Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

December 7, 1920
In re CARLOS S. BASA
Pedro Guevara for respondent.
Attorney-General Feria for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was
found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision
was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.  1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole
question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal
Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided
the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of
the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re  Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash.,
569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully
and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed
over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising
a career may not be utterly ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be
suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered. lawphi1.net

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

[ AM No. P-1356, Nov 21, 1979 ]

REMIGIO E. ZARI v. DIOSDADO S. FLORES
DECISION

183 Phil. 27

FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge
of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado
S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
"1.  Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q-7171), Branch IV, Court of First
Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00,
which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Official Receipt No. 4736418.

2.   Persistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in cases
pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my present
deputy clerk of court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.

On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon request of
the undersigned primarily to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores, which I strongly
disapproved of, and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer with unquestionable
integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten notes, he persisted in taking this
unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.

3.   Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong
and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated March 11,
1976."[1]
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was
required to file his answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case was transferred to the
First Division.[2]
The respondent filed his answer[3] on August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, that his
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then Commissioner Abelardo Subido, who
was also convicted of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had approved his appointment as
Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to
unduly influence the complainant in the discharge of the latter's duties and responsibilities; that while
respondent's language in his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the same could not be considered
contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the sentiments of an
aggrieved employee who deserves a better treatment from his superior after more than six years and
nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in the City Court of Quezon City; that if ever
respondent requested favors from his superior, these were all done in the spirit of friendship which the
complainant professed to him before he left Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City on March 9,
1976; that from October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March 8, 1976, the respondent was
practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored the complainant on the
fine interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge Zari who tried to corrupt him as may be
gathered from the following instances: On January 8, 1976, after the trial in Criminal Case No. VI-5783
vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the respondent to
conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise,
told the respondent to join him for lunch at Alfredo's Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after conducting
the ocular inspection, the respondent proceeded to Alfredo's Steakhouse where he joined Judge Zari,
Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel of Chua and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the
respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the ocular inspection of the site; that up to the time of
his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records of said criminal cases anymore; that in
Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the
respondent was instructed to convict both the accused because the complainant was a relative of a
certain Judge Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio
Villanueva Y Elazo, Dominador Garcia Y Orteza and Balbino Domingo Y Ramos, for the crime of theft,
he was instructed by Judge Zari to convict the accused Dominador Garcia Y Orteza because according
to said Judge, the complainant is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976,[4] this Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of
the respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the respondent that he had not allowed the
respondent to interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions; that while the complainant is aware
of his limitations, he is certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of the Philippine Bar to
"tutor" and give him finer interpretation of the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783
against Juanito Chua and VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before his court; that he did
not call the respondent to his chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal
constructions; that he did not invite the respondent for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the
trial, he went to Alfredo's Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that while in
the said place, the complainant was surprised to see the respondent in the company of the accused;
that he counseled the respondent to be more circumspect as these people had cases before his sala;
that it is true that from then on up to the relief of the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the
aforesaid case could not be found by the respondent because the complainant had the records brought
inside his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the respondent to manipulate the
records; that he did not instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal Case No. VI-166624
and in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the complainant is a relative of a
certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he requested Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix
his initial in all orders, decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint responsibility.[5]
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the respondent applied for the position of
Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted, among others, an affidavit
dated June 10, 1969 that contains the following statement "That I am a person of good moral character
and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record"; that the respondent also
accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 (1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then Judge
Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data sheet, the respondent admits having acted as counsel for
three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the
practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such persons have not
demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation,
report and recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and City Judge Aloysius Alday had
been allowed to inhibit themselves from investigating this case.[6]
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the investigation of this administrative case
recommended that the respondent be separated from the service on the following findings:
"The first charge is 'conviction for libel which is a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude'.

Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of the grounds for disciplinary action
is 'conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.'

Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the respondent was that on April 28,
1967 respondent was convicted of the crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00
which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.

'Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals. 1/
'Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral turpitude are adultery,
concubinage, 2/ rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 3/ criminal
conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof
of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses
against pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of marriage, 4/ estafa 5/ falsification of public
document 6/ estafa thru falsification of public document. 7/
'Moral turpitude' has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. 8/ It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
(1/   In re Abesamis, Adm. Case No. 77, Jan. 17, 1958.
2/   In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915.
3/   In Re Dalmacio de los Angeles, Adm. Case No. 350, Aug. 7, 1959.
4/   In re Basa, Phil. 275; See also In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263; July 31, 1962.
5/   Medina vs. Bautista; Adm. Case No. 190, Sept. 25, 1964; In re Venzon Adm. Case No. 561, April
27, 1967.
6/   De Jesus Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, 7 SCRA 954, April 12, 1961; In Re Avanceña
Adm. Case No. 407, 20 SCRA 1012, Aug. 15, 1967.
7/   In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. Cited in Martins, Rules of Court, Vol. 6, pp. 228-229.
8/   Tak Ng vs. Republic of the Phil., G. R. No. L-13017, Dec. 23, 1959.)
punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently im-
moral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 9/ Moral
turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality
lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited. 10/ Hence, the crime of illegal possession of firearm
or ammunition does not involve moral turpitude for under our laws, what is punishable is the possession
of a firearm or ammunition without a license or authority. 11/
'Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude.' 12/
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral
turpitude.
'The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander, against a municipal officer is not a ground
for suspending him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. 13/
When respondent submitted his application for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City
Court of Quezon City, he submitted among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969, which reads as
follows:

'That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and

(9/   41 C.J. 212.
10/  State Medical Board vs. Rogers, 79 S. W. 2d 83.
11/  See Opinion No. 210, Secretary of Justice, series of 1948; see also opinion of Secretary of Justice,
April 16, 1940.
12/  7 C.J. S. 736; 5 Am. 428; In Re de los Angeles, Adm. Case No. 350, Aug. 7, 1959.
13/  Burguetta vs. Mayor, G. R. No. L-6538, May 10, 1954; 50 O. G. 2447.)
have no administrative, criminal or police record.'
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question No. 10, which asked if applicant has
previously been convicted of a criminal offense, accused placed no. It was later discovered that
accused was previously convicted of theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of public document
under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal obligation to reveal previous conviction. 14/ However
he maybe guilty of perjury under Art. 183. 15/
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is 'falsification of
public documents.'

The second charge is 'persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue
interest in cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the complainant and
to his present Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.'

Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits 'F', 'F-1', 'F-2', & 'F-3'), he intervened for
and in behalf of Gaw Chin in Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the sala of the complainant
because the accused was a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.

On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was practically doing the work of the
complainant and tutoring him in the finer interpretation and application of the law, and he was preparing
the decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying to influence the complainant.

(14/  People vs. Poserio, C.A. 53 O.G. 6159.

15/   People vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255; Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 704.)
The notes marked as Exhibits 'F', 'F-1, 'F-2', & 'F-3' speak for themselves. There is no need for the
undersigned to quote the same.

'A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his wife the family of the judge before whom the
client's cause is to be heard, and to endeavor, in conversation thus to be had in advance of the hearing,
to commit the judge to an expression of opinion favorable to the client's case warrants his dismissal
from the bar. 16/
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 17/

The Third charge is 'discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested by respondent in calling for and
unjust use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the city judges when he wrote the letter,
dated March 11, 1976.'

To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit 'D':

'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of heart and have developed cold feet. You have
badly shaken my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are truly a woman, very fickle and unpredictable,
but very impulsive.'
'I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the sympathies and, if possible, like the other five
(5) judges, involved them in the mess originally of your own making and design and align them with you
against me, hoping to impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be convinced that mine is
a lost cause.'
'However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your conduct, you have dismally failed to live up to
your oaths, x x'
(16/  Exp. p. Cole, 6 F. Cas. No. 2793, 1 McCrary, 405.
17/   Sec. 36 (b) No. 27, PD 807.)
'Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of your wits when you all decided to lay the
blame on me and condemned without trial for the alleged inefficiency.'
'Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring under deep and nagging hallucinations,
induced and prompted by your serious concern to save the face of a colleague.'
'By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of Branches I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say the
public service in their respective branches is efficient, so that they could now come to the succor of a
colleague and are also competent to promote the efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is true, promo-
tions of Judges in the City Court would be fast, the Purge in the Judiciary would not have affected
Quezon City and the unprepared and the inexperienced would not have come to the Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in his letter was justified and
very much called for it being the indubitable manifestation of the indignation and disgust of the
respondent, urged upon him by the complainant who engineered the respondent's illegal transfer from
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a valid and subsisting appointment to the
Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit '43'), to quote the
pertinent provision of which;

'as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after due and circumspect deliberation by and
among the judges.'
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge under Administrative Order No. 6 of the
Supreme Court which provides as follows:

'To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another branch (sala) or to the Office of
the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the
Interest of the service requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in consultation with the
Presiding Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and in case of disagreement, the assignment of the
Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.'
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of the branch concerned who is the
complainant in this case.

'A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for
the detail, he may appeal his case to the commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the commission.' 18/
'An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. Pro-
vided: That such reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status or salary.' 19/
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee from one branch to the Office of the
Clerk of Court in accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court and in consonance
with PD 807.

(18/  Sec. 24 (g), PD 807.

19/   Ibid.)
'The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a
'Civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not;
in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as 'false, erroneous and illegal' and accusing
two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other
members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners
including the President -- constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It undermines and degrades
the administration of justice.'
'The language is necessary for the defense of client is no justification. It ill behooves an attorney to
justify his disrespectful language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client.
A client's cause does not perment an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that 'since lawyers are administrators of justice,
oathbound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.' 20/
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had committed insubordination, a ground for disciplinary
action. 21/
(20/  Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA, Jan. 9, 1970.
21/   Sec. 36(b) No. 25, PD 807.)"[7]
The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His
letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of
Quezon City[8] contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City
Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent
had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.[9]
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer.[10] However,
the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote to then
Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the
tendency of the respondent to malign people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City
presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary
measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969,
the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no
administrative, criminal or police record." This averment is not true because the respondent had been
convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a
sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for serious
disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the
investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice
to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or
agency including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this
decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 6792 - January 25, 2006]

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, v. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano
with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together
with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice
dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been
scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the
case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his
Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation,
which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-
84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,7 which
involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook
the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just
someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence
of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the]
Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by
his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking
pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the
accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when
the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was
about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held
on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car
and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on
his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked
them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he
was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck.
He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in
this case, Roberto Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter
to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a
taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent
filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto
Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be

disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter
also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the
instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who
was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer's contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of
the IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained
that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved
moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation
of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated
the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back
turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's
face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it
was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his
person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character
and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the
moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit
once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions
clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault.

We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he
betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the
road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a
simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His
overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual,
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a
person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy
his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.
We remind him that, both in his attorney's oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice.
He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him
probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to
complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has
taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which
is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by
the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with
complainant's family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it
appear that it was complainant's family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having
been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon]
does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking
and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little
damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant's version of the incident particularly when
he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns
duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice.
In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the
privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers
must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the
IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable - - lawyers in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious
members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant
case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and
wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a
lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession - - that every
lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement
for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances - not the mere
fact of their conviction - would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member
of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.