Carey Et Al. An Integrated Socio-Environmental Framework For Glacier Hazard Management and Climate Change Adaptation - Lessons From Lake 513, Cordillera Blanca, Peru. Climatic Change, 2012

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767
DOI 10.1007/s10584-011-0249-8
An integrated socio-environmental framework for glacier

hazard management and climate change adaptation:
lessons from Lake 513, Cordillera Blanca, Peru
Mark Carey & Christian Huggel & Jeffrey Bury &
Csar Portocarrero & Wilfried Haeberli
Received: 9 November 2010 / Accepted: 10 September 2011 / Published online: 23 November 2011
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract Glacier hazards threaten societies in mountain regions worldwide. Glacial lake
outburst floods (GLOFs) pose risks to exposed and vulnerable populations and can be linked in
part to long-term post-Little Ice Age climate change because precariously dammed glacial lakes
sometimes formed as glaciers generally retreated after the mid-1800s. This paper provides an
interdisciplinary and historical analysis of 40 years of glacier hazard management on Mount
Hualcn, at glacial Lake 513, and in the city of Carhuaz in Perus Cordillera Blanca mountain
range. The case study examines attempted hazard zoning, glacial lake evolution and
monitoring, and emergency engineering projects to drain Lake 513. It also analyzes the 11
April 2010 Hualcn rock-ice avalanche that triggered a Lake 513 GLOF; we offer both a
scientific assessment of the possible role of temperature on slope stability and a GIS spatial
analysis of human impacts. Qualitative historical analysis of glacier hazard management since
1970 allows us to identify and explain why certain actions and policies to reduce risk were
implemented or omitted. We extrapolate these case-specific variables to generate a broader
socio-environmental framework identifying factors that can facilitate or impede disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation. Facilitating factors are technical capacity, disaster
events with visible hazards, institutional support, committed individuals, and international
involvement. Impediments include divergent risk perceptions, imposed government policies,
institutional instability, knowledge disparities, and invisible hazards. This framework emerges
from an empirical analysis of a coupled social-ecological system and offers a holistic approach
for integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.
M. Carey (*)
Robert D. Clark Honors College, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
C. Huggel : W. Haeberli
Department of Geography, University of Zurich, CH-8057 Zurich, Switzerland
J. Bury
Department of Environmental Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street,
Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA
C. Portocarrero
Unidad de Glaciologa y Recursos Hdricos, Confraternidad Internacional Oeste #167, Huaraz, Peru
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1 Introduction
Scholars are increasingly calling for more studies that analyze the practices and processes
of climate change adaptation (Arnell 2010; Pfister 2010). Empirically grounded research on
actual cases of climate change adaptation would complement existing scholarship on
hypothetical scenarios, future projections, and theories of adaptive capacity. It would also
help illuminate how and why effective adaptation takes place (or doesnt), what facilitates
or obstructs the implementation of adaptive measures, and who participates (or doesnt) in
such processes. Climate change adaptation strategies and policies could also be improved
through a more rigorous connection with disaster risk reduction agendasthereby
producing more holistic or integrated approaches to both hazard management and climate
change adaptation (Birkmann, Tetzlaff, and Zentel 2009; Birkmann and Teichman 2010;
Mercer 2010; Thomalla et al. 2006). Recognizing the connection between climate change
and natural hazards, Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) is currently preparing a special report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX). A preliminary SREX
report (Barros et al. 2009) suggests that, although disaster events can be difficult to attribute
to climate due to interaction of climate with other environmental and socio-economic
factors, it is nonetheless expected that unpredictable extreme weather events are likely to
increase in intensity and frequency. Moreover, disaster risk reduction strategies have been
well developed and refined for much longer than climate change adaptation agendas have
existed; thus the tools, methods, and policies used for disaster risk reduction can enhance
climate change adaptation strategies over the short and long term (Barros et al. 2009). To
refine and improve both disaster prevention and climate change adaptation, it is important
to draw lessons from actual cases of disaster risk reductionespecially those cases when
climate change influenced the evolution of natural hazards, as this paper examines
(Amendola et al. 2008; McEntire et al. 2002).
To be most effective, these studies on actual practices of disaster risk reduction
and climate change adaptation must be inter-disciplinary to recognize and analyze
dynamic social-ecological systems (SESs) or coupled human-environment systems
(Folke 2006; Turner et al. 2003; Young et al. 2006). Human vulnerability, perceptions,
responses, and decision-making processes must be integrated with scientific assessments, technological innovations, and engineering strategies associated with hazard
management (Rosenzweig and Wilbanks 2010; Smit and Wandel 2006). Moreover, as
disaster research and planning has long recognized, there is no such thing as a
natural disaster, only natural hazards; disasters are socio-economic and political
because they involve people (Maskrey 1993; Wisner et al. 2004). Risk, then, is defined
by the combination of three elements: (1) the likelihood of a physical event occurring
(the natural hazard); (2) the degree of human exposure; and (3) the level of human
vulnerability (Barros et al. 2009; Thierry et al. 2008; Wisner et al. 2004). These
combined societal and environmental elements cannot be easily disentangled, and thus
effective disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation agendas require holistic,
interdisciplinary approaches.
The need to integrate climate change adaptation with disaster risk reduction is
particularly important in glaciated mountain regions, which are among the worlds most
sensitive and vulnerable areas to climate change (Beniston 2003; Gardner and Dekens
2007; Rosenzweig et al. 2007). Climate has a significant influence on the mass balance of
mountain glaciers, and the IPCC reports with high confidence that warming has led
both to a reduction in snow and ice masses and to the formation of moraine-dammed
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glacial lakes that can have a high potential for glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs)
(Rosenzweig et al. 2007: p. 86). In glaciated mountains and watersheds, climate
changeacting in combination with other environmental and societal factorshas
already caused notable, in some cases catastrophic, consequences as glaciers retreat
(Carey 2010; Clague and Evans 2000; Haeberli et al. 1989; Kb et al. 2007; Kb et al.
2005b; Richardson and Reynolds 2000). In particular, unstable moraine-dammed glacial
lakes have formed in sites where retreating glacier tongues created flat or overdeepened
spaces for lakes to form behind moraines (Ames 1998; Zapata Luyo 2002). The GLOF
risk emerges not only when the lake forms behind such unstable moraine dams, but also when
there are exposed and vulnerable human populations inhabiting valleys below these glacial
lakes. Other glacier-related hazards such as destabilization of steep glaciers and rock slopes can
occur in relation with increasing temperatures in firn and ice, permafrost thaw or debuttressing
effects due to retreating glaciers (OConnor and Costa 1993; Huggel 2009). Such rock
and ice avalanches from slope failures are particularly relevant with respect to glacial
lakes because they can generate displacement waves in the lakes and trigger GLOFs
(Kershaw et al. 2005; Haeberli and Hohmann 2008).
Research on glacier hazards has expanded into many areas in recent years,
including the identification and description of past glacier disaster events (Clague and
Evans 2000; Ghimire 2005; Haeberli et al. 1989; Kb et al. 2005b; Narama et al. 2010;
Richardson and Reynolds 2000), hazard assessment (Huggel et al. 2004; Kb et al.
2005a; Watanabe et al. 2009; Werder et al. 2010), mitigation (Grabs and Hanisch 1993;
Haeberli et al. 2001; Huggel et al. 2008; Reynolds 1993), perceptions (Carey 2007;
Cruikshank 2005; Jurt 2009; Orlove et al. 2008), vulnerability (Hegglin and Huggel 2008),
impacts (Bury et al. 2011; Carey 2010; Young and Lipton 2006), and adaptation (Carey 2005;
Kattelmann 2003; Orlove 2009). The vast majority of this research has been conducted by
environmental scientists in the areas of hazard identification and assessment. Social scientists,
however, are also increasingly studying glacier hazards in various world regions.
Nevertheless, the integration of the social and environmental sciences in climate change
and natural disaster research has barely occurred for the analysis of glacier hazards.
This paper provides such an integrated, interdisciplinary socio-environmental study of
glacier hazard management in Peru, with broader implications for disaster risk reduction
and climate change adaptation beyond the Andes. We call this a socio-environmental
framework because the more commonly used concepts of socio-ecological or socialecological systems (Folke et al. 2005; Young et al. 2006) tend to emphasize ecosystems,
natural resources, and biophysical processes, thereby inadvertently de-emphasizing
geophysical processes. The term environmental instead of ecological suggests a
broader concept that encompasses biological systems, climate, hydrology, and the
cryosphere. Our framework presented in the second part of this paper emerges from an
analysis of long-term GLOF prevention strategies at Lake 513 in the Cordillera Blanca,
Peruthe empirical case study that we present in the first part. On 11 April 2010, a rockice avalanche from Mount Hualcn crashed into Lake 513 and generated a GLOF that
destroyed property and infrastructure near the city of Carhuaz. This event was a surprise to
local residents, policy makers, scientists, and engineers because Lake 513 had been
partially drained during the 1980s and 1990s. Experts had thereafter classified the lake as
secure, with a low GLOF threat prior to the April 2010 event. Carhuaz had also been the
site for a hazard zoning program during the 1970s, when government officials tried to
reduce human exposure to potential glacier avalanches and GLOFs. The area has thus
undergone more than 40 years of comprehensive glacier hazard management that involved
various policies and engineering strategies to reduce the risk of glacier-related disasters.
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Given that the IPCC (Adger et al. 2007; Rosenzweig et al. 2007) links glacier shrinkage,
glacial lake formation, and GLOF threats to climate change, the case of Lake 513 is
also an example of long-term climate change adaptationeven though historical
actors and stakeholders emphasized glaciers, not climate, as the culprit, even though
climate never acted alone in creating either the hazard or the societal risk, and even
though we make no claims about whether the Lake 513 hazard can be attributed to
anthropogenic climate change.
The long-term successful efforts to drain Lake 513 and reduce the GLOF risk, on the one
hand, combined with the development of an unidentified threat above exposed people,
property, and infrastructure, on the other hand, makes this an excellent case to
empirically study and qualitatively identify the drivers and controls that facilitated and
impeded successful disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation over time.
Our ground-level empirical analysis demonstrates that disaster risk reduction and
adaptation to climate change are not one-time occurrences. Instead, they require
ongoing and continual adjustments, the acquisition of new knowledge, evaluation,
monitoring, mitigation, public education, preparedness, and open dialogue among various
stakeholders and decision makers.
2 Terminology
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines
disaster risk reduction as the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through
systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters. Reducing exposure
to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the
environment, and improving preparedness for adverse events are all examples of disaster
risk reduction (www.unisdr.org). UNISDR recognizes that there are natural hazards such
as earthquakes or droughts, but maintains that all disasters are social and political rather
than natural (also see Maskrey 1993; Wisner et al. 2004). The IPCC defines climate
change adaptation as actual adjustments, or changes in decision environments, which
might ultimately enhance resilience or reduce vulnerability to observed or expected
changes in climate and associated extreme weather events (Adger et al. 2007: p. 720).
There are many similarities between initiatives to reduce risk and adapt to climate change
(Mercer 2010), and both strategies target integrated socio-environmental systems while
focusing on minimizing the societal impact of environmental change and natural hazards.
Bridging disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation is particularly appropriate
for glacier hazards, and the IPCC Working Group II recognizes that adaptive measures are
being put into place in developing country contexts to respond to glacier retreat and
associated risks, such as the expansion of glacial lakes, which pose serious risks to
livelihoods and infrastructure (Adger et al. 2007: p. 721).
To date, however, there is a dearth of interdisciplinary studies that analyze the variables
that either facilitated or impeded the implementation of such measures to reduce the risk of
GLOFs and thus help adapt to climate-related environmental change in specific socioeconomic and political contexts. This paper provides such an interdisciplinary study of
glacier hazard management. We define integrated glacier hazard management as
measures that reduce the risk of glacier-related disasters. These measures could involve
the prediction of glacier hazards, the drainage or containment of glacial lakes to remove the
possibility of a GLOF, the minimization of the portion of the population exposed to glacier
hazards, and the reduction of human vulnerability. These various aspects of glacier hazard
737
management follow the UNISDR, IPCC, and other scholarship on disaster risk reduction
and climate change adaptation that recommend multi-level and integrated socioenvironmental approaches (e.g. Adger et al. 2007; Thierry et al. 2008; Wisner et al. 2004).
It should also be noted that this paper does not analyze whether glacier hazards are
caused by anthropogenic climate change because this is beyond the papers scope. When
we refer to climate change, we do not mean anthropogenic climate change, but rather just
changes in the climate system, whatever the cause. Climate change adaptation can and
historically has occurred even when it is not attributed to anthropogenic climate change.
Moreover, the link between anthropogenic climate change and disasters remains
inconclusive (Bouwer 2011). Glacier hazards in the Cordillera Blanca have existed for
decades and centuries, and the most destructive and deadly GLOFs for regional inhabitants
occurred between 1941 and 1950, in response to glacier retreat that began in the latenineteenth century (Ames 1998; Zapata Luyo 2002). Scientists have recognized the role of
climate on glacier retreat and GLOF threats in the Cordillera Blanca since at least
1940 (e.g. Kinzl 1940; Broggi 1943), but it was not identified as anthropogenic climate
change. In fact, while century-scale glacier retreat in the Peruvian Andes has been related
to climate change (Magrin et al. 2007; Rosenzweig et al. 2007), the exact climate-glacier
processes driving glacier shrinkage are not yet fully understood. Temperature-precipitation
feedbacks and humidity are important drivers of glacier mass balance in the Cordillera Blanca,
and on interannual time-scales sea surface temperature anomalies in the tropical Pacific and
ENSO exert important forcing (Kaser 2001; Vuille et al. 2008a). Relevant to this paper is that
climate change, whether natural or anthropogenic, is closely linked to long-term glacier
retreat, and thus to the formation of glacial lakes. The link between climate change and highmountain slope stability is more complicated, however, as climate is only one among several
other factors controlling slope stability. It is understood that atmospheric warming causes
permafrost thaw and an increase of firn and ice temperature on steep glaciers, decreasing
slope stability (Gruber and Haeberli 2007; Huggel 2009). However, clearly attributing a
particular high-mountain slope failure to impacts of climate change is hardly possible, even
with advanced mechanical slope stability modeling (Fischer et al. 2010). Nevertheless, studies
have found an increase of high-mountain slope failures in recent decades and established links
to contemporaneous warming (Allen et al. 2010; Ravanel and Deline 2011). However, a
detailed attribution study, either for the slope failure or the outburst flood at Lake 513, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
3 Methodology
This paper has two major sections: a case study of glacier hazard management at Perus
Lake 513 and a socio-environmental framework drawn from analysis of the case study that
identifies the most significant variables that facilitated or obstructed successful glacier
hazard management. The empirical case study presented in Section 4 has three
subcomponents. First, it involves a historical analysis of glacier hazard management from
1970 to 2010. This environmental history and science and technology studies (STS)
research involved the analysis of hundreds of documents (technical reports, newspaper
articles, testimonies, government reports, and legal documents), oral histories, and
published secondary sources to understand local perceptions and responses to hazards,
government policies, scientific and engineering recommendations, and the evolution of
glacier hazard management over time and within its relevant technical, political, economic,
and social contexts. It also involved an examination of published and unpublished technical
738
studies in order describe the changing physical environment on Mount Hualcn and at Lake
513 and the evolution of engineering strategies developed to reduce the GLOF threats.
Second, the paper describes and analyzes the 11 April 2010 Mount Hualcn avalanche and
ensuing Lake 513 GLOF. Field surveys have been undertaken at Lake 513 and along the
flood path of the GLOF days and weeks after the event, allowing us to reconstruct in detail
the rock-ice avalanche, its impact on Lake 513, and the resulting flood. Topographic maps,
high-resolution satellite images (see below) and repeated photographs were used to analyze
the conditions of the Hualcn flank and Lake 513. For thermal aspects of the slope failure
data from several meteorological stations of the region were investigated. Third, the 2010
event is also analyzed to understand the human impacts. To evaluate these effects, a mixed
set of methods were utilized that included analyses of recent government reports and media
coverage, key interviews with government and civil society representatives in July 2010, and
unstructured interviews with 10 households affected by the event . In addition, a pre- and postimpact GIS spatial analysis was conducted of the entire affected area utilizing high resolution
satellite imagery (Digitalglobe Worldview imagery, ~50 cm-June 1, 2010; June 2, 2005),
moderate resolution imagery (ASTER imagery, ~30 m-June 23, 2010; May 15, 2009), Peruvian
national mapping data and land parcel data from the Peruvian Special Land Titling and Rural
Cadastral Project (PETT).
The socio-environmental framework presented in Section 5 is a qualitative interdisciplinary analysis of the empirical case study. We identified certain factors that helped reduce
the risk of glacier hazards, and we assumed that the ideal or most successful form of glacier
hazard management would be to reduce risk to zero. We analyzed the historical documents
mentioned above and the recent socio-environmental aspects of the 2010 GLOF to
understand why certain decisions were made or challenged, why policies were created or
resisted, and why projects were implemented or not. We identify and present these factors
that influenced decisions, policies, and projects as a framework so that the variables can be
tested on other sites where disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation have or
may take place.
4 Cordillera Blanca case study

The Cordillera Blanca runs approximately 180 km northsouth in central Peru (see Fig. 1).
It contains more than 60 mountains above 5700 m, with Mount Huascarn (6,768 m) the
highest in the country. The glacierized area of the range in 2003 was estimated at ~569 km2,
and it accounts for approximately 25 % of the worlds tropical ice, making the Cordillera
Blanca the most glaciated mountain range in the tropical world (Casassa et al. 2007;
Georges 2004; Racoviteanu et al. 2008; Vuille, et al. 2008a). To the west of the Cordillera
Blanca is the Cordillera Negra mountain rangeand between these two ranges lies the
Santa River Valley, known in Peru as the Callejn de Huaylas. The Santa River runs
through the bottom of this valley and turns west at Can del Pato, cutting through the
Cordillera Negra before descending to the coastal plain and flowing into the Pacific Ocean
just north of the port city of Chimbote. The Callejn de Huaylas has many towns and cities
along the Santa River, including the Ancash capital city of Huaraz (pop. 96,000) and others
such as Caraz (13,000), Carhuaz (7,200), and Yungay (8,000) (Fig. 1). Approximately
267,000 people inhabit the Callejn de Huaylas, with a much larger population in
proximity of the Cordillera Blanca on the eastern slopes and in the lowland Santa
River valley (INEI 2007; Mark et al. 2010). Most Callejn de Huaylas towns and cities
are located along the Santa River, where Spaniards settled in the sixteenth century. The
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Fig. 1 Cordillera Blanca, Callejn de Huaylas, Santa River, Carhuaz, Mount Hualcn, and Lake 513, with
avalanche path and flooded area highlighted
rural upland population, usually categorized as more indigenous because of its Quechua
heritage, consists primarily of subsistence farmers and pastoralists. Class and race
divisions that date to Perus colonial era continue to divide segments of the population,
especially urban from rural, white and mestizo (mixed race) from indigenous, wealthy
from poor, lowland from highland, and coastal from sierra. Although Peruvians generally
refer to these rigid race and class divisions, the categories of course are not so distinct in
practice (de la Cadena 2000).
The Cordillera Blanca has produced some of the worlds most deadly glacier disasters,
and the urban areas, including Carhuaz, on the banks of the Santa River and its tributaries
have been the most exposed to GLOFs and glacier avalanches. A 1941 GLOF killed 5,000
people and destroyed a third of the Ancash capital city of Huaraz. Two more GLOFs in
1945 and 1950 caused nearly 1,000 deaths and destroyed ancient ruins at Chavn de
Huantar and a nearly completed hydroelectric station at Can del Pato on the Santa River
(Carey 2010). These catastrophic GLOFsas well as many others that were less
destructive, including two at Lake 513occurred because moraine-dammed lakes formed
when glacier tongues retreated after the end of the Little Ice Age (LIA) in the midnineteenth century. Despite some brief periods of glacier advances in the mid-1920s, late
1970s, and 1990s, there has been an overall trend of Cordillera Blanca glacier retreat and
loss of ice volume since the LIA ended: the glacierized area declined from approximately
850900 km2 during the LIA to less than 600 km2 at the end of the twentieth century
(Georges 2004; Racoviteanu et al. 2008; Silverio and Jaquet 2005; Vuille et al. 2008b).
This trend of glacier retreat has occurred in parallel with climate change, even though
the attribution of glacier shrinkage to a specific climate forcing requires more
research. Attribution is complicated both because glaciers are sensitive to numerous
climate forcings such as temperature, precipitation, and humidity and because tropical
740
glaciers behave differently than the more thoroughly studied mid- and high-latitude
glaciers (Kaser and Osmaston 2002; Vuille et al. 2008b). As Cordillera Blanca glaciers
retreated since the end of the LIA, dozens of precariously dammed lakes formed and
expanded behind unstable moraine dams. The steadily growing number and size of glacial
lakes perched precariously above exposed Callejn de Huaylas populations inhabiting
potential flood paths thus increased the risk of GLOFs (Ames 1998; Carey 2010;
Fernndez Concha 1957; Kinzl 1940; Lliboutry et al. 1977; Zapata Luyo 2002). As early as
the 1940swhich was many decades before any international discussion of anthropogenic
climate changescientists recognized that climate played a critical role in the development of
these Cordillera Blanca GLOF hazards (Kinzl 1940; Broggi 1943; Oberti 1973). Not all
Cordillera Blanca glacier hazards were climate related, however. The most deadly glacier
disaster was the 1970 avalanche that killed an estimated 6,000 people and buried the city of
Yungay (previous reports estimated 15,000 deaths); the avalanche was triggered by a massive
earthquake that killed 55,000 people beyond the avalanche victims and left hundreds of
thousands homeless (Bode 1990; Ericksen et al. 1970; Evans et al. 2009; Oliver-Smith 1986).
After the 1950 Los Cedros GLOF destroyed the Can del Pato hydroelectric station,
the Peruvian government established a still-ongoing GLOF prevention program that
involved extensive glacier and glacial lake monitoring and engineering projects to partially
drain and dam 34 Cordillera Blanca lakes (Ames 1998; Ames Marquez and Francou 1995;
Carey 2005, 2010; Lliboutry et al. 1977; Portocarrero 1995; Zapata Luyo 2002). The
Lakes Commission created in 1951 has undergone many administrative changes since
then, but it has continued its glacial hazard investigations, Cordillera Blanca
monitoring, innovative engineering projects, and disaster prevention programs ever
since. The institution is currently called the Glaciology and Hydrological Resources Unit
(UGRH: Unidad de Glaciologa y Recursos Hdricos). The regions tragic history with glacier
hazards, coupled with its many successful and ongoing programs to prevent GLOFs that stem in
part from climate change, make it an ideal site for studying an actual case of integrated disaster
risk reduction and climate change adaption.
4.1 Mount Hualcn hazard identification in the 1970s
Glacier hazards on Mount Hualcn and for the city of Carhuaz were first identified in the
late 1960s, when mountaineers noticed a glacier fissure 500 m long on the mountain. They
reported in Lima's El Comercio on 19 July 1967 that the glacier was on the verge of
breaking apart and causing a catastrophic avalanche that would crash into Lake Cochca or
Lake Yanahuanca and trigger a GLOF. The first systematic studies of Hualcn glaciers,
however, did not occur until after the 1970 Mount Huascarn avalanche. A UNESCO
delegation led by French glaciologist Louis Lliboutry concluded that glaciers and glacial
lakes throughout the Cordillera Blanca were unstable (Lliboutry et al. 1970). The report
noted specifically that Mount Hualcn could potentially produce both ice-rock avalanches
and GLOFs, especially if avalanches reached glacial lakesthe same process that triggered
the 11 April 2010 GLOF. To protect Carhuaz residents in 1970, the UNESCO delegation
proposed draining glacial Lake Cochca and relocating local populations outside the
floodplain. Government officials and experts proposed Huchac as the new site for Carhuaz
because, as they explained to the public on 12 November 1970 in El Comercio, it was
recognized as safe from both glacier avalanches and GLOFs.
In 1972, the Peruvian Division of Glaciology and Lake Security, a precursor to todays
UGRH, conducted its own glaciological studies of Mount Hualcn glaciers. Peruvian engineers
concluded that both rock and ice avalanches had previously occurred in the region and could
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occur again in the future (Divisin de Glaciologa y Seguridad de Lagunas 1972; Oberti 1973).
Glacier 513a was recognized as particularly unstable at that time because its glacier tongue
was covered with a large amount of debris, indicating frequent snow and ice avalanches. If an
avalanche reached Lake Cochca, which at the time held 900,000 m3 of water, a combined
avalanche-outburst flood could reach 4.8 million m3, enough to inundate thousands in
Carhuaz (Oberti 1973). Several mechanisms were identified that could trigger the event: long
term climate change, successive accumulation of snow and ice, significant temperature
variation within a single day, or an earthquake. Perus glaciology office lacked adequate
resources, however, to study and monitor these climatic, geologic, and glacial conditions. Nor
was there a mechanism in place to provide advance warning to residents in potential
avalanche and flood paths below. The Glaciology Division reiterated the need to relocate
exposed areas of Carhuaz along the Chucchun River to a safer site. Because the 1970
earthquake had destroyed many homes, buildings, roads, and other infrastructure that were
still not entirely reconstructed, relocation did not entail moving intact communities.
Local residents, however, rejected the proposed zoning laws, not only in Carhuaz but
throughout the Callejn de Huaylas. They resisted relocation plans designed to advance
long-term glacier hazard management because perceived political, social, and economic risks
overshadowed their perception of climatic or glacier hazards. Other studies explain these
reasons in detail (e.g. Bode 1977, 1990; Carey 2008, 2010; Oliver-Smith 1977, 1982, 1986).
By opposing relocation plans, Carhuaz residents became exposed to subsequent glacier
hazards when a new glacial lake formed at the base of Glacier 513a in the early 1980s. They
thus obstructed ideal disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation programs because,
as elaborated below, they remained exposed and vulnerable to hazards that developed when
the Glacier 513a tongue retreated and created a space for a new glacial lake to form behind a
precariously dammed ice-cored moraine.
4.2 GLOF prevention at Lake 513
The new Lake 513 on Mount Hualcn was first noticed as a rapidly growing, dangerous
glacial lake by the UGRH during routine Cordillera Blanca monitoring in 1980. Another
UGRH investigation in 1985 revealed that, as a result of considerable glacier retreat, the
Glacier 513a tongue had largely detached from the active glacier (HIDRANDINA 1990).
Its dead ice body filled a basin approximately 250 m wide and 750 m long. A glacial lake 120 m
deep had formed in the basin and was dammed mostly by solid bedrock except for the most
crucial upper lake level, which was dammed by a 15 m high ice-cored terminal moraine that
rested on top of the bedrock. By August 1988, the lake volume had grown to 1.5 million m3 of
water, which was estimated to be enough to inundate Carhuaz. The lakes moraine dam had
also slumped 4 m between 1985 and 1988 (at a rate of 1.3 m per year or 11 cm per month) as
its dead ice core melted. During those same three years, the lake depth had increased by 10 m.
The freeboard in 1988 was less than 1 m as a result of the simultaneous sinking dam and rising
lake level. Lake 513 was also draining both through filtration through the moraine and through
two springs that had formed below the moraine. Moreover, a wall of ice 1,700 m high rose
directly above the lake, and it generated daily avalanches that threatened to destabilize Lake 513.
Past experiences throughout the Cordillera Blanca and accumulated scientific knowledge
indicated that Lake 513 was extremely dangerous in 1988 (Kaser and Osmaston 2002;
Reynolds 1992; Reynolds et al. 1998). To prevent an imminent outburst flood, engineers
installed a siphon that pumped approximately 1 million m3 of water out of Lake 513. But
the lake level and freeboard did not diminish because new water entered the lake during the
19881989 wet season. Engineers thus installed a second siphon after securing private
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funding from Great Britain and Austria. Perus 2,000 % inflation at the time, combined with
intensifying Shining Path terrorist activities in the region, made work at the remote lake
challenging and cumbersome. Nevertheless, by June 1990, the lakes water level had been
lowered 5 m. A plan to lower the lake level much further was proposed, but before these
measures were implemented Lake 513 produced a GLOF in 1991. The flood was alarming
but relatively small thanks to previous engineering efforts that averted catastrophe. The
GLOF undoubtedly would have been significantly larger if engineers had not already
partially drained the lake. As predicted (HIDRANDINA 1988; Oberti 1973), the GLOF
originated when glacial ice slid into the lake. Displacement waves 2 m high overtopped the
moraine dam and initiated the outburst flood. Floodwater eroded a deep channel through
the moraine, but, fortunately, water dissipated across the upper-valley floor near the lake
and did not cause any loss of life in Carhuaz.
The 1991 GLOF motivated authorities to finance the final stage of the Lake 513 security
project. The objective was to lower the lake level 20 m so that it was dammed behind
bedrock instead of the moraine. However, the lead UGRH engineer had extensive
experience previously directing the Lake Parn drainage project (completed in 1985) and
understood that drilling a single tunnel 20 m below the Lake 513 water surface would have
created a dangerous situation: upon opening the tunnel to drain the lake, the flowing water
could have generated enough hydrostatic pressure to create a catastrophic flood. The lead
engineer thus knew from the outset to drain Lake 513 carefully and slowly. With funds
provided by the National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI), engineers drilled four tunnels
through the Lake 513 moraine dam and bedrock beneath it. Each tunnel was drilled below
the other to lower the water level slowly. By April 1994, the Lake 513 security project was
completed. Engineers had removed 46 million m3 of water, and the final 155 m long
tunnel brought the lake level down so it was dammed behind bedrock with 20 m of
freeboard (INAGGA 1997; Kaser and Osmaston 2002; Reynolds et al. 1998).
From 1994 to April 2010, Lake 513 was categorized as safe, with a low probability of
producing a GLOF event. Nevertheless, Lake 513, like other Cordillera Blanca glacial lakes,
was monitored to ensure its stability. A UGRH analysis of Lake 513 in 1997 concluded that it
was not dangerous due to the successful implementation of the 19881994 GLOF prevention
projects (Electroperu 1997). An independent report (INAGGA 1997) reiterated this
assessment of the dams stability but suggested that climate changewith the ensuing
influence on glacier retreat and ice stabilityincreased the likelihood of glacier avalanches on
Mount Hualcn. Because avalanches were impossible to predict, the report concluded, the
only way to protect Carhuaz residents was through hazard zoning. The suggestion was never
implemented. A few years later, a ten-year strategic development plan for Carhuaz did not
even mention glacier hazards. It thus did not recommend any future hazard zoning to protect
populations by directing future settlement or land use outside the areas exposed to potential
GLOFs and avalanches (CEDEP and Carhuaz 2004). INDECI (2004), on the other hand,
noted that there were risks of GLOFs, avalanches, and floods in the Chucchun River valley in
Carhuaz, but the report indicated that Lake 513 was unlikely to produce a GLOF due to
previous engineering projects. Residents, authorities, and UGRH engineers all believed Lake
513 remained safethat is, until the April 2010 avalanche and flood.
4.3 Physical aspects of the 2010 avalanche and GLOF
At approximately 8 am on 11 April 2010 a rock-ice avalanche involving bedrock material
detached from the steep SW slope of Mount Hualcn (6104 m above sea level [masl]),
starting at an altitude of about 5400 m (see Figs. 1, 2 and 3). Based on pre- and post-event
743
Fig. 2 Mount Hualcn (left) seen from Lake 513. Dashed line indicates the failure zone of the 11 April 2010
avalanche and the arrow the track of the avalanche impacting the lake. Lake 513 bedrock dam (at right) with
overlying moraine material that was overtopped by wave generated by the avalanche impact. The breach in
the moraine material formed by the overtopping wave is clearly visible at center. Circles indicate the location
of the artificial drainage tunnels installed in the early 1990s
high-resolution satellite images and terrestrial photographs, the volume of the avalanche is
estimated between 200,000 and 400,000 m3. The avalanche travelled over the steep surface
of Glacier 513 into Lake 513 at 4428 masl. The lake was impacted by the avalanche along
its longitudinal axes. Despite the 20 m freeboard at the time of the April 2010 avalanche,
Fig. 3 GLOF transformations from 1) erosion of loose morainic sediments, 2) deposition of sediments on
pampa, to 3) intensive erosion and sedimentation
744
the impact of the avalanche caused the bedrock dam to be overtopped. It is suggested that
the avalanche impact caused a push-wave that moved the entire lake volume in a strong
simultaneous displacement. The total wave height reached 25 m above the lake surface and
washed the moraine material on top of the bedrock dam away (Haeberli et al. 2010).
The overflowing volume of water may have been on the order of<1 million m3 and ran
down glacially polished bedrock in the steep upper part of Hualcn Canyon. Erosion in
loose morainic sediments started at an altitude of about 4100 masl, with deposition
occurring in the upper part of the flat Pampa de Chonquil around 3650 masl. Its further
trajectory intensively eroded the steep parts of Chucchun River below the Pampa de
Chonquil. The flow thus transformed into a debris flow with higher sediment concentration
and different flow rheology (see Fig. 3). Eventually, the outer parts of the city of Carhuaz
were reached and an extraordinary peak flow in the Chucchun River and Santa River in the
main valley persisted for about 16 h, covering 0.689 km2 of land based on field survey and
satellite images. This repeated transformation of the flood is not unusual for either GLOFs
or large, mixed ice-rock avalanches (Cenderelli and Wohl 2003; Huggel et al. 2005).
Flow transformations depend on a number of factors, including flow volume, channel
gradient and width, availability and grain size distribution of sediment. In terms of
hazards, flow transformations can be critical as they exert an important effect on the
extent of affected areas.
The avalanche detached from Mount Hualcns southwest slope, a high mountain flank
covered by steep glaciers and firn. Exposed bedrock in the detachment zone is present at
elevations below ~5500 masl. Field surveys showed that both bedrock and glacier ice was
involved in the avalanche, which thus formed a combined rock-ice avalanche. Slope
failures in glacierized mountains are typically a result of a long-term predisposing factors
and short-term triggers. Rock strength and structure, or slope geometry are among the
predisposing factors while permafrost degradation can gradually reduce the shear strength
of a slope, and earthquakes but also rapid (melt) water infiltration act as triggers of slope
failures (Huggel et al. 2010). The exact attribution of a specific slope failure to the different
factors controlling failure is extremely difficult, even with advanced mechanical slope stability
models (Fischer et al. 2010). However, it is often possible to identify important processes
driving slope instability. This also applies to the rock-ice avalanche from Hualcn. The slope
at the detachment zone is inclined at ~40 and rock type is granodiorite.
To better understand the thermal conditions of the steep glacier ice that failed and to
assess whether permafrost may exist in bedrock, we analyzed regional climate data. Longterm quality checked climate data are scarce in the Cordillera Blanca. However, for our
purpose we are primarily interested in data of recent years on mean annual air temperatures
(MAAT) at high altitudes. Feasible MAAT data were derived from long-term and
short-term meteorological stations between 3000 masl and 5000 masl, as described in
Georges and Kaser (2002), Juen et al. (2007), Racoviteanu et al. (2008), as well as from
five additional temperature measurements, taken by UGRH for subsequent years in the
2000s, at sites between 4100 and 4800 masl within a distance of about 50 km of Hualcn
(see Tables 1 and 2). A simple linear regression of elevation versus MAAT indicates a
lapse rate of 0.65C/100 m (with a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.98), which is in
agreement with other studies (e.g. Juen et al. 2007) (see Fig. 4). Using this data and lapse
rate, we estimate a MAAT of 2.5C0.5C at 5400 masl, the elevation of the failure site
of the 11 April 2010 avalanche. Based on that, the mean annual ground surface
temperature (MAGST) of exposed bedrock at this site with a southwestern aspect is
expected to around 2 to 0C (Gruber et al. 2004; Huggel 2009), i.e., in conditions of
warm permafrost. However, if we consider the three-dimensional topography, a strong
745
Table 1 Temperature changes in the Cordillera Blanca and adjacent regions over the past decades
Region/meteorological station
Observation
period
Temperature change
cumulative; rate
Reference
Tropical Andes, 1N-23S, 279 stations
19392006
+0.68C; 0.1C/decade
Vuille et al. 2008b
Central Peru (911S), including

Cordillera Blanca, 29 stations
at 20 to 4600 m asl
19511999
+1.95C; 0.39C/decade
Mark and Seltzer 2005
19621999
+1.01C, 0.26C/decade
Huaraz, 3038 m asl
19701999
+2.79C; 0.9C/decade
Racoviteanu et al. 2008
Recuay, 3394 m asl
19701999
+1.55C; 0.5C/decade
Lamalto, 4030 m asl
19701999
+0.93C; 0.3C/decade
thermal flux from the northern side towards the failure site is likely. From thermal
modeling studies it is known that such ridge situations are characterized by complex
thermal flux fields (Noetzli et al. 2007), in this case probably resulting in somewhat
higher MAGST than estimated above. A further thermal perturbation comes from steep
polythermal glaciers which can warm bedrock up to 0C. Complex thermal ground
conditions, such as those most likely found at the Hualcn failure site, have been
observed at a number of other failure locations of large ice and rock avalanches in Alaska,
the Caucasus, and the European Alps (Haeberli et al. 2004; Huggel 2009).
Recent climate change in the Cordillera Blanca has primarily been reported in terms of
increasing temperature: several studies provide evidence of warming in the Cordillera
Blanca over the past decades, but give different numbers for the rate of warming (Table 1).
Racoviteanu et al. (2008) indicated a rate of temperature increase of 0.3-0.92C/decade over
the period of 19701999 for stations between 3000 and 4000 masl, while Mark and Seltzer
(2005) found a rate of warming of 0.26C/decade (19621999) for stations of the Cordillera
Blanca and adjacent low-elevation areas. Over larger regions of the tropical Andes,
including high-elevation sites, an increase of temperature of ~0.1C/decade over the past
5070 years has been reported (Bradley et al. 2009; Vuille et al. 2008b). Studies on the
influence of recent warming on the high-elevation firn, ice, and bedrock ground
temperatures are missing in the Cordillera Blanca, but are likely similar as found in other
regions of the world. Especially relevant for slope stability is the decreasing strength of
steep ice at higher ice temperatures with possible transformation of cold to temperate ice, as
well as more frequent melting processes reducing shear strength at the base of steep glaciers
(Huggel 2009), and generally decreasing slope stability in relation with warming and
thawing permafrost (Gruber and Haeberli 2007).
Table 2 Additional reference values for estimates of mean annual air temperatures (MAAT) at high
elevations
Meteorological station; distance to Hualcn Observation period
Artesonraju, 4811 m asl; 28 km
MAAT
Reference
2004, 200709
1.8C This study
Jarhuacocha, 4076 m asl; 125 km
200509
6.6C This study
Uruashraju, 4693 m asl, 49 km
200508
2.7
Yanamarey, 4698 m asl; 58 km

Vallunaraju, 5000 m asl, 26 km
200405, 200809
2.1C This study
200001
00.7C Georges and Kaser 2002
Querococha, 3980 m asl, 62 km
19651994
This study
6.5C Juen et al. 2007
746
Fig. 4 Data from regional meteorological stations on mean annual air temperature (MAAT). Two linear
regression equations are computed, with Eq. 1 including data from lower elevation stations (open circles,
30003400 masl) and high elevation stations (>4000 masl), and Eq. 2 including only data from above ~4000
masl (filled circles). Coefficients of determination (R2) are in both cases 0.98. For the extrapolation of MAAT
to the failure site of the April 2010 avalanche from Hualcn at 5400 masl, we used Eq. 2 in order to avoid
climatic disturbance effects from the valley location of the lower elevation stations. Reference for data is
provided in Tables 1 and 2
In addition to long-term warming, seasonal and diurnal temperature variations, in

particular maximum temperatures, can affect slope stability in glacierized high-mountain
areas. Huggel et al. (2010) found that many slope failures in rock and ice around the world
were preceded by particularly warm periods days and weeks before failure. The critical
point is air temperatures above freezing, implying melting and infiltration of liquid water
into bedrock cleft systems and at the base of steep glaciers. We analyzed temperature
records at Yanamarey and Artesonraju stations at 4698 m and 4811 masl, respectively, ten
days before the 10 April 2010 rock-ice avalanche from Hualcn. These stations are located
2858 km from Hualcn and might provide an approximation of the local temperatures at
Hualcn, although the horizontal thermal homogeneity at higher elevations found in the
tropics (Juen et al. 2007) might be less valid for shorter time periods of hours and days.
Both temperature records show that maximum temperatures were consistently above
freezing up to 10 days before failure, reaching up to 8C at 5400 masl (extrapolated). While
such temperature conditions are probably not unique in the Cordillera Blanca, it is likely
that it implied melt water infiltration into rock clefts, with a destabilizing effect due to
processes such as hydrostatic pressure variations, refreezing at night with volume
expansion, or reduction of cohesion in ice-filled clefts (Hasler et al. 2011).
While this analysis does not directly allow any attribution of the April 2010 slope failure
to climate change effects, it should emphasize the possible role of increasing temperatures
for slope stability in temperature-sensitive glacierized mountain regions such as at Hualcn.
Risk reduction and adaptation measures must be able to cope with the currently prevailing
uncertainties related to limited knowledge of climate change effects on high-mountain slope
stability, in particular in terms of timing and location of slope failures. It is worth noting that
climate change effects on slope stability in cryosphere environments can thereby be effective
over the long-term (e.g. decade- to century-scale glacier retreat and debuttressing effects) or
short-term (e.g. very warm periods), and are typically overlaid on predisposing geological,
topographic, and other factors that determine the basic susceptibility of slopes to
747
failure (Allen et al. 2010; Huggel et al. 2010). In 2010 and 2011 several other rock-ice
avalanches were observed in the Cordillera Blanca, with seeming higher frequency than
during past decades. Although the historic documentation is incomplete and these recent
slope failures have not yet been studied in detail, they could be heralds of upcoming
increased slope instabilities which would be of particular concern, given the many glacial
lakes in the Cordillera Blanca that are prone to avalanche impacts.
4.4 Societal impacts of the 2010 GLOF
The 11 April 2010 GLOF generated by the Hualcn avalanche had significant impacts on
downstream households, infrastructure, agriculture, and livestock (see Figs. 1, 3, and 5).
During the actual flood and its immediate aftermath, widespread panic consumed the area
and a state of emergency was quickly declared in the communities of Acopampa, Pariacaca,
Hualcn, and Obraje (INDECI 2010a). Because the peak flow of the flood lasted for 16 h,
and it damaged or blocked several local roads and the major highway linking Carhuaz to
the rest of the region, there was significant uncertainty about the nature of the event and the
likelihood of further avalanches or flooding. Initial media reports indicated that a number of
people were missing or had perished, though these turned out to be incorrect. A preliminary
INDECI (2010b) report issued on 11 April estimated that the GLOF affected the life and
health of 100 people and either damaged or destroyed 22 houses, 90 % of the citys water
system, 100 km of highway, 110 km of irrigation canals, 35 ha of land directly, and 690
animals. The GLOF also affected a much broader population through damages to key
infrastructure such as the major highway in the Santa River valley, smaller connecting
roads, several bridges, and the disruption of public services. A follow-up report was issued
by INDECI (2010a) later in the day that revised the direct damage estimates. It stated that
Fig. 5 Area flooded and infrastructure impacted by 11 April 2010 Lake 513 GLOF, with comparative
representation of flooded area before and after event
748
the life and health of 100 people had been affected, eight structures had been damaged,
three bridges had been damaged or destroyed, and the potable water system had been
affected. In the immediate aftermath of the event, government authorities from the
National Food Assistance Program (PRONAA) delivered 1.2 metric tons of food and
supplies to households most affected by the debris flow and heavy machinery began
to clear debris and repair roads.
In order to examine both the direct and indirect social effects of the GLOF, field
research was conducted during July 2010 to examine the consequences of the GLOF
on the local population. Research methods utilized in the study included spatial
analyses using satellite imagery, a complete survey of the affected area with local
inhabitants and government representatives, key interviews with government and civil
society representatives, and unstructured household interviews with 10 people impacted by the
GLOF (see Section 3 for more information). Household interviewees were selected using a
convenience sample and the overall interview population represents 10% of the total population
classified by INDECI as either directly affected or victims. Overall, the spatial analyses of
satellite imagery, key interviews, and household interviewees illustrated the extent and
magnitude of the GLOFs impacts on household livelihood production strategies and factors
influencing human exposure and vulnerability to the event.
The entire GLOF event affected .689 km2 of land along the Chucchun River and
damaged infrastructure such as the regional water system, roads, bridges, and irrigation
canals (see Fig. 5). The extent of the affected area was digitized using post-GLOF 1 m
resolution Digitalglobe satellite imagery (red areas in Figs. 1 and 5). On the Chonquil
Pampa, the flood wave destroyed the municipal water collection system that served 90 % of
Carhuaz and the community of Acopampa; it had been constructed without completing a
risk assessment (INDECI 2004, 2010a). Municipal potable water service to these
communities was interrupted for 15 days, and fresh water supplies had to be delivered by
vehicle to emergency distribution points throughout the region. The flood wave also
damaged or blocked four vehicle bridges. One small wood footbridge that was not included
in the INDECI revised report was also destroyed. Unpaved roads were damaged in a
number of places due to flooding and landslides. INDECI (2010a) indicated that the GLOF
destroyed 100 km of roads. The post-GLOF imagery analysis indicated that only 2.69 km
of unpaved roads were either damaged or destroyed and one large landslide occurred.
However, because the flood damaged key access points in the regional road network, it
eliminated access to 20 km of unpaved roads above the city of Carhuaz and temporarily
blocked the regional highway that links all of the cities in the Santa River valley. Finally,
the flood damaged or destroyed approximately three kilometers of irrigation canals,
including the intakes for the Savior de los Afligados and Tauripampa canals, both of which
are important regional irrigation networks. Because the intake points for both canals were
destroyed, and large quantities of sediments flowed into the canals before they were
destroyed, INDECIs estimate that 110 km of canals were affected is most likely accurate.
In the immediate area of the water and debris flow, household-level impacts included the
complete or partial destruction of houses and structures. According to INDECIs (2010b)
final evaluation, 25 structures were affected by the GLOF, which is an accurate assessment.
In addition, agricultural landholdings, agroforestry reserves, and livestock were also
affected by the event, largely due to significant erosion of banks along the Chucchun River,
landslides, and the mixed debris flow of the floodwaters. Analyses of the post-GLOF
satellite imagery, parcel data from the Peruvian government, and field interviews
illustrated that approximately 5 ha of irrigated crop lands and 6 ha of agroforestry and
grazing lands were directly affected by erosion or debris deposition. Figure 5
749
illustrates the actual parcels that were affected in the lower reaches of the watershed and
they are coded according to the way households utilized them in the production of their
livelihoods (orange for agroforestry, yellow for agriculture). However, because the major
canals that serve the area in the upper watershed were damaged and many smaller canal
networks closer to the Chucchun River were also damaged or destroyed, the indirect and
longer-term agricultural impacts of the flood on agricultural productivity will likely be
much higher. Finally, interviewees confirmed that a large number of animals perished in
the flood. Several thousand trout were killed in one aquaculture farm and hundreds of
chickens, guinea pigs, pigs, and cows perished in the event. Interviewees further indicated
that the flood not only affected the extent and quantity of their current agricultural and
livestock holdings, but that the heavy deposition of barren and rocky sediments near the
Santa River and the interruption of irrigation water has affected the longer-term
productivity of their lands.
The sudden occurrence of the GLOF and the proximity of land, crops, animals, and
people to the debris flood clearly demonstrate societal exposure to natural hazards. Yet
other real and perceived factors further influenced their vulnerability. According to
interviews with local government authorities, the glaciers and lakes were not being actively
monitored and residents were not alerted until after the peak floodwaters had already passed
through the region. Interviewees affected by the GLOF indicated that they had only a few
moments to react and that the debris flow sounded like a jet airplane as it descended the
Chucchun watershed. Local government representatives also indicated that the event could
have been much more disastrous if the flood had been larger or the volume of water in the
lake was higher. Longer-term factors affecting human vulnerability to the event include the
presence of houses and infrastructure along the banks of the river, despite the fact that
it has been repeatedly classified as an area of high risk by a number of government
agencies (e.g. INDECI 2004). According to interviewees in the lower watershed, land
resources are held by individual property owners up to the banks of the river. Economic
capacity was identified as another factor influencing vulnerability in the area as many of
the houses closest to the river that were damaged or destroyed belonged to recent
immigrants to town or older residents with few resources. The affected areas utilized for
agriculture, agroforestry, livestock grazing, or aquaculture were identified by interviewees as
critical resources for household livelihood activities and the generation of income. The factors
influencing the presence of people, structures, agriculture, and animals in such high risk areas,
according to interviews with local government authorities, include a lack of communication
with local residents about the risks present in the area, the absence of effective public safety
programs, high levels of poverty, and the failure of municipal authorities to enforce
local zoning regulations.
5 Socio-environmental framework for glacier hazard management

Analysis of this Cordillera Blanca case studythe 40 years of studies, projects, and
policies at Mount Hualcn, Lake 513, and Carhuazmakes it possible to qualitatively
evaluate long-term glacier hazard management. We examine which measures were
successful or unsuccessful and explain how or why certain measures were implemented
or omitted. Our evaluation is based on an idealized conceptualization of risk reduction and
adaptation. Risk is characterized by the likelihood of a natural hazard occurring and the
degree to which people are exposed and vulnerable. Adaptation involves actual adjustments
made in response to observed or predicted changes in the climate system. Thus the ideal
750
glacier hazard management approachand, more broadly, an ideal disaster risk reduction
and climate change adaptation programwould involve various socio-environmental
components: having perfect knowledge to identify and predict hazards emerging from
environmental change; reducing the likelihood of those events taking place through
appropriate engineering strategies; removing all exposed populations, property, and
infrastructure from potential hazard zones; and decreasing vulnerability through political
and socio-economic measures that enhance resilience. While impossible or impractical to
achieve all of these, these combined elements provide a standard against which to evaluate
the actions that were actually implemented or omitted.
The following socio-environmental framework (Fig. 6) stems from this idealized vision
of glacier hazard management. Examining the 40 years of glacier hazard management, we
identified periods or actions that most reduced or increased the risk of glacial hazards. We
also explain why certain decisions were made or challenged, why policies were created or
resisted, and why projects were implemented or not. The analysis thus involves not just
identifying what was done to reduce glacier disaster risk, but also explaining why it was or
was not implemented. The framework has two components. First, it identifies the most
significant drivers and controls that either facilitated or impeded glacier hazard management
in this specific case study. These actions are listed in Fig. 6 as either implemented or
omitted in this Cordillera Blanca case. Second, it takes the specific factors that were
implemented or omitted and generalizes them into broader categories that either
reduced risk and facilitated adaptation or increased risk and impeded adaptation.
These conditions are listed as either facilitators or impediments in Fig. 6. The
empirical evidence and this corresponding framework enrich the understanding not only
of long-term disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, but also the limits of
adaptive capacity and resilience (Adger et al. 2009a, b; Arnell 2010; Eakin and Lemos 2010;
Gardner and Dekens 2007; Orlove 2009).
5.1 Factors facilitating risk reduction and adaptation
(1)
Technical Capacity. Although UNISDR and other researchers underscore the

ways in which disasters are more socio-economic and political than natural
(Lavell and Franco 1996; Maskrey 1993; Steinberg 2000; White 1974; Wisner et al. 2004),
risk nonetheless involves the physical environment that generates the flood,
avalanche, or earthquake. Consequently, science, technology, and engineering play vital
roles in disaster risk reduction, as well as in climate change adaptation. Environmental
Fig. 6 Integrated socio-environmental framework identifying factors that facilitate or impede disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation. The broader facilitators and impediments are drawn from the
specific conditions or actual actions that were implemented or omitted in the Cordillera Blanca case of
glacier hazard management at Mount Hualcn, Lake 513, and Carhuaz
751
knowledge, early warning systems, meteorological information, hazard maps,

building materials, and building codes all help protect societies and reduce
disaster impacts. In some cases of geoengineering and weather manipulation, however,
technological solutions for climate change can turn out to be more harmful than beneficial
(Fleming 2006; Harper 2008).
In the Cordillera Blanca, science and engineering contributed significantly to the
monitoring, studying, and draining of dangerous glacial lakes to prevent GLOFs during
the past half century. In fact, engineering efforts to partially drain and dam glacial lakes
has been the single most successful strategy for reducing disaster risk and adapting to
new environmental conditions (glacial lakes) created by glacier retreat and post-LIA
climate change. Accumulated scientific expertise allowed experts first to identify Lake
513 as potentially dangerous in 1985 and then to detect the precise point in 1988 when
it posed an imminent threat, not just a potential hazard. This classification convinced
engineers to initiate mitigation measures immediately. It also motivated the national
government to devote resources to the project and persuaded private donors in England
and Austria to support the lake drainage project. Imminent threats alone may not be
enough to inspire emergency responses, but at Lake 513 the imminent threat was a
critical factor driving the mitigation and adaptation project. The imminent threat,
however, was only recognized because of technical capacity that involved environmental
knowledge (science) and engineering experience.
This knowledge and experience was essential for safe and timely completion
of the Lake 513 drainage project. By the 1980s, the UGRH had already designed
and implemented a variety of engineering strategies to partially drain and dam
more than 25 Cordillera Blanca glacial lakes (Ames 1998; Elas Pizarro 1962;
Fernndez Concha 1957; Lliboutry et al. 1977; Trask 1953; Zapata Luyo 2002).
Building on this experience, experts recognized that they could minimize GLOF risk
by immediately removing water from Lake 513 using siphons. Their experience also
persuaded them to drain the lake slowly and safely using four progressively deeper
drained tunnels. Without detailed knowledge and experience from other glacial lakes
throughout the Cordillera Blanca, the Lake 513 mitigation project might have proceeded
differently, possibly with catastrophic consequences. Relevant engineering practices,
appropriate technologies, and specific local knowledge thus all facilitated glacier
hazard management and proved enormously successful. Nevertheless, the
occurrence of the 2010 GLOF suggests that knowledge was not complete and
risk had not been completely eliminated with technical capacity.
(2) Disaster Events with Visible Hazards. Disaster mitigation programs are often
reactive rather than preventative because early warning systems, building codes,
hazard zoning, and other risk reduction measures are frequently implemented only
after catastrophes (Amendola et al. 2008). Direct experiences with disasters can thus
inspire new programs to reduce risk. Additionally, some people are more likely to
support climate change adaptation initiatives if they have had direct experiences with
natural disasters (Whitmarsh 2008). Visual clues that clearly identify natural hazards
are also more likely to affect peoples acknowledgement of risks and their likelihood
of embracing disaster risk reduction programs (Burningham et al. 2008). But these
risk perceptions based on visibility and experience can never be divorced from other
factors, such as environmental conditions, economic constraints, political forces,
social relations, or cultural values.
In the case of Cordillera Blanca glacier hazard management, the combination of
disaster events and the presence of a visible threat created a sense of urgency to
752
implement GLOF prevention projects. But the experience and visibility of potential
avalanches and outburst floods affected authorities, decision makers, and experts more
than the local population who calculated risk differently (as discussed below). The
most decisive advances in glacier hazard management in the Carhuaz, Mount Hualcn,
and Lake 513 areas occurred in the immediate wake of avalanches and floods in 1970,
1991, and 2010. The 1970 earthquake and Yungay avalanche inspired the first systematic
studies of Mount Hualcn glaciers and led to the innovative but failed hazard zoning plans
to reduce future exposure to potential glacier avalanches and GLOFs. The visible
precariousness of the Lake 513 moraine dam compelled engineers both to initially drain
the lake using siphons in 19881989 and to later design the four-tunnel approach for lake
drainage (Reynolds 1992; Reynolds et al. 1998). The 1991 Lake 513 GLOF had a
notable impact on the completion of the lake drainage project because the flood justified
funding for the project and it was implemented soon after. Local officials also supported
lake drainage projects in the aftermath of the 1991 event, and one Carhuaz mayor even
became known as a friend of the lake for his support of disaster prevention projects,
but only in the immediate aftermath of the GLOF that visibly exposed the hazard. More
recently, the April 2010 GLOF event stimulated notable responses from UGRH
engineers, local residents, Carhuaz authorities, and international experts. Public town
meetings and workshops revealed a surge of support for studies and proposals to address
Mount Hualcn and Lake 513 hazards. Unfortunately, the local political support and
involvement has not continued with concrete community contributions; nor have local
residents seemed willing to discuss hazard zoning as a way to reduce disaster exposure
by restricting future settlement and construction within potential floodplains.
Visible hazardsand the corresponding publicity that often followscan inspire
authorities to respond to some degree. They will be held more accountable if the
hazard is known and public awareness spreads. Coverage of the 2010 GLOF, for
example, was widespread, with newspaper articles, satellite images, photographs,
blog discussions, and amateur videos of the floodwaters circulating on the
Internet. The UGRH also conducted a new study of Lake 513 and held an
international meeting related to climate change and glacier hazard issues more
broadly (Haeberli et al. 2010). The Lake 513 case reveals that experience with
disaster events and observable hazards can inspire management responses, though
they do not always convince local residents of the need to protect themselves from
natural hazards because these residents face a number of risks and make decisions
based on a complicated calculus of various risk perceptions (Carey 2008). In none of
these cases were Carhuaz residents motivated to move out of exposed floodplains
and potential avalanche paths, which would have of course involved substantial
costs and impacts on their livelihoods.
(3) Institutional Support. Social scientists have paid increasing attention to governance and
institutional capacity in their analyses of climate change (Adger et al. 2009a, b; Eakin
2006; Okereke et al. 2009). Institutions drive or hinder adaptation processes because
their presence (or absence) shapes decision making and project implementation. In
many cases, however, there tends to be a sluggish relationship between the scientific
findings related to disaster risk or climate impacts and the institutional responses to
those findings (Eakin and Lemos 2010; Paton et al. 2010).
The UGRH and its various antecedents dating back to the original Lakes
Commission in 1951 were critical drivers of glacier hazard management because they
possessed key personnel, experience, knowledge, equipment, and funding to carry out
successful glacier hazard management. The UGRH discovered Lake 513and dozens
753
of other unstable glacial lakesin 1980 because it routinely monitored Cordillera

Blanca glaciers and lakes. The institution provided logistical consistency and helped
channel national and international resources toward completion of the lake drainage
project. Even if the UGRH lacked adequate resources and technical personnel during the
late 1980s and early 1990s, a skeleton institution was far more successful at
implementing GLOF prevention projects than no institution at all.
Financing is another critical role that institutions can play by both providing funds in
the first place or by directing them to specific projects from diverse sources. While the
UGRH lacked adequate resources to immediately drain Lake 513 in 1988, it nonetheless
utilized its existing budget provided by the Peruvian government, the national energy
company Electroper, and the Callejn de Huaylas engery company HIDRANDINA to
detect and address the Lake 513 GLOF risk during the 1980s. First, institutional
resources were critical in the early 1980s to support investigations that discovered Lake
513 and monitored its dangerous growth. Then, UGRH resources helped fund the
installation of siphons at the lake in 1988 and 1989, which removed a significant
volume of water from the lake and thereby minimized destruction from the 1991 GLOF.
Even when funds were cut drastically during the countrys economic catastrophe in the
late 1980s, some GLOF prevention work at Lake 513 continued because of institutional
momentum (HIDRANDINA 1988, 1990). The UGRHs institutional apparatus also
facilitated the channeling of international funds from Britain and Austria to the Lake
513 project in 1989, which helped make up for declining government or energy
company support for glacier hazard management while the Peruvian economy and state
floundered in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
(4) Committed Individuals. Individuals can play powerful roles in disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation, even as responses are shaped by global
forces and an increasing number of local, national, and international stakeholders.
The initiation and implementation of projects depends on successful publicity,
funding, technical expertise, management, and public support. All four of these
aspects require, or significantly benefit from, committed individuals who go
beyond their regular duties to advocate vigorously for specific projects and
agendas. In the Cordillera Blanca, several committed individuals exhibited four
particular skills that facilitated glacier hazard management: technical expertise,
leadership/institutional diplomacy, fundraising, and community outreach. At distinct
points between 1970 and 2010, specific individuals relied on these skills to implement
measures that reduced the risk of glacier disasters (see Kaser and Osmaston 2002;
Morales 1972; Portocarrero 1980, 1995; Reynolds 1992; Reynolds et al. 1998).
First, technical expertise came from training, knowledge, and experience in glacier
hazard management throughout the Cordillera Blanca and abroad. On one level, this
expertise allowed scientists and engineers to identify Mount Hualcn glacier hazards
during the early 1970s and later discover and monitor the development of Lake 513
during the 1980s. The UGRH engineers who led efforts to implement Carhuaz hazard
zoning in the 1970s and who also monitored, drained, and dammed Lake 513 during the
1980s and 1990s had experience in the Cordillera Blanca since the 1960s. A British
geoengineer and University of Innsbruck glaciologist also offered critical technical
insights into the Lake 513 GLOF prevention project based on their Peruvian and
international experience with glacier hazards. They helped recognize the impending
danger from the lake in 1988, urged the use of siphons to drain it quickly, and then
recommended the slower drainage strategy with four successive tunnels that was
completed in 1994 (Kaser and Osmaston 2002; Reynolds et al. 1998). Second,
754
leadership and institutional diplomacy was important for achieving the significant
expansion of glacier hazard management initiatives during the early 1970s, which
required government support and funding. This was also when the glacier experts
persuaded the government to implement hazard zoning in Carhuaz. Although it ultimately
failed due to local opposition, hazard zoning represented an innovative glacier hazard
management initiative and was spearheaded by UGRH directors and engineers who
worked to secure regional populations (e.g. Morales 1972; Portocarrero 1980). These
engineers kept UGRH projects moving forward during Perus late-1980s socioeconomic and political crises, often due to tireless advocacy for risk reduction programs
and by building international collaborative relationships. Third, fundraising
efforts also helped reduce GLOF risks, and this is especially important in a
developing country like Peru. Some Peruvian engineers followed bureaucratic
channels to acquire funds, even during the late 1980s budget shortfalls, from
UGRH oversight agencies. Foreign experts pursued informal fundraising through
their embassies and among donors for the emergency purchase of the second
siphon installed at Lake 513 in 1989 (HIDRANDINA 1990). Fourth, publicity
and community outreach was important for glacier hazard management. The
glaciology division director boosted public and political support for the institution
during the 1970s (Bode 1990). To raise public and expert awareness of glacier
hazards and climate change, the UGRH director also held public town meetings,
gave public presentations, and organized a scientific workshop following the 2010
Lake 513 GLOF. Without these motivated and active individuals, GLOF prevention
projects at Lake 513 may have languished or failed. Their contributions to disaster
risk reduction transcended specialized knowledge and technical skills as they
exploited whatever power, political connections, and resources they could to win
public support and advance project completion.
(5) International Involvement. At certain points, international assistance helped
advance glacier hazard management. The 1970 UNESCO scientific assessment of
Cordillera Blanca glaciers and glacial lakes provided part of the scientific basis for the
Carhuaz relocation and hazard zoning policies attempted during subsequent years
(Lliboutry et al. 1970). International experts again provided critical support in 1989
when government funding for the Lake 513 drainage project evaporated
(HIDRANDINA 1990). The issue of global warming that has galvanized public and
scientific interest since the 1980s has also brought more international attention to Andean
glacier hazards, including from the European experts involved with the initial Lake 513
drainage project in the late 1980s (Kaser and Osmaston 2002; Reynolds et al. 1998). In
July 2010, an international workshop held in Carhuaz concerning Lake 513 and Mount
Hualcn glacier hazards demonstrated a collaborative relationship among local residents,
regional authorities, Peruvian engineers, and foreign experts. International contributions
to Cordillera Blanca glacier hazard management since 1970 thus helped reduce disaster
risk and promoted initiatives to lessen the potential impacts of glacier retreat and related
GLOF hazards on local societies. Yet research elsewhere (Anderson 2009; Harper 2001;
Sundberg 1998) also demonstrates how international scientists and experts can co-opt
local agendas or perpetuate colonial and postcolonial power imbalances. International
involvement, then, is not always beneficial to all stakeholders. International participation
can thus facilitate disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation as it did with
Lake 513 GLOF prevention, but the inherent power discrepancies that exist among
stakeholders in the developing and developed world could lead to the privileging of
certain segments of the population over others in risk reduction and adaptation efforts.
755
5.2 Factors impeding risk reduction and adaptation

Until recently, research examining impediments to climate change adaptation focused on
three broad areas: ecological or physical limits, technological limits, and economic limits.
But Adger et al. (2009a, b) demonstrate that these factors are too narrow because they fail
to consider endogenous factors and do not address the powerful role of risk perceptions,
culture, ethics, and knowledge. Orloves (2009) study of international responses to glacier
retreat focuses on other issues that can derail successful adaptation, including the multiple
impacts problem and the responsibility problem. Qualitative analysis of glacier hazard
management in the Lake 513 case reveals additional factors beyond these issues that can
thwart disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. These impediments in this
case include endogenous societal forces and limitations on scientific knowledge while also
including Orloves broader issues of responsibility and diverse impacts.
(1)
Perceived Risks. Poor and marginalized populations are generally the most
vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change (Brooks et al. 2005; Eriksen and
Kelly 2007; Steinberg 2000; Wisner et al. 2004). They tend to get pushed into
exposed areas, receive the fewest government protections, and lack resources to
prevent catastrophe or recover afterward. Yet vulnerable populations should not be
construed as passive victims unable to change or respond to the effects of climate
change. Nor will they simply embrace all new measures designed even for wellintentioned disaster risk reduction or climate change adaptation. Instead, all vulnerable
populationswhether U.S. entrepreneurs or Peruvian indigenous peopleconsist of
complex individuals who rank risks and weigh the potential impacts of adaptation
programs on their social standing, property, livelihoods, economic opportunities,
values, worldviews, and daily behavior (Etkin and Ho 2007; Jurt 2009; Paton et al.
2010; Slovic 1999). In the case in glacier hazard management in Carhuaz, some
residents viewed new risk reduction and adaptation measures with skepticism or
even disdain because they imposed new risks on them, such as decreased social (class and
race) status, loss of identity, eviction from homelands, diminished political autonomy, or
infringements on values and cultural emblems.
This discrepancy in perceived risks among locals and policy makers was a major
reason for failed Carhuaz hazard zoning in the 1970s. Residents were not convinced the
government would reimburse them for their property losses and pay for the relocation.
Further, the principal groups targeted for relocation in 1970 were the upper and middle
class residents who lived on alluvial plains at the confluence of the Santa River and its
tributaries flowing from Cordillera Blanca glaciers. But after the 1970 earthquake, many
urban survivors believed rural indigenous people were invading the cities and towns
to loot damaged properties and steal disaster aid such as food and clothing, which the
wealthier urban residents believed was not meant for the rural indigenous population
(Bode 1977; Doughty 1999; Oliver-Smith 1986; Stein 1974; Walton 1974). Relocation
of Carhuaz to an area outside the hazard zone not only threatened individuals but also
the towns political-economic position more broadly. Many in Carhuaz feared that the
time-consuming process of moving and reconstructing Carhuaz would give the
neighboring town of Marcar the opportunity to displace Carhuaz as the administrative
and economic center of the region (Walton 1974). Others opposing the relocation of
Carhuaz lamented the loss of specific places within the urban area that might not be
reconstructed in the relocated site: the Carhuaz market, churches, schools, sports fields,
government offices, and other public buildings. These structures not only served
756
utilitarian purposes; they also provided the community with a sense of place and stood
as emblems of the towns financial, administrative, and cultural hegemony within the
province (Vinatea Quevedo 2002). Hazard zoning thus created several new risks for
community members: economic and material losses, declining social (race and class)
standing, and abandonment of homelands.
These perceived social, political, and economic risks associated with hazard zoning
and community relocation outweighed any gains residents saw from the reduction of
avalanche or GLOF risk. In an ideal glacier hazard management agenda, populations
would have moved outside potential flood and avalanche paths to minimize their exposure
to these hazards. Variation in perceived risks thus impeded successful glacier hazard
management because people opposed hazard zoning and remained exposed to future
GLOFs, such as the 1991 and 2010 floods from Lake 513. Carhuaz residents who rejected
glacier hazard management plans, however, were adapting to a different set of social,
economic, and political changes seen as more pressing than environmental changes.
(2) Imposed Government Policies. Differences in risk perceptions are important because
defining risk is in itself an act of power: the way risk is framed simultaneously
suggests certain solutions to reduce risk (Slovic 1999). Local responses to natural
hazards and climate change must thus be situated within the broader political contexts
that inform decision making and risk perceptions (Jurt 2009). Additionally, people
often reject information about hazards and do not take scientific assessments or
government warnings at face value when risk reduction or adaptation initiatives
threaten their autonomy (see above; Paton et al. 2010). Local residents may even
oppose well-intentioned plans to reduce risk when such measures are imposed from
above or undermine local autonomy and power (Buchenau and Johnson 2009).
As discussed, many urban Callejn de Huaylas social groups viewed government
hazard zoning plans as imposed policies from Lima that threatened their authority
(Bode 1990; Oliver-Smith 1986). They favored other policies such as the highly
successful policy to drain glacial lakes throughout the Cordillera Blanca. But they
believed hazard zoning was a political tool that President Juan Velascos military
government (19681975) utilized to manipulate Peruvian society. Carhuaz merchants,
landowners, and ruling classes feared that relocation would fulfill Velascos broader
objective of creating a more egalitarian society by empowering farmers and
indigenous residents (Peru 1971). Because government authorities and engineers did
not first consult Carhuaz residents about relocation plans, the policy appeared to be an
imposed agenda meant to take land from wealthier populations and give it to the poor
(Walton 1974). Moreover, local and regional authorities never embraced hazard
zoning or pursued disaster prevention policies, thereby leaving glacier hazard
management in the hands of national government agencies and individuals that locals
historically distrusted. Some Carhuaz residents even believed scientific assessments of
Mount Hualcn glacier hazards were imposed on them (Carey 2010). They thus hired
their own scientists to conduct glaciological studies (Morales 1972). When these
scientists disagreed with the glaciology division, residents distrust of the national
government escalated and they rejected relocation. Imposed policies thus impeded
glacier hazard management because populations remained exposed to glacier hazards.
In 2010, however, the UGRH took steps to approach Lake 513 and Mount Hualcn
hazards through public dialogue, discussion, and involvement of Carhuaz residents
and authorities alongside UGRH engineers. Efforts to communicate openly with
communities and avoid top-down policymaking may facilitate long-term disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation.
(3)
757
Institutional Instability. While effective institutions can enhance adaptive capacity,

institutional instability or weak institutions can stifle disaster risk reduction and
climate change adaptation (Eakin and Lemos 2010). A lack of funds for equipment,
projects, and personnel, as well as the absence of technical oversight and project
guidance, can derail specific projects and limit the invention of creative solutions. In
the Cordillera Blanca, the UGRH supported hazard zoning in the 1970s. Moreover, its
successful lake drainage projects in the late 1980s and 1990s likely prevented a
catastrophic GLOF. But institutional instability and weakness slowed project
completion and has led to increased disaster risk over time. Management of the
UGRH shifted seven times among five different state agencies between 1973 and
1990, thereby continually altering the agencys mission, eroding public support, and
causing funding shortages (Carey 2010). The lack of continuous budgets had
significant effects on glacier hazard management. When the UGRH was under
HIDRANDINA in the late 1980s, for example, its annual operating budget fell from US
$437,663 in 1986 to US $53,512 in 1990, even though hazards remained (UGH 1990).
The institution then lacked equipment and personnel to conduct long-term glaciological
and climatological studies (HIDRANDINA 1988, 1990). Institutional instability thus led
to a diminished capacity for technical, scientific, and mitigation measuresand the lake
drainage period dragged on six years from 1988 to 1994. More widespread government
instability also affected popular opinions of the glaciology division and government
projects more broadly. In the last four decades, the Peruvian national government has
gone through elected democracies, authoritarian military governments, and the selfdeclared auto-coup of Alberto Fujimori during the 1990s. These changes have eroded
public confidence in state agencies, including the glaciology division, thereby
increasing vulnerability to glacier hazards.
(4) Knowledge Disparity. Knowledge disparity refers to limited knowledge and scientific
uncertainty as well as divergent knowledge systems that distinct social, ethnic, or
racial groups possess. The disparity thus pertains to knowledge about both human and
environmental systems. Adaptation under scientific uncertainties is a major subject
and under intensive discussion (Dessai and Hulme 2007; Fssel 2007). For the
physical systems determining GLOF hazards, we distinguish two different sets of
knowledge level and related uncertainties in terms of degree of uncertainty, timing,
and magnitude of processes. The first set of uncertainty refers to glacier retreat and
lake formation and growth. Research has documented twentieth-century Cordillera
Blanca glacier retreat and glacial lake formation, especially for the last three decades,
but with relatively little information on previous periods (Georges 2004; Mark and
Seltzer 2005; Racoviteanu et al. 2008; Silverio and Jaquet 2005). Inventories of
current location and extent of glaciers and glacial lakes are available at UGRH.
Juen et al. (2007) furthermore assessed potential future changes in runoff from
glaciers based on IPCC scenarios, but spatially explicit data on future glacier retreat
are lacking. In the Alps, methods are now developed to project the sites of future
glacial lakes using techniques of different complexity to assess ice thickness and
detect glacially overdeepened areas (Frey et al. 2010). This information implies
some uncertainty as to the timing and actual formation of glacial lakes. Nevertheless,
it is useful for expanding scientific knowledge and could be applied to the Cordillera
Blanca. The first set of uncertainty thus can be characterized by a comparably low degree
of uncertainty, with precise knowledge on current extent of glaciers and glacial lakes, and
techniques available to indicate approximate timing and dimensions of future glacier
retreat and lake formation and growth.
758
Higher degrees of uncertainty exist for the second type of knowledge, which is related to
slope instabilities such as rock slope failures, ice avalanches, moraine failures, or combined
events. Limited knowledge exists because of scarce climatic, glaciological, and geological
data in the Cordillera Blanca on the one hand, and a generally limited understanding of the
stability of steep ice and bedrock on the other hand. It is known that both long-term gradual
warming and climatic extremes (both temperature and precipitation related) can have
impacts on slope stability in temperature-sensitive glacier and permafrost environments
(Gruber and Haeberli 2007; Huggel 2009; Huggel et al. 2010). However, prediction of the
exact location and timing of slope failures is virtually impossible. As a consequence,
impacts from rock-ice avalanches on glacial lakes, such as was the case at Lake 513, are
difficult to predict, and combine with additional uncertainties related to the stability of
glacial lakes (Hegglin and Huggel 2008; McKillop and Clague 2007). Therefore,
knowledge is limited with respect to location and timing of potential GLOF events.
Within a socio-environmental framework for adaptation and risk reduction, a way to cope
with different levels of prevailing uncertainties is an improved monitoring program that
considers environmental change as well as social, political, and institutional conditions.
Important knowledge disparities also exist across human systems. As discussed,
institutional instability, shifting power dynamic, changing social relations, and varying
risk perceptions by different groups are difficult to predict and thus can impede the
implementation of appropriate adaptation measures. In the early 1970s, the extent
of local opposition to hazard zoning was not recognized in advance because no
one could predict the social conflict that emerged in the aftermath of the
earthquake and Yungay avalanche, which unleashed highly contested class and
racial politics in the region (Bode 1990; Oliver-Smith 1986). In 1988 and 1989,
when experts suggested warning locals about a possible Lake 513 GLOF, authorities
and some Peruvian engineers discarded the idea because it was unclear how locals
would respondwhether they would take the early warning seriously or whether it
would trigger resentment and rejection of government projects or engineering
strategies. The long-term institutional instability and corresponding shifts from
authoritarian to democratic governments created circumstances in which local
residents often, but not always, distrusted authorities. Over time, international forces
such as neoliberalism or environmental activism also affected Peruvian government
programs, making it difficult or impossible to predict future trends and priorities among
stakeholders. There is little effort, overall, to model human behavior, as opposed to
environmental processes, even ones as complex as global climate and circulation, in part
because human systems are so complex, which is to say unpredictable or uncertain. Thus,
uncertainty about human systems may be even more significant as an impediment to
glacier hazard management than limited knowledge about natural hazards or the
lack of high resolution data for downscaling climate models.
There is also disparity among diverse residents about what constitutes appropriate
knowledge to rely on for decision making. In the 1970s, for example, some Carhuaz
residents distrusted UGRH assessments of Mount Hualcn glacier hazards and
instead hired their own independent, non-government engineer (Morales 1972).
When he contradicted UGRH engineers and concluded that glacier hazards did not
exist, Carhuaz residents distrust of the national government and skepticism about
hazard assessment increased. The result of such suspicion emerging over competing
claims to accurate knowledge hindered glacier hazard management because
residents subsequently rejected hazard zoningand found themselves inhabiting
the potential flood path along the Chucchun River after Lake 513 expanded
759
dangerously in the 1980s. There are other aspects of knowledge discrepancies, such
as local beliefs about enchanted lakes or place naming in the Lake 513 area. Many
Callejn de Huaylas residents do not approach some Cordillera Blanca lakes for fear
that spirits could either suck them in or provoke a flood to inundate an individual or
community (Stein 1961). The place name for the area just below Lake 513 is
Acopampa, which is a plain where a floury drink (aco) was deposited, or
flooded (CEDEP and Carhuaz 2004). Both of these examples reflect alternative
views of potential lake hazards that differ significantly in expression from Western
scientific explanations. Enchanted lakes compel some to stay away from lakes,
while it is possible that Acopampa became the place name because a GLOF once
deposited its sandy or floury liquid on the valley floor. Overall, knowledge disparity
can generate uncertainty or distrust, even in cases where there is potential to
augment existing information through the incorporation of local knowledge
(Cruikshank 2005).
(5) Invisible Hazards. Even when potential climatic and hazard threats are identified,
experienced, or communicated to the general public, people often do not alter their
behavior to protect themselves (Burningham et al. 2008; Whitmarsh 2008). Research
suggests that when hazards can be easily conveyed through traditional photographs,
they are easier for the general public to comprehend than normal plan view maps, 3D
maps, or aerial photographs (Haynes et al. 2007). Visible hazards, especially when
combined with disaster experiences, can thus enhance compliance with risk reduction
and adaptation agendas. But the converse is also true: invisible hazards, even when
known and communicated to the public, are more likely to generate complacence than
observable hazards. There are thus two aspects of invisible hazards: first, invisible to
the public even though scientists have identified them and, second, unidentified
hazards. At Lake 513, GLOF hazards received relatively little attention between 1994
and 2010, in part because the freeboard was large (20 m) and the lake did not visibly
demonstrate dangerous conditions. Instead, the hazard existed underneath the glacial
ice high above the lake on Mount Hualcn. In this case, then, the post-1994 hazard
was both unknown and invisible, giving local residents and authorities, as well as
engineers, the impression that the lake was secure. Ideal glacier hazard management
would have continued scientific studies to understanding the changing environment
and the evolution of new hazards while also striving to keep minimizing human
exposure and reducing vulnerability.
6 Conclusions and perspectives

This interdisciplinary investigation of 40 years of glacier hazard management on Mount
Hualcn, at Lake 513, and in Carhuaz helps illuminate long-term processes of
comprehensive disaster risk reduction programs and adaptation to the effects of post-LIA
climate change that influenced glacier retreat and glacial lake formation. The empirical case
reveals a largely successful example of glacial lake hazard identification and lake drainage
projects at Lake 513. These initiatives minimized the impacts of GLOFs in 1991 and 2010.
But government efforts to reduce exposure to glacier hazards in the 1970s largely failed
because residents rejected hazard zoning. Moreover, with the rock-ice avalanche from
Hualcn, the 2010 GLOF event had a trigger that has been known from cases in other
regions of the world but whose impact was not fully accounted for in the risk reduction
measures at Lake 513. As outlined here, slope failures of rock and ice often have a thermal
760
component, such as long-term climate change or short-term temperature variations. However,

while it is likely that the high temperatures during the days preceding the Hualcn slope failure
had some influence on the avalanche, as for most other such slope failures, a direct attribution to
climate change cannot be made.
The qualitative analysis of these processes of actual glacier hazard management since
1970 reveals that some initiatives to reduce risk and adapt to the effects of climate change
on glacial lake hazards were successful and implemented, while others were rejected or
omitted. The case thus allows the identification of various factors that either facilitated or
impeded glacier hazard management. We present these factors not only as case-specific
variables affecting glacier hazard management, but also as a broader socio-environmental
framework for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. While this case
illustrates these factors as the most significant, other related forces such as public pressure,
the media, social inequality, and limited financial resources may also impact the course of
disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.
The specific drivers and controls presented in this integrated socio-environmental
framework demonstrate how collaboration across the natural and social sciences can lead to
holistic understandings of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Climate
models suggest future decades will bring pronounced, if not dramatic changes in glacierized
high-mountain regions such as the Cordillera Blanca. Changes may be beyond the historical
experience of local people. Projections suggest that some existing glacial lakes will
experience further growth, while others will form at new locations as glaciers continue to
retreat. Similarly, slope instabilities are likely to develop at new locations and may pose a
serious threat if impacting glacial lakesjust as the 2010 event has shown. To adequately
address and manage emerging risks, adapted strategies will need to be developed.
Such strategies must consider the risks posed by environmental changes and related
hazards, as well as the social, cultural, political and institutional systems. This paper
shows a way forward to link these social and environmental systems by analyzing the
main factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation of successful glacier
hazard management strategies.
The next step is to build new adaptive strategies based on these factorsstrategies to
identify new and existing hazards and to reduce human vulnerability to glacier hazards over
the long term. There is thus a need to expand the analysis of potential GLOF hazards from
the lower glacier margin and glacial lake dam to avalanche starting zones near mountain
summits above lakes. Long-term development agendas and community planning should
strive to keep people outside potential flood and avalanche paths. Relocation of existing
settlements may not be practical, but minimizing future exposure through land use planning
could help reduce risk. More research on the socio-economic costs of such development
plans is necessary, though most climate and hazards research tends to be done by natural
not social scientists. It is also vital to communicate hazard information to local people
through education and access to updated information, especially given the diversity of
perceived risks in the region. Installation of early warning systems may reduce disaster
impacts in the event of a future GLOF or avalanche. It may be necessary in this Carhuaz
case to construct a retention dam at the lower end of the Pampa de Chonquil. Many of these
suggestions require additional research and historical insights from this paper help
illuminate where challenges and successes may lie.
This case of long-term glacial hazard management has implications well beyond
Cordillera Blanca glacier hazards because the adaptive strategies outlined here also
apply to other cases of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. The
facilitators and impediments presented for this case likely affect responses to droughts
761
and hurricanes or sea level rise and epidemics. In the Andes in particular, the
projected water shortages from climate change and glacier retreat will increasingly
affect inhabitants in small communities and cities such as Lima, La Paz, and Quito
(Bradley et al. 2006; Juen et al. 2007; Kaser et al. 2003; Mark et al. 2005). If water
management plans evolve without recognition of the various variables presented aboveor if
they are carried out only among scientists, engineers, and policymakers without community
involvementthen effective adaptation measures will likely be difficult to achieve.
Implementing effective adaptive strategies will require an integrated approach that involves
an array of residents and stakeholders while building on enhanced knowledge of
coupled socio-environmental systems.
Acknowledgements This article is based upon work supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation
under grants No. 0822983, DEB 1010550, and BCS 0752175, and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation. We thank Christine Jurt and Stephen Evans for important contributions, Roosevelt Cerna, the
mayor of Carhuaz, the local communities for sharing their time with the researchers, and the Servicio
Nacional de Meteorologa e Hidrologia del Per (SENAMHI) for meteorological data.
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Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

An integrated socio-environmental framework for glacier

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

4 Cordillera Blanca case study

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Tropical Andes, 1N-23S, 279 stations

Vuille et al. 2008b

Central Peru (911S), including

Mark and Seltzer 2005

Huaraz, 3038 m asl

Racoviteanu et al. 2008

Recuay, 3394 m asl

Racoviteanu et al. 2008

Lamalto, 4030 m asl

Racoviteanu et al. 2008

1.8C This study

Jarhuacocha, 4076 m asl; 125 km

6.6C This study

Uruashraju, 4693 m asl, 49 km

Yanamarey, 4698 m asl; 58 km

Querococha, 3980 m asl, 62 km

6.5C Juen et al. 2007

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

In addition to long-term warming, seasonal and diurnal temperature variations, in

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

5 Socio-environmental framework for glacier hazard management

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Technical Capacity. Although UNISDR and other researchers underscore the

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

knowledge, early warning systems, meteorological information, hazard maps,

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

of other unstable glacial lakesin 1980 because it routinely monitored Cordillera

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

5.2 Factors impeding risk reduction and adaptation

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Institutional Instability. While effective institutions can enhance adaptive capacity,

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

6 Conclusions and perspectives

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

component, such as long-term climate change or short-term temperature variations. However,

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767

Climatic Change (2012) 112:733767