Drills
3.1 Drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency.
3.2 Every crew member shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire drill
every month. The drills of the crew shall take place within 24 h of the ship leaving a port if more
than 25% of the crew have not participated in abandon ship and fire drills on board that particular
ship in the previous month. When a ship enters service for the first time, after modification of a
major character or when a new crew is engaged, these drills shall be held before sailing.
The Administration may accept other arrangements that are at least equivalent for those classes
of ships for which this is impracticable.
.1 summoning of passengers and crew to muster stations with the alarm required by
regulation 6.4.2 followed by drill announcement on the public address or other
communication system and ensuring that they are made aware of the order to
abandon ship;
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.2 reporting to stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list;
.5 lowering of at least one lifeboat after any necessary preparation for launching;
3.3.2 Different lifeboats shall, as far as practicable, be lowered in compliance with the
requirements of paragraph 3.3.1.5 at successive drills.
3.3.3 Except as provided in paragraphs 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, each lifeboat shall be launched, and
manoeuvred in the water by its assigned operating crew, at least once every three months during
an abandon ship drill.
3.3.4 Lowering into the water, rather than launching of a lifeboat arranged for free-fall
launching, is acceptable where free-fall launching is impracticable provided the lifeboat is
free-fall launched with its assigned operating crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water at least
once every six months. However, in cases where it is impracticable, the Administration may
extend this period to 12 months provided that arrangements are made for simulated launching
which will take place at intervals of not more than six months.
3.3.5 The Administration may allow ships operating on short international voyages not to
launch the lifeboats on one side if their berthing arrangements in port and their trading patterns
do not permit launching of lifeboats on that side. However, all such lifeboats shall be lowered at
least once every three months and launched at least annually.
3.3.6 As far as is reasonable and practicable, rescue boats other than lifeboats which are also
rescue boats, shall be launched each month with their assigned crew aboard and manoeuvred in
the water. In all cases this requirement shall be complied with at least once every three months.
3.3.7 If lifeboat and rescue boat launching drills are carried out with the ship making headway,
such drills shall, because of the dangers involved, be practised in sheltered waters only and under
the supervision of an officer experienced in such drills*.
3.3.8 If a ship is fitted with marine evacuation systems, drills shall include exercising of the
procedures required for the deployment of such a system up to the point immediately preceding
actual deployment of the system. This aspect of drills should be augmented by regular instruction
using the onboard training aids required by regulation 35.4. Additionally every system party
member shall, as far as practicable, be further trained by participation in a full deployment of a
similar system into water, either on board a ship or ashore, at intervals of not longer than
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two years, but in no case longer than three years. This training can be associated with the
deployments required by regulation 20.8.2.
3.3.9 Emergency lighting for mustering and abandonment shall be tested at each abandon ship
drill.
3.4.1 Fire drills should be planned in such a way that due consideration is given to regular
practice in the various emergencies that may occur depending on the type of ships and the cargo.
.1 reporting to stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list
required by regulation 8;
.2 starting of a fire pump, using at least the two required jets of water to show that
the system is in proper working order;
.5 checking the operation of watertight doors, fire doors, fire dampers and main
inlets and outlets of ventilation systems in the drill area; and
3.4.3 The equipment used during drills shall immediately be brought back to its fully
operational condition and any faults and defects discovered during the drills shall be remedied as
soon as possible.
4.1 Onboard training in the use of the ship’s life-saving appliances, including survival craft
equipment, and in the use of the ship’s fire-extinguishing appliances shall be given as soon as
possible but not later than two weeks after a crew member joins the ship. However, if the crew
member is on a regularly scheduled rotating assignment to the ship, such training shall be given
not later than two weeks after the time of first joining the ship. Instructions in the use of the
ship’s fire-extinguishing appliances, life-saving appliances, and in survival at sea shall be given
at the same interval as the drills. Individual instruction may cover different parts of the ship’s
life-saving and fire-extinguishing appliances, but all the ship’s life-saving and fire-extinguishing
appliances shall be covered within any period of two months.
4.2 Every crew member shall be given instructions which shall include but not necessarily be
limited to:
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.3 special instructions necessary for use of the ship’s life-saving appliances in severe
weather and severe sea conditions; and
4.3 Onboard training in the use of davit-launched liferafts shall take place at intervals of not
more than four months on every ship fitted with such appliances. Whenever practicable this shall
include the inflation and lowering of a liferaft. This liferaft may be a special liferaft intended for
training purposes only, which is not part of the ship’s life-saving equipment; such a special
liferaft shall be conspicuously marked.
5 Records
The date when musters are held, details of abandon ship drills and fire drills, drills of other
life-saving appliances and on board training shall be recorded in such log-book as may be
prescribed by the Administration. If a full muster, drill or training session is not held at the
appointed time, an entry shall be made in the log-book stating the circumstances and the extent of
the muster, drill or training session held.
__________
*
Refer to the Guidelines on training for the purpose of launching lifeboats and rescue boats from ships making
headway through the water adopted by the Organization by resolution A.624(15). (back)
***
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ANNEX 4
2 In all passenger ships, a decision support system for emergency management shall be
provided on the navigation bridge.
.1 fire;
.2 damage to ship;
.3 pollution;
.4 unlawful acts threatening the safety of the ship and the security of its passengers
and crew;
.5 personnel accidents;
4 The emergency procedures established in the emergency plan or plans shall provide
decision support to masters for handling any combination of emergency situations.
5 The emergency plan or plans shall have a uniform structure and be easy to use.
Where applicable, the actual loading condition as calculated for the passenger ship’s voyage
stability shall be used for damage control purposes.
6 In addition to the printed emergency plan or plans, the Administration may also accept
the use of a computer-based decision support system on the navigation bridge which provides all
the information contained in the emergency plan or plans, procedures, checklists, etc., which is
able to present a list of recommended actions to be carried out in foreseeable emergencies.
__________
*
Refer to the Guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for shipboard
emergencies adopted by the Organization by resolution A.852(20). (back)
***
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ANNEX 5
When assessing the crew’s ability to conduct an operational drill the mandatory minimum
requirements for familiarization and basic safety training for seafarers as stated in STCW 75/98
shall be used as a benchmark.
In summary:
All persons employed or engaged on a seagoing ship other than passengers should be able to:
Seafarers employed or engaged in any capacity on board ship as part of the ship’s compliment
with designated safety or pollution prevention duties shall before being assigned duties:
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Seafarers designated to provide medical first aid on board ship shall be required to demonstrate
the competence to undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities as listed in STCW A-VI/4,
table A-VI/4-1. The level of knowledge shall be sufficient to enable the seafarer to take
immediate effective action in the case of accidents or illness likely to occur on board ship.
Seafarers designated to take charge of medical care on board ship shall be required to
demonstrate the competence to undertake the task, duties and responsibilities listed in
STCW Section A-VI/4, Table A-VI/4-2. The level of knowledge shall be sufficient to enable the
designated seafarer to take immediate effective action in the case of accidents or illness likely to
occur on board ship.
***
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ANNEX 6
Section A-VI/1
Mandatory minimum requirements for familiarization and basic safety training and
instruction for all seafarers
Familiarization training
.5 raise the alarm and have basic knowledge of the use of portable fire extinguishers;
.7 close and open the fire, weathertight and watertight doors fitted in the particular
ship other than those for hull openings.
2 Seafarers employed or engaged in any capacity on board ship on the business of that ship
as part of the ship's complement with designated safety or pollution-prevention duties in the
operation of the ship shall, before being assigned to any shipboard duties:
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3 The Administration may, in respect of ships other than passenger ships of more
than 500 gross tonnage engaged on international voyages and tankers, if it considers that a ship’s
size and the length or character of its voyage are such as to render the application of the full
requirements of this section unreasonable or impracticable, exempt to that extent the seafarers on
such a ship or class of ships from some of the requirements, bearing in mind the safety of people
on board, the ship and property and the protection of the marine environment.
______
Notes:
1 The following IMO Model Courses may assist in the preparation of courses:
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Table A-VI/1-1
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Table A-VI/1-2
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Table A-VI/1-3
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Table A-VI/1-4
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***
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ANNEX 7
Section A-VI/3
Mandatory minimum training in advanced fire fighting
Standard of competence
2 The level of knowledge and understanding of the subjects listed in column 2 [Knowledge]
of table A-VI/3 shall be sufficient for the effective control of fire-fighting operations on board
ship. see note 1
4 Every candidate for certification shall be required to provide evidence of having achieved
the required standard of competence within the previous five years, in accordance with the
methods for demonstrating competence and the criteria for evaluating competence tabulated in
columns 3 [Methods] and 4 [Criteria] of table A-VI/3.
______
Note:
1 IMO Model Course 2.03 – Advanced Fire Fighting may be of assistance in the
preparation of courses.
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Table A-VI/3
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***
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ANNEX 8
Section A-VI/4
Mandatory minimum requirements related to medical first aid and medical care
Standard of competence for seafarers designated to provide medical first aid on board ship
1 Every seafarer who is designated to provide medical first aid on board ship shall be
required to demonstrate the competence to undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities listed
in column 1 [Competence] of table A-VI/4-1.
2 The level of knowledge of the subjects listed in column 2 [Knowledge] of table A-VI/4-1
shall be sufficient to enable the designated seafarer to take immediate effective action in the case
of accidents or illness likely to occur on board ship. see note 1
3 Every candidate for certification under the provisions of regulation VI/4, paragraph 1
shall be required to provide evidence that the required standard of competence has been achieved
in accordance with the methods for demonstrating competence and the criteria for evaluating
competence tabulated in columns 3 [Methods] and 4 [Criteria] of table A-VI/4-1.
Standard of competence for seafarers designated to take charge of medical care on board
ship
4 Every seafarer who is designated to take charge of medical care on board ship shall be
required to demonstrate the competence to undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities listed
in column 1 [Competence] of table A-VI/4-2.
5 The level of knowledge of the subjects listed in column 2 [Knowledge] of table A-VI/4-2
shall be sufficient to enable the designated seafarer to take immediate effective action in the case
of accidents or illness likely to occur on board ship. see note 2
6 Every candidate for certification under the provisions of regulation VI/4, paragraph 2
shall be required to provide evidence that the required standard of competence has been achieved
in accordance with the methods for demonstrating competence and the criteria for evaluating
competence tabulated in columns 3 [Methods] and 4 [Criteria] of table A-VI/4-2.
______
Notes:
1 IMO Model Course 1.14 – Medical First Aid may be of assistance in the preparation of
courses.
2 IMO Model Course 1.15 – Medical Care may be of assistance in the preparation of
courses.
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Table A-VI/4-1
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Table A/VI/4-2
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***
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ANNEX 9
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-first session 10 to 19 May 2006, recalled
that at its seventy-fifth session (15 to 24 May 2002), it had considered the issue of the
unacceptably high number of accidents with lifeboats in which crew were being injured,
sometimes fatally, while participating in lifeboat drills and/or inspections, and noted that most
accidents fell under the following categories:
.4 communication failures;
.2 take the necessary action to prevent further accidents with lifeboats pending the
development of appropriate IMO guidance;
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.3 ensure that:
.3.1 on-load release equipment used on ships flying their flag is in full
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 4.4.7.6.2.2 to 4.4.7.6.5 of
the LSA Code;
.3.5 lifeboat drills are conducted in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/19.3.3
for the purpose of ensuring that ship’s personnel will be able to safely
embark and launch the lifeboats in an emergency;
.3.6 the principles of safety and health at work apply to drills as well;
.3.8 hanging-off pennants should only be used for maintenance purposes and
not during training exercises;
.3.9 all tests required for the design and approval of life-saving appliances are
conducted rigorously, according to the guidelines developed by the
Organization, in order to identify and rectify any design faults at an early
stage;
.3.10 the equipment is easily accessible for inspections and maintenance and is
proven durable in harsh operational conditions, in addition to withstanding
prototype tests; and
3 Member Governments were further invited, while enforcing the provisions of SOLAS
regulation IX/4.3, to ensure that the above issues are addressed through the Safety Management
System of the company, as appropriate.
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4 The Committee further recalled that, at its seventy-seventh session (28 May to 6 June 2003),
recognizing the experience gained since the approval of the Guidelines on inspection
and maintenance of lifeboat on-load release gear (MSC/Circ.614) at its sixty-second session
(24 to 28 May 1993), and that the implementation of expanded and improved guidelines could
contribute towards a reduction of the incidence of accidents with lifeboats, it had approved the
Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load
release gear (MSC/Circ.1093), superseding MSC/Circ.614. Taking into account subsequent
amendments to SOLAS chapter III and the LSA Code, and having considered proposals by the
fiftieth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, the Committee approved amendments
to the Guidelines as set out in annex 1. The Committee further noted that the guidance developed
for lifeboats could also apply to the periodic servicing and maintenance of liferafts, rescue boats
and fast rescue boats and their launching appliances and on-load release gear.
5 The Committee further recalled that, at its seventy-ninth session (1 to 10 December 2004),
it had endorsed the intention of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, in
co-operation with the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping, to develop
further IMO guidance as envisioned in MSC/Circ.1049, and accordingly, approved the Guidance
on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats (MSC/Circ.1136), as set out in annex 2.
The Committee further recalled that the Guidance developed for lifeboats has relevance, in
general, for emergency drills with other life-saving systems and should be taken into account
when such drills are conducted. In connection with MSC/Circ.1136, and recognizing the need to
provide a basic outline of essential steps to safely carry out simulated launching of free-fall
lifeboats in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/19.3.3.4, and having considered proposals by
the forty-seventh session of the Sub-Committee on Design and Equipment, the Committee
further approved the Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats (MSC/Circ.1137),
as set out in the appendix to annex 2.
6 Having considered the need to update several of the circulars discussed above, and having
considered proposals by the fiftieth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection to
consolidate the numerous circulars on the subject of measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats
in order to better serve the mariner, the Committee approved the annexed Guidelines for periodic
servicing and maintenance of lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load release gear (annex 1)
and Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats (annex 2).
7 Member Governments are invited to give effect to the annexed Guidelines as soon as
possible and to bring them to the attention of shipowners, ship operators, ship-vetting
organizations, ship personnel, surveyors, manufacturers and all others concerned with the
inspection and maintenance of lifeboats, liferafts, rescue boats and fast rescue boats and their
launching appliances and on-load release gear.
***
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Annex 1
General
2 These Guidelines relate to the application of the ISM Code to periodic servicing and
maintenance of lifeboat arrangements and should therefore be reflected in procedures developed
for a ship under that Code.
3 The general principle in these Guidelines may also be applied for the periodic servicing
and maintenance of liferafts, rescue boats and fast rescue boats and their launching appliances
and release gear.
SOLAS regulations
Responsibility
6 The company* is responsible for servicing and maintenance on board its ships in
accordance with SOLAS regulation III/20 and for the establishment and implementation of
health, safety and environment (HSE) procedures covering all activities during servicing and
maintenance.
7 The personnel carrying out servicing and maintenance are responsible for the
performance of the work as authorized in accordance with the system specified in paragraph 10.
8 The above personnel are also responsible for complying with HSE instructions and
procedures.
*
For the purpose of these Guidelines, company is as defined in SOLAS regulation IX/1.2.
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9 Where satisfied with an organization’s ability to carry out these functions, the
Administration may authorize such organization and its personnel to perform the functions of the
manufacturer and manufacturer’s certified personnel as assigned under these Guidelines, if
manufacturer certified facilities are not available.
Authorization
Qualification levels
12 All other inspections, servicing and repair should be conducted by the manufacturer’s
representative or a person appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to
be done.
13 All reports and checklists should be correctly filled out and signed by the person who
carries out the inspection and maintenance work and should also be signed by the company’s
representative or the ship’s master.
14 Records of inspections, servicing, repairs and maintenance should be updated and filed
onb oard the ship.
15 When repairs, thorough servicing and annual servicing are completed, a statement
confirming that the lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose should be issued by the
manufacturer’s representative or by the person certified by the manufacturer for the work.
***
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APPENDIX
1 GENERAL
1.1 Any inspection, servicing and repair should be carried out according to the system for
inspection and services developed by the manufacturer.
1.2 A full set of maintenance manuals and associated documentation issued by the
manufacturer should be available on board for use in all operations involved in the inspection,
maintenance, adjustment and re-setting of the lifeboat and associated equipment, such as davits
and release gear.
1.3 The manufacturer’s system for inspection and services should include the following items
as a minimum.
2.1 As items listed in checklists for the weekly/monthly inspections also form the first part of
the annual thorough examination, when carrying out this examination the inspection of these
items should be performed by the ship’s crew in the presence of the manufacturer’s
representative or a person appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to
be done.
2.2 Inspection and maintenance records of inspections and routine maintenance carried out by
the ship’s crew and the applicable certificates for the launching appliances and equipment should
be available.
2.3 Repairs and replacement of parts should be carried out in accordance with the
manufacturer’s requirements and standards.
Lifeboats
2.4 The following items should be examined and checked for satisfactory condition and
operation:
.5 manoeuvring system;
.7 bailing system.
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Release gear
2.5 The following should be examined for satisfactory condition and operation after the
annual winch brake test with the empty boat, as required by paragraph 3.1:
.5 hook fastening.
Notes:
1 The setting and maintenance of release gear are critical operations with regard to
maintaining the safe operation of the lifeboat and the safety of personnel in the
lifeboat. All inspection and maintenance operations on this equipment should
therefore be carried out with the utmost care.
3 Hanging-off pennants may be used for this purpose but should not remain
connected at other times, such as when the lifeboat is normally stowed and during
training exercises.
4 The release gear is to be examined prior to its operational test. The release gear is
to be re-examined after its operational test and the dynamic winch brake test.
Special consideration should be given to ensure that no damage has occurred
during the winch brake test, especially the hook fastening.
.1 position the lifeboat partially into the water such that the mass of the boat
issubstantially supported by the falls and the hydrostatic interlock system, where
fitted, is not triggered;
.4 examine the release gear and hook fastening to ensure that the hook is completely
reset and no damage has occurred.
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.4 recover the lifeboat to the stowed position and prepare for operational readiness.
Note:
Prior to hoisting, check that the release gear is completely and properly reset. The final
turning-in of the lifeboat should be done without any persons on board.
.2 the operator should be properly seated and secured in the seat location from which
the release mechanism is to be operated;
Davit
2.9 The following items should be examined for satisfactory condition and operation:
.6 hydraulic systems.
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Winch
2.10 The following items should be examined for satisfactory condition and operation:
.5 winch foundation.
3.1 Annual operational testing should preferably be done by lowering the empty boat. When
the boat has reached its maximum lowering speed and before the boat enters the water, the brake
should be abruptly applied.
3.2 The five-year operational test should be done by lowering the boat loaded to a proof load
equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat and its full complement of
persons and equipment, or equivalent load. When the boat has reached its maximum lowering
speed and before the boat enters the water, the brake should be abruptly applied.
3.3 Following these tests, the brake pads and stressed structural parts should be re-inspected.
Note:
In loading the boat for this test, precautions should be taken to ensure that the stability of
the boat is not adversely affected by free surface effects or the raising of the centre of
gravity.
Note:
***
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Annex 2
1 GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 It is essential that seafarers are familiar with the life-saving systems on board their ships
and that they have confidence that the systems provided for their safety will work and will be
effective in an emergency. Frequent periodic shipboard drills are necessary to achieve this.
Experience has shown that holding frequent drills furthers the goals of making the crew familiar
with the life-saving systems on board their ships and increasing their confidence that the systems
will work and will be effective in an emergency. Drills give the crew opportunity to gain
experience in the use of the safety equipment and in co-operation. The ability to cope with an
emergency and handle the situation, if the ship needs to be abandoned, needs to be well
rehearsed. However, frequent crew changes sometimes make it difficult to assure that all on
board have had the opportunity to participate in drills if only the minimum required drills are
conducted. Therefore, consideration needs to be given to scheduling drills as necessary to ensure
all on board have an early opportunity to become familiar with the systems on board.
1.3.1 Abandon ship drills should be planned, organized and performed so that the recognized
risks are minimized and in accordance with relevant shipboard requirements of occupational
safety and health.
1.3.2 Drills provide an opportunity to verify that the life-saving system is working and that all
associated equipment is in place and in good working order, ready for use.
1.3.3 Before conducting drills, it should be checked that the lifeboat and its safety equipment
have been maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, as well as noting all
the precautionary measures necessary. Abnormal conditions of wear and tear or corrosion should
be reported to the responsible officer immediately.
Drills should be conducted with an emphasis on learning and be viewed as a learning experience,
not just as a task to meet a regulatory requirement to conduct drills. Whether they are emergency
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drills required by SOLAS or additional special drills conducted to enhance the competence of the
crew members, they should be carried out at safe speed. During drills, care should be taken to
ensure that everybody familiarizes themselves with their duties and with the equipment.
If necessary, pauses should be made during the drills to explain especially difficult elements.
The experience of the crew is an important factor in determining how fast a drill or certain drill
elements should be carried out.
1.5.1 The 1974 SOLAS Convention requires that drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted
as if there was an actual emergency.* This means that the entire drill should, as far as possible,
be carried out. The point is that, at the same time, it should be ensured that the drill can be carried
out in such a way that it is safe in every respect. Consequently, elements of the drill that may
involve unnecessary risks need special attention or may be excluded from the drill.
1.5.2 In preparing for a drill, those responsible should review the manufacturer’s instruction
manual to assure that a planned drill is conducted properly. Those responsible for the drill should
assure that the crew is familiar with the guidance provided in the life-saving system
instruction manual.
1.5.3 Lessons learned in the course of a drill should be documented and made a part of follow-
up shipboard training discussions and planning the next drill session.
1.5.4 The lowering of a boat with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of
a drill that may, depending on the circumstances, involve an unnecessary risk. Such drills should
only be carried out if special precautions are observed.
2.1 Introduction
It is important that the crew who operate safety equipment on board are familiar with the
functioning and operation of such equipment. The 1974 SOLAS Convention requires that
sufficiently detailed manufacturers’ training manuals and instructions be carried on board, which
should be easily understood by the crew. Such manufacturers’ manuals and instructions should
be accessible for everyone on board and observed and followed closely during drills.
2.2.1 The shipowner should ensure that new safety equipment on board the company’s ships
has been approved and installed in accordance with the provisions of the 1974 SOLAS
Convention and the International Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code.
2.2.2 Procedures for holding safe drills should be included in the Safety Management System
(SMS) of the shipping companies. Detailed procedures for elements of drills that involve a
special risk should be evident from workplace assessments adjusted to the relevant life-saving
appliance.
*
Refer to SOLAS regulation III/19.3.1.
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2.2.3 Personnel carrying out maintenance and repair work on lifeboats should be qualified
accordingly.*
2.3.1 During drills, those responsible should be alert for potentially dangerous conditions and
situations and should bring them to the attention of the responsible person for appropriate action.
Feedback and improvement recommendations to the shipowner, the Administration and the
system manufacturer are important elements of the marine safety system.
2.3.2 Before placing persons on board a lifeboat, it is recommended that the boat first be
lowered and recovered without persons on board to ascertain that the arrangement functions
correctly. The boat should then be lowered into the water with only the number of persons on
board necessary to operate the boat.
2.3.3 To prevent lashings or gripes from getting entangled, proper release should be checked
before swinging out the davit.
2.4.1 The monthly drills with free-fall lifeboats should be carried out according to the
manufacturer’s instructions, so that the persons who are to enter the boat in an emergency are
trained to embark the boat, to take their seats in a correct way and to use the safety belts; and also
are instructed on how to act during launching into the sea.
2.4.2 When the lifeboat is free-fall launched as part of a drill, this should be carried out with the
minimum personnel required to manoeuvre the boat in the water and to recover it. The recovery
operation should be carried out with special attention, bearing in mind the high risk level of this
operation. Where permitted by SOLAS, simulated launching should be carried out in accordance
with the manufacturer’s instructions, taking due note of the Guidelines for simulated launching of
free-fall lifeboats at appendix.
***
*
Refer to the Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load
release gear (see annex 1).
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APPENDIX
1 Definition
Simulated launching is a means of training the crew in the free-fall release procedure of free-fall
lifeboats and in verifying the satisfactory function of the free-fall release system without
allowing the lifeboat to fall into the sea.
The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide a basic outline of essential steps to safely carry out
simulated launching. These Guidelines are general; the lifeboat manufacturer’s instruction
manual should always be consulted before conducting simulated launching. Simulated launching
should only be carried out with lifeboats and launching appliances designed to accommodate it,
and for which the manufacturer has provided instructions. Simulated launching should be carried
out under the supervision of a responsible person who should be an officer experienced in such
procedures.
3.1 Check equipment and documentation to ensure that all components of the lifeboat and
launching appliance are in good operational condition.
3.2 Ensure that the restraining device(s) provided by the manufacturer for simulated
launching are installed and secure and that the free-fall release mechanism is fully and correctly
engaged.
3.3 Establish and maintain good communication between the assigned operating crew and the
responsible person.
3.4 Disengage lashings, gripes, etc. installed to secure the lifeboat for sea or for maintenance,
except those required for simulated free-fall.
3.5 Participating crew board the lifeboat and fasten their seatbelts under the supervision of
the responsible person.
3.6 All crew, except the assigned operating crew, disembark the lifeboat. The assigned
operating crew fully prepares the lifeboat for free-fall launch and secures themselves in their
seats for the release operation.
3.7 The assigned operating crew activates the release mechanism when instructed by the
responsible person. Ensure that the release mechanism operates satisfactorily and, if applicable,
the lifeboat travels down the ramp to the distance specified in the manufacturer’s instructions.
3.8 Resecure the lifeboat to its stowed position, using the means provided by the
manufacturer and ensure that the free-fall release mechanism is fully and correctly engaged.
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3.9 Repeat procedures from 3.7 above, using the back-up release mechanism when
applicable.
3.11 Ensure that the lifeboat is returned to its normal stowed condition. Remove any
restraining and/or recovery devices used only for the simulated launch procedure.
***
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ANNEX 10
2 There shall be a sufficient number of trained persons on board for mustering and assisting
untrained persons.
3 There shall be a sufficient number of crew members, who may be deck officers or
certificated persons, on board for operating the survival craft and launching arrangements
required for abandonment by the total number of persons on board.
4 A deck officer or certificated person shall be placed in charge of each survival craft to be
used. However, the Administration, having due regard to the nature of the voyage, the number of
persons on board and the characteristics of the ship, may permit persons practised in the handling
and operation of liferafts to be placed in charge of liferafts in lieu of persons qualified as above.
A second-in-command shall also be nominated in the case of lifeboats.
5 The person in charge of the survival craft shall have a list of the survival craft crew and
shall see that the crew under his command are acquainted with their duties. In lifeboats the
second-in-command shall also have a list of the lifeboat crew.
6 Every motorized survival craft shall have a person assigned who is capable of operating
the engine and carrying out minor adjustments.
7 The master shall ensure the equitable distribution of persons referred to in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4 among the ship’s survival craft.
***
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ANNEX 11
1 Survival craft
1.2 In lieu of meeting the requirements of paragraph 1.1, cargo ships may carry:
.1 one or more free-fall lifeboats, complying with the requirements of section 4.7 of
the Code, capable of being free-fall launched over the stern of the ship of such
aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons on board; and
1.3 In lieu of meeting the requirements of paragraph 1.1 or 1.2, cargo ships of less than 85m
in length other than oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers, may comply with the
following:
.1 they shall carry on each side of the ship, one or more inflatable or rigid liferafts
complying with the requirements of section 4.2 or 4.3 of the Code and of such
aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons on board;
.2 unless the liferafts required by paragraph 1.3.1 are stowed in a position providing
for easy side-to-side transfer at a single open deck level, additional liferafts shall
be provided so that the total capacity available on each side will accommodate
150% of the total number of persons on board;
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.4 in the event of any one survival craft being lost or rendered unserviceable, there
shall be sufficient survival craft available for use on each side, including any
which are stowed in a position providing for easy side-to-side transfer at a single
open deck level, to accommodate the total number of persons on board.
1.4 Cargo ships where the horizontal distance from the extreme end of the stem or stern of the
ship to the nearest end of the closest survival craft is more than 100 m shall carry, in addition to
the liferafts required by paragraphs 1.1.2 and 1.2.2, a liferaft stowed as far forward or aft, or one
as far forward and another as far aft, as is reasonable and practicable. Such liferaft or liferafts
may be securely fastened so as to permit manual release and need not be of the type which can be
launched from an approved launching device.
1.5 With the exception of the survival craft referred to in regulation 16.1.1, all survival craft
required to provide for abandonment by the total number of persons on board shall be capable of
being launched with their full complement of persons and equipment within a period of 10 min
from the time the abandon ship signal is given.
1.6 Chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes emitting toxic vapours or gases* shall
carry, in lieu of totally enclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the
Code, lifeboats with a self-contained air support system complying with the requirements of
section 4.8 of the Code.
1.7 Oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes having a flashpoint not
exceeding 60°C (closed-cup test) shall carry, in lieu of totally enclosed lifeboats complying with
the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code, fire-protected lifeboats complying with the
requirements of section 4.9 of the Code.
2 Rescue boats
Cargo ships shall carry at least one rescue boat complying with the requirements of section 5.1 of
the Code. A lifeboat may be accepted as a rescue boat, provided that it also complies with the
requirements for a rescue boat.
3 In addition to their lifeboats, all cargo ships constructed before 1 July 1986 shall carry:
.1 one or more liferafts capable of being launched on either side of the ship and of
such aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons on
board. The liferaft or liferafts shall be equipped with a lashing or an equivalent
means of securing the liferaft which will automatically release it from a sinking
ship; and
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.2 where the horizontal distance from the extreme end of the stem or stern of the ship
to the nearest end of the closest survival craft is more than 100 m, in addition to
the liferafts required by paragraph 3.1, a liferaft stowed as far forward or aft, or
one as far forward and another as far aft, as is reasonable and practicable.
Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph 3.1, such liferaft or liferafts may
be securely fastened so as to permit manual release.
__________
*
Refer to the products for which emergency escape respiratory protection is required in chapter 17 of the
International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk
(IBC Code), adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee by resolution MSC.4(48), as amended, and in
chapter 19 of the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in
Bulk (IGC Code), adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee by resolution MSC.5(48), as amended. (back)
***
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ANNEX 12
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18. Are the crew members familiar with their duties and
the proper use of the ships installations and
equipment for damage control purposes?
REMARKS:
Date: Surveyor:
***
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ANNEX 13
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COMMUNICATION Y N REMARKS
1. Are key crew members able to communicate with
each other in emergency situations?
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REMARKS:
Date: Surveyor:
***
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ANNEX 14
Name of Ship:
PSCO’s:
Scenario:
Muster List
Correctness, adequacy and familiarity of crew
with duties and responsibilities
Firefighting/Damage Control
General effectiveness of the exercise, crew’s
knowledge of the damage control plan,
awareness of counter-measures to minimize
damage
Handling of Casualty
Adequacy and condition of medical
equipment, familiarity with casualty handling
procedures
Equipment
General condition, familiarity of the crew
with the equipment
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Other
Comments
Strengths/Weaknesses
***
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ANNEX 15
2010 Muster List Missing, incomplete, 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/C3.5.4-8
not updated, not – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
readable, not – Flag Consulted/ 99 - Other S74-1/CIII/R37
approved, not posted,
lack of familiarity
2015 Communication Lack of 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.9-11
communication, no – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
working language – Flag Consulted/ 99
2020 Fire Drills Lack of control, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.13-17
of communication, – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
lack of training, – Flag Consulted/ 99
insufficient frequency,
lack of knowledge
2025 Abandon Ship Drills Lack of control, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.18-24
of communication, – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
lack of training, – Flag Consulted/ 99
insufficient frequency,
lack of knowledge
2030 Damage Control Plan Missing, incomplete, 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.25-29
not updated, not – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
readable, wrong – Flag Consulted/ 99
information, lack of
familiarity, lack of
training
2035 Fire Control Plan Missing, incomplete, 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.30-33
not updated, not – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
readable, wrong – Flag Consulted/ 99
information, lack of
familiarity, lack of
training
2040 Bridge Operation Lack of training, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 Res. A.787(19)/ C3.5.34-37
of familiarity – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
– Flag Consulted/ 99
2041 Operation of GMDSS Lack of qualified 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74/CIV/R16
Equipment persons, lack of – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
familiarity – Flag Consulted/ 99
2070 Operations of fire Lack of training, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74-23/CII-2/R14
protection systems of familiarity, not as – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
required – Flag Consulted/ 99
2071 Maintenance of Fire Incomplete, not 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74-23/CII-2/R14
Protection Systems approved, not as – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
required – Flag Consulted/ 99
2080 Operation of Live Lack of training, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74-23/CIII/R20
Saving Appliances of familiarity, not as – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
required – Flag Consulted/ 99
2081 Maintenance of life Incomplete, not 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74-23/CIII/R20
saving appliances approved, not as – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
required – Flag Consulted/ 99
2090 Evaluation of Crew Lack of training, lack 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17 S74-23/CII-2/R15.2.2.3
Peformance of familiarity, lack of – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
information – Flag Consulted/ 99
2099 Other (SOLAS Other 10 – Rectified/ 16 – Within 14 days/ 17
operational) – Before Departure/ 30 – Detained/ 55
– Flag Consulted/ 99
__________
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