Wise and Co., Inc. vs. Wise and Co., Inc. Employees Union, G. R. No. 87672, Oct. 13, 1989

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
WISE AND CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R. No. 87672

October 13, 1989
WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNIONNATU

AND
HONORABLE
BIENVENIDO G. LAGUESMA, in his
capacity as voluntary Arbitrator,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The center of controversy in this petition is whether the grant by
management of profit sharing benefits to its non-union member
employees is discriminatory against its workers who are union
members.
chanroblespublishingcompany
The facts are undisputed. On April 3, 1987 the management issued a

memorandum circular introducing a profit sharing scheme for its
managers and supervisors the initial distribution of which was to take
effect March 31, 1988.
On July 3, 1987 the respondent union wrote petitioner through its

president asking for participation in this scheme. This was denied by
petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by the

parties of the CBA which was due to expire on April 30, 1988. The
negotiation thus begun earlier than the freedom period. On
November 11, 1987 petitioner wrote respondent union advising the
latter that they were prepared to consider including the employees
covered by the CBA in the profit sharing scheme beginning the year
1987 provided that the ongoing negotiations were concluded prior to
December 1987. However, the collective bargaining negotiations
reached a deadlock on the issue of the scope of the bargaining unit.
Conciliation efforts to settle the dispute on 29 March 1988 were made
but no settlement was reached.
On March 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit

not only to managers and supervisors but also to all other rank and
file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused the respondent
union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner was guilty of
unfair labor practice because the union members were discriminated
against in the grant of the profit sharing benefits. Consequently,
management refused to proceed with the CBA negotiations unless the
last notice of strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone
discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was
concluded. After a series of conciliation conferences, the parties
agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration. After the
parties submitted their position papers, a rejoinder and reply, on
March 20, 1989 the voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering
petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing
scheme to the members of respondent union.[1] Hence, this petition
wherein petitioner alleged the following grounds in support thereof
I
THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ORDERED
THE EXTENSION OF PROFIT SHARING BENEFITS TO
THOSE EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CBA DESPITE

PATENT LACK OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR
IN THAT
1. DISCRIMINATION PER SE IS NOT UNLAWFUL
ESPECIALLY WHEN THE EMPLOYEES ARE NOT
SIMILARLY SITUATED.
2. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN
THE CBA HAVE THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A
LAW
BETWEEN
THE
PARTIES.
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, THEREFORE CANNOT DEMAND, AS
A MATTER OF RIGHT, WHAT IS NOT STIPULATED
IN THE CBA.
3. THE ACT OF THE UNION IN NEGOTIATING FOR

THE INCLUSION OF THE PROFIT SHARING
BENEFIT IN THE PRESENT CBA IS AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION THAT THEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
IT IN 1987.
II
THE
HONORABLE
VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE MADE
THE CLEARLY BASELESS CONCLUSION THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS MOTIVATED BY ITS DESIRE TO DEFEAT
OR OTHERWISE PREJUDICE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.[2]
The petition is impressed with merit.

Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from
May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1988 it was agreed that the bargaining unit
covered by the CBA consists of all regular or permanent employees,
below the rank of assistant supervisor.[3] Also expressly excluded
from the term appropriate bargaining unit are all regular rank and
file employees in the office of the president, vice-president, and the
other offices of the company personnel office, security office,

corporate affairs office, accounting and treasury department.[4]
It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the bargaining

unit and who do not derive benefits from the CBA that the profit
sharing privilege was extended by petitioner.
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as

the situation of the union employees are different and distinct from
the non-union employees.[5] Indeed, discrimination per se is not
unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees
concerned are not similarly situated.
Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of

discretion by the petitioner in extending the benefits of profit sharing
to the non-union employees as they are two (2) groups not similarly
situated. These non-union employees are not covered by the CBA.
They do not derive and enjoy the benefits under the CBA.
The contention of the respondent union that the grant to the nonunion employees of the profit sharing benefits was made at a time
when there was a deadlock in the CBA negotiation so that apparently
the motive thereby was to discourage such non-union employees from
joining the union is not borne by the record. Petitioner denies this
accusation and instead points out that inspite of this benefit extended
to them, some non-union workers actually joined the respondent
union thereafter.
Respondent union also decries that no less than the president of the
petitioner agreed to include its members in the coverage of the 1987
profit sharing benefit provided that they would agree to an earlier
negotiation for the renewal of the CBA which expired in 1988. Be this
as it may, since there was actually a deadlock in the negotiation and it
was not resolved and consummated on the period expected, private
respondent can not now claim that petitioner has a duty to extend the
profit sharing benefit to the union members.
The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate,

according to its discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.
This flows from the established rule that labor law does not authorize
the substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its

business.[6] Such management prerogative may be availed of without
fear of any liability so long as it is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws
or valid agreement and are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite.[7]
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees
outside the bargaining unit falls under the ambit of its managerial
prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and without
ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the
CBA where the employees are classified into those who are members
of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union members,
they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA
contract which constitute the law between the contracting parties.[8]
Both the employer and the union members are bound by such
agreement.
However, the court serves notice that it will not hesitate to strike
down any act of the employer that tends to be discriminatory against
union members. It is only because of the peculiar circumstances of
this case showing there is no such intention that this court ruled
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of

respondent Voluntary Arbitrator dated March 20, 1989 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE being null and void, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[1] Pages 32-34, Rollo.

[3] Article 1, Section 1, CBA; page 4, Rollo.
[5] Caltex Phils. vs. Phil. Labor Organization, Caltex Chapter, 92 Phil. 1014, 1018
(1953).
[6] NLU vs. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, 2 SCRA 924, 931 (1961);
Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 226, 235-236 (1967).
[7] PRC vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 107, 110 (1966); and LVN vs. LVN Employees
Association, 35 SCRA 147, 156 (1970).
[8] Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, 45 SCRA 577, 581-582 (1977).

Wise and Co., Inc. vs. Wise and Co., Inc. Employees Union, G. R. No. 87672, Oct. 13, 1989

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Wise and Co., Inc. vs. Wise and Co., Inc. Employees Union, G. R. No. 87672, Oct. 13, 1989

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SUPREME COURT

G.R. No. 87672

WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNIONNATU

The facts are undisputed. On April 3, 1987 the management issued a

On July 3, 1987 the respondent union wrote petitioner through its

In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by the

On March 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit

THOSE EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CBA DESPITE

3. THE ACT OF THE UNION IN NEGOTIATING FOR

The petition is impressed with merit.

other offices of the company personnel office, security office,

It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the bargaining

There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as

Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of

The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate,

the substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of

[1] Pages 32-34, Rollo.

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