Textbook The American Exception 1St Edition Frank J Lechner 2 Ebook All Chapter PDF
Textbook The American Exception 1St Edition Frank J Lechner 2 Ebook All Chapter PDF
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the
american
exception
volume 2
Frank J. Lechner
The American Exception, Volume 2
Frank J. Lechner
The American
Exception, Volume 2
Frank J. Lechner
Department of Sociology
Emory University
Atlanta, USA
Both the preface and Chap. 1 in volume 1 explain the purpose and thrust
of this project. This volume completes it by analyzing exceptionalist claims
about the U.S. economy, government, media, and the military and foreign
affairs. Table 1 presents an overview of all the substantive chapters.
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Index231
List of Abbreviations
xi
CHAPTER 1
“People of Plenty”:
The American Economic Exception
As the first section of this chapter shows, many Americans have long
identified the “American Dream” of material success with a house and
yard in a suburban neighborhood; boosted by ample government sup-
port, housing became a key sector in the economy, with less-than-dreamy
consequences around 2008. The next section looks more broadly at the
design, fuel, and performance of the American growth machine, show-
ing by comparison how the country’s peculiar “variety of capitalism” out-
paced others until recently. The third part of the chapter returns to the
link between economic activity and national identity by asking how, or if,
the idea of a socially equal “land of opportunity” remained viable in a very
economically unequal society. The concluding section again broadens the
perspective by focusing on aspects of the economic impact the U.S. has
had in the world at large, both through economic competition and by set-
ting rules for the world economy.
1.1.1
Building the Dream in a Suburban Nation
Even before the actual founding of the United States, earnest colonists
thought hard about their homes, initiating the “continuing American
theme” of using them to express the values of a Tocquevillean demo-
cratic, socially equal community (Wright 1981: xv, 4). In the nineteenth
century, Gwendolyn Wright argues, the task of “defining the American
home” even became a “national mission” of promoting plain “republican”
homes to instill “democratic” virtue, paradoxically creating national unity
by fostering intense individualism in detached homes that reflected per-
“PEOPLE OF PLENTY”: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXCEPTION 5
sonal independence, family pride, and freedom of choice (Wright ibid. 75,
87–9). “A separate house surrounded by a yard is the ideal kind of home,”
said one preacher of the housing gospel (cited in Jackson 1985: 45).
“Unlike every other affluent civilization,” a contemporary author affirms,
“Americans have idealized the house and yard” (Hayden 2003: 4). Of
course, not all homes fit the democratic ideal—slave quarters suited owner
control, industrial housing served employer interests. By contemporary
standards, the homesteads idealized as truly American also left much to
be desired. In the Little House series of children’s books, for example, Pa
Ingalls builds homes that bake in the stifling Minnesota heat or let in the
snow of a South Dakota winter. But mundane obstacles did not dampen
Americans’ enthusiasm for pursuing happiness in homes and hearths of
their own, later labeled the “American Dream.” As Tocqueville noted,
material well-being, properly pursued, helped define what it meant to be
American. Housing was part of the larger project of America’s “second
creation” (Nye 2003), the way in which the new nation mastered nature,
cleared space, surveyed the land, and used its tools to build its cabins and
thereby its collective character. As its housing record shows, in America
prosperity and identity, economy and culture, were never far apart.
Because dense and dirty nineteenth-century cities made little room for
the house-and-yard dream, many groups looked for a way out as those cit-
ies grew. Across the river from Manhattan, for example, developers turned
Brooklyn into an early suburban haven for commuters who could use the new
steam ferries, and the borough’s population exploded from 1603 in 1790 to
over 800,000 a century later (Jackson 1985: 27). From the 1850s onward,
streetcar lines enabled Bostonians to settle miles from the old city center, in
culturally distinct and politically independent suburbs (Warner 1962: 1–2).
Why pay rent, asked Chicago marketers hawking homes, tapping into a long
American tradition to entice customers to buy in their new suburbs (Hayden
2003: 79–89). In the decades after the Civil War, especially the white middle
class escaped to the growing suburbs, into homes advertised as having “All
Modern Improvements” (including gas light and bathrooms!), where fami-
lies could find refuge and women their proper place—the “materialization of
what America was supposed to offer” (Wright 1981: 94–9). Werner Sombart
thought roast beef and apple pie stifled Americans’ revolutionary inclina-
tions; he might have added homes and yards to his list.
Already by 1900, that changed American life profoundly. Even as
new immigrant groups still settled in urban neighborhoods, other classes
kept their distance, literally and figuratively. Groups that once lived close
6 F.J. LECHNER
starts between 1946 and 1953 (Hayden 2003: 132). Among them were
thousands of simple new homes erected on a lima bean field outside Los
Angeles, which formed the new planned city of Lakewood, population
over 60,000 by 1960. Not far away, Anaheim, California, grew by more
than 100,000 residents just in the 1950s. On an even larger scale than in
the 1920s, Americans bought stuff for their new abodes: a car for com-
muting or shopping, refrigerators for the kitchen, TV sets for the living
room, and of course lawn mowers to maintain the yard—thus making
the suburban boom an economic engine for the new consumer economy
(Beauregard 2006). At the peak of its global power, enjoying a prosperity
that boosted the traditional self-image of a people of plenty, America was
in its cultural prime.
On the East Coast, the Levitt family firm played a major role, starting
its first creatively named “Levittown” in a potato field on Long Island,
New York, in 1949, later adding two other Levittowns in Pennsylvania
and nearby in New Jersey (Kelly 1993). Each community, created from
scratch, consisted of thousands of new homes on small lots. At first, buy-
ers could choose only variations on a single home plan, making the “Cape
Cod” design a staple of East Coast suburban life, and infrastructure was
barebones—the Long Island Levittown even lacked proper sewers. The
towns were all white: at least until the state of New Jersey intervened,
the Levitts tried to keep blacks out, and resident protests greeted a black
family trying to settle in the Pennsylvania Levittown. A bit dreary by cur-
rent standards, with treeless streets lined by similar wooden homes, the
Levittowns nonetheless appealed to families eager to escape cramped
urban neighborhoods in New York and Philadelphia. As growing trees
altered the sterile look, residents soon broke the Levitt mold by tinkering
with their houses, adding a room here, a gable there. More than a refuge
for white, upwardly mobile city workers, the towns actually attracted
different classes with different interests, religions, lifestyles, and educa-
tional backgrounds—for some, Levittown was a destination, for others,
a stepping-stone (Gans 1967). The initial lure of a sheltered residential
community later posed problems, for without much business activity,
Levittown, New York, had to endure high property taxes to fund local
schools, and lack of local opportunity made them “Leavittowns” for many
of the children who had motivated their parents’ move in the first place.
Though only by the mid-1960s a plurality of Americans lived in sub-
urbs, the 1950s boom already changed the face of the nation. Television,
which entered suburban homes in full force during the decade, conveyed
8 F.J. LECHNER
For literally nothing down … you too can find a box of your own in one
of the fresh-air slums we’re building around the edges of American cities
… inhabited by people whose age, income, number of children, problems,
habits, conversations, dress, possessions, and perhaps even blood type are
also precisely like yours. [The suburbs] are developments conceived in error,
nurtured by greed, corroding everything they touch.
came with air-conditioning, 23% had four or more bedrooms, 48% had at
least a two-car garage, and median square footage was 1545; by 2014, 91%
came with AC, 46% had four or more bedrooms, 85% had the big garage,
and median square footage was up to 2517, with 36% squeezing at least
three bathrooms into that larger space (HUD 2014). Its record earned the
U.S. the #1 spot on a 2016 index of housing quality in developed countries
that took into account rooms per person, basic facilities, and level of expen-
ditures (OECD 2016). Judging by such measures of material progress, the
American growth machine had been exceptionally successful.
they could unwind burdensome large bets while gaining equity. Global
investors facing low interest rates on bonds and looking for higher yields
created demand for the new mortgage-backed products, in the U.S. and
elsewhere. Recycled into American investments, billions of dollars earned
by the Chinese and in the Middle East helped to increase bond prices and
lower rates, enabling American financial risk-taking and indirectly juicing
homeowner consumption (Schwartz 2009). Due to securities innovation,
the people originating mortgages could easily pass them on, not having to
check on clients’ creditworthiness while earning high fees for their service.
Under existing rules, financial institutions could make big, potentially
very profitable bets on mortgage-backed securities with mostly borrowed
money. Other innovations, such as credit default swaps, stimulated mort-
gage trading by enabling investors to insure themselves against defaults.
Big banks engaging in such moves left themselves particularly exposed, in
both the U.S. and Europe (Fligstein and Habinek 2014). Not wanting
to be left out, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also loosened underwriting
standards, taking on ever-riskier mortgages (about a quarter of the sub-
prime total).
In the context of the time, chasing the financial dreams may have
seemed rational for every player involved. Repayment risk on the mort-
gages undergirding the stream of new bonds and derivatives seemed low.
In retrospect it is clear, of course, that when the music stopped, as was
bound to happen, many would suffer. Small signs of trouble, especially in
the subprime market, quickly caused a downward cascade. The creative
financing that had made the boom possible now triggered dramatic losses
for many institutions and investors. Even though as late as 2007 Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said that “we do not expect significant
spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the
financial system” (quoted in Blinder 2013: 88), perhaps for the first time
housing caused a major recession on a national scale. The housing bubble
was also a bond bubble, a real estate crisis also a financial system crisis, the
domestic implosion also a global disaster.
The sheer scale of the recession and the sensitivity of housing triggered
a forceful political reaction, which pushed toward still greater government
involvement in the economy. The Troubled Asset Relief Program spent
some $400 billion (net costs were lower) to shore up ailing banks and insur-
ance company AIG and to rescue troubled car companies; the GSEs were
put into “conservatorship” under the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
with Treasury support of about $200 billion; an Exchange Stabilization
“PEOPLE OF PLENTY”: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXCEPTION 13
(continued)
15
16
Sources:
2015 GDP (billions of dollars, current PPPs): stats.oecd.org, “National Accounts at a Glance,” accessed August 23, 2016 (China 2015: data.worldbank.org,
accessed August 23, 2016)
2013 GDP/capita (thousands of dollars, at current prices and PPPs): OECD 2015a (China: 2012 data, OECD 2014)
2013 GDP/capita, OECD = 100: OECD 2015a
2013 individual consumption/capita (dollars at current prices and PPPs): OECD 2015a
2014 GDP per hour worked (dollars at current prices and PPPs): stats.oecd.org, “Level of GDP per capita and productivity,” accessed August 23, 2016
1990–2013 GDP growth rates (average annual % per period): World Bank 2016
2000/2014 hours worked (average annual hours worked per employed person): stats.oecd.org, “Hours worked,” accessed August 23, 2016
2000/2014 labor force participation rate (15–64-year-olds): stats.oecd.org, “Labour force participation rate,” accessed August 23, 2016
2005–12 R&D as % of GDP, number of 2011 scientific and technical journal articles, number of 2013 patents filed by residents: data.worldbank.org,
“Research and development expenditure (% of GDP),” “Scientific and technical journal articles,” “Patent applications, residents,” accessed August 23, 2016
2012 energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) and intensity (GDP per unit of energy use in constant 2011 PPP dollars per kg of oil equivalent): data.
worldbank.org, “Energy use” and “GDP per unit of energy use,” accessed August 23, 2016
1900, 1950 GDP and GDP per capita (GDP in millions/GDP per capita in international Geary-Khamis dollars): Maddison 2003 (Korea 1900 GDP figure
is from 1911)
“PEOPLE OF PLENTY”: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXCEPTION 17
$5.7 trillion (WFE 2015). Out of the 100 wealthiest billionaires in 2015,
Forbes magazine reported in its annual ranking, 40 were Americans, includ-
ing the long-time richest man, Bill Gates; Americans were also overrepre-
sented in the overall club of 1741 billionaires, with several American families
(Walton, Mars, Pritzker) and sources of wealth (hedge funds, Microsoft,
Google) making multiple appearances. In the same magazine’s ranking of
global companies, several Chinese businesses reached top spots, but mea-
sured by market value five American firms (Apple, Google, Exxon Mobil,
Berkshire Hathaway, and Microsoft) came out on top in mid-2015, with
Apple for a time achieving the highest valuation ever, and Wal-Mart in first
place in terms of gross sales. Even some American corporations hit hard by
the previous recession did very well by 2015: Wells Fargo overcame chal-
lenges in finance to overtake the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China
as the #1 bank in market value, and General Motors, benefiting from a gov-
ernment-led reorganization that infused some $50 billion and extinguished
creditor claims, returned to the #4 position among car makers. The growth
machine also acquired new fuel as so-called fracking technology extracted
energy from shale deposits, quickly raising crude oil production from a low
of 10.6 quadrillion Btu in 2008 to over 20 quadrillion Btu in 2014 and
natural gas production from a low of 18.6 to 26.5 in 2014, even with explo-
ration mostly limited to private land and some states, like New York, pro-
hibiting the new methods altogether (EIA 2015). Becoming a top global
energy producer fit its exceptional consumption of energy—in both roles,
the U.S. ranked second only to China—as Americans were by far the highest
per capita energy consumers among developed countries and needed more
energy than Europeans to produce a dollar’s worth of GDP (see Table 1.1).
was ample (from the colonists’ point of view) and labor scarce, wages had
to rise to entice white workers, and their opportunities soon improved
to the point that one who made good reported to relatives, “it is a great
deal better living here than in England for working people, poor working
people doth live as well here, as landed men doth live with you” and a
Virginian already noted in 1622 that “any laborious honest man may in a
shorte time become ritche in this Country” (cited in Galenson ibid. 138).
Many workers became owners: high wages could be saved to buy land, and
before its demise the company started the “headright” system of granting
land to lure immigrants, later used throughout the colonies to foster wide-
spread land ownership. Of course, forms of ownership and labor control
varied across the colonies, with family farmsteads and free labor the rule in
Pennsylvania and New England, and indentured servitude and, fatefully,
slavery more common on southern plantations. Prime products varied as
well, from tobacco and rice down South to New England fish destined
for the West Indies and grain for southern Europe. By current standards,
colonial growth may have been modest and conditions harsh, yet at the
time of the Revolution nonhuman private physical wealth per free man had
already risen to some 222 pounds sterling (or perhaps $12,000 in 1978
dollars) and “the disposable incomes of Americans were surely the highest
in the world,” which helped (white) American men attain superior, near-
modern physical stature of 5′8″ on average—showing that, if nothing else,
Americans ate better (Jones 1980: 58–61; Hughes and Cain 1998: 48;
Sokoloff and Villaflor 1982). By the standards of the era, in fact, the colo-
nies may have devised an early version of the growth machine: annual real
product per capita growth rates in the 1700s of between 0.3% and 0.5%,
with a population growing by about 3% per year, helped to make “the
economic and demographic accomplishments of the colonies of English
America … one of the most dramatic success stories of the preindustrial
world” (Galenson ibid. 207).
In building its empire of wealth, the U.S. demonstrated the power of
growth by addition: from the 1770s to the early 1900s, land and water
under U.S. control grew to over 3 million square miles, the labor force
expanded by a factor of 48 and the stock of capital 388-fold (Gallman
1996: 13). Agriculture, long the largest sector in the economy, showed
the fruits of that addition, as wheat and corn output went from 72 and
70 million bushels, respectively, in 1839, to 399 and 404 million bush-
els just four decades later; since that far outpaced population growth,
Americans by the century’s end ate still better than they had in the 1770s
“PEOPLE OF PLENTY”: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXCEPTION 19