Political Question Doctrine

24 ThursdayMAY 2012

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Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, Aetna LIfe Ins. v. Haworth, Baker v. Carr, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
C.&S. Airlines Inc v. Waterman S.S. Corp, Davis v. Hildebrant, Decatur v. Paulding, Ex Parte Hitz, Forsyth v.
Hammond, Georgia v. Stanton, Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, In Re Baiz, Jones v. United States, Judicial
Restraint, Kendall v. United States ex Rel. Stokes, Kennett v. Chambers, Kiernan v. Portland, Kies v.
Lowrey, Los Angeles v. Lyons, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Luther v. Borden, Marbury v. Madison, Marshall v.
Dye, Martin v. Mott, Minor v. Happersett, Mississippi v. Johnson, Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., Ohio v. Metropolitan Part District, Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, political
question, Powell v. McCormack, Sovereign document, Standing, stands on the land, Taylor and Marshall v.
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United States v. The Three Friends, Ware v. Hylton

(For Frank ‘Austin’ England III)

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

AKA JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE

 PARTICIPATION IN ANY FORM OF THE FEDERAL FRANCHISE OF
“CORPORATE” POLITICS IS FATAL TO YOUR ASSERTION OF ONE
WHO STANDS ON THE LAND

An issue that the federal courts refuse to decide because it properly belongs to the
decision-making authority of elected officials.

THEREBY, REGISTRATION TO VOTE PREJUDICES YOUR ACCESS TO THE NATURAL

RIGHT AND AVOIDANCE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS, WHEREBY YOU BECOME A
SUBJECT (U.S. citizen) EXERCISING THE MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA. And thereby dead meat!

Political questions include such areas as the conduct of foreign policy, the
ratification of constitutional amendments, and the organization of each state’s
government as defined in its own constitution. The rule preventing federal courts
from deciding such cases is called the political question doctrine. Its purpose is to
distinguish the role of the federal judiciary from those of the legislature and the
executive, preventing the former from encroaching on either of the latter. Under
the rule, courts may choose to dismiss cases even if they have jurisdiction over
them. However, the rule has no precise formulation, and its development since the
1960s has sometimes been unpredictable.

The Supreme Court originated the idea of political questions in the early 1800s
during its formative era. As with other judicial doctrines created by the Court, the
rule is interpretive and self-imposed. It is neither a result of legislation nor a part
of the U.S. Constitution, although it appears to emanate from the
Constitution’s Separation of Powers. The Court created the political question
doctrine as part of the broader concept of justiciability—the issue of whether a
matter is appropriate for court review. Appropriate matters are
called Justiciable controversies and may proceed to court. Political questions are
not regarded as appropriate matters; they are not justiciable and, generally, will
be dismissed. The political question doctrine will not be applied to every matter
that arouses fierce public debate, as seen in the Court’s rulings
on Abortion and Affirmative Action. As the history of the Supreme Court shows,
the determination of whether an issue is justiciable is at its own discretion.
Chief Justice John Marshall first used the term political question in 1803 at a time
when the Court sought to tread delicately between warring factions of politicians
in Washington. Not until 1849 was the idea elaborated, in response to a crisis in
the state of Rhode Island known as the Dorr Rebellion: a political uprising had
resulted in the passage of two separate state constitutions, the declaration
of Martial Law, and the promise of military intervention by President John Tyler.
The Supreme Court was asked to settle critical constitutional questions about the
nature of republican government but refused (Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. [7
How.] 1, 40; 12 L. Ed. 581 [1849]). Chief Justice Roger Taney instead delivered
the first articulation of the doctrine: federal courts should leave certain
constitutional questions to the legislative and executive branches in any matter
that is “a political question to be settled by the political power.”

From the mid-nineteenth century until the 1960s, the political question doctrine
changed very little. Then the Supreme Court began to narrow it: where previously
a broad rule applied, now matters that would have been rejected as political
questions became justiciable controversies. In a landmark case in 1962, the Court
intervened to allow a challenge to the way in which the Tennessee legislature
apportioned its voting districts (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 663). Again, in 1969, the Court took up a matter that previously would have
been dismissed. This was its decision that the House of Representatives could not
exclude a duly elected member who met all constitutional qualifications, despite
the provision in Article I of the Constitution that gives both houses of Congress the
power to judge qualifications (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct.
1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491).

These cases cast doubt on the future of the doctrine. In 1974, the Court added
further uncertainty when it ruled against President Richard M. Nixon’s claim
of Executive Privilege in the Watergate scandal (United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039). It is well settled that the federal
courts cannot supervise or control the decisions of the president or other
executive officials. President Nixon had relied on this fact when he defied
congressional subpoenas asking him to release tapes and documents made in the
White House. The Court chose, however, not to adhere rigidly to the rule by
holding that the demands of a fair trial and criminal justice outweighed the
president’s claim.
Political Questions

It may be that the Court will refuse to adjudicate a case assuredly within its
jurisdiction, presented by parties with standing in which adverseness and ripeness
will exist, a case in other words presenting all the qualifications we have
considered making it a justiciable controversy. The “label” for such a case is that it
presents a “political question”. Although the Court has referred to the political
question doctrine as “one of the rules basic to the federal system and this Court’s
appropriate place within that structure, a commentator has remarked that “[i]t is,
measured by any of the normal responsibilities of a phrase of definition, one of the
least satisfactory terms known to the law. The origin, scope, and purpose of the
concept have eluded all attempts at precise statements. That the concept of
political questions may be “more amenable to description by infinite itemization
than by generalization is generally true, although the Court’s development of
rationale in Baker v. Carr, has changed this fact radically. The doctrine may be
approached in two ways, by itemization of the kinds of questions that have been
labeled political and by isolation of the factors that have led to the labeling.

Rescue Army v. Municipal Court fo Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 570(1947);
cf. Baker v. Carr, (1962) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). The most successful
effort at conceptualization of the doctrine is Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). See Hart &
Wechsler, supra at 270-294.

Origins and Development. —In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall

stated: “The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which
they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in this
court.”

But the doctrine was asserted even earlier as the Court in Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) refused to pass on the question whether a treaty had
been broken. And in Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 the Court held that
the President acting under congressional authorization had exclusive and
unreviewable power to determine when the militia should be called out. But it was
in Luther v. Borden that the concept was first enunciated as a doctrine separate
from considerations of interference with executive functions. This case presented
the question of the claims of two competing factions to be the only lawful
government of Rhode Island during a period of unrest in 1842 Chief Justice Taney
began by saying that the answer was primarily a matter of state law that had been
decided in favor of one faction by the state courts.

In Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), the Court, refusing an
effort by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to pay a pension, said:
“The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but
mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was never intended to be
given to them.” It therefore follows that mandamus will lie against an executive
official only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, which admits of no
discretion, and may not be invoked to control executive or political duties which
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867);
admit of discretion. See
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866); Kendall v. United
States ex Rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).

Insofar as the Federal Constitution had anything to say on the subject, the Chief
Justice continued, that was embodied in the clause empowering the United States
to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, and this clause
committed determination of the issue to the political branches of the Federal
Government. “Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily
decide what government is established in the State before it can determine
whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a
State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government
under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized
by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other
department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.
Here, the contest had not proceeded to a point where Congress had made a
decision, “[y]et the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.”
Moreover, in effectuating the provision in the same clause that the United States
should protect them against domestic violence, Congress had vested discretion in
the President to use troops to protect a state government upon the application of
the legislature or the governor. Before he could act upon the application of a
legislature or a governor, the President “must determine what body of men
constitute the legislature, and who is the governor….” No court could review the
President’s exercise of discretion in this respect; no court could recognize as
legitimate a group vying against the group recognized by the President as the
lawful government. Although the President had not actually called out the militia
in Rhode Island, he had pledged support to one of the competing governments,
and this pledge of military assistance if it were needed had in fact led to the
capitulation of the other faction, thus making an effectual and authoritative
determination not reviewable by the Court.

The Doctrine Before Baker v. Carr.—Over the years, the political question doctrine
has been applied to preclude adjudication of a variety of issues. Certain factors
appear more or less consistently through most but not all of these cases, and it is
perhaps best to indicate the cases and issues deemed political before attempting
to isolate these factors.

(1) By far the most consistent application of the doctrine has been in cases in
which litigants asserted claims under the republican form of government clause,
whether the attack was on the government of the State itself or on some manner
in which it had acted, but there have been cases in which the Court has
reached the merits.

(2) Although there is language in the cases that would if applied make all
questions touching on foreign affairs and foreign policy political, whether the
courts have adjudicated a dispute in this area has often depended on the context
in which it arises. Thus, the determination by the President whether to recognize
the government of a foreign state or who is the de jure or de facto ruler of a
foreign state is conclusive on the courts, but in the absence of a definitive
executive action the courts will review the record to determine whether the United
States has accorded a sufficient degree of recognition to allow the courts to take
judicial notice of the existence of the state. Moreover, the courts have often
determined for themselves what effect, if any, should be accorded the acts of
foreign powers, recognized or unrecognized. Similarly, the Court when dealing
with treaties and the treaty power has treated as political questions whether the
foreign party had constitutional authority to assume a particular obligation and
whether a treaty has lapsed because of the foreign state’s loss of independence or
because of changes in the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state, but the Court
will not only interpret the domestic effects of treaties, it will at times interpret the
effects bearing on international matters. The Court has deferred to the President
and Congress with regard to the existence of a state of war and the dates of the
beginning and ending and of states of belligerency between foreign powers, but
the deference has sometimes been forced.

As it was on the established government of Rhode Island in Luther v. Borden, 48

U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869);
See also
Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v.
Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913)(state
constitutional amendment procedure); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244
(1915)(delegation to court to form drainage districts); Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565 (1916)(submission of legislation to referendum); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917)(workmen’s compensation);
Ohio v. Akron Metropolitan Part District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930)(concurrence
of all but one justice of state high court required to invalidate statute); Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew 300 U.S. 608 (1937)(delegation of legislative
powers).

All the cases, however, predate the application of the doctrine in Pacific States Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See Attorney General of the State of
Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905)(legislative creation
and alteration of school districts “compatible” with a republican form of
government); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897)(delegation of
power to court to determine municipal boundaries does not infringe republican
form of government); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.(21 Wall.)164, 175-176
(1875) (denial of suffrage to women no violation of republican form of
government).
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); C. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); Kennett v.
Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852)

Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ex Parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884)

(3) Ordinarily, the Court will not look behind the fact of certification that the
standards requisite for the enactment of legislation or ratification of a
constitutional amendment have in fact been met, although it will interpret the
Constitution to determine what the basic standards are, and it will decide certain
questions if the political branches are in disagreement.

United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); In Re Baiz, 135
U.S. 403 (1890); Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964)

(Blog Masters Note: This document starts off in Austin’s normal style and ends in his style. But,
from “Political Questions” all cases, footnotes (that would hard to copy and place) and further
cases on the subject are online. So I will continue with the part that is strictly Austin. Do go to
the website and study further cases that are important.)

The Justiciability of Doctrines

Case or Controversy

Article III states that the judicial power of the federal courts extends only to cases
and controversies which arise under the Constitution, federal laws of the United
States and its treaties. This remains the overlying principle by which the courts
determine whether or not an issue is justiciable, and has led to the establishment
of the justiciability doctrines. These doctrines are used to determine whether a
case or controversy actually exists, and if one does then the issues are considered
justiciable.

Advisory Opinions
Since Article III mandates that the judiciary only has power over cases and
controversies, the Supreme Court has held that where a case or controversy does
not exist, the judiciary is not to issue any advisory opinion regarding the matter.
This prohibition against advisory opinions helps to serve separation of powers: by
not issuing advisory opinions, the federal judiciary is keeping the courts out of the
political process, and leaving that process solely to the discretion of the legislative
and executive branches. Additionally, by not issuing advisory opinions, the
judiciary is conserving its resources for cases that actually need adjudication.

Three basic requirements must be met so that the judiciary may hear a case and
issue an opinion that would not be advisory. First, the case needs to present an
actual dispute, not a hypothetical legal question. By requiring an actual dispute,
the judiciary is ensuring that any decision issued in the case is the final one
because it was based upon concrete facts and not upon some fanciful situation
which may not have presented a complete picture of the controversy. The second
requirement is that the dispute is between adverse litigants. Adversariness is
required to ensure that the case brought before the courts truly involves a
controversy that is in need of a resolution; if the opponents are not true
adversaries, then any issued opinion would be advisory. The last requirement is
that if a decision is issued in favor of the claimant, there is a substantial likelihood
that it would have some effect. In any situation where the opposing party could
ignore the ruling, then the opinion lacks finality and is in effect advisory.
Declaratory judgments are justiciable as long as they present a real
controversy. Declaratory judgments that meet these criteria are themselves
justiciable. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).

Mootness and Ripeness

Mootness and Ripeness both deal with the existence of an actual controversy;
mootness with whether the controversy has terminated, and ripeness with
whether it is ready for adjudication. A case will be declared moot if the defendant
dies during a criminal trial, if the plaintiff dies during a civil action and the action
does not survive the death (usually by statute), and if the parties settle between
themselves before a final judgement is entered. In these situations the issues are
no longer redressable. Exceptions do exist to the mootness doctrine which allow a
case to be heard: where secondary injuries exist that may be addressed by the
court; cases which involve a wrong that is capable of repetition and likely to evade
review; where an illegal practice has been terminated but it could be resumed at
any time; and in a properly certified class action suit.

Cases are declared not ripe because the injuries are either too speculative or they
may never occur. The rationale behind the ripeness doctrine is that a court should
not issue premature judgements based on abstract disagreements. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Ripeness typically arises when
pre-enforcement review of a statute is sought, at which point to considerations
are examined, and both must be present in order for an issue to be ripe. First, the
plaintiff must show that a hardship is likely to be suffered in the absence of a
judgement. This hardship could be caused by the law as it will eventually be
applied, by collateral injuries, or because compliance with the law causes the
hardship, and the only other choice is to break the law with the resulting
consequences of being prosecuted. The second consideration is whether the issues
are fit for a judicial decision. An issue that specific facts would assist in the
judicial consideration will be found not ripe, while an issue is ripe when it is
mostly a question of law, one which does not depend on context.

Standing

A determination that a person lacks standing means that person is not the proper
party to bring the issue before the court for adjudication. The Standing Doctrine is
viewed as a tool that promotes both the Separation of Power and judicial
efficiency. Separation of Power is achieved through limiting the issues the
judiciary hears, thus limiting review of the other branches of government. The
limiting of cases before the courts promotes judicial efficiency, and this limiting
also improves the decision-making ability of the judiciary through ensuring a
specific controversy and that an advocate with a stake in the outcome is present
to pursue the matter.

Four requirements must be met before a party will be granted standing in the
federal judiciary, all of which must be met. The first three requirements are based
upon Article III as Constitutional barriers to standing, and the last is an exercise
of judicial restraint which may be overridden by Congressional statute.
The first requirement is that the parties must be adversaries. This is shown
through the plaintiff having suffered or imminently likely to suffer a distinct and
palpable injury. A mere interest in the problem is insufficient to establish
standing. Therefore, the complaint must specifically allege that the plaintiff has
suffered or is likely to suffer a distinct injury. The injury may even be one of
aesthetic concerns, so long as it is personally suffered and is legally
cognizable. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Additionally, a
plaintiff seeking declaratory or injunctive relief must show a likelihood of injury in
the future. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Injuries which are
sufficient to satisfy this requirement have generally been found to be any injury
based on the common law and injuries based on a violation of the Constitution.
Congress may create adversariness through statute, but it cannot create standing
so that the public in general satisfies the statutory requirement. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). Along this same line of
reasoning, the Court will not permit an individual to sue the government on the
basis of being a taxpayer or forcing the government to comply with the law.

The second and third requirements are that the named defendant(s) be
the causation of the injuries and that the injury is redressable through the court.
The Supreme Court has declared that these are separate inquiries, but they are
very often examined at the same time. The plaintiff must show that the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant through a causal nexus linking the action of the
defendant with the injury. The link must usually be a direct one, without the
intervention of a third party. Where there is the intervention of a third party, the
court may find that there was no causation, or that the injury is not redressable.
In examining redressability, the court looks to the remedies sought in the
pleadings and examines those for the likely affect they would have on the injury.
When the injury depends on the actions of a third party, a court order will not
affect that party, and the injury cannot be redressed. However, an injury caused
by the defendant can be directly compensated for by the court.

See below for a detailed description of the judicial restraint requirement the
courts use to find an issue non-justiciable.

Political Question
An issue, even a Constitutional one, which the Court feels is best resolved by one
of the other branches of government may denied judicial review under the Political
Question Doctrine. These issues are generally political in nature, and the court
feels that the political system of accountability is the best mechanism to resolve
the issues, as opposed to a mandate from the courts. Often, these issues are
either given wholly to another branch of government in the Constitution, or there
is a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving it, or for a number of
other reasons. See Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). These principals
have been applied in such areas as the republican form of government clause in
Article IV, §4, foreign relations, and Congress’ control of its own internal
processes.

Judicial Restraint

Judicial restraint has two aspects to its nature. The first is the use of discretion in
granting certiorari, and the second is a set of prudential rules used to deny a party
standing in a particular case. Currently, the Supreme Court has the power to deny
certiorari in any case. Congress, however, has the power under Article III to
require Supreme Court review for any issue.

The prudential restraint rules focus on whether the plaintiff’s own rights are being
asserted, or whether someone else’s rights are being asserted. There is no general
third party standing, except in cases of the 1st Amendment and where a special
relationship exists between the injured party and the party asserting the right.
The special relationships which are permitted to exert third party standing are
very limited. A close relationship is required between the third party and the right
being asserted, such as an association which is closely tied to the claimed right or
a party which has a zone of interest encompassing the right. Congress may also
change any of these rules since they are not based within the Constitution.

So the message clearly is: “Come out from her and be ye separate . .

Babylon is the World System…… There is the Kingdom of God………..being the

Kingdom of Light……..
And there is the Kingdom of Darkness…….or the corrupt and bloody Kingdom of
this World…..

Isaiah 6:9……..And he said…….Go, and tell this people, Hear Ye……indeed, but
understand not…… and see ye, Indeed…..but perceive not…..

10…….Make the heart of this people fat….. and make their ears heavy….and shut
their eyes….. lest they see….with their eyes….and hear with their ears….and
understand with their heart……and convert, and be healed…..

Notice this…… 11……..Then, said I………Lord, How Long? And

he answered……Until the cities be wasted without inhabitant….. and the houses

without Man……. and the Land be Utterly Desolate,

12……And the Lord have removed men far away…….. and there be a great
forsaking in the midst of the land…….

13……BUT…..YET IN IT……SHALL BE A…..TENTH…. and it shall return….and shall

be eaten….. as a teil tree, and as an oak…..whose….substance is in them……when
they cast their leaves: so, the Holy Seed……shall be the substance thereof……

God is calling those of us who have the eyes and ears to come out of Babylon……..

Come out from her……. and be ye separate…… The calling out is in our
hearts……minds……

and spirit…..the new Birth… Having our minds renewed by the word…… and our
spirits cleansed from evil……

Ezra 9:2b…..So that the holy seed have….mingled themselves with the people of
those lands…..

Yea, the hand of the princes and rulers hath been…..chief in…..This Trespass……
II Corin.6:14…….Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers….. for what
fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath
light with darkness?

15……And…what concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath he that
believeth with an infidel?

16…..And what agreement hath the TEMPLE OF GOD…..with idols?

for….YE ARE THE TEMPLE OF THE LIVING GOD…… as God hath said….I WILL
DWELL IN THEM….AND WALK IN THEM….. AND I WILL BE THEIR GOD…..AND THEY
SHALL BE MY PEOPLE……

17…….Wherefore….Come Out from among them….and be ye separate… saith the

Lord…..and touch not the unclean thing…..and I will receive you…

18……And……… Will be a Father unto you…. and ye shall be my Sons and

Daughters….saith the Lord Almighty…..

7:1…..HAVING THEREFORE THESE PROMISES…..DEARLY BELOVED….. let us

cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the Flesh and Spirit…. Perfecting Holiness
in the fear of God…..

Rev. 18:4………saying….Come out of her….MY PEOPLE…..THAT YE BE NOT

PARTAKERS OF HER SINS……
and that ye receive not of her plagues…… God is calling us out of the……world….to
be a Holy People for His Name sake………

It really doesn’t matter if America is the City of Babylon…..or not….God is calling

us out…..To be a Holy People…..calling out of this world…

I John2:15…….LOVE NOT THE WORLD……..neither the things that are in the

world…… If any man love the world…..the love of the Father is not in him….

16……For all that is in the world….the lust of the flesh…and the lust of the
eyes….and the pride of life is not of the Father…..but is of the world…..
17…..And the world passeth away……and the lust thereof…….BUT HE THAT DOETH
THE WILL OF GOD………ABIDETH FOR EVER….

WHEREAS: A good place to begin as regards notice to “them,” is send “them” a

NOTICE of the rescission of your signature on any and all politically oriented
documents to the county voter registration regarding your erroneous federal
“voter” registration and thereby, indicate your intent to no longer participate in
the franchise political process, and be perceived voluntarily and knowingly
exercising the franchise of the corporate beast . . .

You can however re-establish your “Natural Right” to become an “Elector” within
you own county, and thereby, exclusively casting a ballot for your county officials;
and in particular, your Sheriff. The fraud lies in having to “vote” for a county
Sheriff by and through a federal franchise. You can see where the office of Sheriff
is co-opted by fraud in the inducement. There is more on this process in regard to
re-establishing the county “Electorate” in lieu of the federal “Voter”

Wherefore….Come out from among them….and be ye

separate… saith the Lord…..and touch not the unclean
thing…..and I will receive you…

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