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Prioritization
in Medicine
An International Dialogue
Eckhard Nagel
Michael Lauerer
Editors
123
Prioritization in Medicine
Eckhard Nagel • Michael Lauerer
Editors
Prioritization in Medicine
An International Dialogue
Editors
Eckhard Nagel Michael Lauerer
Institute for Healthcare Management Institute for Healthcare Management
and Health Sciences and Health Sciences
University of Bayreuth University of Bayreuth
Bayreuth Bayreuth
Germany Germany
In Cooperation with
Valentin Schätzlein
Institute for Healthcare Management
and Health Sciences
University of Bayreuth
Bayreuth
Germany
This contributed volume goes back to the interdisciplinary research group FOR 655
“Setting Priorities in Medicine: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis within the
Context of the German Statutory Health Insurance.” Two volumes associated with
this research group have been published in German language earlier. Edited by
Wohlgemuth/Freitag (2009), the first volume focused on the presentation of objec-
tives and methods of the research group’s subprojects. The second volume, edited
by Schmitz-Luhn/Bohmeier (2013), discussed particularly relevant and controver-
sially assessed prioritization criteria. This volume addresses normative dimensions
of methodological and theoretical approaches, international experiences concerning
the normative framework and the process of priority setting as well as the legal basis
behind priorities. It also examines specific criteria for prioritization and discusses
economic evaluation.
The contributing authors are in parts members of FOR 655 and other scientists
from various academic disciplines and different parts of the world. Some of them
came together at an international conference in Bayreuth, Germany, in November
2013 were the idea for this book originated. Editors invited further colleagues to
contribute, aiming to encourage a comprehensive discussion about different
approaches and methods within this volume and beyond.
Prioritization is necessary and inevitable – not only for reasons of resource scar-
city, which might become worse in the next few years. But especially in view of an
optimization of the supply structures, prioritization is an essential issue that will
contribute to the capability and stability of healthcare systems. Therefore, our vol-
ume may give useful impulses to face challenges of appropriate prioritization.
We acknowledge the excellent cooperation and fruitful exchange with contributing
authors who made this book possible. We would also like to thank members of FOR
655 who encouraged us to realize this book project. Special acknowledgment is made
to the German Research Foundation (DFG) which financed the work of FOR 655 as
the first large-scale project on prioritization in healthcare between 2007 and 2015.
Finally, we are especially grateful to Valentin Schätzlein for his editorial assis-
tance, expert consulting, and for managing all issues along the way to this volume.
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Molière did not have prioritization in mind when he expressed his focal thoughts
about responsibility: “It is not only for what we do that we are held responsible, but
also for what we do not do.” However, being aware that health is one of the most
essential goods and that resources in health care systems are limited clearly shows
us that Molière’s aphorism is of major importance for allocation decisions in health
care. This applies to the decision whether or not to set priorities explicitly as well as
to the process and consequences of priority setting.
Prioritization in medicine can contribute to face the urgent challenges that arise
from scarcity in health care worldwide. The present volume offers an international
dialogue on prioritization in medicine initiated by the German research group FOR
655.1 May it be helpful to meet the responsibility for what we do and for what we
do not do.
1
FOR 655 “Setting Priorities in Medicine” was the first research project financed by the
German Research Foundation (DFG) concerned with prioritization in medicine (2007–2015).
Nationwide 14 universities and research institutions participated in 10 working groups:
Theoretical projects focused on legal, philosophical, and economic aspects, frameworks, and
implications relating to the process of setting priorities in the statutory health insurance.
Empirical projects analyzed stakeholder preferences concerning prioritization in medicine.
(For more details, see http://www.priorisierung-in-der-medizin.de)
M. Lauerer (*) • V. Schätzlein (*) • E. Nagel (*)
Institute for Healthcare Management and Health Sciences, University of Bayreuth,
Prieserstraße 2, Bayreuth D-95444, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]
1 Prioritization in Medicine
Topics such as “Priority Setting in Medicine” and “Rationing in Health Care” are
widely used in the discussion about allocating scarce resources. Thereby, priority
setting and rationing are sometimes used interchangeably. But they can at least indi-
cate different stages in the process of resource allocation (Williams et al. 2012,
p. 6). While rationing regularly refers to actual withholding of health services, pri-
ority setting describes a systematic approach to figure out what is more and what is
less important in health care. It leads to a ranking order and prepares decisions
(Meyer and Raspe 2012, p. 73). Prioritizing can be understood as a prerequisite of
rationing (Raspe 2001, p. 32).
Priority setting does not necessarily have to refer to scarce resources. It can also
be used for quality assurance, for example (Meyer and Raspe 2012, p. 73). But
whether or not explicit priority setting in medicine is desirable or even inevitable
has been discussed particularly in the light of scarce resources.
Basically, limited resources lead to a competition between publicly funded health
care and other sectors, as well as among different health needs and claims within
health care (see chapter “Accountability for Reasonableness and Priority Setting in
Health”). Demand or claims on resources always exceed available resources and
therefore the meaningfulness of priorities appears regardless of whether resources are
available in very large or very small quantities (Mitton and Donaldson 2004, p. 4). It
appears regardless of whether available resources increase, decrease, or remain con-
stant (Williams et al. 2012, p. 6). Nevertheless, setting priorities seems to be the more
important, the scarcer resources are. Unanimously a growing demand, particularly in
consequence of demographic and epidemiological transition as well as medical pro-
gressions, is held responsible for an aggravation of scarcity. Accordingly, allocation
decisions are gaining in importance.
Certainly explicit priority setting is not the only option responding to limited
resources in health care. But each alternative (such as increasing efficiency or the
overall amount spent for health care, rationing by delay, rationing implicitly) goes
along with problems in principle, respectively, practice, and is not sufficiently nar-
rowing the gap that occurs between demand and supply (Williams et al. 2012,
p. 8–12). In particular there is a wide consensus that an explicit approach for fram-
ing health care is preferable over implicit rationing when tight budgets force clini-
cians to make allocation decisions in their day-to-day workload. If doctors must
offer inferior medical interventions without society taking responsibility for this
circumstance and without taking care that allocation criteria are established and
accepted, this overtaxes clinicians, possibly leads to unfair distribution patterns and
jeopardizes the physician-patient relationship (German Ethics Council 2011, p. 30).
Explicit priorities are considered to avoid these negative consequences of implicit
rationing as it happens in clinical practice.
Explicit priority setting helps to allocate scare resources fairly and transparently.
Since health care systems around the globe are faced with challenges along with
setting priorities, it is obviously reasonable to discuss prioritization in an interna-
tional dialogue.
Introduction to an International Dialogue on Prioritization in Medicine 3
Across nations setting priorities is an important and essential part of the debate on
managing resource scarcity in health care. Thereby, countries diverge in regard to
their experiences with discussing and implementing systematic prioritization. While
some European countries already have a long history of priority setting (e.g.,
Norway), the discussion is still in its infancy in other countries (e.g., Germany).
Additionally, those countries that have already implemented systematic priority set-
ting are following fundamentally different approaches (see chapter “Prioritisation:
(At Least) Two Normative Cultures”).
Experiences that have been made with prioritization in several countries can con-
tribute to a mutual learning process by revealing success and failure. Therefore, this
book project aims to stimulate an international dialogue on prioritization.
Contributors bring together experiences from arround the globe. They present a
broad range of professional perspectives and scientific disciplines (such as religious
studies, philosophy, medicine, (health) economics, law, psychology).
This international and interdisciplinary concept enables readers to get a compre-
hensive and balanced insight into the complex issue of setting priorities in medicine.
Hence, the structure of this volume reflects essential topics and challenges along the
way to priorities.
This volume encloses six parts which, in turn, consist of two to five chapters.
Numerous cross-references indicate that a topic is discussed in greater detail in
another chapter. Some chapters introduce or comment on other contributions within
this volume.
Part I, Evaluation and Decisions in Modern Healthcare, addresses elemental
aspects of evaluation in medicine and (prioritization) decisions in health care: In
Chap. 2, Jim Cochrane reflects prioritization in a larger environment of Fundamental
Evaluation Criteria in the Medicine of the Twenty-First Century. Rather than offer-
ing an in-depth discussion of legal frameworks, medical choices, or financial chal-
lenges, he discusses the setting within these topics must be placed. Assuming that
the distinction between “vertical prioritization” and “horizontal prioritization” is
incomplete, he suggests a third category “system prioritization” described by a
dynamic adaptive system. To contextualize this general framework, Cochrane com-
ments on themes that he characterizes as central to questions of prioritization: the
bounds of science and the limits of rational choice theory. In Chap. 3, Sir Muir Gray
discusses resource allocation as Hellish Decisions in Healthcare. He initially pro-
vides an overview of changing paradigms in health care from 2nd World War until
the recent Global Finance Collapse. Subsequently, he characterizes (evidence for)
significant variations in access, quality, outcome, and investment that led to a his-
torical drift, respectively, an attempt to make resource allocation more explicit in
NHS. In this context, Sir Gray critically examines utilitarianism as influential
4 M. Lauerer et al.
principle of British thinking and deduces the need that decision makers are account-
able for reasonable resource allocation. Finally, he introduces program budgeting as
a basis for priority setting in health care.
Part II, Normative Dimensions of Methodological and Theoretical Approaches,
focuses on the concept of Accountability of Reasonableness and the critique of
priority setting as a maximization task. Its coherence is enhanced by a comment on
both issues. Norman Daniels brings together Accountability for Reasonableness
and Priority Setting in Health in Chap. 4, He suggests the concept of “Accountability
for Reasonableness” as an appeal to a type of procedural justice that can improve
the legitimacy as well as fairness of priority setting, particularly in the environment
of a far-reaching ethical disagreement about allocation decisions. Therefore, Daniels
proposes conditions that should be met at various levels where priority setting pro-
ceeds. His contribution considers the implications of the suggested concept for
health technology assessment and for efficiency frontiers (German alternative for
cost-effectiveness analysis). Finally, he assesses the feasibility of “Accountability
for Reasonableness.” In Chap. 5, Weyma Lübbe discusses the Social Value
Maximization and the Multiple Goals Assumption. She considers the focal question:
Is Priority Setting a Maximizing Task at All? To answer this question, the contribu-
tion first addresses the multiple goals assumption: It is frequently assumed that
decision makers pursue the target of fair allocation beside health maximization.
Combining both goals is understood to involve a trade-off. It is often argued that its
quantitative form should be grounded on data collected in social preference studies.
Accordingly, the modification of the health maximizing approach is thought to
involve an alteration in the direction of social value maximization. Lübbe suggests
that an appropriate conceptualization of fair allocation includes a break that goes
beyond breaking with health maximization. This break refers to the notion of maxi-
mizing any value(s) in any way. This means to break with the tie that connects
preference and value. Then, integrating fairness would be beyond the paradigm.
Lübbe exemplifies this by discussing the concept of equity weights for QALYs. In
Chap. 6, Andrea Klonschinski addresses The Trade-Off Metaphor in Priority Setting
and thereby provides A Comment on Lübbe and Daniels (chapters above). Her con-
tribution aims to help the reader to evaluate the arguments presented by Daniels and
Lübbe. It strives to strengthen and complement Lübbe’s critique of the multiple
goals assumption and to connect her considerations with Daniels’ account. It shows
that Lübbes’ objections pertain to Daniels’ contribution. Above, the contribution
itself provides important input to the debate on priority setting. Klonschinski pleads
to pay more attention to conceptual issues in the course of discussing priority
setting.
Part III, International Experiences: Normative Basis and Process of Priority
Setting, provides an international perspective on prioritization. Thereby, authors
take into consideration both the normative basis and the practice of priority setting.
Heiner Raspe analyzes in Chap. 7, Prioritisation – (At Least) Two Normative
Cultures, different models of prioritization and their normative basis: Models from
Oregon and England serve as examples for the Anglophone type. Norway and
Sweden illustrate the Scandinavian approach. Based on this, he contrasts “clinical
Introduction to an International Dialogue on Prioritization in Medicine 5
age in priority setting. In Chap. 14, Sarah M. Watters analyzes Fair Innings as a
Basis for Prioritization from An Empirical Perspective. She differentiates two ver-
sions of the fair innings argument that advocates for age-based prioritization. Her
review of empirical evidence indicates that the acceptance of intergenerational
equity due to the fair innings principle is mixed and support appears to be dependent
on context. In Chap. 15, Just Caring: Fair Innings and Priority Setting, Leonard
M. Fleck raises the pointed question: Does a 90-Year-Old Have a Just Claim to an
Artificial Heart? He suggests that some form of age-based rationing, vindicated
partly by fair innings aspects, is not unjust: Relevant, he argues, is a flexible contex-
tual interpretation of fair innings in a spectrum of conditions for the determination
of just claims to health care for the elderly. Fleck emphasizes in this regard that a
complex theory of rational democratic deliberation as well as according political
practices are required. In Chap. 16, Harald Schmidt analyzes Personal Responsibility
as Criterion for Prioritization in Resource Allocation. This contribution first out-
lines how one could think about the normative groundwork for policies that have
reference to personal responsibility. It takes a closer look at major rationales under-
lying its promotion in resource allocation. Moreover, Schmidt discusses several
essential dimensions of incentives for promoting personal responsibility. Adele
Diederich completes this part of the present volume with her contribution in
Chap. 17, Age and Personal Responsibility as Prioritization Criteria? The View of
the Public and of Physicians. Rather than focusing on philosophical debates, she
reports the views of a representative sample of the German population and of a
sample of physicians as well: The contribution first presents citizens’ and physi-
cians’ attitudes towards age, then towards personal responsibility. Moreover, it
brings together the other contributions in this part of the volume.
Part VI, Economic Evaluation, addresses, on the one hand, the role of economic
evaluation in priority setting in general. On this basis, it discusses, on the other
hand, a special type of evaluation in Germany. In Chap. 18, Using Economic
Evaluation in Priority Setting: What Do We Know and What Can We Do?, Iestyn
Williams and Stirling Bryan comprehensively examine cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) in priority setting. At that, they comment on the evidence base and highlight
two types of barriers toward the use of CEA (accessibility and acceptability). They
reflect the neglect of context when it comes to explanations of the use of
CEA. Focusing on the context, they argue, contributes to explain the disparity
between national and local decision making tiers in regard to using CEA. Williams
and Bryan suggest that for the purpose of CEA to have an increasing impact at local
levels, analysts should consider more the restrictions in which decision makers act
and that greater clearness over roles, responsibilities, and relationships is necessary
in the process of resource allocation. Moreover, they plead for researchers to focus
on closing theoretical gaps as well as empirical gaps in comprehension across health
systems and contexts. In the last chapter (Chap. 19), Let’s Talk About Health
Economic Evaluation: Relevant Contextual Factors for the German “Sonderweg,”
Lars Schwettmann draws on the contribution of Williams and Bryan. First, he com-
ments on selected aspects raised by their analyses of barriers toward the usage of
health economic information. Beyond, he outlines the limited role of economic
Introduction to an International Dialogue on Prioritization in Medicine 7
References
German Ethics Council (2011) Nutzen und Kosten im Gesundheitswesen – Zur normativen
Funktion ihrer Bewertung. Deutscher Ethikrat, Berlin
Meyer T, Raspe H (2012) Priority setting: Priorisierung: Was ist das und wie geht das? Rehabilitation
51(2):73–80
Mitton C, Donaldson C (2004) Priority setting toolkit: guide to the use of economics in healthcare
decision making. BMJ Books, London
Raspe H (2001) Prioritizing and rationing. In: Breyer F, Kliemt H, Thiele F (eds) Rationing in
medicine: ethical, legal and practical aspects. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, pp 31–38
Williams I, Robinson S, Dickinson H (2012) Rationing in health care: the theory and practice of
priority setting. The Policy Press, Bristol, pp 8–12
Part I
Evaluation and Decisions in Modern
Healthcare
Fundamental Evaluation Criteria
in the Medicine of the Twenty-First
Century
James R. Cochrane
J.R. Cochrane
Religious Studies and School of Public Health & Family Medicine, University of Cape Town,
Altensteiger Strasse 28, Seewald 72297, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
forces one to consider crucial issues that are often sidelined by the problematic yet
pervasive Cartesian split between mind and body or spiritual and material reality.
That split dominates a great deal in governance, policy, and practice in the field of
medicine and health care, and it often confounds their aims and objectives. That
religion is invoked (and it is in any case a tricky notion1) should not derail us.
Besides challenging the Cartesian split, our work on the interface between religion
and health has also spawned general concepts that I wish to reflect upon of some
relevance to the most fundamental issues around health-care provision that also
concern this research group, in particular, ideas about health assets, healthworlds,
causes of life, and deep accountability.
The approach I adopt places the question of medical prioritization within a larger
framework of evaluation criteria for medicine in the Twenty-First Century. Here I
suggest an additional category of prioritization that cuts across the notions of verti-
cal and horizontal prioritization, namely, that described by a dynamic (or emergent)
adaptive system. To provide some necessary context to this general framework
while simultaneously highlighting some important fault lines that bedevil many
attempts to solve the major challenges we face, I first wish to comment on two top-
ics that mediate much discussion around medicine and its organization and generate
considerable controversy: the bounds of science and the limits of economics or,
more specifically, of “rational choice” theory as a defining viewpoint.
Undoubtedly one cannot but be mesmerized by the astounding science and the
breathtaking technologies of our time. As an example of one typical piece of magic
at an institution to which I have connections, Dr Anthony Atala and his team at
Wake Forest Medical Center in North Carolina are responding to a growing crisis in
organ availability resulting from in medicine: an aging population and a lack of suf-
ficient organ donors. They engage in regenerative medicine to produce artificial
bladders, spinal bones, and more; with three-dimensional printers, they are build-
ing, layer-by-layer, an artificial kidney, with the promise of other organs to come.
One may cite many other remarkable scientific innovations in fields such as genet-
ics, neuroscience, nanotechnology, and the like.
Such empirical science, given its evident power, is alluring. It is hard not to be
fascinated by it, to place one’s hopes in it, to promote it, and to invest in it. So the
demand grows to allocate major human, intellectual, material, and financial
resources to its work through every relevant institution, private or public.
Where, however, does this often impel us? Even if the manifest intention is to
heal, the explicit practice is often reminiscent, metaphorically speaking, of
1
Smith (1998).
Fundamental Evaluation Criteria in the Medicine of the Twenty-First Century 13
veterinary science or perhaps bioengineering. More generally, one could say that we
embrace one of the four “sins” of global health,2 namely, the lust for technological
solutions (the other three sins being “coveting silo gains, leaving broad promises
largely unfulfilled, and boasting of narrow successes”). I would portray this as an
instrumental, technical response to setting priorities. It is best captured in the idea
of a “magic bullet” and raised virtually to a Holy Grail in the form of randomized
controlled trials which are less reliable than are widely believed or acted upon.3
Pushed in this direction, it is easy to set aside fundamental questions about which
or, more tellingly, whose interests drive research and technological innovation.
Another side of the lure and allure of science is its potential hubris. This rests not
just on its undoubtedly effective utility but also on an epistemological and ontologi-
cal conviction: that “causes” (e.g., of disease or illness) can be determined with
great and increasing certainty and that only the ignorant or the disingenuous person
would reject the superior authority of science. Science, it is assumed, uncovers real-
ity “as it is” and gives us an increasingly firm grip on it.
Yet, as the best scientists well know and Kant long ago theorized, we never per-
ceive causes directly but only via a world of appearances. To these appearances we
necessarily add inferences of order, but we do so only by making fundamental
(supersensible) assumptions we cannot prove. Irrespective of our powers of inven-
tion, this places a fundamental limit on our grasp of reality. We never see fully. And
the order we place upon reality has, can, and will change, not simply according to a
rule of diminishing ignorance and increasing knowledge but in principle and always.
We have and can have no “God’s-eye view” of the real.
In short, though we do grasp the real with greater adequacy and increased power
(which is not inconsequential and can indeed can be profoundly exciting), we never
do so other than by means of generating “laws,” that is, by overlaying a unity and an
order on the appearances that is not intrinsic but of our making—which is why para-
digm shifts in our understanding are both possible and inevitable. At the same time,
this capacity is a measure of our creative freedom, which we exercise in ordering the
appearances of both the natural order and the human order, inseparably. Both must
thus be comprehended together, as the interplay between theoretical reason and
practical wisdom. This applies to the sphere of medicine and health as much as any.
One challenge, then, is how to grasp the complexity with which we are thereby
confronted without reducing it to an instrumental, technical logic. We tend to look
for an order that, to be manageable, is necessarily simplified, made legible, and
measurable—in a word, reductionist. Paraphrasing James Scott’s Seeing Like a
State4 and thinking not of polity but of the field of medical science, we may then
2
See Panter-Brick et al. (2014).
3
Ioannidis (2005).
4
Scott (1998).
14 J.R. Cochrane
speak of its practitioners being disposed to “seeing like a medic”: imagining that
they have grasped reality through their deeply rooted training in instrumental
knowledge and the powerful tools it gives them, supported by powerful accrediting
and grant agencies who see things similarly. In fact it simultaneously tends to blind
them, as Scott notes, to “essential features of any real, functioning social order,”
demoting or setting aside “the indispensable role of practical knowledge, informal
processes, and improvisation in the face of unpredictability.”5
Why is this so important? From a complexity theory point of view, for the simple
but rather profound reason that life is uncontrollable, at least in the sense that its
dynamic, emergent, and unpredictable properties, however much we may grasp
them in one way or another, always exceed that grasp. Whereas it is possible to
understand this complexity in part, sometimes even with astounding depth (say, in
neuroscience), in principle and for epistemological reasons it can always only be
grasped partially.
One way to think of this partial kind of understanding is to regard it as “sufficient
for the purpose”; in many situations we do not require anything more. Yet increas-
ingly, across many fields of inquiry and professional practice, we are realizing that
this is not enough: that linear analyses or diagnoses of a particular lived reality (say,
a health condition) are in many cases misleading and potentially capable of under-
mining the very thing one seeks to achieve. This becomes obvious in the case of
diseases or illnesses like HIV and AIDS or obesity and diabetes and in the face of
the rapidly growing reality of long-term chronic conditions.
To think otherwise is to ensure that we will continually be confounded by our
attempts to control life. This is true even when our focus is death—or mortality and
morbidity—and our knowledge and action are urgently geared toward addressing
pathologies.
5
Scott (1998): 6.
Fundamental Evaluation Criteria in the Medicine of the Twenty-First Century 15
6
See Jaggar (2006), Nussbaum (2001).
7
This Kantian distinction, linked to the second form of his categorical imperative (“treat persons
as ends in themselves and never as means to another end”), has recently been explored with con-
siderable profundity in relation (inter alia) to the new South African Constitution, German Basic
Law, and the Canadian Constitution in (2012).
8
Habermas (1984). Here his distinction between the “system imperatives” of money (markets) and
power (state bureaucracies) and their driving logic—inherently instrumental and purpose-rational
rather than communicative—is evoked.
16 J.R. Cochrane
for a relationally embodied human being defined as person (where the concept of
“decency” becomes helpful).9
The ideology has another deleterious effect too. The public, as such, disappears
from view. At best, it emerges in the form of representation at the level of gover-
nance or the state. But this sphere, too, is easily overtaken by an increasingly
restricted group of actors who have the expertise or means to act and who do so
through highly planned, if volatile, interlocking affiliations, groupings, and interac-
tions that ironically can, and sometimes do, contain elements of a command econ-
omy with little accountability to anyone but themselves (notwithstanding the
supposed democratization of ownership that shareholder or stakeholder approaches
are purported to bring).10
When the sphere of the public is diminished and progressively brought under the
control of entrepreneurs, technocrats and bureaucrats, what might we understand by
the health of the public per se? What becomes of the common good; that is, what
becomes of our accountability not just to ourselves but also to all and indeed to that
which nurtures and sustains us in our environment?
Whether we consider (1) the current, destructive casino logic of financial capital
or (2) the disappearance of the “real human being” from the sphere of economy in
favor of a “virtual person” that is a shareholder without face or responsibility beyond
self-interest with regard to dividends accruing in the market or (3) the troubling
effects of our presence on the earth that have begun to change it in ways we may not
be able to manage, the question of the common good confronts us. The common
good now cannot be understood in nation-state or similarly narrow terms but only
with respect to humanity as a whole in our interdependence and dependence upon
the earth we inhabit in consort with its other creatures. Nor can it be understood as
giving priority to those who seek to socially engineer our lives “from the top down,”
so to speak, always legitimated on the grounds that they have the expertise, the
mandate or the wisdom to know what we all need and want. Yet the search for a new
understanding of the common good cannot be set aside either.
Perhaps this question provides us right now with no specific criteria for how we
prioritize medicine in the time ahead. But it does suggest that some criteria must be
found that enable us to measure the science and practice of medicine in terms of its
contribution to the common good. At least one clue to this is provided by an element
of the contemporary form of the Hippocratic Oath, namely, the Declaration of
Geneva or “Physician’s Oath” which includes a commitment to human rights. Like
the basic injunction that one should do no harm, it is phrased in the negative, how-
ever, requiring that one not violate any rights. There is no suggestion that one seek
to enhance such rights, which would imply a proactive role.
9
See Karpf et al. (2008).
10
See Letza et al. (2004); also Ireland (2005).
Fundamental Evaluation Criteria in the Medicine of the Twenty-First Century 17
In any case, a rights approach has particular limits, especially given the de facto
reality that they are largely articulated juridically as individual rights negatively
defined (what should not be done) and with difficulty as social rights positively
defined (what should be done). Can decisions about prioritization in medicine find
a meaningful relation to a deepened understanding of human rights? This would
mean pushing beyond first-generation or negative rights into the tricky legal terri-
tory of second- and third-generation rights. First-generation rights are largely indi-
vidual rights, whereas second- and third-generation rights are more general and
include, for example, those of unborn generations. To consider the impact of our
actions on unborn generations is to begin to think in terms of the common good
through time.
Another related limit to any consideration of the common good is the notion of
contractual rights, a legal articulation of rights that dominates jurisprudence in most
contexts today—notably (given the context of this discussion), in the use of medi-
cine, the provision of health care, and the status of private corporations (such as the
ultimately bizarre predilection to define corporations as “persons with rights,”
legally entrenched in some places in law with seriously negative impact on demo-
cratic life). It also contains within it certain dangers. A contract is inherently an
expression of exchange relations and not of any common good. Hence, even though
a contract may formally appear symmetrical, those who have greater power, wealth,
access, or authority readily leverage it to their advantage and self-interest. In prac-
tice, then, especially where a great deal is at stake in terms of influence and money,
a contractual right readily expresses deeply asymmetric power relations.
We once had a notion of covenantal rights. This evokes a relationship that goes
beyond contractual limitations. It appeals to a foundation that transcends self-
interest (individual or corporate). Avoiding the religious constructs within which
the term originates, we might now refer to this as the priority of the Just,11 the “law
above the law” (Kant) that transcends specific particular constructs of justice.12
Clearly, there is a normative dimension here, and though it is not defined culturally
or contextually (it is universal, in that regard), it would not find favor with those who
adopt a merely empirical or pragmatic view of law.
This, then, describes in shorthand the alternative before those responsible for the
provision of health and medicine in any society: either autonomy understood as the
discrete nature of an individual who, out of self-interest, makes free choices from
among available goods according to a calculus of costs and benefits (opportunity
costs included) or autonomy understood as the exercise of the will to maximize the
benefits accruing from the use of our creative freedom (in the form of science and
11
Ricoeur (2000).
12
This transcendental law, it should be clear, is not rooted in nature, but in the conditions of pos-
sibility that define the human being (at least) as of intrinsic worth. It is also, in principle, the basis
for the expression of any particular law (culturally, contextually, historically established) and for
its criticism.
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consigned to flames on Lumi Island on Bellingham Bay, Wash.
Two incidents stand out above all the rest in the palmy days of the
Nipsic. She was of Admiral Farragut’s fleet at Mobile and she was the only
American vessel to come out whole in the typhoon at Aphia, Samoa, in
1889.
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