Received: 5 June 2021    Accepted: 22 October 2021

DOI: 10.1111/rec3.12424

ARTICLE

Cognitive and quantitative approaches to Islamic

studies: Integrating psychological, socioeconomic,
and digital-cultural statistics

Aria Nakissa

Department of Jewish, Islamic, and Middle

Eastern Studies, Washington University, St. Abstract
Louis, Missouri, USA
The past 3 decades have witnessed growing efforts to re-

Correspondence
think areas of inquiry traditionally dominated by the hu-
Aria Nakissa, Department of Jewish, Islamic, manities. One such area is religion, and, by extension, “Is-
and Middle Eastern Studies, Washington
lamic studies” (i.e., the study of Islam and Muslim societies).
University, St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive. St.
Louis, MO 63130, USA. Recent efforts to rethink religion and Islamic studies draw
Email: [email protected]
insights from cognitive science, and also frequently employ
quantitative approaches. Such approaches make use of psy-
chological statistics, socioeconomic statistics, and statistical
data extracted from massive collections of digitized cultural
artifacts (e.g., texts, photos, sound recordings). These types
of statistical data make it possible to quantitively describe
long-term global psychological, socioeconomic, and cultural
trends; explain how these trends relate to one another; and
explain how these trends relate to Muslim societies. This ar-
ticle introduces the emerging lines of research mentioned
above. Furthermore, it suggests that these lines of research
open the way for a new more ambitious and more interdisci-
plinary Islamic studies – one which builds on valuable forms
of humanities expertise while integrating the best insights
from non-humanities fields.

INTRODUCTION

Conventional humanities scholarship favors nuanced qualitative studies of limited temporal-geographic scope. Such
studies are informed by deep specialist knowledge of particular texts, material artifacts, doctrines, languages, and
histories. The past 3 decades have witnessed growing efforts to rethink areas of inquiry traditionally dominated by the
humanities. One such area is religion, and, by extension, “Islamic studies” (i.e., the study of Islam and Muslim societies).

Religion Compass. 2021;15:e12424. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rec3 © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1 of 25
https://doi.org/10.1111/rec3.12424
2 of 25 NAKISSA

Recent efforts to rethink religion and Islamic studies draw insights from cognitive science, and also frequently employ
quantitative approaches. Such approaches make use of psychological statistics, socioeconomic statistics, and statisti-
cal data extracted from massive collections of digitized cultural artifacts (e.g., texts, photos, sound recordings). These
types of statistical data make it possible to (1) quantitively describe long-term global psychological, socioeconomic,
and cultural trends (2) explain how these trends relate to one another and (3) explain how these trends relate to Mus-
lim societies.
This article introduces the emerging lines of research mentioned above. Furthermore, it suggests that these lines
of research open the way for a new more ambitious and more interdisciplinary Islamic studies – one which builds on
valuable forms of humanities expertise while incorporating the best insights from non-humanities fields. In this sense,
the article responds to broader calls for integrating the humanities (including the humanistic social sciences) and the
sciences (Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Slingerland, 2008; Slingerland & Collard, 2012; Whitehouse, 2007).
In order to keep matters simple for the reader, I avoid (where possible) many of the technical terms which have
been used to describe the relevant literatures (e.g., econometrics, psychometrics, cliodynamics, culturomics, digital
humanities, cultural analytics).
The remainder of this article is divided into five sections: (1) Methodological Concerns over Cognitive and Quan-
titative/Statistical Approaches to Islamic Studies, (2) Islamic Studies and Cognitive Science, (3) Islamic Studies and
Psychological Statistics, (4) Islamic Studies and Socioeconomic Statistics, (5) Islamic Studies and Digital-Cultural
Statistics.

1  |  METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS OVER COGNITIVE AND QUANTITATIVE/

STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC STUDIES

Cognitive science is the scientific interdisciplinary study of the human mind. Although cognitive science is most closely
related to psychology, it draws on a range of other fields including biology, neuroscience, economics, cultural anthro-
pology, archeology, and history.
Humans exhibit specific patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior. Dominant paradigms in the humanities hold
that the mind acquires these patterns almost entirely as a result of cultural upbringing. Cognitive science acknowl-
edges that such patterns derive, in large part, from culture. However, it is argued that the patterns also derive, in
large part, from human biology – or more specifically – from various evolved psychological mechanisms1 (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1992, Pinker, 2002; Slingerland, 2008, esp. p. 12).
Cognitive scientific claims about biology and culture rely, to a significant degree, on different types of statistical
data. For example, statistical data may indicate that certain patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior are found in
all human societies. Such patterns are often thought to have a strong biological basis. Meanwhile, other patterns are
statistically correlated with very specific forms of kinship, political organization, or technology. These patterns are
often best explained primarily in terms of culture.
Humanities-oriented scholars (or “humanists”) have raised various concerns about related cognitive and statisti-
cal approaches to human social life. For example, humanists have criticized these approaches for being reductionist
(Cho & Squier, 2008; Shweder, 2012), for being antagonistic to salutary intellectual pluralism (Laidlaw, 2007; Shwed-
er, 2012), for being androcentric (Bluhm et al., 2012), and for exaggerating their potential contributions to the human-
ities (Jackson, 2000; Laidlaw, 2007). Below I briefly discuss three of the most important humanist criticisms.
First, humanists have criticized cognitive approaches for overemphasizing biological influence and underempha-
sizing cultural influence (Bluhm et al., 2012; Salazar, 2010). This criticism has some justification. Although cognitive
science has always acknowledged cultural influence, research between the 1970s and 1990s often downplayed the
importance of culture in favor of biology (Slingerland & Collard, 2012, p. 3–42). Nevertheless, over the past 2 decades,
cognitive science research has come to stress the centrality of culture, making three key claims. First, the analysis of
human biology cannot be coherently distinguished from the analysis of human culture because humans acquire culture
NAKISSA 3 of 25

via specialized biologically-rooted learning mechanisms (Henrich, 2016; Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
Second, cultural traditions are semi-autonomous from biology and evolve in keeping with distinctive principles (i.e.,
“cultural evolution” is distinct from “biological evolution”) (Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Slingerland &
Collard, 2012). Third, cultural evolution impacts biological evolution in keeping with theories of “gene-culture coev-
olution” (e.g., the cultural domestication of milk-producing livestock led humans to evolve an adult capacity to digest
lactose in milk) (Henrich & McElreath, 2007; Slingerland & Collard, 2012).
Second, humanists have criticized cognitive and statistical approaches for ignoring the challenges associated with
studying highly complex social phenomena. Consider three complex social phenomena relevant to this article; namely,
“religion,” “Islam” and “Muslims.” These phenomena have generated intense and ongoing critical debates among hu-
manists. Take religion. Over the past 3 decades, humanists have sought to problematize the conventional notion that
there exists a universal concept of “religion.” Rather, it has been argued that every concept of religion incorporates dis-
tinctive cultural assumptions, and is shaped by political power – often, Western (neo)colonial power (Aghapour, 2014;
Asad, 1993; Josephson, 2012; Lofton, 2012; Masuzawa, 2005). Meanwhile, cognitive science holds that religion is a
universal phenomenon rooted in biology. This seems to suggest (naively) that there exists one universal concept of re-
ligion. However, such a view is incorrect. Cognitive science holds that, strictly speaking, there is no one universal con-
cept of religion. Rather, the word “religion” is usually used to refer to a heterogenous collection of patterns (of thought,
emotion, and behavior) produced by separate biologically-rooted psychological mechanisms (e.g., agency detection,
belief in mind-body dualism, in-group identity). Such patterns are combined together in distinctive ways by culture (or
cultural evolution) (Barrett, 2011; Boyer, 2001; Henrich, 2020; Norenzayan, 2013).
This brings us to the linked phenomena of “Islam” and “Muslims” – which lie at the heart of Islamic studies. In the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, Islamic studies took place within the broader humanities field of “Orientalism.”
Orientalist scholarship tended to portray Islam as a uniform and unchanging set of religious teachings and texts, which
determined the behavior of Muslims, thereby endowing all Muslim societies with a uniform and unchanging charac-
ter. Such a scheme made it possible to draw clear and simple distinctions between “stagnant” Muslim societies and
their dynamic Western counterparts. Over the past 4 decades, a major current of humanities scholarship has attacked
Orientalism and its legacy (Al-Azmeh, 1993; Aydin, 2017; El-Zein, 1977; Gilsenan, 1982; Hallaq, 2018; Massad, 2015;
Said, 1978). This “post-Orientalist” current emphasizes that all societies have a heterogenous and hybrid character,
which makes it impossible to speak coherently of differences between “Islam” and the “West.” The post-Orientalist
current also asserts that religious teachings and texts are open to a wide (or virtually infinite) range of interpretations.
Consequently, individuals are always capable of generating interpretations which legitimate their preexisting person-
al interests and preferred political projects. Accordingly, it is mistaken to believe that Islamic religious teachings and
texts determine beliefs or behavior in Muslim societies. Rather, these societies have generated diverse religious inter-
pretations and forms of life. Describing this enormous diversity has been a major goal of recent humanities-oriented
scholarship (Ahmed, 2016; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Geertz, 1968; Hirji, 2010). Meanwhile, cognitive and statistical approach-
es frequently utilize simple terms like “Islam” and “Muslims,” thereby overlooking diverse forms of Islam and diverse
types of Muslims. Can this be justified? There is great value in humanities scholarship which explores, in detail, the
complexities of phenomena like religion, Islam, and Muslims. However, it can be argued that this is not the only valid
form of scholarship, or even the only valid form of humanities scholarship. Oftentimes, the intentional simplification
of complex phenomena is necessary, as it enables the researcher to discern important general patterns in massive sets
of data (e.g., historical data, statistical data) (Healy, 2017). Cognitive and statistical approaches do not rely on simplifi-
cation because they deny the complex realities described in humanities scholarship. Rather they rely on simplification
because they are more interested in discerning general patterns.
Third, humanists criticize cognitive and statistical approaches for overlooking the political character of statis-
tics. Thus, at first glance, statistics seem to offer a neutral objective account of social reality. Nevertheless, it has long
been recognized that statistics are typically, or even inherently, linked to political agendas – especially Eurocentric
agendas. Humanities-oriented scholarship has examined the key role of statistics in different types of modern lib-
eral governance, including domestic governance, colonial governance, the international human rights regime, and
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the “Global War on Terror” (Abu-Lughod, 2009; Foucault, 2007; Merry, 2016; Mitchell, 2002; Nakissa, 2020b). Such
studies argue that political agendas guide choices about what to measure, how to measure it, how to interpret meas-
urements, and how to use measurements. Significantly, statistical data is habitually used to empirically corroborate
the putative benefits of modern liberal governance (see e.g., Norberg, 2016; Pinker, 2018; Rosling, 2018). Statistical
data is also habitually used to produce positive depictions of liberal Western societies, and to produce negative depic-
tions of non-Western societies (for falling short of liberal Western standards). Such negative depictions then justify
Western political, economic, and military interventions. This is particularly evident than when it comes to Muslim
societies (Abu-Lughod, 2009; Merry, 2016; Nakissa, 2020b). Accordingly, there exists a sizable statistically-informed
literature on the purported moral, intellectual, and economic inferiority of contemporary Muslim populations (e.g.,
Paldam, 2009; Kuran, 2011; Rindermann, 2018, pp. 323–367; Kuru, 2019; Hudson et al., 2020). Nevertheless, cogni-
tive and statistical approaches are not inextricably wedded to Eurocentric political agendas. On the contrary, in many
cases, advocates of these approaches have taken a leading role in challenging Eurocentrism. This has involved estab-
lishing the existence of global psychological diversity – showing that humans have a wide range of beliefs and nor-
mative values, and that Western liberal values are culturally unique rather than universal (Haidt, 2012; Heine, 2016;
Henrich et al., 2010). As such, cognitive and statistical approaches offer much to humanistic scholarship which is crit-
ical of Eurocentrism (e.g., postcolonial scholarship) (see Nakissa, 2021b).

2  |  ISLAMIC STUDIES AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Cognitive science views religion and morality as distinct but related phenomena. Since the 1990s, it has developed
closely related literatures on these topics (for studies of religion, see Guthrie, 1993; Boyer, 2001; Atran, 2002; Bar-
rett, 2011; Bering, 2011; McCauley, 2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Johnson, 2016; for studies of morality, see Greene
et al., 2004; Haidt, 2012; McKay & Whitehouse, 2015; Tomasello, 2016; Curry, et al., 2019). Standard cognitive sci-
ence scholarship is concerned with general patterns in religion and morality. However, more recently, humanists have
begun to integrate cognitive science insights into nuanced studies of specific religious traditions. These traditions
include Judaism (Maiden, 2020; Newman, 2018), Christianity (Czachesz, 2016; Luhrmann, 2012; Malley, 2004; Tee-
han, 2010), Buddhism (Arnold, 2012; Purzycki & Holland, 2019; Pyysiainen, 2009), Hinduism (Goldberg, 2007), Con-
fucianism (Reber & Slingerland, 2011), and Islam.
Currently, there are very few cognitive scientific studies focused specifically on Islam. Those that exist offer lim-
ited and preliminary analyses of select topics (Atran, 2010; Nakissa, 2020a, 2020c; Svensson, 2014). Nevertheless,
general cognitive science scholarship addresses numerous subjects relevant to Islamic studies. For instance, there are
studies on biologically-rooted psychological mechanisms underlying ritual (Liénard & Boyer, 2006; Wen et al., 2016);
on mechanisms underlying mystic experience (Newberg, 2010; Wittmann, 2018); on mechanisms underlying the pro-
duction/transmission of supernatural narrative (Nakissa, 2021a; Norenzayan et al., 2006); and on mechanisms un-
derlying the learning/internalization of communal beliefs (Henrich, 2016; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). These studies
are relevant (respectively) to analyses of Islamic worship, Sufism, Islamic scripture, and traditional Islamic education.
Within the cognitive scientific literatures on religion and morality, one particular line of research is especially
important. It holds that biologically-rooted psychological mechanisms produce various “intuitions.” An intuition is an
inclination to adopt a particular belief because it is perceived to be inherently plausible or correct. Some intuitions can
be classified as religious (e.g., an intuition that the soul is immortal). Other intuitions can be classified as moral (e.g., an
intuition that stealing is morally wrong).
Psychological experiments establish that particular religious and moral intuitions spontaneously develop in
young children (e.g., 3–10 years old) (see e.g., Barrett, 2012; Bloom, 2004; Robinson et al., 2007; Rossano et al., 2011).
Beliefs based on such intuitions recur frequently (though not inevitably) in unconnected societies across the globe –
as indicated by statistical compilations of anthropological research data (see e.g., Divale, 2004; Gray, 1999a, 1999b;
Johnson, 2005; Peoples et al., 2016). Studies further indicate that common forms of animal behavior (e.g., care for kin,
NAKISSA 5 of 25

incest avoidance) may underlie human intuitions (e.g., moral intuitions that one should care for kin and avoid incest)
(see e.g., De Waal, 1996; Nowak, 2011; Robinson et al., 2007). Scholars differ on how many distinct religious or moral
intuitions exist. Currently, there is significant evidence for somewhere between three and six religious intuitions (see
e.g., McKay & Whitehouse, 2015; Nakissa, 2021a) and somewhere between five and 15 moral intuitions (see e.g., Gra-
ham et al., 2013; Curry et al., 2019).
Consider three well-evidenced religious intuitions. It has been argued that (1) humans have an intuition that spir-
it beings exist (a spirit being is an entity which possesses an invisible mind, but lacks an ordinary perceptible physi-
cal body) (Boyer, 2001, pp. 137–167; Barrett, 2004, pp. 31–60) (2) humans have an intuition that there exists a God
(i.e., a supremely powerful spirit being) who created the universe with a purpose (Barrett, 2004, pp. 75–90; Kele-
men, 2004; Petrovich, 2019)2 (3) humans have an intuition that the soul is immortal, such that there is life after death
(Bering, 2011, pp. 111–130; Johnson 2016, pp. 121–122). These three intuitions have been incorporated into various
religions, including Islam. Thus, Islam affirms various spirit beings (i.e., angels, jinn), it affirms a God (i.e., Allah), and it
affirms life after death (i.e., in janna or jahannam). At the same time, Islam molds these intuitions into distinctive forms.
For example, (formal Sunni orthodox) Islam denies that God takes avatars/incarnations (thereby endorsing a concept
of God which differs from that found in Hinduism and Christianity). Similarly, (formal Sunni orthodox) Islam does not
conceive of life after death in terms of reincarnation (thereby endorsing a concept of the afterlife which differs from
that found in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism).
We may now consider four well-evidenced moral intuitions. As with religious intuitions, it can be argued that
these have been incorporated into Islam, but have been molded into distinctive forms. Here I provide several brief
examples drawn from Islamic law – or, to be more precise, from Islamic law as understood in formal orthodox Sunnism.
First, humans have an intuition that dishonesty is wrong, such that one should not lie or violate oaths/promises
(see e.g., Hoffman et al., 2014; Parkinson et al., 2011). Accordingly, Islamic law forbids lying and lays down specific
penalties for oath-breaking (e.g., the oath-braker must feed/clothe 10 poor persons, etc.)3. Second, humans have an
intuition that property rights exist and should be respected (see e.g., Boyer, 2015; Rossano et al., 2011). Accordingly,
Islamic law lays down specific penalties for theft (i.e., hand amputation).4 Third, humans have an intuition that it is
morally good to care for family/kin (see e.g., Curry et al., 2019; Nowak, 2011, pp. 95–112). Accordingly, Islamic law
requires that individuals provide regular financial support (nafaqa) to their young children and needy parents.5
Fourth, humans naturally and unconsciously divide the world into communities defined by shared characteristics
(e.g., shared blood, cultural practices, religious practices). Humans have an intuition that it is morally good to protect
one's community and its interests vis-à-vis other communities (Clark et al., 2019; Haidt, 2012, pp. 138–141; Tomasel-
lo, 2016, pp. 85–134). Humans also have an intuition that it is morally good to preserve one's community's distinctive
shared way of life (Tomasello, 2016, pp. 85–134).6 Such intuitions underlie phenomena of “tribalism,” “patriotism,” and
“nationalism,” as well as moral opposition to biological/cultural genocide of one's people. Islamic law treats Muslims
as a community (umma). Furthermore, it obliges individual Muslims to protect this community (through jihād), and to
preserve the community's Sharīʿa-defined way of life (through al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahī ʿan al-munkar) (also see
Nakissa, 2021b).
Conventional humanities scholarship recognizes that culture (including religion) shapes Muslim beliefs and
norms. Culture is typically theorized in terms of transmitted conceptual frameworks (Geertz, 1968; Rosen, 1989;
Weber, 1978[1922]) or bodily practices imposed by powerful institutions (Asad, 2003; Bourdieu, 1977; Hallaq, 2013;
Mahmood, 2005). Nevertheless, while culture is an important factor, a more adequate view must also account for bio-
logically-rooted psychology. Future work in Islamic studies should situate Islamic texts, artifacts/buildings, practices,
doctrines, and institutions in relationship to biologically-rooted psychology (e.g., evolved intuitions).
6 of 25 NAKISSA

3  |  ISLAMIC STUDIES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STATISTICS

Humans possess a wide range of biologically-rooted psychological attributes. Over the past 2 decades, it has been
recognized that such attributes vary significantly between populations in statistically-measurable ways (Heine, 2016;
Henrich et al., 2010; Nisbett, 2004). This realization has spurred efforts to systematically compile statistical data on
the full range of psychological attributes characteristic of different populations across the globe. For instance, statis-
tical data has been compiled on attributes like subjectively-experienced happiness/well-being (Easterlin et al., 2010;
Inglehart et al., 2008; Tov & Au, 2013; Veenhoven, 2011); personality traits (McCrae & Allik, 2002; Saroglou, 2010;
Schmitt et al., 2007, 2017); analytic thinking tendencies/abilities (Rindermann, 2018; Stagnaro et al., 2019); sexual/
mating preferences (Buss, 1989; Schmitt, & International Sexuality Description Project, 2003; Zentner & Mitu-
ra, 2012); and patterns in the expression of emotion (Fischer et al., 2004; Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, et al., 2018; Szny-
cer, Xygalatas, Alami, et al., 2018).
As mentioned earlier, cognitive science treats religiosity and morality as biologically-rooted psychological phe-
nomena. Such phenomena can be statistically measured through methods like surveys and experiments. For instance,
it is possible to measure how much a given population believes in God or believes in moral obligations to kin through
surveys pertaining to belief and behavior (e.g., “Do you believe in God?,” “How often do you go to the mosque?,” “Do you
feel morally obligated to care for grandparents?,” “Do you live with your grandparents?”). Experiments are also useful.
For instance, suppose one wishes to quantitively measure how strongly populations in two cities morally oppose steal-
ing. This might be done by purposefully abandoning numerous wallets in each city, and then calculating how frequently
they are stolen (see e.g., Cohn et al., 2019). Results from surveys and experiments can be checked for accuracy against
socioeconomic statistics (e.g., a group's expressed views about moral opposition to extramarital sex can be checked
against the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases among group members) (see e.g., Becker, 2019; Gray, 2004;
Obermeyer, 2006).
Recent research in psychology and cognitive science has sought to systematically compile psychological statistics
related to religion and morality for populations across the globe (for studies on religion, see e.g., Gervais & Najle, 2015;
Henrich, 2020; Inglehart, 2018; Saroglou, 2010; Saucier et al., 2015; Schmitt & Fuller, 2015; Stagnaro et al., 2019; also
see Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart, & Welzel, 2005; Shweder et al., 1997; Schwartz, 2006; for studies on morality see Gel-
fand et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Oyserman et al., 2002; Henrich, 2020; Inglehart, 2018; Iurino, & Saucier, 2020;
Saucier et al., 2015; van de Vijver et al., 2006; also see Alesina, & Giuliano, 2014; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart, & Wel-
zel, 2005; Schwartz, 2006; Shweder et al., 1997).
Although studies of global psychological variation rarely focus specifically on Muslims, they necessarily collect ex-
tensive data on Muslim populations. Moreover, rising interest in psychological variation has encouraged psychological
research on certain Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan (see e.g., Akbari et al., 2020; Atari, Chaudhary
& Al-Shawaf, 2020; Atari, Graham & Dehghani, 2020; Chaudhary et al., 2018; Khallad, 2005; Yalçındağ et al., 2019; Yil-
maz & Saribay, 2018; Yilmaz et al., 2020). Technical psychological research is also complemented by general statistical
surveys on the global Muslim population and its views regarding religion and morality (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007;
Pew Research Center, 2011, 2013, 2017b).
Psychological statistics reveal different patterns of religiosity and morality across the globe. These patterns are
partly related to biologically-rooted intuitions. Notably, some religious and moral intuitions have an especially signif-
icant impact on social relationships and institutions. Hence, religious intuitions encourage the emergence of religious
institutions (e.g., mosques, madrasas, Islamic states). Moral intuitions that prescribe care for family and protection
of one's community (and its way of life) encourage the emergence of extended families and strong cohesive cultural/
religious communities. Notably, across the world, there is a statistical correlation between value placed on religion,
family and community. Hence, an individual who highly values one is likely to highly value the other two (e.g., an indi-
vidual who highly values family is also likely to highly value religion and community) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 25;
Schwartz, 2006, p. 149–150).
NAKISSA 7 of 25

Religious, familial, and communal institutions can only be sustained through moral duties. Although such duties
receive some support from intuitions, they also limit cherished liberal values of individual liberty and equality. For
instance, the Islamic religion imposes liberty-restricting duties of worship (ʿibādāt). Islamic family life imposes liber-
ty-restricting duties which limit the sexual freedom of spouses, while mandating care, attention, and financial support
for young children and elderly parents. Islamic communal life imposes liberty-restricting duties which mandate up-
holding shared religious norms (e.g., wearing beards and veils, eating halal meat, avoiding alcohol). Religion, family, and
community likewise introduce practices which limit equality. For instance, Islamic norms designed to preserve religion
and community engender unequal treatment of non-Muslims (e.g., mandatory Islamic schooling, bans on blasphemy
and conversion). Furthermore, historical forms of human family life (sanctioned by traditional Islam) are tied to an un-
equal gendered division of labor partly rooted in biology (e.g., female capacities for birth/breastfeeding, male physical
strength) (Buss, 2016; Campbell, 2013). Accordingly, many feminist scholars have argued (plausibly) that progressive
abolition of gender inequality requires progressive abolition of the family (see Firestone, 1970; Weeks, 2021).
Psychological statistics reveal that people in all societies express significant support for religion, family, and com-
munity, as well as individual liberty and equality. Nevertheless, there are tradeoffs between these values. In particular,
greater support for liberty and equality comes at a cost to religion, family, and community (and vice-versa). That being
said, such tradeoffs are not all or nothing affairs. Rather they are matters of degree. Different societies strike differ-
ent balances between values, and these balances shift over time. In assessing tradeoffs, one may perform statistical
comparisons of countries across the globe. Countries that make similar tradeoffs statistically cluster together. For
instance, Western countries form a statistical cluster despite their cultural, linguistic, and geographical differences.
Similarly, Muslim countries form a statistical cluster despite their cultural, linguistic, and geographical differences
(e.g., Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mali). Religions other than Islam appear to exert weaker influence on social life, and
hence generate weaker clustering effects (e.g., unlike Muslim countries, Christian countries do not form a clear clus-
ter). Although many features of Muslim countries correlate largely (or even primarily) with their status as “developing”
nations, Muslim countries are distinct from other developing nations (see Schwartz, 2006, esp. p. 156; Inglehart, 2018,
esp. p. 46; Muthukrishna et al., 2020, esp. p. 690). Present-day Western societies exhibit uniquely strong statistical
tendencies to prioritize individual liberty and equality at the expense of religion, family, and community (Hofst-
ede, 2001; Schwartz, 2006; Inglehart, 2018, esp. p. 46; Henrich, 2020). Meanwhile, Muslim societies exhibit uniquely
strong tendencies to prioritize religion, family, and community at the expense of individual liberty and equality (Ales-
ina, & Giuliano, 2014; Gelfand et al., 2011; Goldscheider, 2006; Inglehart, 2020; Paldam, 2009; Schwartz, 2006, pp.
159–160). Consequently, Muslim countries are statistically the most distant psychologically from Western countries,
at least in moral and religious matters (e.g., more distant than Eastern Europe, East Asia, India, and Latin America) (see
Schwartz, 2006, esp. p. 156; Inglehart, 2018, esp. p. 46; Muthukrishna et al., 2020, esp. p. 690). It should also be noted
that psychological differences do not only exist between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Within a single country
with multiple religious groups, Muslim populations psychologically differ from non-Muslim populations in keeping
with global patterns (i.e., Muslims more strongly prioritize religion, family, and community). Thus, Indian Muslims dif-
fer from Indian Hindus, Nigerian Muslims differ from Nigerian Christians, and German Muslims differ from German
Christians (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 37; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; also see Abdelhadi & England, 2019; Goldschei-
der, 2006; Mathews et al., 2019, pp. 26–71, 129; Pew Research Center, 2008, p. 6; Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 77;
Pew Research Center, 2017a, 2021a).
However, to avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to emphasize four key points. First, the fact that contempo-
rary Muslim populations are more willing to (partially) restrict liberty/equality to preserve religion/family/community
does not imply that Muslims “hate” liberty or equality. On the contrary, Muslims express support for some signifi-
cant measure of liberty and equality (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, pp. 29–63; Pew Research Center, 2013). Second,
everything that has been said pertains to statistical averages. Muslims, on average, value religion and family more than
Westerners. This fact is consistent with the existence of numerous Westerners who value religion/family more than
the average Muslim. Third, recognizing that Muslim societies, on average, exhibit particular statistically-measurable
tendencies, is consistent with the well-known fact that regions of the Muslim world differ in significant ways (e.g.,
8 of 25 NAKISSA

the Middle East versus West Africa or Southeast Asia). Fourth, distinctions must be made between Muslim majority
populations and Muslim minority populations. Statistical evidence indicates that, generally speaking, the psychology
of a religious group within a country tends to be closer to the psychology of the country's overall population, rather
than the psychology of coreligionists abroad (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, pp. 36–38), although in certain cases, a minority
is midway between the psychology of the country's overall population and the psychology of coreligionists abroad.
For example, Muslims in Western countries exhibit a psychology “roughly midway” between Western populations
and Muslims abroad (Norris & Inglehart, 2012; also see Mesoudi et al., 2016; Pew Research Center, 2017c). Notably,
about a quarter of the global Muslim population lives as minorities in non-Muslim majority countries (Pew Research
Center, 2011, p. 18). This fact underlies one major source of difference among global Muslim populations. Thus, al-
though Muslim majority populations cluster together in terms of statistically-measured psychology, Muslim minority
populations fall outside of this cluster.
Across the world, a given country's present condition is significantly influenced by its long-term religious heritage
(Henrich, 2020; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Rindermann, 2018, pp. 323–367). This can be established through regres-
sion analysis, where statistical data is used to calculate how various factors (i.e., independent variables) causally influ-
ence a particular phenomenon (i.e., dependent variable) - although caution must be exercised to properly distinguish
between correlation and causation. Consider the various factors that might influence religious belief in a particular
country. These include, per capita income, average length of citizens' education, a history of communism, a history of
colonialism, the presence of oil, and the like. Regression analysis enables us to quantify the influence of a particular
factor (e.g., every 1000 dollar increase in a country's per capita income leads to a one percent decrease in religious be-
lief). Notably, regression analysis enables us to quantify (and differentiate) the influence of different types of religious
heritage. For example, even in secularized European countries, those with a Protestant heritage differ from those with
a Catholic heritage in significant statistically-measurable ways. Hence, compared to Protestants, Catholics are more
supportive of “traditional” values concerning religion, family, and community (Inglehart, & Baker, 2000). Outside of Eu-
rope, past traditions of Protestantism and Catholicism likewise generate regular statistically-measurable population
differences (e.g., among Christians in Africa and India) (Henrich, 2020, esp. pp. 3–17). Regression analysis establishes
that an Islamic heritage exerts significant influence on contemporary populations, even once additional factors are
statistically accounted for (e.g., per capita income, the presence of oil, etc.) (see Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris, 2011;
Paldam, 2009).
The preceding points have implications for core debates in Islamic studies over Orientalism and its legacy. As
mentioned previously, post-Orientalist humanities scholarship has attacked the Orientalist view that Islam contains
a set of teachings and texts which determine (or heavily influence) beliefs and behavior in Muslim societies, causing
these societies to resemble one another, and making them different from Western societies. Although post-Oriental-
ist critiques are partly valid, recent research suggests that they go too far. Hence, psychological statistics and regres-
sion analysis indicate that Muslim populations are in fact measurably different from other populations (Western and
non-Western), partly due to their Islamic heritage. In other words, just as Protestant and Catholic teachings and texts
have had a long-term influence on populations (e.g., in Europe, Africa, India), the same is true of Islamic teachings and
texts (or, for that matter, Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist teachings and texts).
As noted previously, current cognitive science research holds that culture is a powerful and semi-autonomous
force. Religious texts and teachings are viewed as key elements of culture (and “cultural evolution”). In support of this
stance, cognitive science research has produced strong experimental evidence that humans possess biologically-root-
ed psychological mechanisms which guide learning (i.e., “social learning mechanisms”). These mechanisms endow in-
dividuals with a tendency to automatically and unconsciously adopt the beliefs, norms, and practices characteristic
of their communities (Henrich, 2016, pp. 34–53; Mesoudi, 2011, pp. 71–76; Richerson & Boyd, 2005, pp. 120–126).
Consequently, like all other humans, individual Muslims do, to some extent, simply automatically/unconsciously adopt
communal beliefs, norms, and practices without reinterpreting them to legitimate their personal interests and pre-
ferred political projects. To be sure, Muslims engage in a significant amount of reinterpretation. Yet such reinterpre-
tation is limited, and does not prevent communal Islamic beliefs/norms/practices from exerting some measure of in-
NAKISSA 9 of 25

fluence over individual Muslims. Indeed, compared to other religious communities, Muslims seem uniquely resistant
to ad hoc reinterpretation of religious doctrine in deference to shifting political interests/power. This is evidenced
statistically in Muslim resistance to the adoption of values endorsed by hegemonic Western powers (resulting in the
uniquely large psychological distance separating Muslims and Westerners).
That being said, persisting Islamic influence rarely produces strict adherence to detailed Islamic theological or
legal doctrines. More often, it produces general behavioral tendencies linked to the preservation of religion, fam-
ily, and community. These include tendencies to believe in God, to pray, to marry and have children (see esp. Pew
Research Center, 2017b; Sevinç, et al., 2018), to live in households with large numbers of family members (see esp.
Pew Research Center, 2019), to shun extra-marital sex (see esp. Adamczyk & Hayes, 2012), to oppose denigration
of communal religious beliefs/norms, to openly express communal religious identity (e.g., through dress, through
giving children Muslim names), and to emphasize religion (rather than race or culture) as an element of one's iden-
tity (see esp. Rosentiel, 2006; Mathews et al., 2014, pp. 27–29; Ipsos MORI, 2018, p. 37) (More generally see e.g.,
Goldscheider, 2006; Inglehart, 2020; Norris, & Inglehart, 2012; Paldam, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2017b; Sevinç,
et al., 2018).
Although proponents of cognitive and statistical approaches posit that different religious traditions produce
different social and psychological effects, they are limited in their capacity to explain these effects (see e.g., Ku-
ran, 2011; Kuru, 2019; Paldam, 2009; Rindermann, 2018, pp. 345–359). For instance, what is it about Islam that
causes Muslim populations to place especially high value on religion, family, and community? Why don't Christianity
and Buddhism produce the exact same effects? Such questions require a type of expertise on religious traditions
that is rarely found outside of the humanities. It is in situations of this kind that we can see the benefits of combining
humanities scholarship with cognitive and statistical approaches (see Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Norris, 2011; Sling-
erland, 2008; Slingerland & Collard, 2012). Although considerations of space preclude a full and adequate discussion
of the questions mentioned above, I would like to briefly sketch out some tentative answers by drawing on relevant
humanities scholarship.
First, the general concept of “Islam” is so broad as to be unhelpful. A somewhat more useful concept is that of
Sunni Islam, which is the dominant sect, and which has some key features which differentiate it from other sects.
About 90% of the current global Muslim population is Sunni (Pew Research Center, 2011). (Sunni) Islam prescribes
a detailed religious law (i.e., the Sharīʿa), including many specific rules designed to protect religion, family, and com-
munity. Although some other religious traditions prescribe a detailed religious law (e.g., Judaism, Hinduism), most do
not (e.g., hunter-gatherer traditions, Christianity, Buddhism, Daoism). It should further be noted that (Sunni) Islamic
law is relatively well-defined and coherent. This is because it is linked to a written corpus of scriptural texts which
developed over a fairly short time span following Prophet Muhammad's death.7 (Sunni) Islamic law also mandates an
interpretive methodology which sticks fairly close to the plain literal meaning of scriptural texts,8 thereby restraining
radical legal change (while allowing for more modest adjustments).9 By contrast, Jewish and Hindu scriptural texts
developed over much longer time spans, and as a result they contain more variation in legal content.10 Efforts to har-
monize such content helped give rise to interpretive methodologies which do not stick closely to the plain meaning
of scriptural texts.11
A further factor to take into account is that of historical authenticity. Religious traditions frequently claim that
their core scriptures and teachings have been transmitted, without fundamental alterations, from a founding histor-
ical figure (e.g., Zarathustra in Zoroastrianism, Gautama Buddha in Buddhism, Mahavira in Jainism, Laozi in Daoism,
Moses in Judaism, Jesus in Christianity). Modern Western academic criticism has challenged claims of this kind,
thereby undermining the basic historical authenticity of ancient religious traditions, and fostering disbelief (or sec-
ular inclinations) among their adherents (Barton, 2019; Ehrman, 2014; Henricks, 2000, pp. 1–22; Kugel, 1999; La-
Fargue, 1992, pp. 196–199; Martin, 2012; Schopen, 1997; Skjaervo, 2011; Witzel, 2009; Witzel, 2011). However,
Western critics acknowledge that a significant portion of Islam's core scriptures (e.g., the basic Qurʾānic text)12 and
teachings13 can, in fact, be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad. This has made Muslims more reluctant to aban-
don Islamic teachings, including legal rules protecting religion, family, and community. To sum up, it can be argued
10 of 25 NAKISSA

that Sunni Islam engenders distinctive psychological effects in the modern era because of its religious law, and be-
cause many of its basic teachings have withstood Western academic criticism.

4  |  ISLAMIC STUDIES AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS

There are myriad types of socioeconomic statistics (e.g., life expectancy, fertility, marriage/divorce rates, gender
equality, urbanization, education/literacy, economic growth, crime rate, frequency of political violence). Over the past
3 decades, it has increasingly been recognized (1) that various types of socioeconomic statistics are related to one
another in hidden ways (2) that various types of psychological statistics are related to one another in hidden ways, and
(3) that socioeconomic and psychological statistics are related to one another in hidden ways. This has encouraged
interdisciplinary research which seeks to identify and mathematically describe patterns of mutual influence between
different types of socioeconomic and psychological statistics (or statistical variables). Such efforts give significant at-
tention to religion. They also rely heavily on regression analysis, and seek to answer questions of the following type:
“When the percentage of citizens who believe in God increases by one point, what is the quantitative impact on the
country's economic growth rate (or homicide rate or patents per capita)?,” “When citizens' average time in school in-
creases by a year, what is the quantitative impact on the country's fertility rate (or on citizens' level of happiness; or on
the percentage of the population that believes in God; or on the percentage of the population that believes care for kin
is an important value)?” (See e.g., Akbari et al., 2020; Alesina & Giuliano, 2014; Barro & McCleary, 2003; Becker, 2019;
Berkessel et al., 2021; Bénabou et al., 2018; Carvalho et al., 2019; Darnell & Sherkat, 1997; Easterlin et al., 2010; Hen-
rich, 2020; Iannaccone, 1994; Inglehart, 2018; Iyer, 2015; Lee & Lee, 2016; Lehrer, 2008; McCleary, 2011; McCleary &
Barro, 2006; Rindermann, 2018; Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012; Thomson et al., 2018). Such interdisciplinary research has
(arguably) been spearheaded by economists (e.g., behavioral economics, economics of religion), but has also attracted
political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, as well as quantitative-minded anthropologists and historians.
The findings of the preceding research clarify the role of socioeconomic factors in generating psychological shifts
and global psychological variation. For example, increasing the number of years that citizens spend in Western-style
schools seems to decrease their religiosity (Becker et al., 2017; Hungerman, 2014; Liang & Dong, 2019; Sacerdote &
Glaeser, 2001; also see Mayrl & Oeur, 2009). This is explicable, in part, by the fact that Western-style schooling en-
courages doubt and criticism of one's religious intuitions (see Norenzayan, 2013, pp. 180–185; Stagnaro et al., 2019).
Increased urbanization and decreased family size also seem to reduce the value that individuals place on religion, fam-
ily, and community (see Norris & Inglehart, 2004, pp. 25–79; Goldscheider, 2006; Henrich, 2020; Liang & Dong, 2019;
McCleary & Barro, 2006; Schulz et al., 2019). This is explicable, in part, by the fact that city-dwellers with small families
rely more on markets and government services to meet their needs instead of religious institutions, extended families,
and cohesive communities.
The past 2 decades have also witnessed growing interdisciplinary interest in the compilation of comprehensive
socioeconomic statistics on societies across the globe, and throughout history (often in online databases) (see e.g.,
Akbari et al., 2020; Baumard et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2020; Falk et al., 2018; Goldewijk et al., 2010; Grim et al., 2018;
Henrich, 2020; Livi-Bacci, 2017; Maddison, 2006; Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Paldam & Gundlach, 2013; Sanderson
& Roberts, 2008; Thomson et al., 2018; Turchin & Hoyer, 2020; Watts et al., 2015; Whitehouse et al., 2019; also see
Diamond, 1997; Reich, 2018). Comprehensive statistics enable scholars to describe long-term socioeconomic trends
extending back many thousands of years. Given that socioeconomic trends are linked to psychological trends, such
data casts light on psychological differences between premodern societies (Henrich, 2020; Muthukrishna et al., 2021;
Schulz et al., 2019). For instance, by the late medieval period, Europeans were more likely to live in cities than Middle
Eastern Muslims (Goldewijk et al., 2010). Europeans also had smaller families. This suggests that late medieval Eu-
ropeans placed less value on family than Middle Eastern Muslims – assuming that urbanization and small family size
correlate with reduced value on family (see Henrich, 2020; Schulz et al., 2019; Schwartz, 2006, pp. 165–168).
NAKISSA 11 of 25

Efforts to compile comprehensive global-historical socioeconomic statistics have produced extensive data on
Muslim populations. Such data makes it possible to quantitatively compare Muslim societies with one another, and
with various non-Muslim societies, over the premodern and modern periods. These developments have helped spur
an emerging statistically-informed literature on Muslim societies and Islam's effects on social life (see Abdelhadi
& England, 2019; Adamczyk & Hayes, 2012; Ariff & Safari, 2014; Bahrami-Rad, 2021; Blaydes & Chaney, 2013;
Chaney, 2013, 2016, 2019; Chen, 2010; De Soysa, 2019; Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Fish, 2011; Fish et al., 2010;
Gleditsch & Rudolfsen, 2015, 2016; Goldscheider, 2006; Grim & Hsu, 2011; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019;
Korotayev et al., 2015; Kuran, 2011; Kuru, 2019; McCleary & Barro, 2019, pp. 67–88; Mesoudi et al., 2016; Nor-
ris, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Paldam, 2009; Pew Research Center 2011, 2013, 2017b; Rubin, 2017; Sevinç,
et al., 2018; Shirokanova, 2015; United Nations Development Programme, 2016).
The aforementioned literature has revealed many notable trends. For instance, Muslim populations are charac-
terized by lower levels of homicide (Fish, 2011, pp. 119–131), lower levels of suicide (Shah & Chandia, 2010), lower
levels of alcohol use (Arfken & Ahmed, 2016), and lower levels of both extramarital sex and HIV infection (Adamczyk &
Hayes, 2012; Gray, 2004; Obermeyer, 2006; also see Becker, 2019). Such figures suggest that orthodox Islamic norms
(e.g., against homicide, suicide, alcohol and extramarital sex) have some real effect on behavior.
Particularly notable is Islam's status as the world's fastest growing religion. Thus, Muslims were 12.4% of the
world's population in 1900, doubled to 24.3% in 2020, and are projected to reach 32% in 2075, overtaking Chris-
tians as the world's largest religious group (Johnson, & Zurlo, 2021; Pew Research Center, 2015, p.14). Although the
Muslim percentage share of the world's population is rapidly increasing, other major traditions (e.g., Christianity, Hin-
duism, Buddhism) have maintained relatively stable shares of the global population – not changing significantly over
the past 100 years. Muslims are growing faster than other religious communities primarily due to higher fertility (i.e.,
number of children per woman). However, it is also due to higher levels of religiosity. Hence, fewer people leave Islam
than the number which enter through conversion. In other major traditions, more leave than convert, or the numbers
balance out (Pew Research Center, 2015, esp. pp. 11, 14; Pew Research Center, 2017b, esp. pp. 4–5, 16–17, 41–42;
also see Sevinç et al., 2018).
Admittedly, statistics on religious demography raise numerous methodological issues. Such statistics are calcu-
lated using various forms of data (e.g., estimated fertility and mortality rates, census reports on the total population of
particular countries). Survey questionnaires are of central importance, but are imperfect tools. For instance, suppose
a woman is asked “Do you identify as Muslim?.” She might not consider herself Muslim, yet still respond affirmatively
due to social pressure. Moreover, even if she considers herself Muslim, she might understand this in a number of
ways. Hence, she may be a believer in Islamic doctrines. Alternatively, she may disbelieve in the doctrines but con-
sider “Muslim” to be her cultural/ethnic identity. Generally speaking, researchers attempt to address the problem of
social pressure by promising anonymity to respondents. Moreover, some surveys ask multiple questions designed to
differentiate between belief in Islam and cultural/ethnic identification as a Muslim. A good example is a recent survey
on Indian Muslims. It indicates that 6% of those who consider themselves Muslim are atheists, and simply take Islam
to be a matter of cultural/ethnic identity. Moreover, only 60% of all Indian Muslims hold that lack of belief in God
is incompatible with Muslim identity. A higher proportion (77%) hold that eating pork is incompatible with Muslim
identity (Pew Research Center, 2021b). Given problems like social pressure, and differing understandings of Muslim
identity, demographic estimates of Muslim populations are always characterized by a certain measure of doubt and
ambiguity.
Many statistically-measurable psychological and socioeconomic trends characterize the modern period. Ex-
amples are decreasing fertility, increasing life expectancy, and (arguably) increasing atheism/agnosticism (Ingle-
hart, 2020; Paldam & Gundlach, 2013). Although Muslims are subject to such trends this does not necessarily pro-
duce convergence with other populations. Consider the following inaccurate (but instructive) hypothetical based
on the uniquely high religiosity of Muslims (Inglehart, 2020). Suppose that in 1900, European countries are 90%
Christian and 10% atheist/agnostic, while Arab Middle Eastern countries are 95% Muslim and 5% atheist/agnostic.
Then in 2050 European countries are 20% Christian and 80% atheist/agnostic, while Arab Middle Eastern countries
12 of 25 NAKISSA

are 50% Muslim and 50% atheist/agnostic. In this scenario, European and Middle Eastern countries are subject to
the same atheist/agnostic trend, but there is no ultimate convergence. Indeed, relatively speaking, European and
Middle Eastern countries are now more different than before (i.e., in 1900 there is a tiny gap in European-Middle
Eastern religiosity, while in 2050 Middle Eastern countries are more than twice as religious). A similar point applies
with regards to other socioeconomic statistics like fertility, which is higher for Muslims than all other religious groups
(Pew Research Center, 2017b). Muslim fertility can rapidly decline, but remain higher than, or even increase in relation
to, non-Muslim fertility (e.g., non-Muslim European fertility). Arguably, Muslim non-convergence opens the door to
the following general situation. In absolute terms, Muslims place decreasing value on religion, family, and community
while placing increasingly value on liberty and equality. Meanwhile, relative to (some) non-Muslims (e.g., European
non-Muslims), Muslims place increasing value on religion, family, and community while placing decreasing value on lib-
erty and equality. The issue of contemporary Muslim non-convergence has attracted significant attention, and it re-
mains unclear whether it is a temporary phenomenon (see e.g., Goldscheider, 2006; Inglehart, 2020; Paldam, 2009).
As noted previously, humanists have noted that purportedly objective statistical data frequently reflects tacit
Eurocentric political agendas. Hence, statistical data indicating that Muslims strongly value religion, family, and com-
munity has been used to stigmatize Islam and Muslim populations (e.g., Hudson et al., 2020; Kuran, 2011; Kuru, 2019;
Paldam, 2009; Rindermann, 2018, pp. 345–359). Moreover, such stigmatization arguably has racial dimensions, in ad-
dition to religious and cultural ones. It has been argued that cognitive scientific references to “Western” populations
are actually coded references to “white” populations (Clancy & Davis, 2019). Consequently, statistical studies which
highlight and celebrate distinctive features of Western populations (or stigmatize alternative features) may exhibit
white racial bias. For example, white racial bias is arguably found in statistical studies which stigmatize (predominantly
non-white) Muslim populations for too strongly valuing religion, family, and community (i.e., these Muslim populations
are negatively judged for deviating from a “white” standard).
It behooves all scholars to be conscious of religious, cultural, and racial biases when collecting and analyzing
statistical data. Here, familiarity with relevant humanities scholarship is often essential, for much of this scholarship
probes historically significant forms of bias. When it comes to the study of Islam and Muslim societies, critical human-
ities-oriented literatures on Orientalism, colonialism, and racism are particularly helpful (see e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2009;
Al-Azmeh, 1993; Aydin, 2017; Hallaq, 2018; Mahmood, 2005; Massad, 2015; Özyürek, 2015; Said, 1978).

5  |  ISLAMIC STUDIES AND DIGITAL-CULTURAL STATISTICS

Computers create new possibilities for research on cultural artifacts like texts, photos, sound recordings, and videos.
Ordinary cultural artifacts can be transformed into digital cultural artifacts saved as computer files. Thus, an ordi-
nary text/photo can be scanned and transformed it into a digital text/photo. Digital artifacts have two key advantages
over ordinary artifacts. First, it is possible to collect and store an enormous number of digital artifacts on a computer.
Second, digital artifacts can be analyzed by a computer. For example, a computer can search out words/phrases in mil-
lions of digital texts, determine which words/phrases occur together, and count these words/phrases. Similarly, a com-
puter can search through millions of digital photos, and classify them into different categories. At present, computer
analysis of digital artifacts relies heavily on natural language processing, machine learning, and network analysis. The
output of computer analysis largely consists in “digital-cultural statistics” (i.e., statistical data on digital cultural arti-
facts). Computers visually represent digital-cultural statistics in a rich variety of ways (e.g., graphs, tables, word clouds,
network diagrams, heat maps).
Over the past 3 decades, a growing number of scholars have begun using computers to compile and analyze mas-
sive collections of cultural artifacts. These scholars come from a range of fields including computer science, the natural
sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. Humanities work is particularly relevant to Islamic studies.
The term “digital humanities” (DH) is commonly used to describe any type of research which uses computer tech-
nology to enhance traditional humanities scholarship (see Gardiner & Musto, 2015; Levenberg et al., 2018; Rockwell
NAKISSA 13 of 25

& Sinclair, 2016; Schreibman et al., 2016). Given this loose definition, DH work is quite heterogeneous. Nevertheless,
the most influential branch of DH centers on texts and digital-cultural statistics related to texts.
The past 10 years have witnessed the beginnings of DH scholarship in Islamic studies. Most of this scholarship
comes from humanities specialists interested in computers (Çelik & Lange, 2021; Feener et al., 2018; Keshani, 2012;
Lange et al., 2021; Micklewright, 2021; Miller et al., 2018; Muhanna, 2016; Romanov, 2017; Sadeghi, 2011;
Svensson, 2019; Syed et al., 2019; van Lit, 2019; also see Chaney, 2013, 2016). However, contributions have also
been made by computer scientists interested in Islamic texts (see e.g., Atwell et al., 2011; Azmi et al., 2019; Harrag
et al., 2020; Ouamour et al., 2016; Sayoud, 2012, 2014; Saloot et al., 2016).
Some DH scholarship in Islamic studies engages with visual material like images of artifacts/buildings or maps
(e.g., Feener et al., 2018; Keshani, 2012; Micklewright, 2021). However, the overwhelming majority focuses on texts.
Priority has been given to Arabic language texts. In premodern Muslim lands, Arabic was the language of scholarship,
and was used by people of different linguistic and cultural backgrounds (like English today). The Arabic textual tradi-
tion is one of the largest in human history. It is possible to identify over 40,000 unique titles within this tradition for the
period before 1900. These titles cover every aspect of Islamic religion, culture, and history (Romanov, 2017, p. 226).
Existing DH scholarship has given special attention to classical religious texts (e.g., the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, fiqh, tafsīr)
or texts which contain historical data on important Muslim persons, places, writings, and events (e.g., biographical
dictionaries, histories, bibliographies) (see e.g., Çelik & Lange, 2021; Lange et al., 2021; Miller et al., 2018; Muhan-
na, 2016; Romanov, 2017; Sadeghi, 2011; Syed et al., 2019; van Lit, 2019).
One notable area of DH interest has been stylometry. Thus, each individual has a unique linguistic style, which can
be described statistically (e.g., average number of words per sentence, scope of vocabulary, quantitative patterns of
word use – especially of “function words”). Stylometric analysis can help us determine whether separate texts come
from a single author or multiple authors. Such analysis can also help us determine whether different segments of one
text come from a single author or multiple authors. Stylometric analysis has been applied to Islam's core scriptural
texts (i.e., Qurʾān, ḥadīth). It indicates that the entire Qurʾān comes from one author (likely the Prophet) as it exhibits
one unique style (or set of styles) (Sadeghi, 2011; also see Sayoud, 2014). On the other hand, the ḥadīth do not share
this style. This indicates that many ḥadīth do not come from the Prophet, or if they come from him they have been
paraphrased (i.e., the Prophet's specific wording/style has not been preserved) (see Sayoud, 2012, 2014). Findings of
this sort cast light on fundamental debates concerning early Islamic history and the development of the Islamic textual
tradition.
At present, much DH scholarship in Islamic studies centers on producing Arabic-Islamic digital texts (from ordi-
nary texts and manuscripts), collecting together massive numbers of Arabic-Islamic digital texts, and checking over
these digital texts for accuracy and completeness. Significant attention is also given to tagging digital texts. Tags can
be used to identify a given text's author, date of composition, geographical origin, and genre. Tags can also be used to
identify different chapters, sections, and sub-sections within the text (e.g., kitāb, bāb, faṣl). More complex tagging en-
ables more complex forms of computerized statistical analysis. For instance, absent complex tagging one can answer
a question like the following: “How much attention – measured in word count – do Islamic legal texts give to different
topics (e.g., ablution, divorce, jihād)?” (Lange et al., 2021). By adding tags on texts' date of composition and geographi-
cal origin, one gains the ability to ask time/geography-related questions like the following: “What percentage of extant
Islamic texts were produced by specific regions in the Muslim world (e.g., Syria, Central Asia, India), and how did the
productivity of given regions shift over time?”
DH promises insight into one particularly important Islamic studies question: “What were the most influential
persons/texts in particular regions and at particular historical moments (e.g., which persons/texts are cited most of-
ten in particular regions and at particular historical moments)?” The persons/texts we identify as most important will
fundamentally affect how we view the entire Islamic textual tradition. Yet at present, judgments of importance remain
highly subjective and impressionistic, as they eschew quantification and are based on relatively few texts. Still, it is
possible to see the beginnings of efforts to assess the influence of particular persons/texts. Such efforts use a range
of methods. One method consists in determining how many texts from a given author (e.g., Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn ʿArabī,
14 of 25 NAKISSA

al-Suyūṭī) are mentioned in later texts (see e.g., Romanov, 2017). Another more sophisticated method draws atten-
tion to the fact that premodern Muslim authors habitually incorporate large chunks of earlier texts in their works,
either verbatim or with minor changes in wording. This is often done without attribution. Nevertheless, a computer
can determine where these chunks occur. It is an indication of a text's influence when later works incorporate chunks
from it. A text is more influential if more later works incorporate chunks from it, and these chunks are larger in size.
This method has already been used to assess patterns of influence within a small collection of medieval Arabic histori-
cal texts (e.g., al-Bayhaqī’s Dalāʾil al-Nubuwwa, Ibn ʿAsākir's Tārīkh Dimashq, al-Dhahabī’s Tārīkh al-Islām). However,
it will presumably be expanded to larger text collections in the future (Romanov, 2018).
Generally speaking, DH scholarship (including scholarship in Islamic studies) does not examine psychological or
socioeconomic statistics. By contrast, recent research in cognitive science and psychology has begun to investigate
relationships between digital-cultural, psychological, and socioeconomic statistics – with the aim of discovering links
between cultural, psychological, and socioeconomic trends. Such research gives special attention to massive collec-
tions of texts produced by particular groups (e.g., blog posts produced by Chinese citizens, speeches given by U.S.
politicians). Efforts are made to extract psychological statistical data on these groups (e.g., “What are their personality
traits?, “Are they happy or depressed?,” “Do they have propensities towards ‘extremism’ or violence?”). Extracted data
includes psychological statistics on a group's religiosity and moral values (see Frank et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009;
Greenfield, 2013; Hoover et al., 2018; Iliev et al., 2015, 2016; Kennedy, Ashokkumar, et al., 2021; Kennedy, Atari,
et al., 2021; Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Sagi & Dehghani, 2014; Schwartz et al., 2013; Tausczik, & Pennebaker, 2010;
Twenge et al., 2013). The small portion of this scholarship that focuses specifically on Muslims is driven largely by se-
curity concerns (e.g., analyzing Muslim social media for signs of “extremism”/violence) (see e.g., Dehghani et al., 2014;
Hancock et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2020; also see Awan, 2017; Frissen, 2021; Valentini et al., 2020).
Here it is helpful to consider one of the most influential tools used in the cognitive/psychological analysis of text
collections; namely, “Google Ngram Viewer” (Bollen et al., 2021; Michel et al., 2011; Pettit, 2016). The viewer has
access to millions of digital books written in particular languages (not including Arabic) over particular time periods
(e.g., English or Chinese-language books written between 1800 and 2000). The viewer allows users to track historical
variations in word frequencies over time. It is recognized that specific words are linked to specific religious and moral
values/intuitions (e.g., God, nation, freedom, adultery) (Greenfield, 2013; Kesebir, & Kesebir, 2012; Michel et al., 2011;
Twenge et al., 2013). This suggests that shifts in word frequency during a particular time period reflect psychological
shifts related to religion/morality during that time period. Furthermore, such psychological shifts may be correlated
with socioeconomic shifts during that time period (see Greenfield, 2013; Iliev et al., 2016; Zeng, & Greenfield, 2015).
For instance, if English books mention “God” and “adultery” less after 1850, this may indicate that religion and family
are valued less. This psychological shift may in turn be linked with post-1850 statistical increases in urbanization and
years spent in school (see Greenfield, 2013). The viewer also provides a means to compare societies (e.g., one may
compare how often adultery is mentioned in English versus Chinese texts, and track the trend over time) (Zeng &
Greenfield, 2015). The preceding examples give some sense of simpler efforts to link digital-cultural, psychological,
and socioeconomic statistics.
At present, there are few efforts to highlight such linkages in Muslim contexts. However, it is possible to see the
beginnings of a movement in this direction. Here it will be useful to consider two notable sets of studies; namely, Ro-
manov (2017) and Chaney (2016, 2019).
Romanov (2017) provides a quantitative description of overall scholarly productivity in the Muslim world, from
the rise of Islam until 1900. Thus, estimates are given for the number of identifiable Arabic books produced in the
Muslim world at hundred-year intervals (e.g., from 800 to 900 CE, 400 books were produced; from 900 to 1000 CE,
2000 books were produced). These estimates indicate rises and falls in scholarly productivity, which can be linked with
social and political developments. Some of these developments are described in qualitative terms (e.g., scholarly pro-
ductivity increases when there is governmental stability, as under the early Abbasids and Ottomans). In other cases,
developments are described in loose quantitative terms (e.g., scholarly productivity increases when there is Muslim
population growth, or growth in economic prosperity). Scholarly productivity is also linked to specific regions. The
NAKISSA 15 of 25

most productive (and hence influential) regions are Anatolia, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Egypt. Somewhat less productive are
the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and India. The lowest levels of productivity characterize regions like Southeast
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe. This implies that such regions were less influential in shaping premod-
ern Islamic intellectual life. Romanov also tracks the shifting productivity of different regions shifted over time. For
example, Iraqi productivity is highest before the Mongol destruction of Baghdad in 1258, and Anatolian productivity
is highest after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453.
Chaney (2016, 2019) utilizes digital-cultural statistics to address a perennial question in Islamic studies concern-
ing the relationship between religion, science, and science-driven economic growth. Hence, it is widely believed that
Muslim societies led the world in scientific research and enjoyed high levels of material prosperity during a “Golden
Age” which lasted (roughly) between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE (see e.g., Huff, 2003). Nevertheless, socioec-
onomic statistics indicate that some time after this Golden Age, Western societies came to generate more scientific
knowledge and higher levels of economic growth than other societies, including Muslim societies. How can this shift
be explained? (see e.g., Kuran, 2011; Kuru, 2019; Paldam, 2009; Rubin, 2017). Chaney measures the number of Ar-
abic books dedicated to scientific and religious matters, finding that the proportion of scientific books significantly
declined in relationship to religious books from the twelfth century onwards (i.e., up until 1800, when he ends his
study). Chaney argues that the declining proportion of scientific books can be linked with a number of related social
developments, including the declining power of Muslim monarchs and bureaucrats, the increasing power of religious
authorities, and the proliferation of Muslim religious colleges (madrasas). It is further argued that these social devel-
opments ultimately engendered lower levels of scientific research and economic growth.

6 | CONCLUSION

This article has sought to introduce several emerging lines of research which are likely to transform Islamic studies in
the coming decades. Such lines of research include cognitive science as well as quantitative approaches focused on
psychological, socioeconomic, and digital-cultural statistics. One hopes that these developments will pave the way for
a truly interdisciplinary Islamic studies which incorporates the best insights from inside and outside the humanities.

AC KNOW L E DGEME N T S

I wish to express my gratitude to Ilyse Morgenstein Fuerst for her valuable encouragement and assistance. It was a
pleasure to work with such an outstanding editor. I also wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their excel-
lent input, which greatly improved the manuscript.

C ONFL ICT OF INTER E ST

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

ORCID
Aria Nakissa https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0850-4708

T RAN SPAR E NT PE E R RE VI E W
The peer review history for this article is available at https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/rec3.12424.

ENDNOTES
1
Although there remain debates over the extent to which the mind can be described as modular.
2
Admittedly, within the cognitive science of religion, an influential argument has been made that the notion of God is best
explained as a recent product of cultural evolution. Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Henrich, 2020. That
being said, there remains significant evidence for an alternative view; namely, that the notion of God is largely based on
16 of 25 NAKISSA

biologically-rooted intuitions. Such evidence includes (1) the tendency of children to explain the existence of things in
the world with reference to a Creator God (Kelemen, 2004; Petrovich, 2019) (2) the tendency of humans to posit one
unique cause (e.g., one God) in explaining the universe's existence (Nakissa, 2020c) (3) the recurrence of belief in God
(i.e., one high God) in different societies across the world, including a substantial minority of hunter-gatherer societies
(Divale, 2004; Gray 1999a, 1999b).
3
Qurʾān 5:89.
4
Qurʾān 5:38.
5
See Qurʾān 16:90; Ibn Qudāma, 1997, vol.11:372–388.
6
This issue is often treated under the heading of “conformity” to communal tradition, or deference to the “authority” of
communal tradition. See Haidt, 2012, pp. 142–146; De Dreu & Kret, 2016; Henrich, 2020, pp. 36–38, 198–204.
7
These include the Qurʾān, which was canonized within a few decades of the Prophet's death, as well as ḥadīth reports
which took shape within approximately 150–250 years of the Prophet's death. See Anthony, 2020; de Blois, 2010; Hal-
laq, 2005; Motzki, 2002; Reinhart, 2010.
8
Nakissa, 2019, esp. pp. 181–226; Nakissa, 2021b.
9
Hallaq, 1984; Johansen, 1998.
10
Whereas Islamic scriptural legal texts develop over a 150–250 year period, Jewish scriptural legal texts (e.g., Hebrew Bible,
Talmud) and Hindu scriptural legal texts (e.g., Vedas, Manusmriti) developed over a period of more than a 1000 years. See
Berger, 1998; Flood, 1996; Kugel, 1999; Pollock, 2011; Witzel, 2009; Witzel, 2011.
11
For example, midrash in Judaism (see esp. Berger, 1998; Halivni, 1991; Kugel, 1999, 2007, pp. 1–46).
12
Nasser, 2013; Sadeghi & Goudarzi, 2012; Sinai, 2017; Van Putten, 2019.
13
For example, belief in one God, paradise, hell, and a day of judgment; obligation of five daily prayers, a Ramaḍān fast, and
pilgrimage to Makka; obligation to avoid extramarital sex, drinking wine, and eating pork.

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AU T H O R BIOGR A PH Y

Aria Nakissa is assistant professor of Islamic Studies and Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis. He
holds a joint-PhD in Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard, a JD from Harvard Law School, and
an MA in Islamic Law from the International Islamic University Malaysia. Nakissa has conducted extensive ethno-
graphic fieldwork in the Middle East and Southeast Asia using the Arabic and Indonesian languages. He has also
written extensively on cognitive science in relation to religion and morality. He is author of The Anthropology of Is-
lamic Law: Education, Ethics, and Legal Interpretation at Egypt's Al-Azhar (Oxford University Press, 2019). His articles
have been accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Journal of Global History; Journal
of Cognition and Culture; Journal of the American Academy of Religion; Method & Theory in the Study of Religion; Human
Rights Review; Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde/Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast
Asia; Islamic Law and Society; Muslim World; and Arabica.

How to cite this article: Nakissa, A. (2021) Cognitive and quantitative approaches to Islamic studies:
integrating psychological, socioeconomic, and digital-cultural statistics. Religion Compass, 15(12), e12424.
Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/rec3.12424