Succession Rulings - Josh and Viene

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GENERAL PROVISIONS

G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,


vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x
Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving
Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned
of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on
the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by
the recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have
easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or
encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" 14 or used words to that effect.
Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve
his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise").
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa"
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the
donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of
the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor." 23 Indeed, doubts
on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed."24
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke
against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007


NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA,
BR. 31, respondents.

When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument;
in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the
interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until
they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.33

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has
already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 34 The NHA issued its
resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by
Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all
her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or
may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original
owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an
interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be
able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell 36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's
demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an
obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property
already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.38

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent
as the next "person"39 likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the
purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera
should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the
said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed
therein null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and
properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is
concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. 20 The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.21

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because
unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person
to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of a will.22

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic
will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. 27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to
be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover,
it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the
decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement
were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were.
Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may
have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.

G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,


vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4,
1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving
the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a
will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having
jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and
place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed
by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein
of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition
for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time
when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered
to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.wphï1.ñët

There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's
will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter
court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in
Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race
between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost
its validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to
the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property in which the testator has not disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being
no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to
the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of
pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee;


JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA
and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco
de Borja, appellant. .
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana
Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000
payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary


share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable
to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco
de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual
share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a
hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect
the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous
litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of
them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the
law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve
the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the
estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco
de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana
Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and
as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court
of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.

WILLS

[ G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LUZ GASPE


LIPSON AND ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,

ROEL P. GASPI, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE MARIA CLARISSA L.


PACIS-TRINIDAD, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, IRIGA
CITY,* RESPONDENT.

Generally, a person's death passes ownership over their properties to the heirs.29 When there is
no will, or when there is one—but does not pass probate, the law provides for the order of
succession and the amount of successional rights for each heir.30 When real properties are
involved, law will also govern the formalities and consequences in the transfer of properties.

However, prior to death, a person retains control as to how their estate will be distributed. This is
done by executing a written31 document referred to as a will.32

Wills may be notarial33 or holographic.34 In either case, the formalities required for their
execution is more elaborate than most deeds relating to other transfers of property.

Death makes it impossible for the decedent to testify as to the authenticity and due execution of
the will, which contains their testamentary desires. The proof of the formalities substitutes as the
legal guarantee to ensure that the document purporting to be a will is indeed authentic, and that it
was duly executed by the decedent.

A will is then submitted to the Regional Trial Court for probate proceeding to determine its
authenticity, as "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court."3

Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals38 elaborates:

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:

 whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
 compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
 the testamentary capacity of the testator;
 and the due execution of the last will and testament.39 (Citations omitted)
The extrinsic validity of a will, that is, that the document purporting to be a will is determined to
be authentic and duly executed by the decedent, is different from its intrinsic validity.

The intrinsic validity of the will "or the manner in which the properties were
apportioned,"40 refers to whether the order and allocation of successional rights are in
accordance with law. It can also refer to whether an heir has not been disqualified from
inheriting from the decedent.

Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which is the preliminary issue in probate of
wills, is governed by the law of the country where the will was executed and presented for
probate.41 Understandably, the court where a will is presented for probate should, by
default, apply only the law of the forum, as we do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.42

This is the situation here. A Filipina who was subsequently naturalized as an American executed
a will in the Philippines to pass real property found in the country. The designated executor now
files a petition for probate in the Philippines.

However, the probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into its
intrinsic validity, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would require the probate
court to touch upon the intrinsic validity of the will.44

When it comes to the form and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic validity, the
Civil Code provides that the law of the country of execution shall govern:

ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

Courts, therefore, retain jurisdiction over the subject matter (probate) and the res, which is the
real property in Iriga in this case.

Moreso, there was no objection with respect to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.


MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA,
JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to
the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded
that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of
mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful
so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed
in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only
"magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.


We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. 68 Forgetfulness
is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code
states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered
by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.
Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a
Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful
and intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial
evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly
pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was
born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to
execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.
Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear
or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the
alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former
purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her
own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is
not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and
raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo
and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for
and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already
married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said
document as against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are
not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that
bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot
suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. 71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to
be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact,
whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested
in [the estate of the deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

G.R. No. L-28328 October 2, 1928

In the matter of the will of Jennie Rider Babcock.


BEATRICE BABCOCK TEMPLETON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM RIDER BABCOCK, opponent-appellant.

The sole question in controversy therefore now is, whether the testatrix, at the time will was
made, had the status of a citizen of the State of California, as required by section 636 of our
Code of Civil Procedure. But, under the first paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, the citizenship of a person born in the United States, as was the
testatrix in this case, is dependent upon the place of residence, or domicile; and the question
before us ultimately resolves itself into a contention over the point whether the testatrix
had ever acquired a legal domicile in the State of California and whether, supposing such
domicile to have been acquired, she may not have lost it as a result of her removal from
that state.

In particular, we are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error in attaching
importance to the circumstance that the deceased had voted in California elections. Though
not of course conclusive of acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an important
circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of
the franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life
does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he lives more than in the act of
voting. 1awph!l.net

This record supplies no material with which to refute the conclusion of the trial court that a
domicile was thus acquired by the testatrix in the state of California; and what we consider the
more critical question is whether or not the domicile thus acquired was subsequently lost by
removal from said state. But upon this point also, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the
trial court, to the effect that acquired domicile had not been lost, is in conformity with the
evidence. It is a recognized rule that the intention with which removal is made from a particular
state determines whether or not the domicile is abandoned; and intention is revealed only in the
acts and declaration of the person concerned.

In the case before us there are no declarations of the testatrix in evidence which would tend
to show that, upon removal to New York, she had any intention of acquiring a legal
domicile in that state. On the contrary her short stay there and her repeated statements
made thereafter show that she could not possibly have had any intention of making that
state a place of permanent abode. As was pointed out by this court in In Re Estate of
Johnson (39 Phil., 156), a person transferring his domicile from one state of the American
Union to another loses his domicile in the state of his earlier abode upon acquiring a
domicile, or citizenship, in the state of his new abode. The acquisition of the new legal
domicile extinguishes the old. Certainly in this case it cannot be said with any propriety
that the domicile of the testatrix in California was suppressed by the acquisition on a new
domicile in New York State.

But it is said that, even supposing that the testatrix had not acquired a domicile in New York, yet
she was a resident of the Philippine Islands at the same time of her death, and that, having
established herself in these Islands as a place of permanent abode, her will should not be
admitted to probate as the will of a citizen of another state. But the proof shows that however
long the testatrix had resided in the Philippine Islands, she at no time had any intention of
residing here permanently. In the contrary, her repeated declarations reveal a fixed intention of
returning ultimately to the United States.

Again, it is a rule that a citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the
Philippine Islands by residence here, however long continued (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil., 156). The testatrix therefore remained at the time of her death a citizen of the United
States. Her will is therefore provable under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
the will of a citizen of another state or country; and the only question to be determined in
this case is, which state of the American Union has the best claim to her citizenship, a
question, which, as we have already seen, turns upon domicile; and there is no other state
whose citizenship she can claim, according the evidence in this record, with as good right as
the State of California

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, respondents.

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in
a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature
of conjugal funds.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was
to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926

MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and


LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the
testator be of "sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a
"disposing mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane
or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].)
Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of
testamentary capacity: "'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature
of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to
be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.'" (Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163,
followed in Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of the testator is
determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).

Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be
rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor
eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests
on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts. On the issue of testamentary capacity, the
evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out
which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will
concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of the attending
physician is also to be relied upon.

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the
will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set
aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs.
Paguio, supra.)
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile
dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often
contested. Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages. To
constitute complete senile dementia there must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the
testator of intelligent action,. In the first stages of the diseases, a person may possess reason
and have will power.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory,
may have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed
the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an
exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the
oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.
G.R. No. L-2211 December 20, 1948

NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner,


vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, MARIA ROXAS and
PEDRO ROXAS, respondents.

According to section 2, Rule 75, taken from section 685 of the former Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, as amended, "when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is
the reason why, according to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines," and section 6, Rule 79, provides for appointment of one administrator in case of
intestacy, except in certain cases in which two or more joint, but not separate and independent,
administrators may be appointed under section 3, Rule 82. Therefore the administrator
appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall also
administer, liquidate and distribute the community property, because the estate of a
deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered, liquidated and distributed,
consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the
assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as determined
after the liquidation thereof in accordance with the provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of
the Civil Code.
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no power to appoint two special
administratices of the estate of a deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore the respondent judge acted in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore
said order is hereby set aside, with costs against the respondents. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929

In re estate of Piraso, deceased.


SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees.

"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or
a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into
effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator ," etc. (Emphasis
supplied.) Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs.
Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the
locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in support of the
probate of said document Exhibit A, as a will, because, in the instant case, not only is it not
proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and
where Exhibit A was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no
other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the
English language in which Exhibit A is written. So that even if such a presumption could have
been raised in this case it would have been wholly contradicted and destroyed.

We consider the other question raised in this appeal needless and immaterial to the adjudication
of this case, it having been, as it was, proven, that the instrument in question could not be
probated as the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso, having been written in the English
language with which the latter was unacquainted.

Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be
technically held that said will, in order to be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect;
whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a means of
communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well
enough to understand a will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain
that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not
know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions
of the law, and inevitably prevents its probate.

G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,


vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the
Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of
which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's
property.
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for
this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place
might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done,
there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the
means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A
statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
(De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence
on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory
requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be
established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781,
in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the
testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than
the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a presumption
arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.

A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,


vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch
25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must
be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which
was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).

G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.


GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the
dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same
was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a
neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this
dialect in which this will is written.

3. Notarial and Holographic Wills; Joint Will (Arts. 804-891)

Cases:

1. Bella Guerero vs. Resureccion Bihis, G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.

One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a


notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable
requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
accepted for probate. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case of a
notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.

The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses
to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed
to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or
legatees in the will. Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a
lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public.

A notary public’s commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It
is issued “within and for” a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public’s authority
is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts,
including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the
place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he, is not a notary
public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this
Court categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson, 61 Phil. 781 (1935): An
acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer’s jurisdiction
is void as if the person taking it were wholly without official character.

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless
the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were
transgressed in the execution of the alleged "acknowledgment." The compulsory language
of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of
the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty.
Directo were all completely void.

2. Pedro Garcia vs. Felipe Gatchalian, G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967

Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.

Compliance with the requirement contained in Article 806 of the new Civil Code to the effect
that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the
witnesses is indispensable for its validity.
An examination of the document (Exh. “C”) shows that the same was acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator, but not by the instrumental witnesses. As said document
does not comply with the requirement contained in Article 806 of the new Civil Code, it is
obvious that the same may not be probated.

3. Faustino Gan vs. Ildefonso Yap, G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this
opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, however,
to make this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation.
Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the
evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.

At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the
loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their
whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the
testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of
the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his
wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man
could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the
handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible
witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it,
and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will
having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the
oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not
at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages,
and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be
the most important ones, may go undetected.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing
the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in
court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at
hand.

Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial
judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the appealed
decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to
relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could
pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to
her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted so much to
conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries?
Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days
after the alleged execution of the will.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities
and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by
Rule 77, sec. 6.

4. Agapita Cruz vs. Judge Guillermo Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit, and “before”
means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit his having signed the will in
front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that
one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
witnesses. For then he would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud would be thwarted.

5. Marcela Rodelas vs. Amparo Aranza, G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can
be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate
of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested,
at least three Identifying witnesses are required.

However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available,
the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as
material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or
carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

6. Paula Dela Cerna vs. Manuela Rebaca Potot, G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

An error of law committed in admitting a joint will to probate does not affect the jurisdiction
of the probate court nor the conclusive effect of its final decision.

A final probate decree of a joint will of husband and wife affects only the share of the
deceased spouse and cannot include the disposition of said joint will, in so far as the estate
of the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de
novo.

Where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon the death of the husband said will
was admitted to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife dies
later, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband but
cannot affect the estate of the wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of
each testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the estate of the wife
should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary
heir, unless some other valid will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless
the testamentary heir is the only heir of said wife.

7. Felix Azuela vs. CA and Geralda Castillo, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950,
at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering
that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from
Section 618. However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of
interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of
the Civil Code states: “In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805.”

“[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate
of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except
by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself.” Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a
visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
witnesses signed in one another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw
since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the
will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in
requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the
absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed
to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in
the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages
which comprise the will.

At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of
the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to
prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery
or intercalation of notarial wills. Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in
impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself
had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will. The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the
Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s incontestable desires, and
not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from
the requisite that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses].” The
respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses
are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the
signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is
separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in
an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the
page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.

The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the
attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause.
Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every
page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances
reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not
the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page
thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also
hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that “every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses” has also not been complied with. The
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from
the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article
806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited
flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import. In lieu of
an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner
of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment
is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the
usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the
language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the
notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself “signed and
notarized” the document. Possibly though, the word “ninotario” or “notarized” encompasses
the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would
involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

Even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
“acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any
textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a
will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless
act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare
before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own
free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or
those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of
assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to
those persons he/she had designated in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under
Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn
to before a notary public.

8. Felicidad Javellana vs. Matea Ledesma, G.R. No. L-7179, June 30, 1955

The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was
duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of
the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix
and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed
without interruption (Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil., 643), or, as the Roman maxim puts
it, "uno eodem die ac tempore in eodem loco" and no reversible error was committed by the
Court in so holding. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not
contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge
the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

9. Bebiano Roxas vs. Andres De Jesus, G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of
the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the
liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in
case of doubt is to prevent intestacy.

Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
testamentary privilege (Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and
fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v.
Cartagena, 56 Phil. 282).

The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by
this Court in Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476) where we ruled that: “The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. x x x”

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and
fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no
question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is
also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix
agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by
the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because
the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of
its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the
only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

10. Marcela Rodelas vs. Amparo Aranza, G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

SUPRA.

4. Witnesses to a Notarial Will; Qualifications and Disqualifications (820-824)

Cases:

1) In the Matter of Petition for the Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia vs.
Natividad Garcia Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020

It is settled that “the law favors testacy over intestacy” and hence, “the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory.” In a similar way, “testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.”

The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due
execution or the extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of
Court. The probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition
of the estate by the testator. Thus, due execution is “whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law” as
mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the
attestation clause, “[t]he spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed
aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account,
may only defeat the testator’s will.”

Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, “[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code.” Here, the attesting
witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the aforementioned
qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from being witnesses under Article 821 of
the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time. As pointed out by
Natividad, these lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by knowingly signing a
document which they knew was forged or executed under duress; moreover, they did not
have anything to gain from the estate when they signed as witnesses. All the same,
petitioners did not present controverting proof to discredit them or to show that they were
disqualified from being witnesses to Consuelo’s will at the time of its execution.

In any case, as earlier stated, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in
which the properties were apportioned is not within the purview of the probate court. “The
court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on,
the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court — at this
stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.”

2) Margie Santos Mitra vs. Perpetua Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018

In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses
signed on each and every page of the will, except the last page. Such being the case, the CA
erred in concluding otherwise. There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805
of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental
witnesses on each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was
complied with.

It should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the
testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last page of the
subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at
the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where
the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the
last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere
continuation of the Acknowledgment.

As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause
renders such will defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque v. Naves Sioca, 43 Phil. 405
(1922), and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived such omission as a fatal flaw. In Uy Coque, one
of the defects in the will that led to its disallowance is the failure to declare the number of its
pages in the attestation clause. The Court elucidated that the purpose of requiring the
number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will
more difficult. In In re: Will of Andrada, the Court deemed the failure to state the number of
pages in the attestation clause, fatal. Both pronouncements were, however, made prior to
the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950.

Subsequently, in Singson vs. Florentino, the Court adopted a more liberal approach and
allowed probate, even if the number of pages of the will was mentioned in the last part of
the body of the will and not in the attestation clause. This is to prevent the will of the
testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.

The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which
provides that:

Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

Thus, in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that
the number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment.
In Azuela vs. CA, the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if
it is stated elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.

What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such
omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting
to extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of
the will itself." An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause
indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However, as was the
situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified
therein that the will is composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included.

3) Testate Estate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward Bellis, et al., G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country
and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of
Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that Texas
has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which
calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the Philippines.

In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the
same as our local conflicts rule.

The decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional
rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.

The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second
paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old
Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph
of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent must have been to
make the second paragraph of article 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied
in testate and intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is
governed by the decedent's national law.

Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congres has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has
specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article
16 of the New Civil Code.

Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs,
the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the
decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

5. Codicils and Incorporation by Reference (Arts. 825-827)

Pedro Unson vs. Antonio Abella, G.R. No. 17857, June 12, 1922

Though the general rule is that, if opposition is presented to the probate of a will, all the
attesting witnesses must be produced; nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit:
When one of the witnesses is dead, or cannot be served with process of the court, or his
reputation for truth is questioned, or he appears to be hostile to the cause of the parties
seeking the probate of the will. In such cases the will may be admitted to probate, if upon
the evidence actually introduced the court is satisfied of the due execution of the will,
inasmuch as even if said witness had been produced and had testified against the
application, the result would not have been changed, if the court was satisfied upon the
evidence adduced that the will has been executed in the manner prescribed by the law.

When in a will reference is made to an inventory of the properties of the testator,


which has thus been made a part of the will, if the will has an attestation clause
that meets the requirements of the law, no other attestation clause is necessary
for the said inventory, but that of the will will be sufficient for the validity both of
the will and the inventory.

Paging in inventory with Arabic numerals is in compliance with the spirit of the
law, requiring that the paging of a will be made in letters, and is just as valid as
paging with letters A, B, C, etc., under the circumstances stated in the case of
Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378).

6. Conflict Rules (Arts. 16 and 17)


Cases:

1) Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Judge Venicio Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860
and L-27896, March 29, 1974

Legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges’ will provide neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under
article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under article 863 thereof.
There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1)
predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter
to accept the inheritance, as required by article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the
estate or any part thereof for anyone else.

Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.”

The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.
It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned
and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during
his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter rivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis
causa, and all his right to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to
the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.

The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under
Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse,
consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving
ascendants nor descendants.

The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters in issue is, in the first
instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in
any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within
the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they
have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do
not claim otherwise.

When, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given
case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it
for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such
virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what
otherwise would be competent evidence on the point.

2) Juan Misciano vs. Andre Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this
point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute
an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence
in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed.

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it
must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second
clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor
by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with
it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the
will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,
and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern
it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly
valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national
law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of
this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one
of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

3) Testate Estate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward Bellis, et al., G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

SUPRA.

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