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Foreign Direct Investment, Country Capabilities and Economic Growth

Author(s): Karin Olofsdotter


Source: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv , 1998, Bd. 134, H. 3 (1998), pp. 534-547
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40440664

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Kürzere Aufsätze & Kommentare
Shorter Papers & Comments

Foreign Direct Investment,


Country Capabilities and Economic Growth
By

Karin Olofsdotter

I. Introduction

development of growth theory in the 1980s has not only em-


phasized innovating activities but also put forward the role of im-
itation and technology diffusion for economic growth and devel-
opment. Therefore, the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
become particularly interesting since MNEs not only produce a large
share of world knowledge, but foreign direct investment (FDI) also ap-
pears to be one of the major channels for international technology trans-
fer.

Quite surprisingly, however, the impact of FDI on growth and its


determinants have not been subject to much empirical investigation.1
Some indicative studies are provided by Blomström et al. (1994) and
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996). Blomström et al. find positive growth
effects from FDI using the inflow of FDI in developing countries as a
measure of a country's interchange with other countries. The study by
Balasubramanyam et al. analyzes the impact of trade policy regimes on

Remark: I thank Magnus Blomström, Yves Bourdet, Hans Carlsson, Lena Dahl, Karo-
lina Ekholm, Fredrik Gallo, Fredrik Sjöholm, Peter Svensson, Johan Torstensson, Rasha
Torstensson, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Partici-
pants at the seminars at Lund University, University of Nottingham, and the workshop
on "Multinationals, Trade and Economic Geography" at IUI, 1996, have also contrib-
uted with helpful suggestions. Financial support from the Jacob Wallenberg Foundation
is gratefully acknowledged.
Most earlier works are micro-based studies that have concentrated on spillovers from
activities by MNEs, i.e. effects of FDI on host economies that are external to the MNEs.
See Kokko (1992) for an overview.

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 535

FDI flows. Starting from the hypothesis that export-promoting (EP)


countries attract more FDI, they test and find significant results sup-
porting the assumption that FDI is more important for economic growth
in EP countries than in import-substituting (IS) countries.2
The assumption that the potential growth effects from FDI differ
across countries is explicitely considered by Borensztein et al. (1995)
who analyze the interaction between FDI and human capital. In their
theoretical framework, the level of human capital determines the
ability to adopt foreign technology. Thus, larger endowments of human
capital are assumed to induce higher growth rates given the amount of
FDI, a hypothesis which is supported by their empirical findings. Fur-
thermore, the paper suggests that countries may need a minimum thresh-
old stock of human capital in order to experience positive effects from
FDI.
In accordance with Borensztein et al., the extensive literature on
income convergence across countries has emphasized the contention
that the capability of technologically backward countries to catch up
with more economically advanced countries differ. Besides the need for
a sufficient level of human capital and openness to trade,3 the catching-
up literature stresses the importance of well-functioning institutions in
order to close the technology gap and experience economic growth (e.g.,
Abramovitz 1986; Stern 1991).
Like Borensztein et al., this paper will consider the absorptive capac-
ity of countries receiving FDI. Our approach, however, will be more
general and take into account a number of channels, as suggested by the
growth literature, through which FDI may affect growth. In particular,
Stern (1991) stresses the importance of infrastructure which, in his own
words, should be interpreted in a broad sense and include property-right
protection and "the way business is done" where bureaucratic effi-
ciency plays an important role. Thus, when firms that are engaged in
productivity-enhancing activities have to cope with an obstructive
bureaucracy and insecure property rights, we get an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources. Empirical analyses of these issues are provided by
Torstensson (1994) and Mauro (1995). Testing the impact of property
rights on technological change and growth, Torstensson finds that im-

2 This assumption is based on the neutrality, in terms of market distortions, of an export-


promoting trade regime.
See e.g. Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992) for the importance of human capital
in the growth process. The study by Ben-David (1996) suggests growth effects from
trade liberalization. Hansson and Henrekson (1994) also identify human capital and
openness as factors determining the ability to catch up.

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536 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1998, Vol. 134(3)

properly defined property rights have inhibiting effects on growth. Ana-


lyzing the role of bureaucratic efficiency and following the idea that
rent-seeking activities slow down economic growth, Mauro argues that
corruption induces lower growth rates both directly and through a neg-
ative effect on investment decisions. On the other hand, if firms do not
have to cope with an obstructive bureaucracy, the adoption of new tech-
nology will be facilitated. The empirical results corroborate this hypoth-
esis, pointing out bureaucratic efficiency as an important determinant
for investment and growth.
Thus, our study adds to the literature dealing with the effects of FDI
on host economies. Following earlier studies that view FDI as a chan-
nel for technology transfer, we intend to treat human capital and open-
ness to trade as factors that may strengthen the potential benefits from
FDI on growth. In addition, we will consider the role of the institution-
al capability of a host country which has been stressed in many other
growth studies. This, we believe, should be of great importance, because
an inadequate institutional framework, more than anything else, can be
expected to reduce productivity-increasing activities. Also, by allow-
ing for various channels through which FDI may affect growth, we may
be able to see how sensitive earlier results are to the addition of new
variables.

II. Method and Data

The regression equation

In order to reach a testable regression equation, consider a country's


aggregate production function:

Yt=F(KnLt)An (1)
where Yt is total production,
labor, respectively, and A,
edge. Concentrating on At,
innovations are done abroa
is the available amount of
addition, we allow for a cat
logically backward country
country (see Edwards 199

4 We could, of course, allow for


changing the basic insight.

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 537

the rate of technological change evolves according to (time indices left


out):

where A is a given exogenous parameter that denotes the rate of con-


vergence, Wis the available amount of foreign technology, and j3, which
takes a value between zero and one, is the share of the foreign technol-
ogy that is actually adopted. Hence, ß is a function of the capability
level, c, and /?' (c) > 0. Equation (2) states that technical change is pos-
itively related to the stock of foreign technology, the capability level,
and the technology gap. It should be noted that in the long run, it is the
growth rate of foreign technology that will determine domestic techno-
logical change, but W and the capability level will affect A in the short
run.

Thus, if we let FDI reflect the inflow of foreign technology, both


the growth rate and the stock of FDI should be included in the regre
sion equation. Besides the variables that determine technologic
progress, we also add capital investment and the growth of the popul
tion. The latter term is used instead of growth in the labor force, sin
the dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita and not p
worker.5 We will assume a basically linear relationship and estimate t
following growth equation:

GDPG = a + /i INV + y2 POPG + y3 GAP + y4 GFDI (3


+ y5FD/xoz/? + y6X + £,

where INV is capital investment as a share of total output, POPG is t


growth rate of the population, GAP is a measure of the technology g
GFDI is the rate of growth of FDI, and FDI x cap denotes the multip
cative effect of the stock of foreign technology and the capability level.
The multiplicative term should be interpreted as reflecting how FDI a
the capability level jointly affect GDPG. Thus, FDI will have a large
impact on growth, the higher the capability level of the host countr
Finally, X denotes a set of control variables to be explained in the ne
section, and e is an error term. In order to proceed, we have to identi
the capability factors and define our variables empirically.

5 The same argument is done by Edwards (1992). Furthermore, the role of populati
growth seems to be more important as a determinant of economic growth than
growth rate of the labor force (see, e.g., Levine and Renelt 1992).

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538 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1998, Vol. 134(3)

Variables and data description


The data set we will use covers 50 countries and the period
1 980-1 990.6 This time period is chosen mainly because of the lack of
data on FDI before 1980.7 Since we want as large a sample as possible,
both developed and developing countries are included. Only FDI
received from developed countries is considered, however, because we
believe this type of FDI to involve much more technology transfer than
FDI from developing areas. At the same time, since the basic interest
of our paper is technological progress through imitation of foreign tech-
nology, we exclude the most important innovating countries, including
the United States, Japan, France, and the UK, which together are the
main net exporters of FDI and account for about 60 percent of the stock
of world FDI (World Investment Report 1993). The data on FDI are col-
lected from World Investment Directory provided by the United
Nations and we define two variables - FDI, which denotes the average
stock of FDI as a share of GDP between 1980-1990, and GFDI, which
is the average annual growth rate of the stock of FDI over the same
period.
Turning to the capability variables, we have two variables that intend
to capture the institutional level: one is a measure of the degree of prop-
erty-right protection and the other is a measure of bureaucratic efficien-
cy. The property-right variable, which will be denoted PROP, is taken
from Scully and Slottje (1991) and is a simple average of measures of
the risk for individuals of being exposed to arbitrary seizure of their pri-
vate property and the degree of government ownership. The countries
in the sample are allocated a value 1 , 2, 3, or 4, and the higher the value,
the lower is the protection of property rights. As insufficient protection
of property rights will make domestic firms less efficient and decrease
the potential benefits from FDI, we expect the sign of this variable to
be negative.
The bureaucratic efficiency variable, denoted BUREFF, is a meas-
ure based on subjective indices constructed by Business International
and presented by Mauro (1995). The index takes an integer value from
0 and 10, and the higher the value, the better the institutional frame-
work. Since we assume that an efficient bureaucracy facilitates invest-
ment decisions and successful adoption of foreign technology, the
expected sign is positive.

6 Countries are listed in Table Al in the Appendix.


7 These data are especially scarce for developing countries.

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 539

Furthermore, we include factors reflecting the level of human


capital and openness which have been suggested by earlier studies.
Human capital, which is suggested to have a positive effect, is measured
by the average mean years of schooling, labeled SCHOOL, and the data
are from Human Development Report 199 L The measure for openness
is from Sachs and Warner (1995) and is a dummy variable where a coun-
try is allocated 1 - and, thus, considered not to be open - if it meets any
of the following criteria: (i) a high proportion of imports covered by
quota restrictions, (ii) (for Sub-Saharan countries) a high proportion of
exports covered by state export monopolies and state-set prices, (Hi) a
socialist market structure, and (i"v) a black-market premium over the offi-
cial exchange rate of 20 percent or more. Since this variable, that we
denote OPEN, is believed to reflect a country's isolation from the rest
of the world economy, its impact on growth is assumed to be negative.
The present paper, it should be noted, concentrates on the interac-
tion of the capability level and the stock of FDI. Hence, although the
variables that we have identified as capability factors could be im-
portant growth determinants in general, their direct effect on growth
will not receive much attention here. For econometric reasons, howev-
er, the separate effects of the interaction terms have to be included in
the regression equation, and the inclusion of these direct effects is
expressed by X in (3). By doing this, we control for the possibility that
the separate effects of FDI and the capability factors could have an
impact on growth. Otherwise a significant interaction term could sim-
ply be due to the omission of the direct effects of the interacted terms.
Furthermore, one may argue that the capability level could also influ-
ence the inflow of FDI in the host country. Since we interact the capa-
bility factors with the stock of FDI, however, this is not believed to be
a major problem in this paper.
As for the remaining variables in (3), the dependent variable, GDP,
will be measured by the average annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita. Investment will be measured by the percentage share of invest-
ment related to GDP, denoted INV, and POPG is the average annual
growth rate of the population. Finally, the catching-up effect will be
measured by the natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita, denoted
IGDP (Baumol 1986).8 All these data come from Summers and Heston
(1991).

8 Thus, we replace the variable GAP in (3) by the variable IGDP.

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540 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1998, Vol. 134(3)

III. Results

Base Estimations

As a starting point, we disregard interactive effects and run an OLS


regression on GDP growth, including only the variables INV, POPG,
IGDP, and GFDL In every specification in Table 1, a dummy variable,
called LATAFR, for the Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries is
also included because of the negative growth experienced by many of

Table 1 - Impact ofFDI and Country Capabilities on the Growth


Rate of Real GDP Per Capita, 1980-1990

Independent (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)


variables

Constant 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.23***


(6.36) (5.46) (5.14) (6.86) (8.64) (5.83)

INV 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***


(4.70) (2.98) (5.01) (5.00) (4.86) (3.37)
POPG -1.107*** -0.921*** -1.149*** -1.12*** -1.26*** -1.13***
(-7.20) (-3.83) (-6.84) (-6.06) (-7.45) (-5.85)
IGDP -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(-5.46) (-5.08) (-3.88) (-7.02) (-7.33) (-5.28)
GFDI 0.038* 0.048*** 0.046** 0.057*** 0.07*** 0.074***
(1.92) (3.13) (2.26) (3.28) (3.70) (4.14)
OPEN -0.007 -0.016
(-0.82) (-1.579)
FDIxOPEN -0.004 0.003
(-0.83) (0.66)
SCHOOL -0.001 0.0004
(-0.81) (0.25)
FDIxSCHOOL 0.0005 -0.0005
(1.14) (-0.83)
PROP 0.008** 0.005
(1.99) (0.80)
FDIxPROP -0.007** -0.005
(-2.56) (-1.44)
BUREFF -0.003** -0.003
(-2.28) (-1.53)
FDIxBUREFF 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.34) (3.00)
FDI 0.003 -0.002 0.014** -0.011*** -0.002
(0.80) (-0.85) (2.52) (-3.42) (-0.17)
LATAFR -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.02*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015***
(_4.74) (_4.i9) (_4>76) (_3>64) (_5>Ol) (-3.30)
R2 0.66 0.70 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.72
n 50 50 50 50 50 50

Note: The i-statistics w


White's (1980) method
at the 10, 5, and 1 perc

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 541

these countries during the observed period, and the variable is expect-
ed to be negatively correlated with the growth rate.9 The results pre-
sented in Table 1, column (i), show that all these variables have the
expected signs and are statistically significant. In particular, an increase
in FDI seems to have a positive impact on the growth rate. Further, the
effects of these variables appear to be robust throughout all columns in
Table 1.
In the specifications (ii)-(v) we have added the joint effects of
FDI with OPEN, SCHOOL, PROP, and BUREFF, respectively. 10 Recall
that SCHOOL and BUREFF are expected to interact positively with
FDI, while the joint effects of FDI with OPEN and PROP are ex-
pected to be negative. In every specification, the separate effects of
the interactive terms are also included. As can be seen in Table 1, only
the interactive terms FDIxPROP and FDIxBUREFF turn out to be
significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The joint effects
of the other capability factors OPEN and SCHOOL, however, have the
right signs but are insignificant. Finally, in column (vi), all the interac-
tive terms have been included in the regression. The interaction term
with BUREFF remains significant, while we do not find any statistical
significance of FDIxPROP in this specification. This could be
explained by a high correlation between the explanatory variables as
suggested by the Simple Correlation Matrix (Table A2 in the Appen-
dix).
It is interesting to notice that, in contrast to previous works, our
results reveal no positive growth effects from the stock of FDI in com-
bination with the degree of openness or the level of human capital,
which, at least, suggests that the results in earlier studies are sensitive
to the empirical method.11 Since these results could also be caused
by multicollinearity, various regressions with different combinations
of interactive terms and exclusions of one or more of the other explan-
atory variables have been tested. The results for FDIxOPEN and
FDIxSCHOOL, however, turned out to be very similar in every spec-
ification. The lack of significant effects for these variables is empiri-
cally supported by some earlier findings. Regarding the openness result,

9 This is also done by e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992) and Borensztein et al. (1995).
10 We have taken the natural logarithm of FDI since otherwise, there are very high sim-
ple correlations between the interactive terms.
1 1 The findings for OPEN and SCHOOL remain valid even after exclusion of the indu-
strialized countries in our data sample. Other measures of human capital and openness,
viz. initial secondary school enrollment and real exchange rate distortions, respective-
ly, have also been tested, with similar results. These results are available upon request.

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542 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1998, Vol. 134(3)

a micro-based study by Kokko (1994) suggests that the role of open-


ness may be ambiguous. Kokko finds that even if the host country is
relatively open, FDI could take place in industries where MNE affili-
ates operate in isolation from the rest of the economy. In consequence,
the rate of technology imitation is not necessarily dependent on the
degree of openness. Turning to the human capital variable, the result
is in accordance with Pritchett (1996). Finding a negative effect of
educational attainment on growth rates of output per worker, he argues
that schooling, although raising private wages, may not in fact raise
cognitive skills. Another explanation could be that human capital accu-
mulation may be directed to socially wasteful activities, for example
bloated bureaucracies. This brings the tentative conclusion that open-
ness and human capital do not per se increase the growth effects from
a given amount of FDI, while the institutional capability of the host
country could be important in order to reap the potential benefits from
FDI.

Sensitivity Analysis

We will test the sensitivity of our results for the institutional vari-
ables by taking into account the problems of non-normally distributed
error terms, measurement errors, and endogeneity.
First, if the error terms are not normally distributed, OLS regression
will result in inefficient estimates. Following D'Agostino et al. (1990)
and Royston (1991), joint tests for skewness and kurtosis were per-
formed on the error terms in specification (iv) and (v) in Table 1, which
did not reject the hypothesis of normally distributed error terms at the
5 percent level.
A more severe problem might be measurement errors associated with
the use of proxy variables. Measurement errors will bias the estimated
coefficients, and may thus lead to incorrect inferences from the regres-
sion results based on OLS. The true maximum likelihood estimates can
be obtained by running reverse regressions (see Klepper and Learner
1984). We therefore regress those independent variables that we sus-
pect to be measured with errors on the variables in the original direct
regression, including the dependent variable. We then solve each regres-
sion equation for the originally dependent variable and obtain the
implied coefficients. These coefficients, in turn, put a lower and a high-
er bound on the true estimate. If the signs of the estimates from the
reverse regressions do not change, the estimates are robust to measure-
ment errors. On the other hand, if they do not have the same sign, the

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 543

estimates are unbounded and one should be careful when making infer-
ences from the OLS regression.
The results from the reversed regressions procedure are presented
in Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix. The coefficients in the specifica-
tion that contains the bureaucratic efficiency variable do not change
signs, while in the specification with the property-right variable the
dummy LATAFR does. This result, however, can be disregarded as the
variable does not involve any measurement problem. Thus, the results
seem not to be sensitive to measurement errors.
Finally, there might be an endogeneity problem between, in partic-
ular, the increase in the stock of FDI and the dependent variable since
it is possible that countries with high growth rates of GDP will attract
more FDI. In order to test that the estimated coefficients are not biased
due to misspecification, we perform a Hausman specification test for
contemporaneous correlation between the error term and GFDI on spec-
ifications (iv) and (v) in Table 1. In order to conduct the Hausman test
we need instrumental variables that are highly correlated with the var-
iables for which they are instruments but not with the error terms. Look-
ing at the Simple Correlation Matrix, SCHOOL seems to be a reason-
able candidate. According to the test results, though, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation. In other words,
estimation with the OLS method seems appropriate.

IV. Summary and Concluding Remarks

This study has analyzed whether FDI contributes to economic


growth. There are strong theoretical reasons to believe in the existence
of such a relationship, but the hypothesis has not been subject to suffi-
cient empirical investigation. The assumption in this paper has been that
FDI leads to higher growth rates by bringing new technology to the host
country of the MNE. Furthermore, in order to explain why the effects
of FDI may differ across countries, the ability of the domestic econo-
my to adopt foreign technology has been taken into account.
The empirical analysis showed that, irrespective of the capability
level, an increase in the stock of FDI appears to be positively related to
growth. Furthermore, the regression results suggest that the beneficiary
effects of FDI are stronger in countries with a higher level of institu-
tional capability, the importance of bureaucratic efficiency being espe-
cially pronounced. A sensitivity analysis, which in particular takes into
account the problem of measurement errors and endogeneity, further
verifies the robustness of these results.

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544 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1998, Vol. 134(3)

On the other hand, no inference could be made with respect to the


interaction between FDI and the variables reflecting openness and
human capital. This is interesting since these variables have been
emphasized in earlier studies. Partly, this could be explained by the use
of different empirical method and data set, which suggests that the find-
ings in previous studies are not very robust. At the same time, the ambi-
guity of openness and human capital are consistent with findings in
some earlier studies.

Appendix

Table Al - Country Sample

1. Algeria* 14.Trinidad&Tobago* 27. Iran* 40. France


2. Cameroon* 15. Argentina* 28. Israel 41. Ireland
3. Egypt* 16. Brazil* 29. Jordan* 42. Italy
4. Ghana* 17. Chile* 30. Korea South* 43. Netherlands
5. Ivory Coast* 1 8. Colombia* 3 1 . Malaysia* 44. Norway
6. Kenya* 19. Ecuador* 32. Pakistan* 45. Portugal
7. Morocco* 20. Peru* 33. Philippines* 46. Spain
8. Nigeria* 21. Uruguay* 34. Singapore* 47. Sweden
9. South Africa 22. Venezuela* 35. Sri Lanka* 48. Switzerland
10. Zimbabwe* 23. Bangladesh* 36. Thailand* 49. Turkey
1 1. Canada 24. Hong Kong* 37. Austria 50. Australia
12. Mexico* 25. India* 38. Denmark
13. Panama* 26. Indonesia* 39. Finland

* Developing countries.

Table A2 - Simple Correlation Matrix

INV POPG IGDP GFDI OPEN SCHOOL PROP BUREFF FDI LATAFR

INV 1.00
POPG -0.55 1.00
¡GDP 0.63 -0.71 1.00
GFDI 0.32 -0.45 0.44 1.00
OPEN -0.66 0.63 -0.56 -0.25 1.00
SCHOOL 0.59 -0.75 0.84 0.45 -0.53 1.00
PROP -0.48 0.61 -0.58 -0.24 0.59 -0.62 1.00
BUREFF 0.49 -0.49 0.67 0.31 -0.46 0.69 -0.57 1.00
FDI 0.06 -0.05 0.22 -0.19 -0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.13 1.00
LATAFR -0.37 0.42 -0.32 -0.27 0.55 -0.30 0.17 -0.13 0.03 1.00

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Olofsdotter: Foreign Direct Investment 545

Table A3 - Reverse Regression Results for the Bureaucratic


Efficiency Specification

Variable Direction of minimization

GDP INV POPG IGDP GFDl BUREFF FDIx FDI


BUREFF

INV 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001


POPG -1.26 -1.056 -3.731 -2.062 -0.946 -2.48 -2.036 -1.962
IGDP -0.026 -0.037 -0.037 -0.052 -0.041 -0.011 -0.034 -0.028
GFDI 0.07 0.072 0.052 0.109 0.377 0.268 0.216 0.191
BUREFF -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.012 -0.051 -0.025 -0.026
FDIx 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.013
BUREFF
FDI -0.011 -0.008 -0.019 -0.012 -0.031 -0.091 -0.068 -0.077
LATAFR -0.019 -0.009 -0.011 -0.019 -0.015 -0.001 -0.013 -0.012

Table A4 - Reverse Regression Results for the Property Righ


Protection Specification

Variable Direction of minimization

GDP INV POPG IGDP GFDI PROP FDIx FDI


PROP

INV 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002


POPG -1.119 -1.021 -4.46 -1.895 -0.518 -4.652 -1.858 -1.945
¡GDP -0.025 -0.036 -0.042 -0.048 -0.042 -0.025 -0.034 -0.038
GFDI 0.057 0.06 0.027 0.095 0.397 0.168 0.144 0.167
PROP 0.008 0.016 0.033 0.008 0.023 0.253 0.01 0.099
FDIxPROP -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.017 -0.086 -0.054 -0.053
FDI 0.014 0.018 0.002 0.021 0.041 0.175 0.108 0.112
LATAFR -0.016 -0.008 0.0004 -0.014 -0.006 0.041 0.009 0.008

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